美国证交会(SEC)对高盛(Goldman Sachs)提起的民事诉讼，将遭到被告人的有力抗辩。猜测哪方会胜诉很有意思；但在近几个月内我们不会知道结果。不过，不管最终结果如何，该案都会对美国国会正在考虑的金融改革立法产生深远影响。
不管高盛是否有过错，本案所涉的那笔交易显然没有任何社会效益。它涉及一种复杂的合成证券，源自于将现有的抵押贷款证券"克隆"成模仿原型的虚构单位。这种合成的债务抵押债券(CDO)没有为任何额外的购房融资，也没有提高资金的配置效率；它只是增加了房地产泡沫破裂时价值暴跌的抵押贷款证券的数量。这种交易的主要目的，是创造手续费与佣金。
这清楚地展示了衍生品与合成证券，如何被用来无中生有地创造虚有价值。市场上生成的AAA级CDO的数量，要多于AAA级标的资产的数量。尽管所有参与方都是专业投资者，但这种操作仍在大规模地进行。这种操作持续了数年，并于大崩盘时达到顶峰，其结果是巨额财富亏损。我们不能放任这种做法继续发展。即使所有参与方都是专业投资者，衍生品与其它合成产品的使用也必须受到监管。普通证券必须先在美国证交会(SEC)进行登记，然后才能交易。合成证券同样应该登记，尽管这项任务可以被指派给另一个机构，比如商品期货交易委员会(CFTC)。
衍生品可服务于许多有用的目的，但它们同时也包含了隐藏风险。例如，它们可以累积供给或需求的隐藏失衡，直到某个临界值被打破，失衡突然暴露出来。应用于外汇套期保值的所谓"触碰失效期权"(knockout option)便是如此。另外还有纽约证交所(New York Stock Exchange) 1987年10月"黑色星期一"的罪魁祸首――投资组合保险程序。此后推出断路器实际上默认了衍生品可能导致中断，但没有总结出正确的结论。
信用违约互换(CDS)尤其不可靠。它们理应向债券持有人提供违约风险保险。但由于可以自由交易，所以它们可被用来发动空头袭击(bear raids)；除了保险，它们还提供了"杀人"执照。监管机构应限定它们的使用范围，仅允许对某国或某家公司债券拥有可保权益的人利用这种工具。
监管者应该承担起一个任务，即了解衍生品与合成证券，如果无法充分评估它们的系统性风险，就拒绝让它们被创造出来。这项任务不能丢给投资者，不能再继续奉行直到最近还占上风的市场原教旨主义教条。
在交易所交易的衍生品应该被登记成一种类别。定制衍生品须分别登记，监管者须清楚其中涉及的风险。登记是一项费时费力的工作，将会打击人们使用场外衍生品交易的积极性。可用交易所交易工具构成定制产品。这将防止在一定程度上导致2008年崩盘危机的滥用行为再现。
要求衍生品与合成证券进行登记简单而有效，但目前正在考虑的法案并没有纳入任何这类要求。美国参议院农业委员会(Senate Agriculture Committee)提议，阻止吸收存款银行在互换市场上做市。这是一个非常棒的提案，它将大大降低市场的相互联系性，阻止传染，但它没有对衍生品进行监管。
充当做市商、且占了美国未偿付场外交易逾95%份额的五家大型银行，可能反对登记要求，因为这将打击它们的利润。更令人困惑的是，一些跨国公司也表示反对。唯一的解释是，定制衍生品可以方便避税以及操纵利润。这些考虑不应该影响此次立法。
本文作者是索罗斯基金管理公司(Soros Fund Management)主席
译者/何黎
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001032352
The US Security and Exchange Commission's civil suit against Goldman Sachs will be vigorously contested by the defendant. It is interesting to speculate which side will win; but we will not know the result for months. Irrespective of the eventual outcome, however, the case has far-reaching implications for the financial reform legislation Congress is considering.
Whether or not Goldman is guilty, the transaction in question clearly had no social benefit. It involved a complex synthetic security derived from existing mortgage-backed securities by cloning them into imaginary units that mimicked the originals. This synthetic collateralised debt obligation did not finance the ownership of any additional homes or allocate capital more efficiently; it merely swelled the volume of mortgage-backed securities that lost value when the housing bubble burst. The primary purpose of the transaction was to generate fees and commissions.
This is a clear demonstration of how derivatives and synthetic securities have been used to create imaginary value out of thin air. More triple A CDOs were created than there were underlying triple A assets. This was done on a large scale in spite of the fact that all of the parties involved were sophisticated investors. The process went on for years and culminated in a crash that caused wealth destruction amounting to trillions of dollars. It cannot be allowed to continue. The use of derivatives and other synthetic instruments must be regulated even if all the parties are sophisticated investors. Ordinary securities must be registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission before they can be traded. Synthetic securities ought to be similarly registered, although the task could be assigned to a different authority, such as the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.
Derivatives can serve many useful purposes, but they also contain hidden dangers. For instance, they can pile up hidden imbalances in supply or demand which may suddenly be revealed when a threshold is breached. This is true of so-called knockout options, used in currency hedging. It was also true of the portfolio insurance programs that caused the New York Stock Exchange's Black Monday in October 1987. The subsequent introduction of circuit breakers tacitly acknowledged that derivatives can cause discontinuities, but the proper conclusions were not drawn.
Credit default swaps are particularly suspect. They are supposed to provide insurance against default to bondholders. But because they are freely tradable, they can be used to mount bear raids; in addition to insurance they also provide a licence to kill. Their use ought to be confined to those who have a insurable interest in the bonds of a country or company.
It will be the task of regulators to understand derivatives and synthetic securities and refuse to allow their creation if they cannot fully evaluate their systemic risks. That task cannot be left to investors, contrary to the diktats of the market fundamentalist dogma that prevailed until recently.
Derivatives traded on exchanges should be registered as a class. Tailor-made derivatives would have to be registered individually, with regulators obliged to understand the risks involved. Registration is laborious and time-consuming, and would discourage the use of over-the-counter derivatives. Tailor-made products could be put together from exchange-traded instruments. This would prevent a recurrence of the abuses which contributed to the 2008 crash.
Requiring derivatives and synthetic securities to be registered would be simple and effective; yet the legislation currently under consideration contains no such requirement. The Senate Agriculture Committee proposes blocking deposit-taking banks from making markets in swaps. This is an excellent proposal which would go a long way in reducing the interconnectedness of markets and preventing contagion, but it would not regulate derivatives.
The five big banks which serve as marketmakers and account for over 95 per cent of the US's outstanding over-the-counter transactions are likely to oppose it because it would hit their profits. It is more puzzling that some multinational corporations are also opposed. The only explanation is that tailor-made derivatives can facilitate tax avoidance and manipulation of earnings. These considerations ought not to influence the legislation.
The writer is chairman of Soros Fund Management
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