英国经济的“病”有多重？经济政策方面面临何种挑战？在我看来，与1979年玛格丽特•撒切尔(Margaret Thatcher)执政以来的任何一次大选前夕相比，这些问题似乎都要紧迫得多。
所有人都一致认同英国政府财政亏空的程度：每支出4英镑，就有1英镑是借来的。但没有人愿意讨论可能需要为此做些什么。这并不令人感到意外：目前财政赤字的规模，为以往的任何和平时期所未见。而即使人们承认，这些赤字问题必须解决，但在此类行动的时机选择和内容方面，仍存在巨大的疑问。
至少在英国，财政赤字是私人部门盈余的“镜像”。而且后者是因，前者是果。回归财政（及经济）健康的必要条件，是私人支出复苏或净出口大幅增长，或者（理想状况下）两者同时出现。关键问题是，私人支出和净出口的根本复苏，是发生在政府无法以合理条款举债之前还是之后。如果是之前，顺利地退出财政刺激方案就是可行的；而如果是之后，就可能发生危机。我虽然对此持乐观态度，但并非看不到风险。
2007年至2009年间，英国私人部门“净贷款”（收入与支出之间的差额）占国内生产总值(GDP)的比例大幅增长了9.8%。考虑到外国资本净流入几乎没有下降，抵消私人部门转向节俭的主要因素，是政府的支出大幅增加。从2007年到2009年间，政府净负债占GDP的比例大增8.6%。
现在看看私人部门因素。从2007年到2009年间，家庭由负债转向盈余，对GDP的贡献度为6.0%，非金融企业的转变贡献度为3.2%。至少就短期而言，此次危机对私人支出的影响，已经超出了英国央行(BoE)货币政策的抵消效应。
现在来考虑一下政策方面的挑战：不是不计后果地削减财政赤字；而是在保持复苏和增长的同时削减财政赤字。要实现的是增长之下的稳定，而不是以增长为代价的稳定。经济困境非但不可取，而是令人憎恶。
举例来说，如果将实际财政赤字占GDP的比例削减10%，那么国内私人部门和对外部门的财政盈余总额就必须出现同等降幅。如果要在保持经济增长的情况下做到这一点，这些部门就需要大幅增加支出。对于这可能意味着什么，总部位于伦敦的Smithers & Co的安德鲁•史密瑟斯(Andrew Smithers)做出了令人信服的分析*。特别是，他指出，在外部收支状况没有明显改善的情况下，这是不可能实现的。
唉，英国家庭净储蓄水平极低。这与1992年至2007年间家庭部门明显转向赤字是一致的。家庭储蓄需要增长，而非下降。尽管目前最需要的是住宅投资的抵消性跃升，但这种情况不太可能出现。
正如史密瑟斯所指出，多年来英国固定资产投资一直处于极低水平。最近以来，一直仅占GDP的14%。英国需要大幅提高固定资产投资，以产生当前的需求和未来的增长。然而，即使预计固定资产投资占GDP的比例增长5个百分点，也过于乐观。此外，尚不清楚这是否会推动非金融企业部门完全实现收支平衡，因为利润（以及留存收益）的增长，或许是加大投资的前提。那么总体收支可能依然为正。
由此得出的结论是：外国收支（及净出口）占GDP的比例至少需要提高5%。遗憾的是，肯•库茨 (Ken Coutts)和罗伯特•罗松 (Robert Rowthorn)最近在为智库Civitas撰写的一篇令人揪心的文章中表示，英国外部收支却在下降。弱势英镑远不是一个问题，而是解决方案中的重要组成部分。但这还不够。英国政府还必须注意培育更具活力的制造业部门。鉴于目前发电量正在下降，这种做法肯定是必须采取的。
一些盲目乐观的人认为，如果削减财政赤字，国内私人支出和外部收支将会自动调整。但是，在与指数挂钩的英国国债实际利率仅为0.6%，短期利率为0.5%，常规10年期国债收益率为4%左右，同时信贷和广义货币增长疲弱的情况下，这简直是天方夜谭。目前的情形与1981年截然不同——当时保守党成功地在衰退期间收紧了财政政策。
然而，即使财政紧缩更有可能意味着复苏，而不是导致复苏，这也不意味着，我们能够在足够长的时间内为当前财政赤字提供融资，使必要的经济调整得以进行。尽管英国私人部门盈余规模庞大到几乎足以为财政赤字融资的程度，但它可能不会决定投资购买国债（至少在目前的价格水平上）。它或许会购买外国资产。
问题在于，英镑的进一步下跌是否（或何时）会演变为一场崩盘。人们丧失对英镑的信心，可能削弱通胀预期，并推高长期利率。结果可能是英国重新陷入衰退，公共债务也出现爆炸式增长。与此同时，英国的进一步贬值如果说不是不可避免的，似乎也是人们希望看到的——主要原因是近期的生产力表现糟糕（受人欢迎的就业表现的另一面）。作为英国最大的贸易伙伴，欧元区需求疲弱，也只会加大英镑走低的必然性。
关于英国经济的决定性事实是，它不得不努力完成跨越多年的巨大经济调整。政策制定者必须记住以下四点：第一，他们必须促进投资和净出口的根本性走强；第二，他们必须意识到，这种重大经济调整是财政持久改善的必要条件；第三，他们还必须阻止财政赤字挤掉必要的经济调整；最后，他们不能想当然地以为，如果经济本身的调整未能出现，目前的巨额财政赤字也能够无期限地轻松获得融资。
这将是一项非常棘手的政策措施，我未来将谈论如何实现它。
* 《UK: Either a Large Trade Surplus or Grim Prospects for Profits and the Fiscal Deficit》，2010年3月发表，内部刊物
译者/君悦
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001032222
How ill is the UK economy? What are the challenges for economic policy? These questions seem to me to be far more urgent than before any general election since 1979, when Margaret Thatcher came to power.
