2012年10月29日

比亚迪三季度净利润锐减94%

中国电池和汽车生产商比亚迪股份有限公司(BYD Co., 1211.HK, 简称:比亚迪股份)周一表示,由于国内市场汽车需求持续低迷、手机销量减少以及太阳能电池业务遭受损失,公司第三季度净利润大幅下滑,并由此预计2012年净利润将下降至多98%。

截至9月30日的三个月,比亚迪股份实现净利润人民币460万元(合737,000美元),较上年同期的人民币7,737万元减少94%。

第三季度收入人民币105.3亿元,较上年同期减少10.7%。

今年前九个月,该公司净利润较上年同期的人民币3.527亿元下滑94%,至人民币2,088万元。该公司早些时候曾预计,今年前九个月净利润同比将下滑75%-95%。

巴菲特(Warren Buffett)旗下Berkshire Hathaway Inc.子公司MidAmerican Energy Holdings Co.持有比亚迪股份10%的股权。

比亚迪股份表示,2012年全年净利润可能较去年下滑至多98%,至人民币2,769万元,因汽车和手机业务疲软,并且太阳能业务出现损失也对盈利能力造成负面影响。

中国2009年超越美国成为全球最大的汽车市场。但自2010年年中政府开始取消购车补贴以来,中国市场汽车销量的增长开始放慢。北京和上海等城市采取的车辆限购措施也制约了汽车销量。

此外,中国与日本之间的领土争端对国内汽车市场造成了影响,9月份汽车销量出现了九个月来的首次下降。当月全国乘用车销量为132万辆,较上年同期下降0.3%。

虽然中日领土争议在一定程度上给国内汽车品牌带来了积极影响,但分析师们指出,比亚迪股份、吉利汽车控股有限公司(Geely Automobile Holdings Ltd.)和长城汽车股份有限公司(Great Wall Motor Co.)等国内低端品牌厂商之间竞争的加剧可能会挤压它们的利润空间。

比亚迪股份表示,旗下汽车业务可能将受益于下半年推出的新车型,但国内市场业务将面临压力。该公司称,第三季度共销售汽车77,004辆,较上年同期下降18.1%。

比亚迪股份还表示,该公司在香港上市的子公司比亚迪电子(国际)有限公司(BYD Electronic (International) Co., 简称:比亚迪电子)将继续受到全球手机市场需求疲弱及主要客户经营业绩下滑的冲击。比亚迪电子的大部分收入来自诺基亚(Nokia Corp)和华为技术有限公司(Huawei Technologies Co.)等主要客户。

比亚迪股份另外发布公告称,吴经胜已辞任公司秘书,自10月29日起生效;董事会已委任李黔为公司秘书,自10月29日起生效。该公司未说明吴经胜辞职的原因。

Joanne Chiu

(本文版权归道琼斯公司所有,未经许可不得翻译或转载。)

中国人,你“性”福吗? The Shifting Terrain of Sex in China

代社会中,很少还有人类行为能像五千年前中华文明初露曙光时那样有研究价值了。性却是一个例外。一本刚刚出版的新书便是以此为主题,欲解密世界第一人口大国的床笫之欢乃至举国“性事”。

理查德•伯格(Richard Burger)的处女作《红门背后:性在中国》(Behind the Red Door: Sex in China)上个月由Earnshaw Books出版。这本书向我们展示了一个由阴阳平衡传统理念孕育出的文化是如何遭遇后起的像毛泽东、互联网这样的强大力量的影响的。伯格发现,就像其他很多事一样,中国的“性事”与西方的“性事”也有些不同。

Earnshaw Books
58岁的伯格现定居于美国凤凰城(Phoenix),他在中国最为人所知的是已经连续更新了十余年的博客“北京烤鸭”(Peking Duck)。本来,他只是打算做一个记录旅游见闻的博客,2003年非典疫情(SARS)爆发时北京方面的强硬反应促使他转而开始关注这个国家的政治与社会结构。

调查中国“性事”需要很大的工作量,它涉及到传统文化(儒家学说、纱罗帐、小妾)与现代社会(中共审查制度、网上交友、离婚侦探)的交织。伯格写道,“没有哪个社会经历过像中国这样的性剧变,从极端开放到道貌岸然,再到如今的暧昧气氛。”

