上周五的诺贝尔和平奖颁奖仪式被普遍解读中国领导层面临的一场尴尬。然而更值得注意的是，这是一个最新例证，表明在国际论坛上，特别是在那些制定世界规则的多国组织中，中国说服其它国家支持自己的能力日益增强。
将近20个国家拒绝了邀请，没有派遣大使出席上周在奥斯陆市政厅举行的颁奖仪式。没错，其中大多数国家长期对人权持怀疑态度。它们决定拒绝出席是在中国游说之后，同时它们也意识到自身对中国市场的日益依赖。长期以来，中国也一直反对国际社会干涉其内政，并向发展中国家寻求支持。但有所改变的是，北京在利用这些同盟制衡作为少数派的发达国家方面颇为有效。
面对新兴的经济强国，西方国家曾希望借助国际组织推行自由主义标准，提升自己的经济利益。它们曾以为最大的挑战在于让中国"融入"现有的国际秩序。中国外交官员为取得最重要的国际和地区性机构的成员资格，确实花了不少时间。但现在，他们已经越来越擅长利用这些机构来维护中国自身的重大利益与政治模式。
中国在联合国(UN)的影响力就是一个突出例证。最近，中国成功阻止了美国支持的对缅甸展开战争罪行调查。在幕后，中国巧妙建立各种同盟，阻挠联合国人权理事会的作为，由中国外交官员带头限制对负责调查特殊人权问题的联合国"特别报告员"(special rapporteurs)的授权。北京方面还构建联盟，阻止所有成员国都应接受的"普遍定期审议"(universal periodic review)范围扩大。
不过，中国影响国际规范的努力远不止于人权问题的范畴。上周末结束的坎昆气候峰会，在很大程度上也受到中国的左右。自2009年哥本哈根气候谈判以来，北京一面扮演着异质发展中国家群体的领头羊角色，一面竭力要求为更贫穷国家提供更多支援和技术转让，让它们承担共同但多样化的责任。坎昆峰会的决议草案涵盖了上述大部分要求，而西方国家却未能制订出一个强有力的监控机制。
北京还将从自身利益出发，不遗余力地重塑国际贸易机制。上周，世界贸易组织(WTO)指责欧盟(EU)非法对中国产螺丝征收反倾销税。在此之前，中国派出了一个小型贸易律师团队，对世贸组织抗击反倾销程序的法律框架进行了认真研究。最近，在与美国就对中国鸡肉征收关税的争端中，中国也赢得了世贸组织的支持。尽管在商品关税问题上采取了法律攻势，但北京依然反对开放其服务业和政府采购的国际规则，不过在这个领域，中国或许也能够得偿所愿。
最后，在从半导体到电动汽车、从风能发电到移动电话等领域，中国打造新技术标准的意愿似乎越来越坚决。这些变化大多旨在帮助中国企业维系国内市场份额，但中国国家冠军企业在世界其他地区的成功或许也会为将这些标准推广到国外铺路。例如，中国移动(China Mobile)已经开始在亚洲其他国家使用中国移动多媒体广播(CMMB)标准。
这种状况并不完全是消极的。中国越清楚地认识到国际组织的规则不是要对它不利，它就会越愿意参与其中。中国也并不总是反对西方推崇的经济标准——它只会在自身已具有竞争优势的国家或行业寻求支持这些标准。
然而，西方国家面临的挑战依然存在。国际标准反映了世界权力分配。有些人视其为遏制强国之间竞争的一种方法；事实上它们是以不同的形式延续了这些强权政治。中国还将继续与发展中国家建立同盟，经济开放只有在适合其产业发展时才会得到允许。从现在起，西方国家若想继续塑造国际政治规则，就必须团结一致、达成共识，并更加努力地成为眼下中国不断示好的发展中国家的行为榜样。
注：本文作者是布鲁塞尔当代中国研究所研究员。
译者/何黎
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001036033
Last Friday's Nobel Peace Price ceremony was widely interpreted as an embarrassment for China's leadership. But it was more remarkable as the latest example of China's growing ability to convince other countries to support it in international forums, and in particular in the multinational institutions that set the world's rules.
Some 20 countries declined an invitation to send their ambassador to the ceremonial in the Oslo City Hall last week. True, most have long-standing scepticism of human rights. Their decisions to stay away came after Chinese lobbying and with an awareness of their growing dependence on the Chinese market. China has also long opposed interference in its internal affairs and sought support from developing countries. What has changed, however, is the effectiveness with which Beijing is using these alliances to counterbalance the minority of developed countries.
Facing emerging economic powers, the west had expected to be able to use international organisations to promote liberal standards, and advance its own economic interests. It thought the challenge was to "socialise" China into the existing order. Chinese diplomats took some time to get to grips with the their memberships of the most important of these international and regional institutions. But now they are becoming ever more effective in exploiting them to defend China's vital interests and political norms.
Chinese influence at the United Nations is one obvious example. It has recently sought to prevent a US-backed probe into war crimes in Burma. Behind the scenes it has also been cleverly forming alliances to stymie the UN's Human Rights Council, with Chinese diplomats spearheading efforts to limit the mandate of its "special rapporteurs" tasked with investigating specific human rights issues. Beijing also formed coalitions to block the expansion of the "universal periodic review", an audit all states are supposed to undergo.
Yet China's efforts to influence international norms go well beyond the issue of human rights. The climate summit in Cancún, which concluded this weekend, was also substantially shaped by the People's Republic. Since the 2009 talks in Copenhagen, Beijing has both acted as ringleader of a heterogeneous grouping of developing nations and pushed vehemently for more assistance to poorer countries, technology transfer and common but diversified responsibilities. The draft decisions of the Cancún meeting included most of these demands, while western countries fell short of hammering out a strong monitoring mechanism.
Beijing is also going to great lengths to shape international trade regimes in a way that suits its interests. Last week, the World Trade Organisation rebuked the European Union for unlawfully imposing antidumping tariffs on imports of Chinese screws. The announcement followed China's dispatching of a small army of trade lawyers to get to grips with the WTO's legal framework combating anti-dumping procedures. Recently it also won WTO backing in a dispute over American tariffs on chicken. This legal offensive against tariffs on goods notwithstanding, Beijing still opposes international rules that would liberalise its services sector and government procurement, but this is another area in which it may also get its way.
Finally, China seems increasingly determined to mould standards for new technologies in fields from semiconductors and electric cars to wind energy and mobile telephony. Most of these changes are designed to help Chinese companies maintain domestic market share, but the success of Chinese national champions in other parts of the world might also pave the way for promoting them beyond China's borders. China Mobile, for example, has started using the china mobile multimedia broadcasting standard in other Asian countries.
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