从
布鲁塞尔到华盛顿，经济学家和政治家们都说人民币存在低估。他们说，为中国自身利益和全球经济着想，人民币需要在短时间内大幅升值。
REUTERS
中国银行一家支行的员工在清点人民币
当时是日本这个实力不断上升的亚洲出口国令美国头疼，那时日圆汇率也是一个重大的政治问题。为了缓解这个问题造成的紧张关系，1985年9月，当时世界主要经济体的领导人在纽约的广场饭店(Plaza Hotel)举行了会晤。他们在会上达成的协议导致日圆在两年时间内由约240日圆兑1美元升值到160日圆兑1美元。
现如今，批评中国的人正要求人民币也作同样幅度的升值。但日本很快就对同意日圆大幅升值感到后悔了：当时日本经济增长速度急剧放缓，政府被迫增加支出并降低利率。此后是房地产泡沫的破裂和日本持续多年的经济萧条。而《广场协议》(Plaza Accord)打算解决的问题：日本的巨额贸易顺差直到今天都依然存在。
中国人从日本身上学到的教训是，汇率的大幅变动有可能损害经济增长，但却未必有助于纠正贸易失衡。
中国大多数经济学家都认为，通过旨在降低过高储蓄率的一系列国内政策，可以使中国贸易顺差过大问题得到最好的解决。北京大学中国经济研究中心的经济学家姚洋说，只关注汇率的做法是错误的，同时必须要关注基本面。他说，如果你让人民币在一个月内升值20%，将会扼杀中国经济。
人民币汇率大幅变动给中国造成的代价是直接而确凿的：那些产品突然间变得过于昂贵的出口工厂将会关门，并导致大量工人失业。而所谓人民币升值带来的好处却是遥远而抽象的：主要而言，那只不过是全球经济的更加“均衡”。
那么，有什么可以用来劝说中国调整人民币汇率？最有可能的因素是通货膨胀。
中国领导人对外国不断加大要求人民币升值的压力一直感到恼火，日本的负面先例使他们没有什么理由听从西方的建议。
中国外交部发言人马朝旭最近表示，指责和压力明显无助于解决问题。然而，中国领导层对可能引发社会动荡的通胀周期的担忧，却有可能成为驱动人民币升值的一个强有力因素。
由于中国政府的经济刺激计划，中国经济远远先于世界其他国家走出了经济危机，但经济快速增长所带来的问题也已迅速出现，1月份消费者价格指数同比增长1.5%，增速在接下来的几个月内还有可能加快。中国央行今年已经两次提高了银行存款准备金率，最近的一次是在上周五（2月12日），此举旨在控制房地产价格飙升下的信贷泡沫。
中国政府上一次试图遏制通货膨胀是在2007年，当时人民币升值了15%。人民币这一升值过程直到2008年年中中国重新实行人民币盯住美元的政策时才告停止。现在，中国政府有可能再度让任命升值。
那么，人民币应该怎样升值呢？没有完美的解决方案。教科书上的答案是一次性的大幅升值。但是快速升值对实体经济来说会是非常困难的，原因是出口商来不及去适应。
渐进式的升值也有其弊端，正如中国在2007-2008年时所经历过的那样：由于投资者很容易产生对人民币升值并带来收益的预期，海外资金纷纷涌入中国，而这又可能进一步推高了通货膨胀和资产价格，这种局面直到全球金融危机到来之后才被打破。
中国当下所面临的两难选择对这个国家而言并不陌生。这意味着，中国政府可能会采取一个世人熟知的办法，即2005年7月时人民币与美元脱钩这样一个折衷方案的翻版。当时，人民币小幅升值，然后走上了渐进式升值的轨道。相关部门还放宽了人民币汇率每日允许波动的区间，试图让市场相信，人民币既可以走高，也可以走低，结果却是市场并不买帐。
Andrew Batson
Economists and politicians from Brussels to Washington say that the Chinese yuan is undervalued. For China's own good and that of the global economy, they say, the currency needs to move up in a big way, and soon.
So why hasn't China revalued? Part of the answer is Japan.
The last time the U.S. was faced with a rising Asian export power, the currency also became a big political issue. And in September 1985 the major economies of the time met at the Plaza Hotel in New York to ease those tensions. The accord they reached caused the dollar to fall from roughly 240 Japanese yen to about 160 over two years.
Today, China's critics are demanding a similarly sweeping move. But Japan soon regretted agreeing to a big surge in the yen: Growth slowed abruptly, which pushed the government to boost spending and lower interest rates. A real-estate bubble and a years-long slump followed. And the issue the Plaza Accord was intended to fix -- Japan's sizable trade surplus -- remains to this day.
From Japan's example, Chinese thinkers learned that a big exchange-rate move could damage their economy, and won't necessarily help the trade balance.
Most Chinese economists say they think their nation's large trade surplus is best addressed with domestic policies to lower high savings rates. 'To only focus on the exchange rate is the wrong approach. You have to look at fundamentals,' said Yao Yang, an economist at the China Center for Economic Research in Beijing. 'It will kill China's economy if you appreciate the renminbi by 20% in one month.'
