美中两国在人民币汇率争议上都已发出了信号。美国财政部原定于4月15日宣布是否将中国列为汇率操纵国，而此前两周，财政部长蒂姆•盖特纳(Tim Geithner)决定推迟发布汇率报告。在此之前，中国国家主席胡锦涛宣布，将出席由美国牵头的核裁军峰会，坦率讨论对伊朗实施新制裁以及限制朝鲜核武器项目等问题。
尽管将人民币问题暂且搁置符合中美两国的利益，但世界各国对此番争论的反应，显示出了这种边缘政策的危险。除了国际货币基金组织(IMF)总裁多米尼克•斯特劳斯-卡恩(Dominique Strauss-Kahn)的几句温和责难、五位20国集团(G20)领导人软弱无力的联名抗议，美国的强硬姿态几乎没有得到任何支持。日本和韩国默不作声，这两国在中国有着巨额投资。它们最大企业的利润与中国的出口表现息息相关，而人民币走强将削弱出口。
但中国政府不应为此感到安心，因为对于中国的权力，其邻国越来越感到不安。我们可以从印度的举动中找到证据：该国不仅与美国结盟，而且在俄罗斯总理弗拉基米尔•普京(Vladimir Putin)最近来访时，还试图恢复与俄罗斯的军事联系。日本前防卫大臣小池百合子(Yuriko Koike)呼吁强化日印军事关系，也表明亚洲各国正在寻求遏制中国的方式。
决定性时刻出现在去年。在斯里兰卡对泰米尔反政府武装(Tamil)的镇压中，中国提供了军事援助和建议。此举暴露出中国有意将军力扩张至传统势力范围之外，明显对印度构成了挑战。
此外，为中亚及东欧前苏联国家提供贷款的举动，表明了中国试图维持欧亚大陆冷战后安定局面的决心——在金融层面上，这相当于驳斥了俄罗斯所宣称的其邻近地区是专享“势力范围”的主张。
中国过去30年来的快速经济增长，加之军事实力的增强，已使其成为亚洲最强大的国家。在被亚洲以外地区或其外围的强国——俄罗斯、英国、美国、日本——主宰了数百年之后，中国正重新拥有在其历史上大多数时间内所掌握的影响力，并开始在一些新的地区（比如斯里兰卡）施压。
为了避免形成旨在遏制中国的地区性联盟、维持与美国之间尚属友善的关系，并制定出一种“东方政策（Ostpolitik，尤指20世纪60年代西德对东欧国家保持正常关系的政策——译者注）”，以笼络较小的邻国（如东盟(ASEAN)成员国），中国领导人将需要在外交政策上耍一些手段。
这种手段让人想起了19世纪时的外交策略大师奥托•冯•俾斯麦(Otto von Bismarck)。在统一德国之后，俾斯麦也曾面临类似的需要。俾斯麦通过无情斗争，实现了德国的统一，并使得普鲁士在强国中获得了他心目中应有的地位。实现这些目标后，他试图通过审慎与克制，维持一种新的欧洲平衡。但德国的资源和民族主义情绪已被完全调动起来，这让它的邻国感到惊惧。很快，俾斯麦就在谈论“敌意联盟的噩梦”。尽管他付出了种种努力，这个噩梦最终还是成为了现实。
与俾斯麦时期的德国一样，中国面临的两难困境是：它的力量超出了所有邻国的总和（由于核武库的原因，这里不包括俄罗斯在内）。为了避免重蹈第二帝国(Second Reich)的覆辙，中国必须意识到、且要公开承认，自己已不再是一个发展中国家，而是一个担负着责任的世界强国——这些责任已超越了其直接本国利益的范畴。中国将需要对自己的行为加以解释，并将其它国家的利益纳入其政策考虑。
对中国政府而言，围绕人民币汇率的争议是一记警钟。但仅仅脱离与美国关系恶化的边缘还不够。中国也不能依赖亚洲的“巨大生产链”，为它提供一个安全而稳定的亚洲。正如在1997年亚洲危机中，中国摒弃了以邻为壑的货币政策一样，目前中国最需要的，是致力于友好多边主义的承诺。
本文作者是政治、经济与商业咨询公司朗富德顾问有限公司总裁
译者/何黎
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001032263
Both America and China have blinked in their dispute over the renminbi's exchange rate. A fortnight before Tim Geithner was due to pronounce on whether China manipulates its currency, the US Treasury secretary postponed the report. The decision followed President Hu Jintao's announcement that he would attend this week's US-led nuclear disarmament summit for forthright discussions on imposing new sanctions on Iran and curbing North Korea's nuclear weapons programme.
