2013年9月2日

107岁的投资大师 The 107-Year-Old Stock Picker

果你有机会向一位拥有84年投资经验的人学习,那可一定不要错过。

在欧文•卡恩(Irving Kahn)庆祝自己107岁生日的前一天,我有幸与他交谈。卡恩是纽约卡恩兄弟集团(Kahn Brothers Group)的董事长,曾为价值投资之父本杰明•格雷厄姆(Benjamin Graham)担任过助教。

卡恩的听力和视觉已经衰退,但他的好奇心、判断力以及对市场变革史的领悟丝毫未减。

卡恩身上集中体现了格雷厄姆1949年经典著作《聪明的投资者》(The Intelligent Investor)中阐述的投资美德。卡恩与沃伦•巴菲特(Warren Buffett)一样,是直接受教于格雷厄姆的硕果仅存的几位投资大师之一。

Natalie Keyssar for the Wall Street Journal
华尔街投资大师欧文•卡恩于1928年开始自己的职业生涯
卡恩的投资组合一半是现金,而这仅仅是因为他终于到达了他自己所说的“可以完全听命于自己保守性格”的年龄。他告诉我,能够避免“进入自己不了解领域”的个人投资者依然有很大机会可以击败专业投资者,尤其是专注于投资小市值股票的话。

我还没来得及开口提问,卡恩就先向我抛出了一个个问题:《华尔街日报》(The Wall Street Journal)的新主编是谁?每天的发行量有多大?谁是最大的竞争对手?

卡恩拥有一种投资者应该注重开发的特质,即探寻“结构不确定性”(structured uncertainty)或“机缘巧合”(serendipity)的能力。美国著名社会学家罗伯特•莫顿(Robert K. Merton)将这种特质视为智力领域探索与发现的关键要素。

1928年,卡恩在纽约证券交易所(New York Stock Exchange)的交易大厅开始了自己的职业生涯,为一家名叫Hammerschlag, Borg & Co.的小公司当跑单者(runner)。在交易大厅只干了一周,卡恩就觉得自己身边都是一群“疯子”,于是央求调往研究部门。

卡恩还在晚上和周末在当时一家大型券商H. Hentz & Co兼职。工作之余,他经常在Hentz公司位于曼哈顿的办公大楼里闲逛,每次了解一层楼的情况,敲开那些依然灯火通明的办公室大门。

有一次,有个簿记员开门接待了卡恩。他那里正好有公司主要的损益分类账目,卡恩问能否看一下。其中有一组账目引起了他的注意,那是一连串几乎从来没有亏损过的投资交易,都在“本杰明•格雷厄姆共同账户”的名下。

惊讶于如此谨慎而收益丰厚的交易记录,卡恩开始探访格雷厄姆这个人,发现他就在这栋大楼里工作。

后来卡恩成为格雷厄姆的助手,为其在哥伦比亚大学(Columbia University)商学院名闻遐迩的授课提供协助。卡恩说,他从格雷厄姆身上学到的最重要的东西,是其抵御赚取快钱诱惑的能力。“在大多数时候,格雷厄姆对这种快进快出的赚钱方式都不为所动。除非他认为这笔投资的赚钱几率要大大高于亏损几率,否则他不会下手。”

经验告诉我们,用100减去自己的年龄,就可以得出投资组合中最佳的股票占比。以这种逻辑来看,卡恩应该把所有资产放在债券和现金上(甚至应该在股票仓位上呈现负数,或是“空头”)。

然而,卡恩依然把一半的个人资产放在股票上。他从不借钱投资。他对我说:“如果你手头有很多现金,即使在某笔投资上犯了错误,也不用太担心。”

卡恩喜欢农业股──正如他所说的,“太阳会为你办妥一切。”此外,他认为基础工业“急需增加资本投入”。他最喜欢的股票包括:中国高科技元器件制造商南太电子公司(Nam Tai Electronics),以及种子和除草剂巨头孟山都公司(Monsanto)。

卡恩说,从某种角度来说,投资就是回归本源。

20世纪20年代及30年代初,当时的企业财务披露制度还具有较大的随意性,“拥有证券的那些家伙知道的企业内情比你多得多”。现在,虽然短线交易已日益成为主流,但卡恩相信,对耐心的投资者来说,如今的市场环境要好得多。

严于律己是卡恩获得成功的一个关键因素。107岁高龄的他依然每个星期上五天班,偶尔周五给自己放一天假。他每天要阅读很多东西,包括至少两份报纸、许多杂志和书籍,尤其是科学类的。卡恩告诉我,他有一个长期不变的目标,即“对一只股票的了解,要比卖给你股票的那个人多得多”。

是什么让他如此长寿?卡恩说:“没有秘诀,这是老天爷给的。”

他对不健康生活方式的看法是:“每年都有数百万人死于一种本可以避免的毛病,这个毛病就是不够理智,缺乏控制自己冲动的能力。”

对于投资者来说,这一点同样适用。

Jason Zweig

(本文版权归道琼斯公司所有,未经许可不得翻译或转载。)


When you get the chance to learn from someone with 84 years of investment experience, you should take it.