在调查约会、结婚、同性恋、乱交等问题时,伯格征求了性学家和性服务提供者的意见。但《红门背后》并不是一本窥探隐私的书,它引用了大量文学资料,例如《红楼梦》(Dream of the Red Chamber);同时也引用了一些关键时点的新闻报道,例如1993年北京首家性用品商店开业,2003年木子美开出忏悔博客,2010年薄熙来责令重庆希尔顿酒店停业(薄熙来上个月因与多名女性发生或保持“不正当关系”等问题被开除党籍)。

在这本书中,性和欺骗是不变的主题,从300美元的处女膜修复手术,到大量男同性恋因为面子而与女人结婚,以及七种不同层次的卖淫──从二奶到小工棚。

伯格与《华尔街日报》记者聊了中国社会的性革命以及政府的反应等话题。以下是对话的节选。

Richard Burger
理查德•伯格
《华尔街日报》:你写这本书有什么缘由吗?

伯格:这与我以前做的事完全不同。我以前作为观察者,一直对中国的诸如卖淫、同性恋等现象非常感兴趣,就我所见,这里的性文化与西方截然不同。

如果去找中国从古至今关于性的书,你会发现能找到的尽是些白皮书、教科书之类的学术资料,所以我有了填补这个空白的想法。

《华尔街日报》:中国的性革命与西方有何不同?

伯格:西方的性革命包含在更广泛的人身自由革命的范围内,它形成了“做自己想做的事”和“造反有理”的氛围。中国的性革命在很大程度上仍由政府说了算,只能局限于此。它与人身自由、个人自由不太相关,只是对毛泽东时代及更早以前对性文化过度禁忌的一种放松。

《华尔街日报》:政府是如何影响性文化的?

伯格:我在引言中提到的热线电话就是一个很好的例子。这些提供性问题咨询的热线电话兴起于上个世纪九十年代中后期,你的反应可能是,“哦,有人打进这些热线电话来聊自己的性和感情生活。”据此,你也许会认为这是一种解放。但实际上,在电话那头的顾问都是政府工作人员,节目也是由政府发起的……其目的只是为了强化家庭观念。

《华尔街日报》:欺骗是整本书的一个重要话题吗?

伯格:是的,确实是这样,因为中国正处在对传统价值观(例如女子必须守身如玉直到洞房那一天)的纠结和挣扎之中。一边是保守的传统观念,一边是像西方一样的性开放观念,二者正相持不下。

女性与求爱的男性发生关系的情况更加普遍,但要结婚时,她们仍然需要证明自己还是处女。因此,她们不得不说谎,有的甚至离谱到去做处女膜修复手术。

《华尔街日报》:对于网上色情内容的审查有多严?

伯格:我认为有关方面对网上色情内容的处理就像“打鼹鼠”游戏一样。政府经常宣布严打,几年前宣称关掉了六万家色情网站,逮捕了5000名涉案人员,其中一人甚至被判无期徒刑。

《华尔街日报》:在性教育方面你有什么发现?

伯格:八十年代初期,性教育首次被纳入中学阶段的必修内容。但大部分老师(通常是生物老师)都过于拘谨了,在教的时候对这部分内容要么一带而过,要么完全跳过。

就算是教,他们也只会教些关于解剖学和生物学的知识。这样的教学完全不像性道德教育,只是在教生殖原理而已。

虽然有了很大进步,在性方面中国仍然很保守。我敢说,大多数中国父母根本不对孩子进行性教育。有的父母甚至哄骗孩子说,他们是从石头缝里蹦出来的,或者是在大街上捡来的。要讨论这个话题显得那么难。

《华尔街日报》:书中有一章叫做“大转变”(Shifting Landscape),什么在转变?

伯格:我从2003年广为人知的木子美的故事讲起,木子美在博客上发布性爱日记,以白描的记叙手法公开她的性爱细节以及性爱对象的姓名。她是因描写性受关注的第一人,为了性而性,为了享受而性爱,没有其他任何附加条件。事实上,她的博客很快就被封杀了。但她已经留下了无法抹去的痕迹。

她引起了关于女性角色的新讨论……女人不该对性行为有负罪感,而是应该尽情享受。

中国的性解放将迎来重大转变,但与西方所经历过的性革命相比,我想还是有很长的一段路要走,就像我说过的,旧观念和传统价值观对中国还很有影响。

《华尔街日报》:中国为什么有这么多性用品商店?

