MARK A. DEWEAVER 6
月20日，中国央行拒绝向资金匮乏的中国银行体系注资，此举直接导致了一场重大信贷危机。中国央行拒绝扮演"最后贷款人"这一角色冻结了中国银行间市场的借贷。5月初仅为2.1%的隔夜利率迅速蹿升至破纪录的13.4%。 就在有关中国国有银行偿付能力出现问题的传闻四处扩散的时候，一些评论家开始谈论中国的"雷曼时刻"。但危机很快过去，银行间市场隔夜拆借利率迅速回落。截至7月4日，这一利率已经下降至3.4%。 银行间市场的问题自6月初以来一直在酝酿。当时中国政府开始打击非法流入的外汇，而这曾是中国国内货币供应量增长的主要来源之一。市场对人民币的需求也开始上升。中资银行要为6月30日的账目结算做准备，同时银行客户也要为上半年纳税做好准备。 上述现象带来的结果是信贷的供给和需求日益失衡。由于此前传闻央行欲进行大规模干预却屡次未能兑现，商业银行意识到它们不得不自谋生路。中资银行开始囤积现金以防范交易对手可能出现的违约现象。金融机构之间原本正常流动的资金迅速干涸。 中国央行的直接目标似乎是遏制中国的"影子银行"系统。近年来中国影子银行迅速增长，其在中国信贷总额中的占比愈发显著。中国影子银行包括一类较少受到监管的产品。此类产品允许储户获得高于存款利率的收益，通过发行产品揽获的储蓄则向"次级"借款人提供资金。 通常来说通过上述方式揽获的资金是短期的，因此这类业务对流动性状况非常敏感。影子银行需要不断流入的新资金来支付到期债务。银行或是通过发行理财产品等方式来筹集资金，或是从那些能够获得银行融资的国有企业等实体那里获得资金。 此举背后或许是涉及面更广的政治角力。中国央行并非独立决策机构，因此关闭信贷闸门的命令一定直接来自中共中央政治局。中国央行这次对银行信贷发起的突袭应该被理解为中国领导层为提高经济效率（这也是中国政府当前的工作重心）而祭出的一记重拳。如果中央政府无法克服来自受益于现状且实力强大的地方利益集团施加的阻力，那么上述目标将无法实现。中共高层的目标可能是切断阻挠改革一派的资金流，以逼迫其就范。 地方政府看来才是中国央行此举的真正目标，因为它们严重依赖影子银行融资，继而破坏中央政府的改革举措。影子银行资金直接流入那些在中央政府看来纯属浪费资源的地方政府项目。这些资金又通过推高土地价格令地方政府间接受益。只要影子银行资金能够继续流动，基础设施、重工业和房地产的过度投资问题将继续泛滥，中央政府设计的新经济愿景也难以实现。新经济模式主要由消费者需求和生产率增长拉动。 但这一做法会带来两个问题。首先，中国央行的这一政策会带来相当大的附带损害。中小民营企业受到的冲击尤为严重。这类企业往往没有资格获得银行贷款，经常依赖影子银行融资才能量入为出。 其次，打击反改革派系还不足以产生真正的改革。如果不对地方政府的经济职能进行彻底改革，那么只要这次打击的余波散去，故态很快就会萌发。 中国央行或许赢得了这场战斗，但中共中央政治局却还难以言胜。 本文作者MARK A. DEWEAVER负责管理新兴市场基金Quantrarian Asia Hedge，他也是《具有中国特色的动物精神》(Animal Spirits with Chinese Characteristics)一书的作者。 （本文版权归道琼斯公司所有，未经许可不得翻译或转载。）
MARK A. DEWEAVER
On June 20, China's central bank precipitated a major credit crisis by withholding funds from the nation's cash-starved banking system. The People's Bank of China's refusal to act as liquidity provider of last resort froze lending in the interbank market. Overnight rates, which had been as low as 2.1% in early May, exploded, closing at a record 13.4%.
As rumors swirled about the solvency of China's state-owned banks, some commentators began talking about a Chinese 'Lehman moment.' But the crisis passed and the overnight interbank lending rate quickly came back to earth. By July 4, it had fallen to 3.4%.
Trouble in the interbank market had been brewing since early June, when Beijing began a crackdown on illicit inflows of foreign exchange, previously a major source of growth in the local money supply. The demand for yuan also began rising, as Chinese banks prepared for their June 30 book closings and their customers for their first-half tax payments.
The result was a growing imbalance between the supply of and demand for credit. As rumored large-scale interventions by the People's Bank of China repeatedly failed to materialize, commercial banks realized they would have to fend for themselves. Lenders hoarded cash to guard against potential counterparty defaults, and the normal flow of funds among financial institutions quickly dried up.
The central bank's immediate objective seems to have been to rein in China's 'shadow banking' system, which has grown rapidly in recent years and now accounts for a significant share of total Chinese credit. Shadow banking in China involves lightly regulated products that allow savers to earn more than the official deposit rate while providing financing for 'subprime' borrowers.
Generally the funding is relatively short-term, which makes the business highly sensitive to liquidity conditions. Shadow lenders require inflows of new money to pay off maturing obligations. These typically come either directly from the banks伟for example, via their 'wealth management products'伟or from entities with access to bank financing such as state-owned enterprises.
There may be a larger political game going on. The People's Bank of China is not an independent central bank, so the order to turn off the credit spigot must have come directly from the Politburo. The central bank's surprise attack on bank credit must therefore be understood in the context of the leadership's current focus on improving economic efficiency. This objective will be impossible to achieve unless the central government can overcome resistance from the powerful local interests that benefit from the status quo. The Politburo's goal may have been to starve opponents of reform into submission.
Local governments appear to be the central bank's real targets, because they rely heavily on shadow financing to subvert Beijing's reform initiatives. Shadow funds flow directly into local government projects that the central government views as wasteful, and the funds benefit localities indirectly by pushing up land prices. As long as this money keeps flowing, over-investment in infrastructure, heavy industry and real estate will continue unchecked and Beijing's vision of a new economy driven mainly by consumer demand and productivity growth will be impossible to realize.
There are two problems with this approach. First, the central bank's policy will result in considerable collateral damage. Small- and medium-size private firms will be particularly hard hit. They tend to be ineligible for bank loans and often depend on shadow financing to make ends meet.
Second, attacking anti-reform factions will not be enough to generate real reform. Without radical changes in the economic role of local governments, they will quickly return to business as usual once the fallout has cleared.
The People's Bank of China may have won a battle, but the Politburo is far from winning the war.
Mr. DeWeaver manages the emerging markets fund Quantrarian Asia Hedge and is the author of 'Animal Spirits with Chinese Characteristics' (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
