对
任何一位中国领导人来说，其面临的首要任务是确保经济以足够快的速度增长，从而能够支撑就业、维护社会稳定。从这方面看，即将离任的领导人胡锦涛和温家宝在过去10年取得了巨大成功。中国经济增长强劲、就业率维持在高位、中共的统治得到了保障。
但在表象之下，有越来越多的迹象表明中国社会存在种种疲态：出口和房地产行业面临巨大压力；民营企业家被挤出市场；不平等和腐败现象激增；人们担心胡锦涛及其团队推行的改革不足以支撑下一个十年的经济增长。
在中南海主政10年之后，胡锦涛在经济方面交出了一份怎样的答卷？《中国实时报》栏目制作了多张图表为您一一梳理： 中国国内生产总值(GDP)快速增长，胡锦涛在位期间中国经济年均增速超过10%。由于有效应对了全球金融危机，中国赢得了世界的喝彩。中国经济增速和就业率在危机发生后仍然维持在正常的轨道上，并为世界经济的复苏做出了贡献。
快速增长的经济令中国一跃超过英国、法国、德国和日本，成为仅次于美国的全球第二大经济体。这令中国市场成为全球各企业的目标，使中国领导人在全球治理中得以发挥更大的作用，并促使西方批评家在人权问题上软化了立场。
美国国务卿希拉里•克林顿(Hilary Clinton)在2009年2月时说，在人权问题上向中国施压不能对全球经济危机、全球气候变化危机以及安全危机造成影响。从中可以明显看出其语气的转变。
中国民众也受益于快速增长的中国经济，生活水平大幅上升。国际货币基金组织(IMF)的数据显示，按
购买力衡量的中国人均GDP水平从2002年的2,800美元增加到2012年预估的9,100美元，增幅达到两倍多。
快速增长的中国经济毅然决然地把中国带出贫穷国家的行列，进入中等收入国家群体。但几乎没有迹象表明中国开启了民主化进程。中国也并没有向外界预期那样，出现财富增加催生政治改革的现象。
中国经济保持10年快速增长的确是一个了不起的纪录。但其中很大一部分功劳要归于胡锦涛的前任江泽民。江泽民引导了影响深远的改革，为这10年的经济增长奠定了基础。不过，这些改革对经济的拉动作用眼下已经不断减弱。
中国在2001年加入世界贸易组织(WTO)令中国迎来了一个出口繁荣期。从2002年至2007年，中国出口年均增速接近30%。但随着中国成长为世界上最大的出口国，其在全球市场的份额超过10%，中国出口进一步扩张的空间也变得有限。不断上升的工资水平和不断升值的人民币均削弱了中国出口竞争力。
温州男杰剃须刀厂负责人陈朱南说，中国加入WTO之后出口业迅速蓬勃发展。温州的生意非常红火。
现在情况就没有那么好了。陈朱南说，2007年是一个分水岭。在此之前出口行业生意不错，但2007年后情况越来越糟。特别是今年，生意真的非常难做。2012年头十个月出口增速同比回落至7.8%的水平。
房地产行业走上了一条类似的道路。1998年，随着中国城市中的工厂宿舍和破旧住房升级为现代公寓，政府开始放开房地产市场，启动了逾10年之久的建设狂潮。从2002年至2010年，新建住宅施工面积以每年平均17%的速度增长，房地产成为推动内需的最重要行业。但随着飙升的房价与百姓收入脱节，政府被迫采取严格的控制措施，以遏制购房需求。
其结果是，供应过剩使中国城市周边出现大量无人居住的地区，市区里留下很多烂尾楼。2012年前10个月，新建住宅施工面积同比下降了12.7%。
江泽民和当时的国务院总理朱�基改革中国臃肿而不赚钱的国有企业，关闭了成千上万家低效企业。这为私营企业的繁荣发展创造了空间，为过去10年的经济增长打下了基础。
在胡锦涛主政时期，由于政府大力支持大型国有企业，之前取得的一些成果付之东流。虽然
国有企业在企业总数中所占的比重持续下滑，2011年降至5%，但由于国有企业仍在经济的制高点占有主导地位，其产出在总产出中所占的比重一直保持在相对较高的26%。
劳动力和资本存量的迅速增长推高了中国的经济产出，胡锦涛也因此受益。他的继任者们将不会这么幸运。
过去10年，中国适龄劳动人口增加了数千万人。这提高了生产力，使工资保持在较低水平，进而极大地提高了出口竞争力。联合国的预测显示，未来10年中国劳动人口数量将见顶并开始减少。
10年前，中国的工厂缺少生产产品的机器设备，城市缺少将产品运至市场所需的道路和铁路。甚至是在2012年，中国的资本存量依然远远低于美国的水平。但经过10年狂热的支出后，单位投资创造的效益开始下降。
日本一桥大学(Hitotsubashi University)中国数据研究专家伍晓鹰(Harry Wu)估计，从2001年至2010年，中国每增加一个单位资本，能增加0.13个单位产出，单位产出量低于上世纪90年代的0.17和80年代高点时的0.24。伍晓鹰还是世界大型企业联合会中国经济与企业研究中心(The Conference Board China Center for Economics and Business)的高级顾问。