The day before he celebrated his 107th birthday, I spoke with Irving Kahn, chairman of Kahn Brothers Group in New York and former research assistant to Benjamin Graham, the father of value investing.


Mr. Kahn's eyesight and hearing have diminished, but his curiosity, common sense and grasp of market history are intact.

He personifies the virtues that Graham spelled out in his classic 1949 book, 'The Intelligent Investor,' from which this column takes its name. Along with Warren Buffett, Mr. Kahn is one of the last surviving investors who learned directly from Graham.

Mr. Kahn's portfolio is half in cash, but only because he has finally gotten to the age where he is fully 'captive to my own conservative personality,' he said. Individual investors who avoid 'doing things you know too little about' still stand a decent chance of outperforming professional investors, especially by sticking to smaller stocks, he told me.

Before I could even ask him a question, Mr. Kahn began peppering me with his own: Who is the new editor of The Wall Street Journal? What is its daily circulation? Who are its toughest competitors?

Mr. Kahn has a knack that more investors should develop: exploiting 'structured uncertainty,' or serendipity, which the sociologist Robert K. Merton identified as a key to intellectual discovery.

Mr. Kahn began as a 'runner,' or trading assistant on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange, for a small firm called Hammerschlag, Borg & Co. in 1928. After only one week on the trading floor, surrounded by people he considered 'crazy,' he begged to be reassigned to the research department.

Mr. Kahn also worked evenings and weekends for H. Hentz & Co., a major brokerage of that era. In his spare time he regularly roamed the building in downtown Manhattan where Hentz was based. Day after day, working his way down one floor at a time, he knocked on the door of any office that had the lights on.

Once, a bookkeeper answered; he turned out to have access to the main profit-and-loss ledgers of H. Hentz & Co. Mr. Kahn asked if he could see them. One set of entries caught his eye: a string of investments that almost never lost money. All were made by 'the Benjamin Graham joint account.'

Fascinated to find someone who traded so prudently and profitably, Mr. Kahn sought Graham out -- and discovered he worked in the same office building.

He became Graham's assistant, helping him teach his famous classes at Columbia University's business school. The main thing he learned from Graham, said Mr. Kahn, is the strength to resist the temptation to trade for a quick buck: 'Most of the time, he passed. He wouldn't go in on anything unless he thought it had a much better chance of making more money than he stood to lose if he was wrong.'

A rule of thumb says that to find the percentage of your portfolio that belongs in stocks, you subtract your age from 100. By that logic, Mr. Kahn should have all his assets in bonds and cash (and a 'short,' or negative, position in stocks).

Even so, he has half his personal assets in stocks. He has never invested with borrowed money. 'If you command a lot of cash,' he told me, 'you can be wrong and still not have to worry.'

He likes agriculture stocks -- where, as he put it, 'the sun does the work for you.' Also, he sees 'a bad need for improved capital investment' in basic industries. Among his favorite stocks: Nam Tai Electronics, a Chinese maker of high-tech components, and Monsanto, the seed and herbicide giant.

In some ways, Mr. Kahn says, these are the good old days.

In the 1920s and early 1930s, when corporate financial disclosures were largely discretionary, 'the fellows who owned the securities knew a lot more about them than you could,' he said. Despite the growing dominance of short-term trading, Mr. Kahn believes 'it's much better now' for investors who can be patient.

Discipline has been a key for Mr. Kahn. He still works five days a week, slacking off only on the occasional Friday. He reads voraciously, including at least two newspapers every day and numerous magazines and books, especially about science. His abiding goal, he told me, is 'to know much more about the stock I'm buying than the man who's selling does.'

What has enabled him to live so long? 'No secret,' he said. 'Just nature's way.'

He added, speaking of unwholesome lifestyles: 'Millions of people die every year of something they could cure themselves: lack of wisdom and lack of ability to control their impulses.'

You could say almost the same thing of investors.

