在要求银行今后留存的资本额度方面，全球银行业监管部门新达成的巴塞尔协议III (Basel III)很是值得称赞。该协议的有效性，将取决于监管部门采取的其它提高金融体系稳定性的措施。
该协议将银行的普通股（其界定已有所收窄）对风险加权资产之比提高了一倍以上，至4.5%。一旦银行开始动用一笔额外的、占风险加权资产2.5%的“缓冲”资金，监管者将限制其奖金发放和派息。这既彰显出了政治智慧——在衰退时期发放高额奖金极其不得人心——又能防止银行让其缓冲资金跌得太厉害。再加上各国监管部门将提出的不超过2.5%的反周期资本缓冲要求，这几项规定能极大地改进现状。
即便如此，这项协议仍有不尽如人意之处。新的比率低于它们原本可能达到的水平，而且到2019年才会全面落实。市场反应积极，反映出一个事实，即大多数银行不必筹募新资本。新规逐步到位的时间窗口被拉长，是对中小银行做出的让步（尤其是德国的银行）——这些银行很难立即履行这些规定。此举并不明智：如果银行资本金不足，它们不应等待近10年才去解决问题。
这些还不是唯一的让步。去年7月，监管部门在拟议的短期流动性规定上放软了身段（目前计划在2015年推出这项提案），降低了用于测试银行的压力假设。监管部门还承诺，将修订另外一项长期流动性规定。这些犹豫不决揭示出潜在的“监管被俘”的危险，尤其是在对游说颇为精通的银行业。关键在于，在转型期间，监管机构要坚定地抵制住压力。
提高资本充足率本身并不足以预防未来的危机。监管部门应谨防风险向影子银行体系转移。多德-弗兰克(Dodd-Frank)法案赋予了美国监管部门权力，可以将任何机构视为“具有系统重要性”。即将成立的欧洲系统风险委员会(European Systemic Risk Board)也应设法执行类似的职能。
“大到不能倒”的问题也应加以解决。银行若能获得隐性政府担保，就将继续承担过度风险。建立将损失加于债权人的机制——决议机制以及“保释”机制——是十分必要的。巴塞尔协议III是全球监管框架内的关键要素。但除非同时采取其它措施，金融稳定仍将是镜中花水中月。
译者/何黎
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001034616
There is much to admire in the new agreement reached by global banking regulators on the amount of capital banks will be required to hold in the future. Its effectiveness will depend on other measures taken by regulators to enhance the stability of the financial system.
The ratio of common equity (whose definition has been tightened) to risk-weighted assets has more than doubled to 4.5 per cent. Regulators will be expected to restrict bonuses and dividends when banks dip into an additional buffer of 2.5 per cent. This is both politically savvy – bloated bonuses during a recession were hugely unpopular – and will discourage banks from allowing their buffers to fall too far. With further countercyclical cushions of up to 2.5 per cent to be brought in by national regulators, the package is a big improvement over the status quo.
Even so, it is not ideal. The new ratios are lower than they could have been and will not be fully implemented until 2019. The market has reacted positively, reflecting the fact that most banks will not have to raise fresh capital. The longer phase-in was a concession to smaller banks, especially in Germany, that would struggle to comply immediately with the rules. It is unwise: if banks are undercapitalised, they should not wait nearly a decade to fix the problem.
These are not the only concessions. Last July, regulators softened a proposed short-term liquidity rule (now to be introduced in 2015) to let banks use less demanding stress scenarios. They also promised to rework a separate long-term liquidity rule. These vacillations reveal the danger of regulatory capture – especially in an industry as proficient in lobbying as banking. It is crucial that regulators stand firm against pressure during the transition period.
Higher capital ratios are not, by themselves, enough to prevent future crises. Regulators should be wary of risk migrating to the shadow banking system. The Dodd-Frank bill gave US regulators the power to deem any institution “systemically important”. The soon to be created European Systemic Risk Board should try to perform a similar function.
The too-big-to-fail problem should also be resolved. Banks with an implicit government guarantee will continue to take excessive risks. Schemes to impose losses on creditors – resolution regimes as well as “bail-in” mechanisms – are essential. Basel III is a key element in the global regulatory framework. Unless the others are also set in place, financial stability will remain elusive.
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