2009年至2010年中国为应对金融危机而大幅增加的放贷也损害了未来的经济增长前景。据“中国实时报”栏目估计，未偿贷款与GDP之比从2002年的约116%上升至2011年的172%。要想降低这个比率，需要将信贷增速降至名义GDP的增速以下。中国新一代领导人不能依靠大规模放贷来支持经济增长。
胡锦涛将和谐发展──即更公平地分享财富不断增长带来的好处──作为其战略的一个重要组成部分。尽管如此，中国的贫富差距已经扩大到令人担忧的水平。
贫富分化的程度在官方数据中没有得到体现，这一定程度上是因为中国的精英阶层不愿向政府统计人员披露其财富的详细情况。但学术调查显示，中国的分配不公已经达到了拉美的水平。
王小鲁2008年进行的一项调查显示，中国城市居民中收入最高那10%的人每年平均可支配收入为人民币13.9万元，比普通收入者高出六倍，比收入最低那10%的人高24倍。由于富有家庭的储蓄率比贫穷家庭的储蓄率要高，因此收入不公现象有助于解释中国的高储蓄率和低消费现象。
中国精英阶层收入非常高的原因之一是腐败。政府控制着重要投资项目和土地等
清廉指数(Corruption Perceptions Index)，中国以3.6分（总分10分）的得分排在第七十五位，跟同为“金砖国家”的巴西和印度差不多。
和征地、环境恶化等问题一起，腐败等因素导致社会进一步动荡。可靠数据很难取得，但清华大学教授孙立平曾说，2010年群体性事件有180,000起，高于2002年胡锦涛当上总书记时的50,000起。怎样管理不再那么和谐的社会，将是中国新一届领导层的面临的一个挑战。
在改革方面，胡锦涛及其团队并非完全无所建树。
他们的最大成就，是改善了公共服务和福利供给。2011年教育支出占GDP的4%，高于2002年的2.2%。医疗、养老保险范围扩大，而取消农业税有助于提高中国6.5亿农村人口的收入。
在金融行业，四大国有银行上市，在它们的贷款决策之中加入了市场约束的元素。作为经济再平衡关键工具的利率也已经部分自由化，这意味着家庭储户的回报率提高，这是朝着增加收入、提振消费的方向迈出的一步。
同为再平衡工具的汇率也已自由化。人民币从2005年与美元脱钩以来，已相对美元升值31%。2012年，人民币波动区间扩大，让市场对其走势有了更大的决定权。
人民币走强从一个方面降低了中国对外贸易的失衡，2011年
经常账户顺差占GDP比例已经从2007年10.1%的高位降至2.8%。
再平衡也获得了政府控制范围之外力量的支持。劳动力供应的减少带来工资的快速上涨。来自江西省的40岁农民工刘兴顺（音）目前在深圳一家家具厂工作。他对“中国实时报”栏目说，2000年他一个月工资在1,000元（合160美元）左右，现在一个月能挣4,000元到5,000元。
工资上涨对于推动中国家庭消费增长有着至关重要的意义。然而，改革议程中的关键元素仍然未解，比如放开经济中被政府控制的行业，引入竞争，又如强化农民土地权利，改革不公正的城乡户籍制度等。
在胡锦涛引退之际，一些初步迹象表明，人们等待已久的中国经济再平衡可能终于开始了。
家庭消费占GDP比重从2002年的44%降至2010年的34.9%，远低于美国或亚洲邻国的水平。2011年又小幅升至35.4%。按国际标准和历史标准衡量，这个比例仍然非常低，但正在朝着正确的方向变动。
2012年，家庭收入的增长超过了GDP的增长。家庭收入占GDP比例的增加──这样消费者可以拿更多的钱去购物──是再平衡的核心所在。
这些变化到底是投资、出口暂缓之际的昙花一现，还是中国经济实现再平衡这个趋势的开始，将是确定胡锦涛经济遗产的一个关键因素。
Tom Orlik（更新完成） （本文版权归道琼斯公司所有，未经许可不得翻译或转载。）
The number one task for any Chinese leader: securing fast enough economic growth to shore up employment and social stability. On that basis, outgoing leaders Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao's decade at the top was a resounding success. Growth was strong, employment was high, and the Communist Party's rule secure.