Jason Zweig

巴菲特的老搭档芒格轶事 Here's The Story On Berkshire's Munger

伦•巴菲特(Warren Buffett)俨然是伯克希尔-哈撒威公司(Berkshire Hathaway Inc.)的代名词,他那些动辄数十亿美元的大手笔交易赢得了人们的交口称赞,也使他成为全球投资者心中的偶像。但巴菲特每年一次与伯克希尔-哈撒威公司的股东见面时,坐在他旁边的还有公司副董事长查尔斯•芒格(Charles Munger)。

Charlie Powell
芒格不但是位精明的商人,还是位爱读书的人,他一星期能看好几本书。
本周六,这对几十年的老搭档又将联袂出现在内布拉斯加州奥马哈的伯克希尔-哈撒威公司股东年会上,告诉数千名忠实的股东他们在此次金融危机中看到了巨大商机。由于本轮经济危机,伯克希尔创下了巴菲特44年前接手它以来的最差业绩。

虽然现年85岁的芒格和现年78岁的巴菲特经常相互沟通想法并就公司的大部分交易彼此交换意见,但两人的行事风格还是有所不同。芒格说话简洁明了,巴菲特则显得��嗦嗦。芒格倾向于共和党,而巴菲特则倾向民主党。芒格愿意出高价收购企业,巴菲特则喜欢那些没有投资风险的超廉价股。

芒格的意见曾把伯克希尔推向了一些出人意料的投资方向。几年前,芒格听说了中国一家名不见经传的电池和汽车生产商比亚迪股份有限公司(BYD Inc.),这家公司希望能开发出一种廉价、实用的电动轿车。

中国的科技企业可与那些伯克希尔投资过的中国制鞋和内衣企业截然不同。但芒格却对投资比亚迪很热心,他对比亚迪的老板王传福比对比亚迪的技术更感兴趣。芒格说,王传福有可能成为有史以来最重要的生意人之一。

虽然巴菲特一开始对投资比亚迪持怀疑态度,但芒格却坚持要投。伯克希尔旗下公用事业公司MidAmerican Energy Holdings Co.的董事长大卫•索科尔(David Sokol)专程去考察了比亚迪在中国的工厂,他也赞同芒格的判断。去年,MidAmerican斥资2.3亿美元购买了比亚迪10%的股份。

巴菲特说,投资比亚迪是芒格的主意。他说,当芒格遇到天才,并且看到此人把企业经营得不错时,他就由衷地感到高兴。

芒格还是伯克希尔2006年向以色列金属切削工具生产商Iscar Metalworking Cos.投资40亿美元的支持者。在当时,这可不是一笔小数目,特别是鉴于巴菲特对投资廉价企业的偏好。芒格却向自己的老搭档保证说,Iscar值这笔钱。

这项交易为伯克希尔在美国以外的其他一些大手笔投资铺平了道路。上述两项投资的效益如何伯克希尔未予公布。

巴菲特和芒格都认为美国的金融体系需要变革,都对这一体系以往的过分之举进行了指责。芒格说,一些人仅仅因为敢于大量举债就获得了高得惊人的报酬。这两人一直在反复提醒人们注意滥用杠杆和衍生品造成的系统性风险。

芒格认为,监管机构可以严格限制银行能够使用的杠杆(即借款)数额。这将压低华尔街公司的薪酬,因为交易员将不能再进行这么大的杠杆化投资。这可能对伯克希尔有利,该公司截至2008年年底共有243亿美元现金储备。他说,这样就会有新的游戏规则,对我们这样的人来说,这会很有意思。

周六的会议是在伯克希尔经历它历史上最糟糕的一年后召开的。去年该公司的每股账面价值缩水了9.6%。这是巴菲特1965年接手这家公司以来的最大跌幅。当时该公司是位于东海岸的一家纺织品企业,巴菲特把它转变成了一个投资王国。自去年9月份以来,伯克希尔的股价下跌了36%。

这两位投资者称,他们预计伯克希尔不久后将会恢复状态,他们还会继续合作。每周他们至少会在各自的办公室通一两次电话──巴菲特在奥马哈,芒格在加州帕萨迪纳。

巴菲特说,芒格可能比许多行业的业内人士更了解这些业务的本质,他比我看到的任何人都能更快抓住要点。

芒格在奥马哈长大,二战期间参加了美国陆军,在阿拉斯加任气象员。战争结束后,他获得哈佛大学法学院学位,成为加州一家公司的律师。

他也成为了一名认真的投资者。1959年,他在奥马哈一家餐馆首次见到巴菲特。经过多年来在众多投资上的合作,两人于1978年终于在伯克希尔成为全职搭档,芒格出任了这家公司的副董事长。