The one point on which everybody agrees is over the depth of the fiscal hole: the government is borrowing a pound for every four it spends. But nobody wants to discuss what might need to be done. This is not surprising: today's fiscal deficits exceed those of any previous period, in peacetime. Yet even if one accepts that these deficits must be tackled, huge questions remain over the timing and content of such action.
In the UK at least, the fiscal deficits are mirror images of private sector surpluses. Moreover, the direction of causality is from the latter to the former. The necessary conditions for a return to fiscal (and economic) health are a recovery in private spending, a huge increase in net exports or, ideally, both. The big question is whether the essential recovery in private spending and net exports will occur before, or after, it becomes difficult for the government to borrow on reasonable terms. If it comes before, a smooth fiscal exit is feasible. If it comes after, a crisis would intervene. I am optimistic on this, but am not blind to the risks.
Between 2007 and 2009 net lending – the gap between income and expenditure – of the UK private sector jumped by a massive 9.8 per cent of gross domestic product (see chart). Since the net inflow of capital from abroad fell little, the principal offset to this shift towards frugality was the government's towards profligacy. Net government borrowing jumped by 8.6 per cent of GDP between 2007 and last year.
Now look at the private sector components. Between 2007 and 2009, the shift of households towards surplus was 6.0 per cent of GDP. The shift of non-financial corporations was 3.2 per cent. The impact of the crisis on private spending has overwhelmed the monetary policy offsets from the Bank of England, at least in the short term.
Now consider the policy challenge: it is not to cut the fiscal deficit, regardless; it is to cut the fiscal deficit, while sustaining recovery and growth. It is stabilisation with growth, not stabilisation at the expense of growth. Economic misery is not desirable, but detestable.
If the actual fiscal deficit is to be cut by, let us say, 10 per cent of GDP, then the sum of the financial surpluses of the domestic private and foreign sectors must fall by the same amount. If this is to occur with growth, there needs to be a strong surge in spending in these sectors. Andrew Smithers of London-based Smithers & Co offers a compelling analysis of what this might mean.* In particular, he points out that this is impossible without a massive improvement in the external balance.
Alas, the UK's net household savings are exceptionally low. This is consistent with the sector's huge shift into deficit between 1992 and 2007. Household savings need to rise, not fall. While an offsetting jump in residential investment would be most desirable, it is unlikely to occur.
As Mr Smithers notes, UK fixed investment has been extremely low for years. It has, most recently, been running at a mere 14 per cent of gross domestic product (see chart). A big rise would be desirable, to generate current demand and future growth. It would be optimistic, however, to expect its share of GDP to rise even by as much as 5 percentage points. Moreover, it is unclear that this would drive the non-financial corporate sector all the way to balance, because higher profits (and so retained earnings) would probably be a condition for the higher investment. The overall balance, then, could remain positive.
The conclusion is that the foreign balance – and so net exports – need to shift by at least 5 per cent of GDP. Unfortunately, a disturbing new paper by Ken Coutts and Robert Rowthorn, for the think-tank, Civitas, argues that trends in the UK's external position are in the opposite direction. Weak sterling, far from being the problem, is a big part of the solution. But it will not be enough. Attention must also be paid to nurturing a more dynamic manufacturing sector. With the decline in energy production under way, this is now surely inescapable.
The Panglossian view is that if the fiscal deficit were reduced, domestic private spending and the external balance would adjust automatically. But, with real interest rates on index-linked gilts at just 0.6 per cent, short-term interest rates at 0.5 per cent, yields on conventional 10-year gilts at around 4 per cent and weak growth of credit and broad money, this is a fairy story. The situation is entirely different from that in 1981, when the Tories tightened fiscal policy successfully in a recession.
Yet even if fiscal tightening is far more likely to follow recovery than cause it, it does not follow that current fiscal deficits will be easy to finance for long enough to permit the needed economic adjustments to occur. While the UK's private sector surpluses are nearly big enough to finance the fiscal deficit, this may well not be how it decides to invest its money, at least at present prices. It might buy foreign assets, instead.
The question is whether, or when, a further fall in sterling could turn into a rout. Such a loss of confidence might then undermine inflationary expectations and raise long-term interest rates. The result could be both a renewed recession and an explosive path for public debt. At the same time, a further fall in sterling seems desirable, if not inevitable, not least given the poor recent performance of productivity (the flip side of the welcome employment performance). Weak demand in the eurozone, the UK's biggest trading partner, only makes such a fall even more necessary.
The decisive fact about the UK economy, then, is that it has to manage a huge, multi-year economic rebalancing. Policymakers must bear four points in mind: first, they must promote the essential strengthening of investment and net exports; second, they must realise that this big economic adjustment is a necessary condition for a durable fiscal improvement; third, they must also prevent the fiscal deficit from crowding out the needed rebalancing; and, finally, they cannot assume that today's huge fiscal deficits can be comfortably financed indefinitely, should the rebalancing of the economy itself fail to occur.
This is going to be a very tricky policy performance. How to carry it off will be my subject this Friday.
* UK: Either a Large Trade Surplus or Grim Prospects for Profits and the Fiscal Deficit, March 2010, restricted
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