Beneath the surface though, there are growing signs of strain: exhausted exports and real estate sectors, private entrepreneurs choked out of the market, burgeoning inequality and corruption, and fears that reform by Mr. Hu and his team has been insufficient to underpin another decade of growth.
After ten years behind the big desk at Zhongnanhai, what is Mr. Hu's economic legacy? China Real Time charts it out:
China's GDP growth blistered, averaging more than 10% a year during Mr. Hu's time in office. China won plaudits for an effective response to the financial crisis keeping growth and employment on track and contributing to the world recovery.
Rapid growth catapulted China up the global economic rankings, overtaking the UK, France, Germany and Japan to claim second place, behind only the United States. That made the Chinese market a target for the world's corporations, won its leaders an expanded role in global governance, and encouraged critics in the West to soften their tone on human rights.
In a noticeable rhetorical shift, U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton said in February 2009 that pressing China on human rights 'can't interfere with the global economic crisis, the global climate change crisis and the security crisis'
China's citizens benefited from rapid growth with a sharp increase in their standard of living. GDP per capita measured in purchasing power terms more than tripled from $2,800 in 2002 to a forecast $9,100 in 2012 according to the International Monetary Fund.
That lifted China decisively out of the ranks of poor nations, and into the middle-income bracket. With few signs of democratization, China also defied expectations that rising wealth would lead to political reform.
Ten years of rapid growth is an impressive record. But much of the credit must go to Mr. Hu's predecessor Jiang Zemin, who shepherded far reaching reforms that laid the foundations of the decade's growth. The boost from those reforms is now running its course.
China's entry into the World Trade Organisation in 2001 ushered in an export boom, with exports averaging nearly 30% annual growth from 2002-07. But as China has grown to be the world's largest exporter, with more than 10% of the global market, the room for further expansion is limited. Rising wages, and a stronger yuan, have also taken a toll on export competitiveness.
'The exporting industry was booming right after China joined the WTO. Business in Wenzhou was great' said Chen Zhunan, director of Wenzhou Nanjie Razor Factory.
Now things are not so good. 'The year 2007 is like the watershed. Before 2007, the export industry was doing good, but after 2007, it is becoming worse and worse. Especially this year, it is very difficult to do business,' said Mr. Chen. Export growth has fallen back to 7.8% year-on-year in the first ten months of 2012.
Real estate follows a similar trajectory. In 1998, the government opened the market, kicking off more than a decade of frenetic construction as urban China moved from factory dormitories and crumbling tenements to modern apartments. From 2002 to 2010, new residential floor space under construction averaged 17% annual growth, and real estate became the single most important driver of domestic demand. But as prices rose out of line with incomes, the government was forced to impose draconian controls, choking off demand.
The result: Oversupply has left China's cities ringed with empty suburbs and skylines littered with half-finished tower blocks. New floor space under construction shrank 12.7% year-over-year in the first ten months of 2012.
Jiang Zemin and then-Premier Zhu Rongji took a knife to China's bloated and unprofitable state sector, closing thousands of unproductive enterprises. That opened up space for private sector firms to flourish, underwriting the growth of the last decade.
Under Mr. Hu's administration, some of those gains have been reversed, as the government has thrown its weight behind state champions. The number of state-owned enterprises as a share of the total has continued to fall, dropping to 5% in 2011. But with SOEs still dominant in the commanding heights of the economy, their share of total output has remained relatively buoyant at 26%.
Mr. Hu also benefited from rapid additions to the labor force and capital stock that boosted China's output. His successors will not be so fortunate.
China added tens of millions to its working-aged population in the last decade. That added to production and kept wages low supercharging export competitiveness. In the decade ahead, projections from the United Nations show the workforce will plateau in size and then start to shrink.
