呈贡是昆明——中国西南重镇之一——附近的一座新城。它于2003年开始兴建，迄今取得了显著成果：13座美伦美奂的地方政府大楼，每座都铺着大理石砖；一所配备室内泳池的高中；两所占地宽广的当地主要高校。崭新的高层公寓楼排排耸立，簇新的窗户在亚热带的阳光下十分耀眼。
唯一的缺点是：此刻的呈贡几乎是一座空城。宽阔的马路上不见车辆，银行支行里没有客户，市镇办公楼的门厅里堆积了一地落叶。
开始让人们对中国经济真实状况的看法出现分歧的，正是像呈贡这样的地方。中国是全球危机中的大赢家。去年，在其它国家陷入衰退之际，中国经济增长了8.7%。然而，随着农历新年假期的结束，围绕以下问题的分歧正在形成：中国政府为渡过全球低迷期而实施的刺激方案，将会产生何种长远影响？
虽然在有些人看来，中国在基建和城市规划方面的投资具有前瞻性，并将为新一轮增长奠定基础，但其他人担心，去年的复苏其实是建立在投资泡沫上的海市蜃楼。对于脆弱的全球经济而言，这个问题同样关键。如果中国的复苏夭折，全球其它地区很可能受到拖累，从而陷入"双底"型衰退。
去年的疯狂放贷——新增贷款翻了一番——有何风险？对于这一问题，政府内部存在激烈的辩论。由于担心中国经济依然疲弱，一些官员希望保持投资阀门的敞开，而其他官员则担忧通胀和产能过剩的潜在威胁。
专业投资者的意见分歧则更大。著名英籍投资者安东尼•波顿(Anthony Bolton)最近宣布，他将移居香港，管理一只中国基金，并对"中央统筹经济的有效性"赞不绝口。但对冲基金经理吉姆•夏诺斯(Jim Chanos)——他以发现安然(Enron)帐目造假而闻名——则表示，同样的中央计划体制已经在投资领域——尤其是房地产领域——吹出了"一个史无前例的泡沫"。在呈贡，这两派都可为自己的观点找到论据。
以下三方面的问题显而易见。首先，投资在中国经济中承载的负荷过重。中国社会科学院经济学家余永定表示，投资占国内生产总值(GDP)的比重过去在25%左右，如今正向50%靠拢。"投资率的快速上升正引发严重问题。投资率目前已经过高，但仍在大幅攀升，"他表示。"所有这一切都意味着，中国的产能过剩问题未来很可能严重恶化。"
比照历史可以发现，中国本轮投资热具有某种前所未有的特性。《经济学人智库》(Economist Intelligence Unit)指出，即便在掀起去年的投资热潮之前，中国投资占GDP的比重也已达到了1997-98年亚洲金融危机前夕泰国的水平，或者上世纪60年代日本投资高潮阶段的峰值水平。
余永定表示，目前的体制鼓励地方政府投资于政绩工程，比如闪亮的新城和行政中心，因为如果项目在5年内基本上没得到使用，官员们有时也并不介意，因为5年后他们将另有他任。他表示："产能过剩有其重要的制度原因。地方政府具有进行此类投资的强大动机。"
刺激政策引发的第二个担忧，是它将催生金融泡沫，尤其是房地产领域的泡沫（见下文）。除此之外的第三种担忧，是大量新增贷款最终将变成坏账，对于地方政府而言尤其如此——它们在大部分基建支出中扮演着核心角色。这些支出通常通过数以千的特设投资工具完成，资金来自于银行贷款。
美国西北大学(Northwestern University)学者史宗翰(Victor Shih)仔细翻阅了地方政府文件和评级机构资料，根据他的推算，大陆地方政府目前负债11.4万亿元人民币（合1.67万亿美元），比官方的估计高出一倍以上，相当于GDP的三分之一。他表示，银行已同意在2011年前，向这些"地方政府公司"再放贷12.7万亿元人民币，而其中有些公司肯定会无力还贷。
他补充称："我的数字是保守估计，因为可能还有很多放出去的贷款是我们不知道的。"
但即使存在所有这些风险，一些经济学家仍然认为，实际威胁被大大高估了。在他们看来，修建像呈贡这样的地方并不是浪费，而是对国内最贫穷的地区进行了非常必要的升级。
云南省社会科学院经济学家陈利君指出，他所在城市昆明的市中心——距离呈贡约20公里——过于拥挤。因此他认为，不出几年，像呈贡这样的新城就会人满为患。（一些市政部门将于今年夏季迁入新城。）呈贡项目只是昆明市及云南省改造工程的一部分，那里的官员辩称，他们是在夺回失去的时间。
"中国经济改革开放之初，首先发展起来的是东部地区，接着是中部，之后才是西南地区，" 陈利君表示。"昆明错过了与沿海城市齐头并进的机会，这让我们面临诸多挑战。"
当地政府希望通过建造15座桥梁和高架公路——它们的模型和设计图都陈列在一座崭新的城市规划博物馆里——以及一个全长163公里、很快可以连通呈贡与昆明市中心的轻轨网络，来减轻该市严重的交通堵塞。与此同时，一条高铁线路将把昆明与近2000公里以外的上海连接起来，并帮助这个曾经与世隔绝的地区，更紧密地融入全国经济。