伯格:性用品商店无关下流也无关色情。它事关健康。

开设性用品商店的考虑与开通热线电话的道理是一样的,都是为了促进社会和谐。民众越“性”福,越有满足感,国家就越太平。要是很多人都过得不“性”福,公权力就更容易受到质疑。

James T. Areddy

(本文版权归道琼斯公司所有,未经许可不得翻译或转载。)


Meet the people shaping life and culture in Asia. More from The Moment

Few human activities remain as ripe for study today as they did at the dawn of Chinese culture 5,000 or so years ago. But sex is one of them, and it's the focus of a new book that peeks into the bedrooms and brothels of the world's most populous nation.

Released last month, 'Behind the Red Door: Sex in China' (Earnshaw Books) examines how a culture born in concepts of yin-yang balance has fared against powerful forces like Mao Zedong and the Internet. Like many things in China, finds first-time author Richard Burger, sex is somehow different than in the West.

Mr. Burger, 58 years old and now based in Phoenix, is best known in China for his decade-old blog Peking Duck. Though he originally intended for it to serve as an online travelogue, Beijing's heavy-handed reaction to the 2003 SARS outbreak energized him to focus Peking Duck on the country's political and social structure.

It's a big job to survey sex in China, where aspects of ancient culture (Confucian doctrine, silk curtains, concubines) echo in modern society (Communist censorship, online dating, divorce detectives). 'No society has swung more dramatically from extreme sexual openness to prudish orthodoxy and then to the sexually ambiguous atmosphere we see at present,' writes Mr. Burger.

In probing dating, marriage, homosexuality and promiscuity, Mr. Burger tracks down sexologists and prostitutes for their input. But 'Behind the Red Door' isn't voyeuristic. Instead it draws on fabled sources like 'Dream of the Red Chamber' and news coverage of notable junctures, like Beijing's first sex shop in 1993, a confessional blog launched by a woman known as Muzimei in 2003 and the 2010 closure of Chongqing's Hilton during a crackdown by Bo Xilai (who last month was expelled from the Communist Party in part because of 'improper sexual relations' with multiple women).

Sex and deception emerge as a running theme in the book, whether it's $300 hymen reconstructions to fake virginity, the large percentage of gay men marrying women to save face, or the seven tiers of prostitution - from ernai ('second wife') to xiagongpeng ('down the work shack').

Mr. Burger spoke with the Journal about the Chinese sexual revolution and how the country is dealing with it. Below are edited excerpts from the conversation.

The Wall Street Journal: Why did you write this book?

Mr. Burger: This was totally different from anything I'd done in the past. I've been an observer and always been fascinated, for instance, with the phenomenon of prostitution in China, about gays in China, the sexual rituals that I saw that were very different from in the West.

If you look for books on the subject that offer us a survey from sex in ancient China to today, you'll find there's almost only the academic literature available, white papers, textbooks, so I thought this was a real opportunity to fill that gap.

How does China's sexual revolution differ from the West's?

The sexual revolution in the West was part of a much broader revolution for all sorts of personal freedoms. It became an atmosphere of 'do your own thing' and 'to rebel is good.' In China, the sexual revolution, it's on the government's terms to a large extent. You can only go so far. It's not so much personal freedom, individual freedom, than a relaxation of the taboos about sex that have ruled China from the time of Mao and even earlier.

How does the government influence sex culture?

A good example of this is the telephone hotlines that I mention in the introduction. These phone lines for sexual counsel, they started in the mid-, late-1990s, and you would think, 'OK, here are people calling in about sex and talking about their love lives.' And you might see this as liberating. But in fact, all of the counselors were government cadres, and the shows were sponsored by the government…it was all about strengthening the family.

Is dishonesty an important facet of the story?

It is, and it has to be, because China's in a tug-of-war against traditional Chinese values such as the wife being a virgin on her wedding night, a traditional Chinese belief. It's a tug-of-war between that and Western-style sexual openness.

Women are more frequently having sex with men who are demanding sex, but when it comes time to get married, they still have to prove that they're a virgin. They have to lie. They have to go to outrageous lengths, such as having a hymenoplasty operation.

How actively is pornography censored online?

I equate what they are trying to do on the Internet in terms of pornography as a game of whack-a-mole. They are always announcing these big stings. A couple of years ago the government announced they had shut down 60,000 porn sites and arrested 5,000 of the operators. One of them was even sentenced to life in prison.

What did you find about sex education?

In the early 1980s, sex education became mandatory for the first time. It had to be taught in the high schools. Most teachers are so squeamish that they either zip through it - these are biology teachers usually - they just hurry through it, or they skip it altogether.