他们早期的一项交易是收购了伯克希尔旗下最知名的品牌之一。1972年,芒格说服巴菲特共同以2,500万美元收购了加州盒装巧克力生产商See's Candies。虽然按一些指标衡量收购价似乎太高,但这项交易却大获成功,共带来了10多亿美元的税前利润。

纽约基金管理公司T2 Partners LLC的经理蒂尔森(Whitney Tilson)说,如果没有这样的投资,伯克希尔不太可能发展成现在这么大。他说,芒格帮助巴菲特鉴别了一些高质量的投资,在几十年后带来了数十亿美元的收入。T2 Partners持有伯克希尔的股票。

在财务方面,巴菲特做得更好。根据福布斯杂志的世界富人排名榜,巴菲特2008年的净资产为370亿美元,排名世界第二,仅次于微软(Microsoft Corp.)创始人比尔•盖茨(Bill Gates)。芒格在这份名单上排名522位,净资产为14亿美元。

芒格赢得了伯克希尔公司董事比尔•盖茨(Bill Gates)的尊重。盖茨说,当美国司法部上世纪90年代末指控微软在Windows操作系统上滥用垄断权力时,他曾向芒格寻求法律建议。在创立比尔及梅林达•盖茨基金会(Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation)方面,他也曾征求过芒格的意见。

盖茨在接受采访时说,如果没有芒格的辅佐,巴菲特恐怕很难做得这么好。

Scott Patterson


Warren Buffett is synonymous with Berkshire Hathaway Inc., getting credit for billions of dollars in big deals that have made him an icon to investors around the world. But on the one day a year when he faces his shareholders, at his side will be his longtime partner, Vice Chairman Charles Munger.

On Saturday, the partners will take their decades-old act back to the stage in Omaha, Neb., telling thousands of loyal shareholders that they see huge opportunities amid the financial crisis that drove Berkshire to its worst performance since Mr. Buffett took it over 44 years ago.

The two men, Mr. Munger, 85 years old, and Mr. Buffett, 78, speak frequently and confer about most deals, but there are differences. Mr. Munger is laconic; Mr. Buffett loquacious. Mr. Munger leans Republican; Mr. Buffett tilts Democratic. Mr. Munger will pay hefty price tags for businesses; Mr. Buffett likes safe, dirt-cheap stocks.

Mr. Munger's views have pushed Berkshire into some surprising directions. Several years ago, Mr. Munger learned of an obscure Chinese maker of batteries and automobiles called BYD Inc., which hopes to create a cheap, functional electric car.

A Chinese tech company is nothing like the shoe and underwear makers Berkshire had been buying. But Mr. Munger was enthusiastic, less about the technology than about Wang Chuanfu, who runs BYD. Mr. Wang, Mr. Munger says, is 'likely to be one of the most important business people who ever lived.'

Mr. Buffett was skeptical at first. But Mr. Munger persisted. David Sokol, chairman of Berkshire utility MidAmerican Energy Holdings Co., paid a visit to BYD's factory in China and agreed with Mr. Munger's assessment. Last year, MidAmerican paid $230 million for a 10% stake in BYD.

'BYD was Charlie's idea,' Mr. Buffett said. 'When he encounters genius and sees it operating in a practical way, he gets blown away.'

Mr. Munger also was an advocate of Berkshire's $4 billion investment in Iscar Metalworking Cos., an Israeli maker of metal-cutting tools, in 2006. The investment was relatively pricey, especially given Mr. Buffett's preference for cheap companies. But Mr. Munger convinced his longtime partner that Iscar was worth the cost.

The deal helped pave the way for other large investments by Berkshire in companies outside the U.S. Results on the two investments haven't been reported.

The men share a view that the U.S. financial system will change, and criticize past excesses. 'People were horribly overpaid for just pouring on leverage,' Mr. Munger said. The two investors have repeatedly warned about the systemic risks posed by the abuse of leverage and derivatives.

Mr. Munger thinks regulators may significantly curb the amount of leverage, or borrowed money, that banks can use. That will drive down pay at Wall Street firms, since traders won't be able to make as many big, leveraged bets. This could benefit Berkshire, with its cash hoard of $24.3 billion at the end of 2008. 'There's going to be new rules in the game,' he said. 'For someone like us, that's going to be very interesting.'

Saturday's meeting comes after the worst year in Berkshire's history, when it lost 9.6% in book value per share, a common metric it uses to track its performance. It marked the biggest decline since Mr. Buffett took over the company in 1965, when it was an East Coast textile maker, and turned it into an investing powerhouse. Berkshire's shares have fallen 36% since September.