大举投资的另一个目的，是把该地区的经济发展方向，从面向中国较为富裕的东部沿海地区，转向西南方的亚洲邻国。随着一座大桥的竣工，连接昆明与曼谷的公路已全线贯通，另一座连接云南和越南北部公路上的大桥也已接近竣工。通往中缅边境的公路与铁路连线已经修缮完毕，一座斥资230亿元人民币、旨在使昆明成为东南亚旅游业枢纽的机场正在建设之中。陈利君表示："如果交通更方便的话，我们与东南亚的贸易额完全可以再翻一番。"
巴克莱资本(Barclays Capital)驻香港经济学家彭文生表示，那些担心基建投资过度的怀疑人士忘记了，从发展阶段看，中国更像是上世纪五六十年代——而非80年代泡沫时期——的日本。换句话说，中国很多地方仍急需基础设施建设。
他补充称，政府促成最近一轮投资热潮乃是明智之举，因为再过几年，社会将趋于老龄化，届时可能无法拿出推行此类大胆计划所需的金融资源。"2015年后，就业人口将开始减少，储蓄也将随之下降，"他表示。"在那之前，我们有5年时间来建设一套先进的基础设施。这不仅是应对去年出口下滑的便捷之道，也是这个国家必须要做的事情。"
那么孰对孰错呢？这些数据不能完全说明问题，但的确表明中国仍有一定的喘息空间。如果中国经济全面陷入产能过剩，效率和投资回报率会出现骤降，这也意味着中国今后的增长将明显减速。
余永定表示，这一点已经在衡量投资效率的增量资本产出率(ICOR)数据中清楚地体现出来。（数字越大，意味着一个国家必须加大投资，才能生成额外产出。）日本在投资热潮期间，这一数字大约为3，中国在1991至2003年间为4.1。而在刺激政策的作用下，目前这一数字已高于6，在余永定看来，这是一个明显的警示信号。
但一些经济学家指出，前十年，当有关产能过剩和投资过剩的警告不绝于耳时，公司利润实际上出现了增长，尽管某些行业有时会蒙受损失。此外，学术研究已表明，期间资本回报率一直保持稳定。
此外，高增长率可以让产能过剩问题迅速消失。正如彭文生所言："过去10到15年，任何根据产能过剩理念来分析中国的投资者，都赚不到一分钱。"
另一个问题是，金融体系是否会被坏账阻塞？史宗翰提供的数据，让许多经济学家都静下心来想一想刺激方案可能开出的账单，尤其是考虑到人们对钱到底怎么花出去的所知甚少。世界大型企业联合会(Conference Board)的比尔•亚当斯(Bill Adams)在北京表示："透明度很低，能见度极差——这正是人们对投资热的担心所在。"
不过，除非坏账激增，否则中国有能力在不损害金融体系的同时，消化大量不良贷款。坐拥2.4万亿外汇储备的中国，能够在银行遭遇问题时，轻松地重组其资本结构。实际上，中国在过去十年的最初几年正是这样做的——当时，各大银行由于之前的信贷狂热，技术上已陷入了破产境地。
《中国经济季刊》(Chinese Economic Quarterly)出版人葛艺豪(Arthur Kroeber)指出，未来10年，如果能保持合理的增长率，这些坏账在GDP中所占的比例将迅速下降。他指出，基础设施空置引发的恐慌，往往会在过几年项目完全投入使用后烟消云散。
但就连他也认为，中国无法长久地利用其银行，来为资金来源可疑的基础设施建设项目谋得贷款。否则坏账规模可能会大到危险的地步，如果中国要继续维持增长，就需要大大提高资本配置的效率。
葛艺豪表示："中国正在接近用这种方式为增长融资的极限。"他补充道，管事的中央规划者"这一次或许能摆脱危险，但如果他们继续打算如此行事，就会陷入麻烦"。
译者/章晴、陈云飞
Chenggong is a new town near Kunming, one of the main cities in the south-west of China. Construction started in 2003 and the results are now apparent in 13 immaculate local government buildings, each clad in marble tiles. A high school boasts an impressive indoor swimming pool and two of the region's main universities have built large campuses. Pristine high-rise apartment blocks stand in rows, their new windows glinting in the subtropical sun.