What they do teach, when they do teach it, is about anatomy and biology. There's nothing about sexual morality. It's just taught as how reproduction works.

China remains, for all the advances, very uptight about sex. And most Chinese parents, I would say, don't teach their kids about sex at all. And some will even tell them that they found them under a rock or on the street somewhere. It's such a sticky subject.

One chapter is called 'Shifting Landscape.' What's shifting?

I start it off with the well-known story of Muzimei in 2003 writing her tell-all blog where she names names and described what they did in graphic terms. She was the first to gain attention who wrote about about sex, just for the sake of sex, and the joys of personal satisfaction with no strings attached. In fact, the government soon shut it down. But she had left an indelible mark.

She generated a new conversation about the role of women…that a woman shouldn't feel guilty about having sex and that she should savor it.

We're seeing a decided shift toward sexual liberation, but I think it's going to be a long hard slog before we see anything comparable to what we saw in the West, simply because, as we've said, traditional Chinese beliefs and values are playing a tug-of-war.

Why does China have so many sex shops?

The sex shops aren't about lewdness or about pornography. They're about health.

The thinking is just like the hotlines that a sexually satisfied population, a more contented population adds to the nation's harmony. If you don't have a sexually satisfied population, they're more likely to question authority.

James T. Areddy

2012年10月25日

张维迎:中国的反凯恩斯斗士 Zhang Weiying: China's Anti-Keynesian Insurgent

空没有被烟雾所遮蔽,中国最知名的经济学家之一张维迎心情乐观,同时具备这两点的下午在中国首都北京并不多见。在中国共产党即将进行10年一次的领导层换届、并将对其曾经前途大好的人物薄熙来提出刑事指控之际,中国经济正在遭遇麻烦。心存忧虑的投资者希望看到北京依然致力于"保增长"的迹象,而他们最乐于见到的迹象是一场凯恩斯主义的大规模经济刺激。

张维迎认为,根本不必惊慌。他边喝茶边平静地说,中国经济增速放缓实际上是好消息,这会让政府认识到中国需要改变,即放弃靠政府注资来促进经济发展的老路,走上改革之路。他坚称,中国人并不都是凯恩斯主义者。

三年前,凯恩斯理论是中国的官方政策。2008年那场金融危机曾让中国幸灾乐祸于信奉自由市场的"华盛顿共识"遭遇失败,并使得中国得以对外吹嘘其以政府干预为特色的"中国模式"。凯恩斯理论颇对计划经济追捧者的胃口,而中国当时正好遭遇了出口大幅滑坡,所以政府将折合3.5万亿美元(大约相当于国内生产总值50%)的银行贷款和政府直接支出投入了经济体系。

张维迎在学术界的同行们当时都对"中国模式"赞誉有加,但他却在2009年发表了题为《彻底埋葬凯恩斯主义》的演讲。张维迎当时任北京大学光华管理学院的院长,他目前仍然在这所学院教授经济学。张维迎在演讲中称,由于2008年这场金融危机是由低成本资金引发的,所以不可能用可以廉价得到的资金来解决。他说,现在的经济就像一个吸毒病人,医生却给吸毒病人开的药方是吗啡,最后的结果可能会使问题更严重。

他引用诺贝尔经济学奖得主哈耶克(Friedrich Hayek)和奥地利学派的观点提出,如果不允许中国经济按其自身规律进行调整,那么中国经济中小的泡沫破裂之后就会发生大泡沫的破裂。他还建议废除各种导致经济发生扭曲的现行做法,比如国有企业在许多产业中享有的垄断地位。

Zina Saunders
张维迎发表上述演讲的那段时间也正是中国迅速成为世界第二大经济体的日子(2010年的某个季度中国经济较上年同期增长了11%),所以中国的主政者没有兴趣去听他这些话。张维迎说,当我批评中央政府的刺激政策时,许多高级官员感到不高兴。张维迎去年在于中国召开的世界经济论坛(World Economic Forum)年会上还说,中国权力巨大的国家发展和改革委员会是"一群聪明人在做一件非常愚蠢的事"。这或许更令中国官员不满。

