人民币再次成为华盛顿不和谐论战的主题、中美紧张关系升级的导火索，这不是第一次，也不会是最后一次。在今年春季发生类似情况时，北京出台了一系列巩固信心的举措，并于6月份宣布将提高人民币汇率弹性，成为那一轮调控措施的高潮。威胁恫吓、随后紧张逐步缓和，这已经成为了一种模式，但这种状况每发生一次，出现新的金融与经济动荡的风险就会随之增大。
美国最近在人民币问题上的施压——包括上周奥巴马政府向世贸组织(WTO)提交了两份针对中国的起诉书——在一定程度上要归因于11月份国会选举前美国政坛的不稳定性。但奥巴马政府这么做，不仅仅是为了赢得选民的欢心。更确切地说，世界两大经济巨人——一个是最大债务人、另一个是最大债权人——对金融危机过后全球体系如何运行的看法发生了冲突。本质上，这场论战的核心问题是，谁应该为经济失衡负责，谁又该负责修正这种失衡。
问题的答案一度非常简单。美国及其它西方国家已经大受触动，准备在未来几年内增加储蓄、降低私人与公共债务。由此可以推论出，如果世界体系要想平稳运行，那么，某些国家必须减少储蓄。中国及其它债权国如今应带头实施这些必要的举措。
不过，北京似乎不愿意做出大的让步。3个月前北京宣布提高人民币弹性时，我曾指出，这是一项明智的外交举动，但再无其他。此后，人民币汇率几乎没有任何变动，直到9月初——自那以来，人民币升值速度开始加快，但目前仍仅比6月份高出了1%。最近一次人民币升值，一定程度上是因为美国国内齐声要求教训中国，另一方面也因为高规格政治会议与谈判即将到来。
中国有一个强有力的论点：人民币升值不会对美国降低贸易赤字产生很大帮助，因为美国出现赤字，价格只是部分原因，更主要的还是与结构性现象有关。结构性现象是中美两国储蓄与投资失衡的根本致因。日本上周采取的打压日元的干预举措，也给了中国抵制人民币升值要求的借口。华盛顿对日本举动接近缄默的态度，只能被北京理解为它在选择性地表现敌意。它这么做想必基于下述假设：它已不再视日本为商业威胁，而中国在商业上与政治上，都是它的竞争对手。
即便如此，北京方面做出让步，不仅会是精明的战略之举，也符合中国的国家利益。尽管美国资产的持有者（尤其是中国央行）将会因人民币大幅升值受损，但升值有利于推动北京正广泛讨论的一种转型：转向更以消费为中心的经济模式。这种转型推迟的越久，一旦发生经济冲击，冲击力度就会越大。
尽管人民币汇率问题是当前的关注焦点，但中国的根本问题在于经济制度，这种制度使得中国国民储蓄占国内生产总值(GDP)比例长期维持在50%以上。除非中国政府实施机构、企业、劳动力市场、社会保障等一系列改革，扩大本土生产与消费所占经济比重，推动经济恢复平衡，否则，上述状况不会发生多少改变。而改革需要政府的大力推动。
汇率纠纷历来都与全球经济体系根深蒂固的失衡有关。这种失衡需要修正举措，以及债务国与债权国的高度合作。这不是没发生过，如布雷顿森林时代(Bretton Woods era)，或许还有《广场协议》（Plaza Accord，本周将迎来该协议的25周年纪念日）签署后很短的一段时间。但我们十分清楚，这些只是例外。
我们所需要的是全球领导力。不幸的是，华盛顿与北京都已被国内选举分散了注意力。但像中国这样的债权国始终处于相对有利的地位，来带头发挥领导力，即使它们的不情愿已是声名远播。如果美国可以让中国相信，它逐年降低预算赤字与公共债务的承诺不是说着玩的，那么，它还有可能促使中国改变态度。
这并不容易。美国缺乏推出这样一个计划的政治意愿，最乐观估计，大概也要等到2012年总统大选之后；而中国在2012年领导层换届前，不太可能会实施大规模经济与社会改革。不管怎样，美国能做的事情有限。最终，还是必须说服中国。
本周，中国国务院总理温家宝赴纽约参加联合国(UN)扶贫峰会，并与巴拉克•奥巴马(Barack Obama)总统会晤。这将是缓和形势的一次机会，尤其是考虑到，美财政部已定于11月中旬发布半年度汇率报告。该报告可能会指控中国操纵汇率，而该指控意味着两国必须对簿WTO，并可能实施关税惩罚。
如果出于自身的原因，中美不能够或不愿意与对方就贸易与汇率问题进行接触，那么，双方在其它关键政策问题上合作的可能性，似乎微乎其微。合作失败将留下真空，可能只有保护主义来填补。如果是那样的话，去全球化进程将会开始，而这对谁都没有好处，尤其是中国。
乔治•马格纳斯是瑞银证券(UBS Investment Bank)高级经济顾问，著有《崛起：新兴市场会塑造还是撼动世界经济》(Uprising: will emerging markets shape or shake the world economy)。
译者/何黎
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001034765
The renminbi, not for the first or last time, is the subject of a cacophonous debate in Washington and rising tensions between the US and China. When this happened in the spring, a series of confidence-building measures culminated in Beijing’s announcement in June that it would allow its currency to trade more flexibly. Sabre-rattling and subsequent de-escalation has become a pattern but with every occurrence the risks of new financial and economic turbulence are growing.
