几天前，我偶然读到一本20年前撰写的很有影响力的著作《日圆神话》(The Weight of the Yen)，作者是记者兼银行家塔嘎特・墨菲(Taggart Murphy)。讽刺的是，这本书与今天的现实颇为相关，只是相关的方式也许是墨菲本人未曾料到的。
墨菲写就本书时，日元疲软正令许多美国政策制定者和一些日本人忧心忡忡；最值得注意的是，20世纪70年代和80年代早期，日元借助政府控制，被人为地限制在低位，兑美元汇率维持在300日元左右。其结果是，日本出口行业机器轰鸣，以更低的价格与美国工业进行竞争；日本投资者大笔购入美国债务，人为压低了美国国债的收益率。正如墨菲所述：“导致失衡的原因是双重的：其一‘里根革命’已从结构上将联邦赤字嵌入美国国体；其二是日本以国家杠杆、集中化的信贷分配和信贷风险社会化为特点的‘发展型国家’经济体制。”
当然，如今至少对日本而言，故事已经有所发展。本周日本政府忙于干预汇市，压低过于坚挺的日元，日元汇率本周早些时候曾一度攀升至1美元兑82.88日元。同时，美国评论人士也不再担忧日本“不公平地”出口产品或购买债券；相反，日本在很大程度上已从美国的政治视野中消失。
然而，如果把“日本”二字替换为“中国”，墨菲的书就会让读者强烈地感到似曾相识。毕竟，借用墨菲的话来说，如今正是中国在主要运用低汇率和“集中化的信贷分配”来推动出口产业，同时大举购买美国国债。与此同时，美国政界人士现在正呼吁人民币大幅升值，这与1985年七国集团(G7)达成对日元重新估值的《广场协议》(Plaza Accord )相似。
这种压力会不会产生效果？目前，正如我的同事艾伦•贝蒂(Alan Beattie)所报道，达成中国式《广场协议》的可能性不大。但随着汇率争端愈演愈烈，墨菲书中讲述的那个时期的某些教训值得深入研究。回到1985年，提高日元汇率的协议刚达成时，许多美国观察人士一开始都认为取得了成功，因为在20世纪80年代末期，日元汇率达到了1美元兑150日元水平，并在该水平维持了若干年。
然而讽刺的是，这种“成功”并没有带来持久的稳定。相反，由于日元购买力激增，日本金融机构继续大举购买海外资产（包括美国国债）。同时，日本央行削减利率以避免出口下滑，并激发更多内需。这一切铺就了通向疯狂泡沫的道路，接着泡沫破灭，随后的几年中出现更多汇率不稳定。用墨菲的话说：“更改记账单位丝毫不可能解决这些根本的（扭曲）问题，只是造就了一个更不稳定的世界。”
鉴于以上事实，现在回顾历史时，很容易得出《广场协议》是一个坏主意的结论。并不让人意外的是，一些中国的政策制定者恰恰也在这么说。但实际上，整个故事更为微妙。就日本经济的繁荣和衰退乃至更大范围的不稳定而言，最大原因可能不仅在于《广场协议》的内容及其引发的情况，而是之前几十年期间发生（或未发生）的情况。
问题的关键在于日本的“发展型国家”体制。第二次世界大战后的几年中，资本极为稀缺，日本似乎有理由通过集中化的信贷分配和资本管制，将资金引导至工业。然而到了20世纪70年代中期，日本工业反弹如此之快，该国经济增长达到的水平已经使其不再需要这种以银行为中心的体制，就像儿童长大后不再需要旧鞋子一样。回首以往，这似乎表明日本本应更早取消各种管制，然而实际上，日本曾抗拒改革。所以到20世纪80年代，日本经济已浑身布满扭曲，日元低估只是其中之一。而这进而加大了实施任何平稳调整的难度。
中国能否避免这些错误？中国自称将努力避免，毕竟，北京正在实施一项金融改革计划，旨在帮助中国的金融体系缓慢“成长”，脱离发展型模式的桎梏。但考虑到中国增长的速度，在我看来，这种放开（以及汇率调整）的步伐看起来仍然缓慢得有些危险。可能现在将《日元神话》译成中文恰逢其时，至少，它能有说服力地阐明快速升值和完全拒绝改革这两种做法可能造成的风险。
译者/王柯伦
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001034690
A few days ago, I stumbled across an influential tome written two decades earlier by Taggart Murphy, a journalist-cum-banker, called The Weight of the Yen. It is wryly relevant today – though not in the way Murphy might have thought.