最终,北京的经济刺激措施对一场人为的投资热潮起了推波助澜的作用,这股投资热使资产泡沫更加严重,此后由于政府收紧经济政策,吗啡产生的刺激作用逐渐消失。官员们称,中国经济今年第二季度较上年同期增长了7.6%。但对这一数字持怀疑态度的人认为,实际的经济增长率更接近4%。(伦敦一家研究机构认为经济增幅是1%。)与此同时,钢铁和太阳能发电等国家主导或鼓励发展的产业则因产能过剩而举步维艰。有报道说,有数不清的铜板被堆放在库房里,这些多得把仓库大门都堵上了的库存产品生动体现了哈耶克所说"不正当投资"造成的恶果。

换句话说,中国的经济刺激措施反证了张维迎所推崇的奥地利学派的正确。这些措施的巨大失败忽然之间引发了世人对奥地利学派理论的关注。张维迎说,凯恩斯式的政策并没有产生它所许诺的结果,因此越来越多的人意识到,当政府向那些无用的项目投入资金时,经济衰退就会到来。

如今,中国官员已不再像对待被放逐者一样对待张维迎。他说农业部官员告诉他,他们喜欢看他写的文章。其他部委以及包括河南和辽宁省在内的地方政府则邀请他发表演讲。他说最近写了一篇赞扬已故奥地利学派经济学家罗斯巴德(Murray Rothbard)的文章后,上海市委书记告诉他自己喜欢这篇文章。

对奥地利学派的同情是否能感染中国政府高层官员?上个月,中国国务院总理温家宝称刺激措施是对经济危机的合理反应,并试图驳斥中国为此付出过高代价的指控。温家宝的话听来像是面对那些读过哈耶克或张维迎著作的内部挑战人士时不得不进行的辩护。

张维迎直到2008年才开始认同奥地利学派的主张。当年他在芝加哥的一场经济学会议上发表了一篇论文,有人对他说他的观点听来就像是哈耶克的信徒。张维迎说他的观点一直如此。

52岁的张维迎出生在中国陕西省的农村。在一个中共官员和"虎妈"争相给年轻人"洗脑"的国家,张维迎有幸躲过了这样的双重打击。

张维迎说,农村地区在很大程度上没有受到中共意识形态的"污染"。他说我的父母没有文化,我开始上学后他们并不理解我从学校带回家的那些"理念",也就是说他们从来没有干预过我的想法。

从他在陕西念经济学研究生开始,张维迎就在规划自己的人生。1983年他在报纸上写了一篇文章,为赚钱正名。因为这项"罪名",当时力量仍然非常强大的反资本主义阵营的批评人士对他进行了严厉抨击。那时他甚至存在毕业后无法拿到学位的危险。但"幸运的是,中国的政治气候在很短的时间内发生了转变"。

在20世纪80年代中期,在中共领导人邓小平的领导下,中国官员开始开放经济。但有时他们也会毫无头绪。张维迎说,经过几十年的计划经济,所有商品的价格都被扭曲。政府的解决办法是建立一个有大型计算机的价格研究中心,根据计算机的运算结果调整价格。当然,他们不会得到任何结果。

这给了张维迎首个脱颍而出的机会。在他的硕士论文中,张维迎提出了这样一种假设,即是否可能在政府管控的一套价格体系之外保留另一套由市场机制发挥调控作用的价格体系,这样各行业能逐渐从第一套价格体系过渡到第二套。在1984年的一次会议上,张维迎以这一"双轨制"理论给当时的决策者留下深刻印象。他们采纳了这一建议并让张维迎到当时的国家经济体制改革委员会去工作。但正是这份工作令他失去了对制定政策的兴趣。张维迎说,政府官员不爱"惹事",决策是一个政治过程,是一种妥协。

为了找到一个不需妥协的世界,他去牛津大学(Oxford University)留学,并在那里获得了经济学博士学位。1994年回国之际,他与人合作创办了北京大学中国经济研究中心(China Center for Economic Research)。北京大学是中国资历最老的现代高等学府之一。

张维迎说,相比政策研究,他更喜欢学术性的观点的自由市场。但即使是在学术界,张维迎也显得卓尔不群。和中国那些改革派经济学家不同(这些人将自己视作削弱中央集权的技术官僚),张维迎的思想有着鲜明的道德烙印。在今年的一次讲话中,他援引亚里士多德(Aristotle)和阿奎那(Thomas Aquinas)的话指出,世间存在一种叫"自然法"的东西,且产权的重要性在主权之前。

这种追求成功的自由带来的另一面是要能够忍受失败,而这正是张维迎和哈耶克存在交集的地方。即使是中央银行试图操纵需求的做法也会引起奥地利学派的反感,因为就像张维迎所说的那样,当你犯错时,你必须承担责任。

