哥本哈根气候变化大会已过去近2个月，但会上的一段插曲仍在北京引起热议。根据目击者的描述，在最后几轮紧张谈判的某一刻，一名中国官员开始用手指着美国总统巴拉克•奥巴马(Barack Obama)说话。
许多人认为，中国正在采取一种不同以往的强硬外交姿态，上述事件最主要的象征意义也在于此。正如一名欧洲外交官所言：“如果一个发改委副主任就能对美国总统做出这种举动，那么他们会怎样对待我们其余这些人？”
中美两国之间几乎每天都会出现新的摩擦：关于西藏、台湾、人民币，还有谷歌(Google)、伊朗、轮胎和鸡爪。不只是美国，印度、俄罗斯和欧洲各国也与中国有着类似的摩擦。
其中一些争执可谓了无新意，尤其是台湾和西藏问题。但中国威胁对波音(Boeing)等参与对台军售的美国公司进行制裁，似乎是出了一记狠招。从很多方面来看，中国采取更加咄咄逼人的立场是可以理解的。所有人都在告诉中国，它是未来的超级大国。那么，中国希望把这一地位转化为在“核心”问题上的实际影响力，就并不让人感到意外。一名中国商人上周表示：“我们要让美国看到，今天的中国已与8年前截然不同了。”
与美国进行强硬对话，在民族主义情绪往往一触即发的中国颇受欢迎。在奥巴马政府批准64亿美元的对台军售方案前，中国国内网站和一些报纸就已在兜售对相关美国公司进行制裁的主意了。
导致中国对美国不满的某些原因，出乎人们的意料。中国持有的美元外汇储备，通常被视为一种实力。但很多中国人抱怨称，政府是在美国的说服下，才购买了这些在他们看来必将急剧贬值的资产。前日发表在《第一财经》(China Business News)的一篇文章题为：“美国急了 恶招频出意在逼迫中国买美国债”。
有些言论可能也反映出，围绕通胀潜力和领导权更替等问题的内部政治斗争正在升温。
尽管这类言论是国内政治斗争的有力武器，但中国要是真的对美国采取更加强硬的立场，那就是在玩火。如果这些争执超出“口水战”的范畴，北京方面可能会付出很大代价。
最显而易见的风险是，中国对美国军火公司的制裁，可能成为引发贸易战的导火索之一。在美国国会，有整整一柜子法案在威胁：如果北京方面不让人民币升值，就对中国商品加征关税。这些法案上的灰尘随时会被拂去，尤其是在美国失业率居高不下的情况下。
更泛泛地说，北京方面更为强硬的姿态，可能会破坏10多年来取得很大成功的外交策略，这一策略有助于维持中国经济的繁荣。北京方面通过和平解决边境争端、加大在国际组织中的参与和对世界各地提供援助，化解了“中国威胁”可能导致的不少紧张关系。这一策略的基石是确保与美国的关系不致过僵。
但如果北京方面将部分威胁付诸实践，那可能会导致许多国家对本国与中国交往的方式做出战术调整。虽然在头一年任期里，奥巴马政府曾强调与中国进行接触，但它的态度可能会变得更倾向于遏制中国。其它国家——比如日本、澳大利亚和印度——也可能有类似倾向。中国的中亚和东南亚邻国则会变得更加警惕，以免受制于中国。其结果是，中国要想达成能源供应方面的交易、或者为其产品开拓新的市场，会变得更加困难。
中国已经足够强大，不必再遵循政治家邓小平建议的“韬光养晦”策略。但中国领导人在考虑如何向外国施加更大影响力的同时，也有必要问问自己：“为此而放弃一项制胜的策略，真的值得吗？”
译者/何黎
It is almost two months now since the Copenhagen climate change conference, but one incident from the meeting is still causing a buzz in Beijing. It was the moment in one of the tense final sessions when, according to witness accounts, a Chinese official started to jab his finger at Barack Obama, the US president.
More than anything else, that incident has symbolised what many see as a newly aggressive Chinese approach to diplomacy. As a European diplomat said: “If one of the deputy heads of the planning ministry can behave like that to the American president, how are they going to treat the rest of us?”
Almost every day there appears to be a new source of irritation between China and the US about Tibet or Taiwan or the Chinese currency. That is on top of Google, Iran, tyres and chicken feet. And it is not just the Americans: similar stories are being told by Indians, Russians and assorted Europeans.
There is a ritualistic quality to some of these disputes, especially Taiwan and Tibet. But China seems to be raising the stakes threatening sanctions on US companies selling arms to Taiwan, including Boeing. In lots of ways, China's pushier approach is understandable. Everyone has been telling the Chinese they are the coming superpower. It should be no surprise, then, that China wishes to turn that position into real influence over “core” issues. “We have to show the US that today's China is very different from the China of eight years ago,” a Chinese businessman said last week.
Talking tough with the US is popular at home, where nationalist sentiments are often only just beneath the surface. The idea of imposing sanctions on US companies over Taiwan arms sales was touted on the internet and in some newspapers before the Obama administration approved the $6.4bn package.
Chinese frustrations with the US include some surprises. China's foreign currency reserves of US dollars are usually seen as a strength, but many in China complain the government has been talked into buying assets whose value, they think, will inevitably collapse. A headline in yesterday's China Business News reads: “The US frequently uses cunning tricks to force China to buy its bonds”.
Some of the rhetoric might also reflect growing internal political battles, over the potential for inflation, for instance, or the leadership succession.
But even if such talk is good domestic politics, China is playing with fire if it takes a genuinely harder line with the US. Beijing has a lot to lose if these disputes become more than just a war of words.
The most obvious risk is that Chinese sanctions on US arms companies could help provoke a trade war. There is a cupboard full of bills in the US Congress threatening tariffs on Chinese goods if Beijing does not let its currency appreciate, which are just waiting to be dusted off – especially if unemployment remains high.
More broadly, Beijing's more abrasive approach risks undermining a decade or so of highly successful diplomacy that has helped sustain China's booming economy. Beijing has managed to neutralise a lot of potential tensions about the “China threat” by settling border disputes, increasing its participation in international organisations and distributing aid. The cornerstone of this strategy was making sure relations with the US did not become too fraught.
But if Beijing follows through on some of its sabre-rattling, it could lead to a cascade of tactical adjustments on how to deal with China. In its first year, the Obama administration emphasised engaging China, but it could lean more towards containment. Japan, Australia and India, for instance, might be pulled in a similar direction and neighbours in central Asia and south-east Asia could become more wary of being dominated by China. The result would be to make it more difficult for China to do energy-supply deals and open new markets for its products.
China is too powerful to keep following statesman Deng Xiaoping's advice to “adopt a low profile”. But as China's leaders ponder how to exert more influence abroad, they need to ask: “Is it really worth tearing up a winning strategy?”
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001031258
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