When Murphy wrote his book, what was worrying many American policymakers – and some Japanese – was the weakness of the yen; most notably, during the 1970s and early 1980s the yen had been kept artificially low by government controls, running at around Y300 to the dollar. As a result, the Japanese export machine boomed, undercutting American industry; and Japanese investors gobbled up American debt, keeping US Treasury yields artificially low. Or as Murphy wrote: “The causes of the imbalances were twofold: first the US Federal Deficit, which the Reagan Revolution had structurally embedded into the US body politic; and secondly the Japanese ‘development state’ system of national leverage, centralised credit allocation and credit risk socialisation.”
These days, of course, the story has moved on – at least as far as Japan is concerned. This week the Tokyo government has been busily intervening to weaken its excessively strong currency, which hit Y82.88 earlier in the week. Meanwhile, American pundits are no longer fretting about “unfair” Japanese exports or bond purchases; instead, the country has largely moved off the US political radar screen.
However, if you replace the word “Japan” with the word “China”, Murphy’s book creates a powerful sense of déjà vu. After all, these days it is Beijing which is primarily using a weak currency and “centralised credit allocation” – to use Murphy’s words – to boost an export machine, even as it gobbles up US Treasury bonds. Meanwhile, American politicians are now calling for a major revaluation of the Chinese currency, comparable to the so-called Plaza deal that was struck between the Group of Seven in 1985 to revalue the yen.
Will this pressure actually work? Right now, as my colleague Alan Beattie reports, the chance of a new Chinese-style Plaza deal seems unlikely. But as the currency tussle intensifies, it is worth taking a closer look at some of the lessons from that period, that were covered in Murphy’s book. Back in 1985, when the deal was first struck to strengthen the yen, many American observers initially considered it a success. For in the late 1980s, the currency moved towards the Y150 level, where it stayed for several years.
But – ironically – this “success” did not deliver much lasting stability at all. On the contrary, as the purchasing power of the Japanese currency swelled, Japanese institutions continued to gobble up overseas assets (including Treasury bonds). Meanwhile, the Bank of Japan slashed rates to ward off an export decline, and stoke up more domestic demand. That paved the way for a crazy bubble, followed by a bust, and more currency instability in subsequent years. Or as Murphy adds: “Changing the units of account had not the slightest chance of dealing with these fundamentals [distortions]. But they made for a more unstable world.”
Now, given that, it might seem tempting in retrospect to conclude that the Plaza Accord was a bad idea. And, unsurprisingly, that is exactly what some Chinese policymakers now say. However, in reality, the story is more nuanced. For perhaps the biggest reason for Japan’s boom and bust – and wider instability – was not simply what happened in the Plaza deal; instead the crucial period is what did (or did not) happen in the decades before.
The issue at stake revolves around Japan’s “development state”. In the immediate years after the second world war, capital was so scarce that it seemed to make sense for Japan to use centralised credit allocation and capital controls to channel its funds to industry. But by the mid 1970s, its industry had rebounded so fast, that the country had “outgrown” its need for this bank-centred system – just like a child might outgrow a pair of shoes. In retrospect that suggests the Japanese should have removed controls earlier; in practice, though, Japan resisted reform. Hence by the 1980s, Japan was plagued with distortions, currency undervaluation was just one. And that, in turn, made it hard to implement any smooth adjustment.
Can the Chinese avoid these mistakes? They certainly claim to be trying. After all, Beijing is now implementing a programme of financial reform that is intended to help the Chinese financial system to slowly “grow up”, away from a developmental model. But to my mind, this pace of liberalisation – and currency adjustment – still seems dangerously slow, given the speed at which China is growing. Perhaps it is time to translate The Weight of the Yen into Chinese; if nothing else, it is a potent lesson of the risks that can be created both by rapid revaluation – and by refusing to reform at all.
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