张维迎说,如果你今天经受痛苦,那么这还只是小痛苦,但如果你今天不经受这种痛苦,将来你会有更大的痛苦;让公众知道这个真理是经济学家或学者应该做的事情。

中国领导人也应该做这件事。张维迎兴奋地谈起了上世纪90年代末发生的亚洲金融危机。这场危机促使中共开始了国有企业的私有化进程,虽然这导致2,000万国企员工下岗。张维迎说,这场危机击垮了印尼和其它一些国家,而中国领导人则在当时吸取了危机带来的教训,这就是必须抛弃裙带资本主义和臃肿的政府机构。

在当时,张维迎代表了知识界的潮流。张维迎是国有媒体中央电视台(CCTV)评选的2002年度经济人物,他记得当时在北京大学,整个校园的文化都是以改革为导向的。那一年他被任命为北京大学的校长助理,后来被任命为光华管理学院院长,在学院任职期间,他极力推动改革。

这些改革是成功的,但是改革者却受到了迫害。教师中的保守派提出抗议,网上到处都是质疑张维迎的忠诚、怀疑其学历的声音。2010年,他在光华管理学院被免职。

大多数的麻烦源于学校内的政治,但张维迎同时表示,当时的大环境变了。中国的大学是计划经济的产物,所以,"如果全国都在改革的良好进程中,像我这样的人不会受到这样的待遇。"

发生了什么?2002年上台的胡锦涛和温家宝领导团队逆转了改革进程。日益严重的的社会不公成为了公营部门受到偏爱的最初借口,有人认为,是高增长率让决策者很快决定继续走这条道路。北京新的流行说法是"国进民退",国有经济向前发展,私营领域向后退却。

当金融危机来袭时,中国政府抓住这一机会将国有经济进一步做大。这一做法导致的糟糕经济后果现在已清清楚楚摆在那里,但是张维迎说,过去的10年也发生了引人注目的社会问题,这些问题促成了舆论环境的改变。中国人看到官员们把资源分配给国有企业和自己的朋友,公众对腐败和不公平的认知开始增长,他说,中国政府面对的绝不是市场危机,而是国家危机。

这就是张维迎希望推进改革的原因。他主张重启私有化进程,他说,现在实施私有化会更容易,因为一些公司已经在交易所上市。下一步是对金融系统进行全面改革,因为国有企业正在把银行当做自动取款机,让企业家们失去了从正规渠道获得融资的机会。

我们能否期待11月中旬中国新一届领导班子上台后,这样的自由化进程会立即发生?张维迎说,最高决策机构席位的竞争者之一、广东省委书记汪洋,是一个"真正的改革者"。但是在其他方面,他承认中国的政治完全是难以捉摸的。

北京有可能再次求助于刺激计划来提振GDP吗?张维迎说,毫无疑问情况有可能变得更糟,但也有可能出现良好机会。他可以确信的是,人们的思维方式已经改变。只是在中国的非民主体制下,"这种影响是含蓄而不是明确表现出来的。"

张维迎感到乐观,因为他认为30年的改革开放已经改变了人们的预期。他说,我们现在对市场充满信任,这就是为什么过去10年的反市场动向激怒了人们。清华大学(Tsinghua University)整理编纂的政府数据显示,反对政府征地和其他以强权侵害百姓利益行为的群体性事件每年有18万起。这些群体事件让中共难以回避,也为自由市场提供了道义上的依据。

张维迎说,人类永远在寻找幸福。现在有两种方式。你牺牲他人幸福来换取自己的幸福,我把这叫做强盗逻辑。另一种方式是,你通过使他人幸福来让自己得到幸福,这是市场逻辑。你更喜欢哪一种?

(Bhattacharya是《华尔街日报》亚洲版的评论版撰稿人)

(本文版权归道琼斯公司所有,未经许可不得翻译或转载。)


ABHEEK BHATTACHARYA

It's a rare afternoon in the Chinese capital when smog hasn't blocked the skies, and one of China's most famous economists is in a sanguine mood. The economy is in trouble as the Communist Party heads for a once-in-a-decade transfer of power while prosecuting its former golden boy, Bo Xilai, on criminal charges. Worried investors want signs that Beijing remains committed to growth-and the sign they'd most like to see is a big Keynesian stimulus.