Although putting the renminbi on the back-burner serves the interests of both Washington and Beijing, the world's response to the debate suggests the dangers of such brinksmanship. America received almost no support for its tough stance, save for some mild words of rebuke from Dominique Strauss-Kahn, the managing director of the International Monetary Fund, and a soft joint letter of protest from five leaders of the Group of 20. There was a deafening silence from Japan and South Korea, both of which have massive investments in China. Their most powerful companies' profits are linked to China's export success, which a stronger renminbi would undermine.
But Beijing should not take comfort from this because its neighbours are increasingly jittery about Chinese power. Evidence can be found in India's efforts not only to forge an alliance with the US but, during Vladimir Putin's recent visit, to revive military ties with Russia. A call from Yuriko Koike, the former Japanese defence minister, for a strengthening of Japanese-Indian military ties also suggests that the region's powers are looking for ways to contain China.
The critical moment came last year. In providing military aid and advice to Sri Lanka as it crushed the Tamil rebels, China revealed a willingness to wield its military might outside of its traditional sphere of influence, dramatically challenging India.
Moreover, by extending credits to prop up former Soviet states in central Asia and eastern Europe – demonstrating in financial terms its rejection of Russia's claim to an exclusive “sphere of influence” in its near abroad – China showed its determination to maintain the post-cold war settlement across Eurasia.
China's rapid economic growth over 30 years, combined with its military build-up, has made it Asia's strongest power. After centuries of dominance by powers outside Asia or on its periphery – Russia, Britain, the US and Japan – China is reasserting the sway it held for most of its history and is exerting pressure in new areas, as in Sri Lanka.
Leaders in Beijing will need to become foreign-policy jugglers as they seek to prevent regional coalitions to keep China in check, maintain tolerably amicable relations with the US and develop an “Ostpolitik” to keep smaller neighbours – such as members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations – happy.
This juggling act is reminiscent of that required of Otto von Bismarck, the 19th century's master diplomat-conjuror, after he united Germany. Bismarck strove ruthlessly to achieve unification and what he considered Prussia's rightful place among the great powers. Having achieved these aims, he sought to preserve a new European equilibrium through prudence and restraint. But Germany had so mobilised its resources and nationalist sentiments that it terrified its neighbours. Soon, Bismarck was speaking of “the nightmare of hostile coalitions”. For all his efforts, it was a nightmare that would come true.
China's dilemma is that, like Bismarck's Germany, it surpasses in power all its neighbours combined (save for Russia with respect to its nuclear arsenal). To avoid the fate of the Second Reich, China must recognise and publicly accept that it is no longer a developing country but a global power with responsibilities that extend beyond its immediate national interests. It will need to explain its actionsand factor other countries' interests into its policies.
The dispute over the renminbi is a wake-up call for Beijing. But pulling back from the brink with the US is not enough. Nor can China rely on Asia's “great chain of production” providing it with a secure and stable region. As with the Asian crisis of 1997, when China shunned beggar-thy-neighbour currency policies, what is needed above all is a commitment to neighbourly multilateralism.
Wen Liao is chairwoman of Longford Advisors, a political, economic and business consultancy
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