The two investors say they expect Berkshire to return to form in the near future, and they continue to collaborate. They speak on the phone at least once or twice a week from their respective offices -- Mr. Buffett in Omaha, Mr. Munger in Pasadena, Calif.

'Charlie understands the essence of a lot of businesses probably better than people in those industries do,' Mr. Buffett said. 'He gets right to the point of it quicker than anyone I've seen.

Mr. Munger grew up in Omaha and joined the U.S. Army during World War II, serving as a meteorologist in Alaska. After the war, he earned a degree from Harvard Law School and became an attorney at a California firm.

He also became a serious investor. He met Mr. Buffett in an Omaha restaurant in 1959. After working together on a number of investments for many years, the two joined forces full time at Berkshire in 1978, when Mr. Munger became vice chairman.

One of their early deals is one of Berkshire's best-known brands. In 1972, Mr. Munger helped persuade Mr. Buffett to participate in a joint purchase of See's Candies, a California boxed-chocolate maker, for $25 million. While the price seemed steep by some measures, the deal was wildly successful, producing more than $1 billion in pretax earnings.

Without such investments, it isn't likely that Berkshire could have grown as large as it has, says Whitney Tilson, manager of T2 Partners LLC, a New York money manager that owns Berkshire stock. He says: 'Munger helped Buffett appreciate some of the higher-quality investments that lead to multibillion-dollar outcomes several decades later.'

Financially, Mr. Buffett has done better. He boasts a net worth of $37 billion in 2008, according to Forbes magazine's list of the world's wealthiest people, putting him at No. 2 in the world behind Microsoft Corp. founder Bill Gates. Mr. Munger placed 522 on the list, with a net worth of $1.4 billion.

Mr. Munger has won the respect of Mr. Gates, who sits on the company's board. When the Justice Department accused Microsoft of abusing monopoly power with its Windows operating system in the late 1990s, Mr. Gates says he sought out Mr. Munger for legal advice. He also consulted Mr. Munger when considering how to set up his charity, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.

'Warren wouldn't have done nearly as well without his help,' Mr. Gates said in an interview.

Scott Patterson

2013年9月1日

薄熙来的政治遗产

张千帆

宕起伏、众人瞩目的薄熙来案庭审终于落下帷幕。无论被告的当庭"翻供"是否"演戏",这起"世纪审判"还是很有看点的──微博直播是此次庭审的重大亮点,兴许能为推动审判公开提供契机;被告被赋予相当程度的辩护权,对受贿、贪污、滥用职权三项指控给予有力的回驳。

如果薄熙来仅此公诉指控的这三宗罪的话,那么此次庭审更坐实了他是被政治斗争坑害的"清官"、"好官"形象,刑事指控只不过是权力斗争的胜利者迫害政治对手的专政工具。即便法庭上扯来扯去的那2000多万贪污受贿全部构成犯罪事实,也丝毫改变不了这个结论。现在一个科级干部都能挪用上亿公款,他那个级别的官员只贪这么一点儿的话,不是"清官"是什么?三项指控中最能做点文章的是滥用职权,薄熙来和王立军当面对质也是此次审判的高潮,但是最后却巧妙演变成一出催人想象的"爱情伦理剧"。

至于之前说他"生活作风腐败"、和多名女性有染的故事,更是上不了台面的"小节"。无论从哪个角度看,生活作风在党内历来只是细枝末节的个人道德问题,只够用来抹黑,根本上不到法律层次。那些对毛泽东搞女人大惊小怪的人其实活在毛的阴影下,误以为他头上还有"圣人"的光环,以至生活作风不检点成了一件大事。这样看他,就好像把显微镜聚焦在麻风病人的一块红斑上,对表面瑕疵的关注漏过了致命的内部缺陷及其造成的实质伤害。我倒是宁愿他昏天黑地玩女人,以至无暇顾及政事和权争,这样也就未必会发生"大跃进"和"文革"的灾难了。薄熙来和毛泽东一样,玩女人是其所有罪行当中最轻微的一种,此次庭审也理所当然只字未提。

如许多法律人所说,此次庭审的出发点已是避重就轻,目的是既结束薄十分珍惜而威胁巨大的政治生命,又不深度触及其滥用公权和贪腐事实。例如,在庭审过程中,辩护人自己透露被害人海伍德曾向薄瓜瓜索要1400万英镑的"中介费"?到底是什么项目要如此昂贵的"中介费"?项目本身的标的高达多少?面对如此明显的重大线索,检方却未顺藤摸瓜、追查到底,只能说明此次审判终究是一场结果预定的表演。