A decade ago, China's factories were short of machines to produce goods and its cities lacked the roads and rails necessary to take them to market. Even in 2012, capital stock remains way below the level of the U.S. But after a decade of frenetic spending, the benefits of an extra unit of investment have been reduced.
China data whiz Harry Wu of Hitotsubashi University and The Conference Board China Center estimates that from 2001 to 2010 each additional unit of capital added 0.13 units to output, down from 0.17 in the 1990s and a high of 0.24 in the 1980s.
A lending splurge in 2009-10 as China responded to the financial crisis has also hurt future growth prospects. The ratio of outstanding credit to GDP has risen from around 116% in 2002 to 172% in 2011 according to China Real Time estimates. Bringing that ratio down will require growth in credit to fall below growth in nominal GDP. China's new leaders can't splurge on loans to support growth.
Mr. Hu made harmonious development sharing the benefits of rising wealth more evenly a key part of his strategy. Despite that, the gap between China's haves and have-nots has widened to worrying levels.
The extent of inequality is hidden in the official data, partly because China's elite are reluctant to disclose details of their wealth to government statisticians. But academic surveys point to levels of inequality hitting Latin American levels.
A survey of by Wang Xiaolu in 2008 found that the top 10% of China's urban dwellers had average disposable income of 139,000 yuan a year, 7 times more than average earners, and 25 times more than the bottom 10%. With rich households saving more of their income than poor, that income inequality helps explain China's high savings rate and low consumption.
Part of the explanation for very high incomes amongst China’s elite is corruption. Government control of major investment projects, and key resources like land, offers multiple opportunities for graft. China ranks 75th in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, with a score of 3.6 out of ten. That’s around the same level as fellow BRICs Brazil and India.
Along with problems like land grabs and environmental degradation, corruption has contributed to an increase in social unrest. Reliable data is hard to come by but Sun Liping, a professor at Tsinghua University, has said that there were 180,000 mass incidents in 2010. That’s up from 50,000 in 2002 when Mr. Hu took over. Governing a less harmonious society will be a challenge for China’s new leaders.
Mr. Hu and his team have not been entirely asleep at the wheel on reform.
Top of the list of achievements is improved public services and welfare provision. Education spending hit 4% of GDP in 2011, up from 2.2% in 2002. Health and pension coverage have expanded, and elimination of agricultural taxes helped raise incomes for China’s 650 million rural dwellers.
In the financial sector, the big four state-owned banks were listed on the public markets, bringing an element of market discipline to their lending decisions. Interest rates, a key instrument of economic rebalancing, have been partially liberalized. That means higher returns to household savers a step to increasing incomes and boosting consumption.
China’s exchange rate another instrument of rebalancing has also been liberalized. The yuan has risen 31% against the dollar since the peg was broken in 2005. In 2012, the band in which the yuan trades was widened giving the markets a great say in how it moves.
A stronger currency has helped reduce the imbalance in China’s trade, with the current account surplus shrinking to 2.8% of GDP in 2011 from a high of 10.1% in 2007.
Rebalancing is also receiving support from forces outside of the government’s control. A diminished supply of workers is driving up wages at a rapid clip. Liu Xingshun, a 40-year-old migrant worker from Jiangxi province, currently working in a furniture factory in Shenzhen, told China Real Time he made about 1,000 yuan ($160) a month in the year 2000. Now he makes 4,000 to 5,000 yuan.
Higher wages are essential to fuel an increase in China’s household consumption. But key elements of the reform agenda, from opening state-dominated sectors of the economy to competition, to strengthening farmers’ land rights, and reforming the iniquitous system of urban and rural residence rights, remain undone.
As Mr. Hu bows out, there are tentative signs that the long-awaited rebalancing of China’s economy may finally be underway.
The share of household consumption in GDP fell from 44% in 2002 to 34.9% in 2010, way below the level in the U.S., or China’s Asian neighbors. In 2011, it ticked up to 35.4%. That’s still very low in international and historical comparison, but it’s a move in the right direction.
In 2012, growth in household income has accelerated past GDP. A rising share of household income in GDP giving consumers more cash to spend at the shops is the essence of rebalancing.
Whether these changes represent a blip as investment and exports take a breather, or the beginning of a trend as China’s economy regains its balance, will be a key factor in determining Mr. Hu’s economic legacy.
Tom Orlik
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