巴拉克•奥巴马(Barack Obama)刚当选美国总统时，北京方面以为他会在人权和贸易问题上采取强硬立场，但在国家安全方面不会。1年半过去了，奥巴马的政策与人们的预期完全相反。
奥巴马并未就中国糟糕的人权纪录对其施加重压，而是将人权问题搁在一边。国务卿希拉里•克林顿(Hillary Clinton)在2009年2月访华前夕证实了这一态度。为了避免在2009年11月首次访华前引起中国领导人的敌对情绪，奥巴马甚至推迟了与达赖喇嘛(Dalai Lama)的私人会面。总体而言，奥巴马政府在人权问题上几乎没有什么动作。
贸易问题上也几乎一样。尽管美国国会正就人民币实际上盯住美元的汇率制度对中国加大压力，但奥巴马迄今拒绝将中国列为"汇率操纵国"。的确，除了实施几项影响不大的反倾销处罚，其贸易政策与乔治·W·布什总统(George W. Bush)时期没什么两样。
不过，奥巴马政府在国家安全问题上表现出的强硬态度令人吃惊，过去几个月表现得尤为明显。华盛顿方面不顾中国政府的抗议，派出一支庞大的海军舰队，与韩国海军在日本海举行了联合军事演习，以期威慑朝鲜政府。此外，为了抵制中国在东南亚日渐增强的影响力，美国还恢复了对印度尼西亚的军事援助，最近还派出一支航母战斗群，首次与越南举行了联合海军演习。
美国政府还宣布了一项有争议的计划，向越南出售民用核技术。在最近一期中国军力年报中，美国国防部严厉地指责了中国的军事现代化计划及其对亚洲均势的影响。
但最令人震惊的事件要算希拉里今年7月在河内发表的言论。她在东盟(Asean)地区论坛讲话时几乎明白无误地宣示，美国不会允许中国胁迫其弱小邻国。美国方面头一次公开宣称，"南海航海自由、亚洲公海领域的开放、以及对国际法的尊重"，事关美国的国家利益。这听上去似乎立场中立，但北京方面必然会觉得震惊和受到伤害（中国政府最近发出信号，称其视南海为"核心利益"之一）。
奥巴马的对华政策为何会出现这样的转变？一部分责任要归咎于北京方面自身的失策。奥巴马上台初期试图拉近美中关系的示好努力，遭到了中国领导人的冷遇。由于北京方面限制了他与中国民众的接触，奥巴马去年11月份的访华被视为一次彻底失败。中国对美国早就计划的对台军售所作出的过激反应，以及今年早些时候奥巴马与达赖喇嘛（被推迟）的会面都于事无补。中国还阻碍了美国对伊朗实施制裁、以及谴责朝鲜击沉韩国军舰的努力。
更重要的是，奥巴马恢复了美国与新兴强国打交道的长期准则。其原因在于，尽管美国能自信地应对中国日渐提升的经济实力，并指望经济进步促使中国放开政治体制，但全球唯一的超级大国不能让新崛起的竞争对手成为亚洲霸主。
从许多方面看，奥巴马逐渐演变的对华政策更加基于现实。通过放弃"战略合作伙伴"这种不切实际的亲近表述，华盛顿方面平衡但强硬的对华新战略，更准确地反映了构成美中关系基础的经济合作和地缘政治竞争的复杂格局。这种政策还应该能让中国紧张的邻国放心：美国承诺维护亚洲的战略平衡。
今后几年，随着华盛顿方面继续推行这一政策，我们会看到两国在安全问题上更频繁地爆发冲突，尽管两国保持着紧密的经济往来。从根本上讲，奥巴马改头换面的对华政策是布什"战略对冲"的一种延续——只要中国依然是一党制国家，并继续奉行挑战美国领导的自由世界秩序的"现实政治"外交政策，这一战略就肯定会保持下去。
本文作者为克莱蒙特-麦肯纳学院(Claremont McKenna College)教授，卡内基国际和平基金会(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)客座高级研究员
译者/何黎
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001034444
When Barack Obama was elected president, Beijing thought that he would be tough on human rights and trade, but not on national security. A year and a half later, Mr. Obama's policy could hardly be more different.
Instead of pressing China hard on its poor rights record, Mr Obama has put the issue to the back burner. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton confirmed as much on the eve of her visit to China in February 2009. To avoid antagonising Chinese leaders before his own visit to Beijing in November last year, Mr Obama even postponed a private meeting with the Dalai Lama. On the whole, his administration has done precious little on the issue.
The story on trade is much the same. Despite mounting congressional pressure on China's de facto dollar-peg, Mr Obama has refused to label China a "currency manipulator." Indeed, except for imposing a few modest anti-dumping penalties, his trade policy is indistinguishable from that of President George W. Bush.
However, on national security, the Obama administration has shown a surprisingly hard edge, particularly in the past few months. Against Beijing's protestations, Washington dispatched a large naval force to conduct joint military exercises with the South Korean navy in the Sea of Japan, as deterrence against Pyongyang. To counter China's growing influence in Southeast Asia, the US has also resumed its aid to the Indonesian military, and recently sent a carrier battle group in an unprecedented joint naval exercise with Vietnam.
Washington also announced a controversial plan to sell civilian nuclear technology to Hanoi. In its recent annual report on the strength of the Chinese military, the Pentagon levelled harsh criticisms at China's military modernisation programme and its impact on Asia's balance of power.
Perhaps the biggest bombshell was dropped by Mrs Clinton in Hanoi in July. Speaking to the Asean regional forum, she all but declared that the US would not allow China to coerce its smaller neighbours. For the first time, Washington designated the South China Sea as an area where it had a national interest in "freedom of navigation, open access to Asia's maritime commons and respect for international law". This might look neutral, but Beijing (which recently signalled that it regards the South China Sea as among its "core interests") must have felt stunned and stung.
Why has Mr Obama's China policy taken such a turn? Beijing's own missteps share part of the blame. Chinese leaders rebuffed early efforts to woo Beijing into a closer relationship. Mr Obama's China visit last November was viewed as a debacle because Beijing limited his access to the Chinese public. China's over-the-top reaction to America's long-scheduled arms sales to Taiwan, and Mr Obama's (belated) meeting with the Dalai Lama earlier this year, did not help. China also obstructed US attempts to impose sanctions on Iran and condemn North Korea's sinking of a South Korean warship.
More important, Mr Obama has reverted to long-standing American principles in dealing with a rising great power. For while the US can confidently manage China's mounting economic prowess, and count on economic progress to liberalise the Chinese political system, the world's sole superpower can ill-afford to allow its new rival to become Asia's hegemon.
In many ways, Mr Obama's evolving China policy is more grounded in reality. By abandoning the touchy-feely rhetoric of "strategic partnership", Washington's balanced but hard-nosed new China strategy more accurately reflects the complex dynamics of economic co-operation and geopolitical competition that underlie its ties with Beijing. It is also a policy that should reassure China's nervous neighbours that America is committed to maintaining Asia's strategic balance.
In the years ahead, as Washington pursues this policy further, we should expect more frequent eruptions over security issues, even as the two countries keep close economic ties. In its essence, Mr Obama's revamped China strategy is a continuation of Mr. Bush's "strategic hedging" – a strategy certain to endure as long as China remains a one-party state, and continues a realpolitik foreign policy that challenges the America-led liberal world order.
The writer is a professor at Claremont McKenna College and an adjunct senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001034444/en
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