当然,薄熙来的罪远不止于贪几个钱。从法律人的角度看,他在重庆主政期间劣迹昭彰。破坏法治、刑讯逼供、迫害律师和企业家、剥夺犯罪嫌疑人的辩护权利……这一切都是在他眼皮底下发生的,都是他在重庆"唱红打黑"的成果。要真正追究薄熙来的罪,就得从这些实质问题入手,否则就不是真正意义的审判。避重就轻的起诉使得庭审公开成为可能,但也让公开审判的价值大打折扣。

"重庆模式"的本质

济南庭审正式结束了薄熙来的政治生命,却远未埋葬其政治遗产。在这一点上,我同意薄熙来本人的立场,那就是薄案的核心不是法律问题,而是政治问题、"路线斗争"或模式之争;他的主要罪过不在于违反了《刑法》哪一条,因而用刑法去整他注定是避重就轻。用一句话概括,薄熙来的政治犯罪是在重庆缔造了一个红色法西斯帝国。这个他留给中国的政治遗产,今后几年很可能在全国范围内发扬光大。

用"红色法西斯"来描述薄熙来治下的重庆,是恰如其分的。"红色"自不必说,"法西斯"是什么?法西斯的原始含义是"团结就是力量",其核心要件是政党、国家与意识形态的高度一体化,即党政一体化的权力结构、绝对的领袖崇拜、超强的大众动员及扑灭一切质疑与反对意见的国家能力。

薄熙来治下的重庆显然符合这些条件。不考虑来自中央的外部干预,薄熙来就是整个重庆的"土皇帝",他的话就是圣旨,谁敢不听?虽然党政机关名义上是集体决策,但是在"一把手负责制"面前,整个官僚系统实际上是比古代帝制有效得多的个人意志实施工具。在他主政期间,别说重庆的媒体,就是敢言的南方报系也不能报道他的半点负面消息,而他却能娴熟利用所掌控的媒体资源让"重庆模式"表演得淋漓尽致。这些特点当然不是重庆特有的,但是薄熙来无疑使之更加特征化了。他的"高富帅"形象,他的显赫家世、精明强干、飞扬跋扈、不按规则出牌……所有这些因素都强化了他的个人权威,把他变成重庆的"毛泽东"。

就和毛时代的中国"一切皆有可能"一样,薄熙来的重庆发生"唱红打黑"、冤假错案、劳教村官乃至"提督夜奔美领馆"等种种悲喜闹剧,是一点也不奇怪的。一般认为,重庆"唱红打黑"双管齐下,但"唱红"是虚,"打黑"是实;实质危害是"黑打","唱红"只不过是掩人耳目的陪衬,至多浪费点钱而已。然而,这种看法忽视了"唱红"所依托的新闻控制手段在其中发挥的核心作用。没有扭曲真相的政治宣传和压制真相的新闻控制手段,"唱红"只是一个昙花一现的泡沫,薄熙来很快会被还原成一个纨口子弟,"黑打"则可能一天都进行不下去……他能把荒谬绝伦的"唱红"进行得如火如荼,以至一度"绑架"了中央和全国各地,足以表明在重庆发生一切都是"正常"的。

法西斯政体和一般威权专制的主要区别即在于国家对思想和言论的垄断,新闻传播成为国家机器的组成要素。一个威权国家可能会限制新闻自由,但是并不会以"真理"的面孔出现,要求全体国民接受一套按照国家需要制造出来的"真理"和"真相"。法西斯政体的新闻则是专政机器的一个配件,随时为执政集团服务。即便在私人媒体历史悠久的德国和日本,新闻机构在战争前夕也早已丧失了独立功能,成为法西斯统治集团的附庸,并通过一系列扭曲真相的报道,鼓动全民走向战争。无论是左是右,极权政体是生活在自己构造的神话叙事里的。宣传机器制造并不断复述神话,专政机器则镇压任何挑战或瓦解神话的力量;没有二者一体配合,极权体制即失去赖以生存的空气。

极权时代的制度遗产

毛泽东时代的中国就是这样一种极权政体,也正是这种政体成就了他的个人魅力型统治。国家权力越集中,就越容易发生个人集权,制度集权是个人集权的垫脚石。

首先,极权政体无一例外地排除实质性的选民政治参与,执政权力不受社会监督。德国纳粹、意大利法西斯都是先用蛊惑人心的政纲获得选票上台,随即废除自由民主体制,实行永久执政。