Recent US pressure on the issue, including last week’s referral by the administration of two complaints against China to the World Trade Organisation, can be explained partly by the unstable nature of US politics ahead of November’s Congressional elections. But this is about more than the need to curry favour among voters. Rather, the two giants of the world economy – one the biggest debtor, the other the biggest creditor – are skirmishing over how the global system should work in the aftermath of the financial crisis. At its heart, the debate is about who is to blame for economic imbalances and whose responsibility it is to right them.
For once, the answer is simple. The US and other western nations have been shocked into saving more and lowering private and public debts over the coming years. It follows that, if the world system is to function smoothly, someone has to save less. China and the other creditor nations are now in pole position to take the needed initiatives.
Yet Beijing seems unwilling to bend significantly. When the renminbi flexibility announcement was made three months ago, I suggested that it was a smart diplomatic move but little else. The currency barely moved until the beginning of September, since when it has risen more quickly to stand just over 1 per cent higher than in June. The timing of the most recent move up can be explained partly by the China-bashing chorus in the US and partly by the imminence of high-level political meetings and negotiations.
China has a strong argument that a higher renminbi would not help much to lower the US trade deficit, which is only partly about prices and much more about structural phenomena that underpin savings and investment imbalances in both countries. Japan’s intervention to weaken the yen last week also gives China cover to resist a higher renminbi. The near-silence in Washington on the Japanese move can only be understood in Beijing as targeted hostility. The presumption must be that Japan is no longer seen as a commercial threat, while China is both this and political rival.
Even so, a concession on Beijing’s part would not only be strategically astute; it would also accord with national interests. While holders of US assets – not least the central bank – would suffer under a large appreciation, a stronger renminbi is entirely in keeping with the shift to a more consumer-centric economy that is widely debated in Beijing. The longer this is deferred, the bigger the economic shock will be when it comes.
Although the exchange rate is the focus of attention, China’s underlying problem is an economic system that sustains national savings at more than 50 per cent of gross domestic product. Little will change unless an array of institutional, corporate, labour market and social security reforms are introduced to rebalance the economy towards local production and consumption. It will not happen without a big push.
Currency disputes are historically about deep-seated imbalances in the global economic system that demand corrective action and high levels of co-operation by both debtors and creditors. This does happen, for example during the Bretton Woods era and perhaps for a short time following the Plaza Accord, which has its 25th anniversary this week. But we know only too well that these were exceptions.
What is needed is global leadership. Unfortunately, both Washington and Beijing have been distracted by domestic constituencies. But creditor countries such as China are invariably better placed to take a lead, even if their reluctance is legendary. Here the US would make a difference if it could convince China that it was serious about lowering the budget deficit and public debt over time.
This will not be easy. The US lacks the political will to come up with such a plan, probably until after the 2012 presidential elections at best, while China is unlikely to embrace large-scale economic and social reform until after the 2012 leadership changeover. There is only so much the US can do in any event. In the end, it is China that must be persuaded.
Premier Wen Jibao’s visit this week to the UN poverty summit in New York and to see President Barack Obama will be an opportunity to calm things down, not least because the US Treasury is scheduled to publish its latest semi-annual currency report in mid-October. This might accuse China of manipulation, a charge that could entail bringing the case to the WTO and the imposition of tariffs.
If, for their own reasons, the US and China are unable or unwilling to engage with each other over trade and exchange rate issues, the chances of collaboration in other vital policy matters look slim. Failure would leave a vacuum, which could only be filled by protectionism. In that event, the process of deglobalisation would have begun – and that is nobody’s interests, least of all China’s.
The writer is senior economic adviser at UBS Investment Bank and author of Uprising: Will Emerging Markets Shape or Shake the World Economy?
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