The one drawback: at the moment, Chenggong is almost completely empty. Its wide streets are all but bereft of traffic, a bank branch has no customers, and leaves collect in the foyers of the municipal offices.
It is places such as Chenggong that are starting to divide opinion about what is really happening in the Chinese economy. China was the big winner from the global crisis, with its economy expanding by 8.7 per cent last year amid recession elsewhere. But as the country returns from its lunar new year holiday, divisions are emerging over the long-term impact of the stimulus package implemented by Beijing to carry it through the international downturn.
While some regard China as having made forward-looking investments in infrastructure and urban planning that will lay the foundations for a new burst of growth, others fear last year's recovery is really a mirage based on an investment bubble. It is also a crucial question for the fragile global economy. If China's rebound were to fizzle, it could easily drag the rest of the world into a double-dip recession.
Within the government, there is sharp debate about the risks from last year's credit binge, which saw the number of new loans double. Some officials want to keep the investment taps open because they fear the economy is still weak, while others worry about looming threats of inflation and overcapacity.
Among professional investors, views are even more polarised. Anthony Bolton, the prominent British investor, recently announced he was moving to Hong Kong to manage a China fund and purred about "the effectiveness of the centrally run economy". Yet Jim Chanos, the hedge fund manager best known for seeing the fiction in Enron's accounts, says the very same centrally planned system has created "an unprecedented bubble" in investment, especially in real estate. Both sides can find ammunition for their arguments in Chenggong.
Three sets of worries are in evidence. The first is that investment is now carrying too big a load in the Chinese economy. According to Yu Yongding, an economist at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, investment that was once around 25 per cent of gross domestic product is heading towards 50 per cent. "The rapid increase in the investment rate is creating serious problems. It is already too high and it is still increasing significantly," he says. "All of this means that in the future, China's overcapacity problem is likely to become much more serious."
Historical comparisons suggest there is something unprecedented in China's investment boom. Even before last year's surge, the Economist Intelligence Unit notes, China's investment-to-GDP ratio was the same as Thailand's on the eve of the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, or Japan's at its peak during its high investment phase in the 1960s.
Prof Yu says the system encourages local governments to invest in trophy projects, such as gleaming new towns and administrative centres, because officials sometimes do not care if the project is barely used in five years' time as they will by then have moved to a different job. "There are big institutional reasons for overcapacity. Local governments have a strong motivation to create this investment," he says.
The second worry from the stimulus is thus that it creates financial bubbles, especially in real estate (see below). Beyond that, the third fear is that the flood of new lending will end up as bad debts. This is particularly the case for local governments, which have been at the heart of most of the infrastructure spending, usually through thousands of specially created investment vehicles funded by bank loans.
Victor Shih, an academic at Northwestern University of the US, sifted through local government documents and ratings agency filings and calculated that mainland local governments now have debts of Rmb11,400bn ($1,670bn, £1,085bn, €1,235bn), which is more than double the official estimate and is equivalent to one-third of GDP. Banks have agreed to lend a further Rmb12,700bn by 2011 to these local government companies, he says, some of which are bound to struggle to repay the loans.
"My numbers are a conservative estimate as there are probably a lot more loans out there that we do not know about," he adds.
Y et even though all these risks are present, some economists believe that the actual threat is being vastly overstated. For them, places such as Chenggong are not waste but a much-needed upgrade for the poorest parts of the country.