其次,党政一体化排除了党外竞争,为执政党领袖树立至高无上的党内个人权威提供巨大便利。假如共产党当年可以公开合法活动,蒋介石就很难剪除国民党内的异己力量;一旦把蒋介石赶出大陆,毛泽东就可以肆无忌惮向共产夺权的功臣们开刀,这和历代开国皇帝"狡兔死、走狗烹"是一个道理。

最后,一旦新闻媒体也成了专政宣传工具,"领袖"更是如虎添翼;党媒在树立党国"光辉形象"的同时,也被"领袖"用来宣传自己、打击政敌,压制反对派的挑战和批评。

由此建立的极权政体不会承认任何分权,没有任何人或机构有力量抵制领袖的个人集权;等到集权过程完成,整个党和国家都是操控在他个人手里的玩物。在权力高度合一的体制下,司法也不可能幸免。德意志帝国法院有相当悠久的司法独立传统,但是对于保护犹太人的基本权利却无能为力,甚至成为纳粹迫害的帮凶。薄熙来治下的重庆要办谁的罪,没有做不到的,公检法、媒体乃至民意都会通力配合。极权体制往往是靠领袖"魅力"支撑起来的,并几乎必然走向极端的人治。

毛泽东死后,中国走向"后极权"时代,但是极权时代的制度遗产几乎原封不动保留下来,只是原先统治人民思想的正统意识形态不灵了。如果说积极"洗脑"可能带来反感,但"洗脑"体制并没有实质变化,而由此产生的消极效应是整个民族的历史失忆,尤其是年轻一代对"大跃进"、"文革"等极权体制的灾难没有感同身受,甚至以为毛时代真的是莺歌燕舞、道德纯洁、社会平等、没有贪官污吏的"太平盛世"。薄熙来也正是利用宣传控制造成的民族历史感空白,祭起"文革"式的"唱红"大旗。也许"唱红"本身的危害只是显示中国人是多么容易被组织起来"集体犯傻",但这种组织机制的危险性是不容忽视的。它向我们展示,"文革"并没有离中国远去,而是具备丰厚的制度与社会土壤。

中国各地之所以有那么多人喜欢薄熙来,甚至在他审判之后依旧如此,不仅因为他"高富帅",归根结底在于他们喜欢以"唱红打黑"为标志的"重庆模式";这种发自内心的喜欢也许纯粹是出于对历史和现实的无知,但这已经不重要,重要的是"重庆模式"仍然深得人心。当然,薄熙来比毛泽东做得高明;"大跃进"、"文革"是纯粹的大破坏,"重庆模式"则"有破有立",确实为当地的治安和民生做了一点实事,但仅此并不改变"重庆模式"的本质。法西斯政权不是只有专政和谎言,也是相当注重民生的,"纳粹"的原意正是通过国家实现"社会主义";和一般威权体制相比,法西斯政体的优越性正在于它们通常都受到本国人民的强烈拥护,至少上台那一刻是如此。打民生牌只不过让"重庆模式"更具迷惑力,因而也更具危险性。

"重庆模式"与中国未来

尽管左派话语气势汹汹,如今要发生"文革"那样的大规模迫害已不现实。然而,薄熙来大受市民欢迎表明,小规模的"杀富济贫"还是大有市场,"文革"式的红色法西斯极权是可以成功的。薄熙来的成功之处即在于剥夺极少数,取悦大多数,并让后者心怀感激地接受其个人特权登峰造极的极权体制。你只要瞄准极少数富商或贪官,以"反腐"或"打黑"等名义剥夺他们的自由、充公他们的财产;你只要分出一点给劳苦大众,那么,哪怕你得了其中的大头,你仍然会获得绝大多数人的喝彩,老百姓仍然会对你感激涕零,而不太在乎那个极少数的遭遇。反正中国的企业家和官员都是有"原罪"的,计划经济和极权政治就是一个制造"原罪"的体制,剥夺他们天经地义;剥夺者不是罪犯,而是救民于水火的英雄。

如果你告诉他们,依法"打黑"、整顿治安是政府的本职工作,用不着如此感恩戴德,他们会回答你:其他官员也贪,还不做事,还不如这个为人民办点实事的"清官",有这样的"清官"实在是重庆的"幸运"!一边是普遍的"仇富"、"仇官",一边是祈求"青天"、"救星",两种看似矛盾的心态并行不悖地存在于同一个人格中。这就是长期专制为极权统治准备的社会土壤。