The costs to China of a big exchange-rate move would be immediate and concrete: export factories whose goods suddenly got too expensive would close, idling workers. Yet the benefits that proponents say come from yuan appreciation are diffuse and abstract: chiefly, a more 'balanced' global economy.
So what could persuade China to revalue? The most likely factor is inflation.
China's leaders have bristled at rising foreign pressure on the yuan, also known as the renminbi, with Japan's unhappy example giving them few reasons to heed Western advice.
'Accusations and pressure clearly do not help solve the problem,' foreign-ministry spokesman Ma Zhaoxu said recently. But the leadership's fears of an inflationary cycle that could spark social unrest may prove a stronger motivator.
Thanks to its government stimulus, China's economy has recovered well ahead of the rest of the world. The problems of rapid growth also have arrived early: Consumer prices were up 1.5% from a year earlier in January, and are expected to accelerate in coming months. The central bank has already raised banks' reserve requirements twice this year, most recently on Friday, aiming to contain a boom in credit as housing prices soar.
China's government tried to counter the last surge in inflation, which began in 2007, with currency appreciation. The yuan gained about 15% against the dollar until authorities returned to a de facto peg in mid-2008. A similar response now is plausible.
So how might China go about revaluing its currency? There is no perfect solution. The textbook answer is to revalue in one fell swoop. But a fast move would be harder on the real economy, because exporters wouldn't have time to adjust.
Gradual appreciation creates its own problems, as China found out during the yuan's rise in 2007 and 2008. Investors could easily anticipate gains in the currency, and the money that flowed into China as a result probably fed a surge in inflation and asset prices that was only interrupted by the onset of the global financial crisis.
Today's dilemma is familiar to China. That means Beijing may opt for a familiar solution: a variation of the compromise approach it took in July 2005 when it moved off a de facto peg to the dollar. That involved making a small appreciation, then setting the currency on a path of gradual gains.
Authorities also widened the yuan's daily trading band, in a mostly unsuccessful attempt to convince markets that the yuan could go down as well as up.
Andrew Batson
So why hasn't China revalued? Part of the answer is Japan.
The last time the U.S. was faced with a rising Asian export power, the currency also became a big political issue. And in September 1985 the major economies of the time met at the Plaza Hotel in New York to ease those tensions. The accord they reached caused the dollar to fall from roughly 240 Japanese yen to about 160 over two years.
Today, China's critics are demanding a similarly sweeping move. But Japan soon regretted agreeing to a big surge in the yen: Growth slowed abruptly, which pushed the government to boost spending and lower interest rates. A real-estate bubble and a years-long slump followed. And the issue the Plaza Accord was intended to fix -- Japan's sizable trade surplus -- remains to this day.
From Japan's example, Chinese thinkers learned that a big exchange-rate move could damage their economy, and won't necessarily help the trade balance.
Most Chinese economists say they think their nation's large trade surplus is best addressed with domestic policies to lower high savings rates. 'To only focus on the exchange rate is the wrong approach. You have to look at fundamentals,' said Yao Yang, an economist at the China Center for Economic Research in Beijing. 'It will kill China's economy if you appreciate the renminbi by 20% in one month.'
The costs to China of a big exchange-rate move would be immediate and concrete: export factories whose goods suddenly got too expensive would close, idling workers. Yet the benefits that proponents say come from yuan appreciation are diffuse and abstract: chiefly, a more 'balanced' global economy.
So what could persuade China to revalue? The most likely factor is inflation.
China's leaders have bristled at rising foreign pressure on the yuan, also known as the renminbi, with Japan's unhappy example giving them few reasons to heed Western advice.
'Accusations and pressure clearly do not help solve the problem,' foreign-ministry spokesman Ma Zhaoxu said recently. But the leadership's fears of an inflationary cycle that could spark social unrest may prove a stronger motivator.
Thanks to its government stimulus, China's economy has recovered well ahead of the rest of the world. The problems of rapid growth also have arrived early: Consumer prices were up 1.5% from a year earlier in January, and are expected to accelerate in coming months. The central bank has already raised banks' reserve requirements twice this year, most recently on Friday, aiming to contain a boom in credit as housing prices soar.
China's government tried to counter the last surge in inflation, which began in 2007, with currency appreciation. The yuan gained about 15% against the dollar until authorities returned to a de facto peg in mid-2008. A similar response now is plausible.
So how might China go about revaluing its currency? There is no perfect solution. The textbook answer is to revalue in one fell swoop. But a fast move would be harder on the real economy, because exporters wouldn't have time to adjust.
Gradual appreciation creates its own problems, as China found out during the yuan's rise in 2007 and 2008. Investors could easily anticipate gains in the currency, and the money that flowed into China as a result probably fed a surge in inflation and asset prices that was only interrupted by the onset of the global financial crisis.
Today's dilemma is familiar to China. That means Beijing may opt for a familiar solution: a variation of the compromise approach it took in July 2005 when it moved off a de facto peg to the dollar. That involved making a small appreciation, then setting the currency on a path of gradual gains.
Authorities also widened the yuan's daily trading band, in a mostly unsuccessful attempt to convince markets that the yuan could go down as well as up.
Andrew Batson
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