Zhang Weiying would say that they're wrong to panic. The economic slowdown, he calmly says over tea, is actually good news that 'makes the government think we need to change'-toward reform and away from priming the pump. We aren't all Keynesians now in China, he insists.

Three years ago, Keynesianism was official policy. The 2008 financial crisis had Beijing gloating over the failure of the free-market 'Washington Consensus' and touting the 'China Model' of government intervention. Keynesianism fit the statist zeitgeist and Beijing then suffered an export slump, so the government allocated $3.5 trillion-or about 50% of gross domestic product-in bank loans and direct spending.

Mr. Zhang's academic colleagues were all praise for the 'China Model,' but in 2009 he was giving speeches entitled 'Bury Keynesianism.' Then a top administrator at Peking University, where he now teaches economics, he argued that since the financial crisis was caused by easy money, it couldn't be solved by the same. 'The current economy is like a drug addict, and the prescription from the doctor is morphine, so the final result will be much worse,' he said.

He invoked the ideas of the late Nobel laureate Friedrich Hayek and the Austrian School of Economics to argue that if the economy weren't allowed to adjust on its own, China's minor bust would be followed by a bigger one. He also advocated doing away with existing distortions such as the monopolies enjoyed in many industries by state-owned enterprises.

Those were the days when China was fast becoming the world's second-largest economy (growth in one 2010 quarter crossed 11% on an annual basis), so the establishment was in no mood to listen. 'When I criticized the central government's stimulus policy, many senior officials were not happy,' Mr. Zhang says. It might not have helped that at last year's World Economic Forum in China he called the government's powerful National Development and Reform Commission 'a bunch of smart people doing something really stupid.'

Ultimately, Beijing's stimulus fed a false investment boom that stoked asset bubbles-then the morphine wore off while the government tightened. Officials claim the economy grew at 7.6% year-on-year between April and June this year. Skeptics think the real number is closer to 4%. (One London research house says 1%.) Meanwhile, industries dominated or favored by the state, such as steel or solar power, are idling from overcapacity. Countless sheets of copper are reportedly stacked in warehouses, blocking doorways and exemplifying Hayek's notion of 'malinvestment.'

In other words, the stimulus was a poster child for Mr. Zhang's Austrian theories. And the sheer size of the failure suddenly has people paying attention. 'The Keynesian policy didn't deliver what it promised,' he says, so 'more and more people realize that . . . when the government makes investment [in] something that's useless, recession will come.'

Chinese officials no longer treat Mr. Zhang as a pariah. He reports that Ministry of Agriculture officials tell him they enjoy reading his articles. Other ministries and local governments, including in Henan and Liaoning provinces, invite him to speak. He says that when he recently wrote an article praising the late Austrian economist Murray Rothbard, the Communist Party secretary of Shanghai-a fairly high-level apparatchik-told him he liked it.

Could Austrian sympathies be percolating right to the top of Chinese officialdom? Last month, Premier Wen Jiabao called the stimulus a 'scientific response' to the crisis and tried to refute the charge that the country 'paid an undue price' for it. He sounded like someone forced to defend against internal challengers who had been reading Hayek-or Zhang Weiying.

Mr. Zhang didn't identify with the Austrian school until 2008, when he presented a paper at an economics conference in Chicago and someone told him he sounded like a Hayek acolyte. He says he'd always thought this way.

The 52-year-old was born in rural Shaanxi province in north-central China. In a country where party officials and tiger mothers compete to brainwash youth, he escaped both.

'Rural areas were not so polluted by [party] ideology,' he says. 'My parents were illiterate,' he adds, and once he began his education, they couldn't understand the ideas he brought home from school. 'That means they never interfered.'

Mr. Zhang has been charting his own way since he was a graduate student in economics in Shaanxi. He wrote a newspaper article in 1983 arguing that money wasn't evil. For that crime, critics from the still-powerful anticapitalist camp tore into him. There was a danger he wouldn't be able to graduate with a degree, but 'thankfully, China's political climate changed in a very short time.'

In the mid-1980s, under party leader Deng Xiaoping, officials were moving to liberalize the economy. Yet they were sometimes clueless. After decades of a planned economy, says Mr. Zhang, 'the price [of everything] was distorted' and the government's solution was to 'set up a price research center with a big computer . . . and adjust prices according to this calculation.' Of course, 'they couldn't get any results.'