当然,如果真相曝光,这一切也是兜不住的。如果薄熙来的奢靡私人生活被揭露,如果他在重庆所作所为的实质被起底,如果他纵容或指使下的公检系统的种种骇人听闻的胡作非为被报道出来;如果重庆人民看到自己为"唱红"付出了多少成本,包括人格的自我愚弄;如果他们看到"黑打"至多只能维持一时的表面平安,而代价是法治体系的彻底崩坏;如果他们开始理解那种杀鸡取卵的"劫富济贫"会造成企业家的"集体逃离",所谓的"重庆模式"是靠了中央"输血"才维持下来,而代价是让自己长年负债;更重要的是,如果重庆市民知道,一个真正由他们选举产生的领导人可以用小得多的成本为他们做更多的事情,还没有破坏法治、践踏人权的后遗症……他们一开始就不会选择薄熙来和他的"重庆模式"。但是就在这里,极权式宣传体制显现出不可替代的优越性,而薄熙来不愧是新闻专业出身,把这个行当的技术运用得炉火纯青,让自己的超级演技迷倒了大片观众,以至"世纪审判"一槌定音都未能将他们敲醒。
审判薄熙来,不等于清算"重庆模式"。"文革"结束后,官方还曾有过一段不彻底、不深刻的反思;薄熙来倒台一年,当局却从未对"重庆模式"进行过任何反思乃至讨论,似乎都在心照不宣地"既往不咎"向前看。"文革"造成的巨大灾难有目共睹,但"重庆模式"是在其恶性发作之前就被击溃,加上大部分恶果至今都被捂着盖子,因而许多人看不到它的危害。薄熙来审判对其在重庆的倒行逆施不置一词,而社会似乎也很快遗忘不久前发生的重庆那些事,以至"重庆模式"造成的经济、法治、人权"黑洞"统统成了一笔糊涂账。"唱红"到底花了多少钱?重庆究竟欠了多少债?"打黑"又制造了多少冤案?企业家被剥夺的巨额财产流进了谁的腰包?对于所有这些关系重庆市民切身利益的问题,公众和媒体不仅一概不知,似乎也再没兴趣追问。一个对历史教训如此健忘或选择性失明的民族,只能在"重庆模式"的黑色怪圈中越陷越深。

事实上,就在审判薄熙来期间,"重庆模式"在中国大行其道。红色法西斯的精髓在于党国和宣传体制的高度一体化,在于国家宣扬某种"真理"并用专政机器消灭一切不同思想和言论的能力。极权主义虽已不合当代中国时宜,但是极权体制资源却一直保存完好,随时可被另一个薄熙来激活。

今年五月以来的反宪政逆流即可被视为一种"唱红",对许志永、郭飞雄等活跃人士的打压则是对公民运动的违法构陷,而近日对秦火火、薛蛮子等网络名人的拘捕算是"打黑"或"黑打"的翻版;此后各地大肆围剿"网络谣言",河北清河女子只是网上询问"听说娄庄发生命案了,有谁知道真相吗"即被拘留一周,可见专政机器对言论的管制已较"重庆模式"有过之无不及。只是这几件事当局做得均不如薄熙来案漂亮,不仅未能博取多少掌声,而且还把自己放在正义力量的对立面。

陈有西律师说得好,"重庆模式"就是"中国模式"的"加强版";重庆那些事在全国各地都算不上新鲜,只是薄熙来为了自己的政治仕途让"重庆模式"高调得有点出格。它与其说是薄熙来的遗产,不如说是毛泽东的遗产,只是薄熙来将其复活了。在某种意义上,我们要感谢他,因为他向我们展示了红色法西斯中国的真实可能性。

虽然网络极大丰富了中国人的思想和信息来源,解冻了极权主义社会土壤,公民独立思维开始形成并带有一定的免疫力,但是组织化的公民力量仍然十分脆弱,并只能在体制压抑下艰难成长。相反,毛泽东的群众基础却在官方宣传扶持下显得相当丰厚;毛本人仍然被官方视为"救星",即足以说明问题。"师爷"健在,安能委屈了"徒弟"?薄熙来的倒台及其模式的破灭只是"一个巴掌打出来"的偶然事件。下一个"薄熙来"登场的时候,很可能没有"王立军"陪伴,中国还有这么幸运吗?为了不让大大小小的"文革"式闹剧重演,理智清醒的中国公民能做什么?

(本文作者张千帆是美国德克萨斯大学奥斯汀分校政府学博士,北京大学法学院教授、博士生导师,中国宪法学会副会长。个人法律博客:http://const123.fyfz.cn/blog/const123/。文中所述仅代表他的个人观点。)

(本文版权归道琼斯公司所有,未经许可不得翻译或转载。)