Chen Lijun, an economist at the Yunnan Academy of Social Sciences in Kunming, points out that the centre of his city – which lies about 20km from Chenggong – is overcrowded. As a result, he says, it will only take a few years before new projects such as Chenggong are fully occupied. (Some city government departments will move to the new town in the summer.) The Chenggong project is only one part of a makeover of Kunming city and the province of Yunnan, where officials argue they are making up for lost time.
"When China started reforming the economy, the east developed first and then the centre and only after that the west and south," says Prof Chen. "Kunming missed a chance to develop as quickly as the coastal cities, which left us with a lot of challenges."
The local government hopes to reduce the city's intense traffic congestion by building 15 new bridges or flyovers – models and artists' impressions of which are all on display at a brand new urban planning museum – as well as constructing a 163km-long light rail network, which will soon link Chenggong to the city centre. Meanwhile, a high-speed rail line will connect Kunming to Shanghai, nearly 2,000km away, and help bind this once isolated region more closely into the national economy.
The investment boom is also intended to reorient the region's economy, which has long focused on China's richer east coast, towards its south-east Asian neighbours. The construction of a bridge has completed a road linking Kunming to Bangkok, while a bridge on another road joining Yunnan with northern Vietnam is nearly finished. Road and rail links to the border with Burma are also being improved and a Rmb23bn airport is under development, with the aim of making Kunming a hub for tourism in south-east Asia. "If the transport links were better, our trade with south-east Asia would double without any problem," says Prof Chen.
Peng Wensheng, an economist at Barclays Capital in Hong Kong, says sceptics worrying about excessive investment in infrastructure forget that in development terms China is more like Japan of the 1950s and 1960s, not the bubble-era 1980s. In other words, large parts of the country are still in dire need of infrastructure.
He adds that the government was smart to push through the recent surge in investment because in a few years it greying society might not generate the financial resources to make such bold plans. "Savings will start to drop after 2015 when the working population starts to decline," he says. "Before that, we have five years to build a modern infrastructure. It is not only a convenient way to deal with the decline in exports last year, it is also a necessity for the country."
So who is right? The figures are inconclusive but they do suggest China still has some breathing room. If the economy were drowning in overcapacity, there would be a dramatic decline in efficiency and returns on investment, suggesting much slower growth in the future.
Prof Yu says this is already evident in the figures for the incremental capital/output ratio, which measures the efficiency of investment. (A higher number means a country needs to invest more to generate additional output.) In Japan during its investment boom, this figure was about three, and in China from 1991-2003 it was 4.1. Yet as a result of the stimulus it is now above six, he says, which is a large red warning light.
Some economists point out, however, that during the previous decade, when warnings about overcapacity and overinvestment were widespread, corporate profits actually increased, even if specific sectors suffered at times. And academic research has suggested that returns on capital remained stable.
Moreover, high rates of growth can make overcapacity problems disappear quickly. As Mr Peng puts it: "Any investor who based his views on China on the idea of overcapacity would not have made any money over the last 10-15 years."
The other question is will the financial system become clogged up by bad debts. The figures produced by Mr Shih are giving many economists pause for thought about the potential bill from the stimulus package, especially given how little is known about how the money was really spent. "There is so little transparency, so little visibility – that is what is worrying about the investment boom," says Bill Adams at the Conference Board in Beijing.
Yet unless the bad debts become an avalanche, China has the ability to absorb a large number of non- performing loans without it undermining the financial system. With $2,400bn in foreign exchange reserves, it can easily recapitalise the banks if they run into problems. Indeed, that is exactly what it did in the early part of the last decade after the main banks became technically insolvent from a previous credit binge.
Arthur Kroeber, editor of the Chinese Economic Quarterly, points out that if reasonable rates of growth are maintained, those bad loans will rapidly decrease as a percentage of GDP over the course of the decade. Previous scares about empty infrastructure, he points out, often evaporated when the projects became fully put to use a few years later.
But even he thinks China cannot keep using its banks for much longer to push through loans for infrastructure projects with questionable finances. Bad debts would otherwise become dangerously large and China needs much more efficient allocation of capital if it is to keep growing.
"We are getting to the end of China's ability to finance growth in this way," he says, adding that the central planners in charge "can probably get away with it this time – but if they keep trying to do things this way, they will get into trouble".
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001031396
没有评论:
发表评论