This gave Mr. Zhang his first break. In his graduate thesis, he considered the possibility of having one price system remain government-controlled and leaving another to the market, with industries moving slowly from the first track to the second. He impressed policy makers with the idea at a 1984 conference, and they adopted it, giving Mr. Zhang a job with the State Commission for Reforming the Economic System. The stint turned him off from policy-making. Bureaucrats rarely 'rock the boat,' he says. 'Making policy is a political process . . . a compromise.'

Looking for a world where he didn't have to compromise, he went to Oxford, where he studied for an economics doctorate. On returning to China in 1994, he co-founded the China Center for Economic Research at Peking University, the country's oldest modern institution of higher learning.

Mr. Zhang says he prefers the academic marketplace of ideas rather than policies, but he stands out there too. Unlike the Chinese tribe of reformer-economists who see themselves as technocrats chipping away at statism, Mr. Zhang thinks in stark moral terms. In a speech this year, he invoked Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas to argue that there is such a thing as natural law and that the right to property is 'passed prior to sovereignty.'

The flip side of this freedom to pursue success is being able to stomach failure, which is where Mr. Zhang's affinity for Hayek ties in. Austrians frown even on central banks trying to manipulate demand because, as Mr. Zhang tells it, 'when you make a mistake, you must take responsibility.'

'If you suffer today, it's a small suffering. But if you don't have that suffering today,' tomorrow 'you'll have a big suffering.' Letting people know that truth, he says, 'is what an economist or scholar should do.'

Leaders should do this too, and he talks excitedly about the late 1990s, when the Asian economic crisis spurred the party to privatize state companies, even if it left 20 million unemployed. The crisis had brought Indonesia and others to their knees, says Mr. Zhang, and China's leaders understood at the time that 'the lesson was not to have crony capitalism' and a bloated public sector.

Back then, the intellectual tide was going in Mr. Zhang's direction. State-controlled CCTV proclaimed him 'Economist of the Year' in 2002, and he remembers that at Peking University 'the whole culture was reform-oriented too.' He was appointed assistant president of the university that year and later dean of the Guanghua School of Management, where he pushed reform.

The reforms proved successful, but the reformer was crucified. The old guard in the faculty lounges revolted, while accusations impugning Mr. Zhang's loyalty and questioning his credentials swirled over the Internet. He was forced out of his Guanghua post in 2010.

Much of the trouble stemmed from internal campus politics, but he also says that the broader 'environment changed.' China's universities are a product of a planned economy, so 'if the whole country [was] in the good process of reform, people like me won't be treated like that.'

What happened? China's leadership team of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, in place since 2002, reversed reforms. Rising inequality was the original excuse for favoring the public sector and, one suspects, high growth soon convinced policy makers to continue on that path. The new mantra in Beijing was 'guo jin, min tui'-the state advances, the private sector retreats.

When the financial crisis struck Beijing jumped at the chance to advance the state even further. The poor economic result is now front and center, but Mr. Zhang says the past decade has also seen dramatic social problems that help alter the climate of opinion. The Chinese people have watched bureaucrats distribute resources to state companies and their friends, and popular perceptions of corruption and inequality have grown. Far from a crisis of markets, he says, Beijing is facing a crisis of state.

That is why Mr. Zhang is hopeful for reforms. He proposes restarting privatization, which he says is easier to do now because 'some of these companies are listed on exchanges.' Overhauling the financial system is next, since state companies use the banks as ATMs and deprive entrepreneurs of formal loans.

Can we expect such a liberalization right after the new crop of leaders is anointed in mid-November? He says that Guangdong Party Secretary Wang Yang, a contender for the top decision-making body, is a 'real reformer.' But otherwise he admits that Chinese politics is a black box.

Is there a possibility that Beijing will turn to another stimulus to goose GDP? 'Certainly things could go worse. But there could also be good opportunity,' he says. What he does know is that people's way of thinking has changed. It's just that the 'impact is implicit, not explicit' in China's nondemocracy.

Mr. Zhang is optimistic because he thinks 30 years of openness have altered expectations. 'We have a lot of trust in' markets today, which is why the last decade's anti-market turn has exasperated people. Mass protests against land grabs and other government bullying now number 180,000 a year, according to government data compiled at Beijing's Tsinghua University. These protests are hard for the party to ignore-and powerfully make the moral case for free markets.

'We human beings always seek happiness,' says Mr. Zhang. 'Now there are two ways. You make yourself happy by making other people unhappy-I call that the logic of robbery. The other way, you make yourself happy by making other people happy-that's the logic of the market. Which way do you prefer?'