亚洲成功度过了2008-09年的全球危机。作为过去3年摩根士丹利(Morgan Stanley)亚洲业务的主席，我有幸亲自见证了亚洲这种非凡的适应能力。在如今即将返回美国之际，我感到有三个经验教训非常引人注目。
首先，亚洲很好地汲取了1997-98年地区危机的沉痛教训。那场危机主要源于亚洲易于遭受国际资本流动变化的冲击。亚洲各国外汇储备匮乏，短期外债过多，实施刚性的汇率盯住制度，因此在热钱开始逃离之际，几乎没有幸免于难的机会。当泰国倒下的时候，印度尼西亚、韩国、台湾以及发展中亚洲的其它大部分地区也很快陷入了危机。
相比之下，对亚洲而言，最近这场危机主要是一场外部需求冲击。2009年全球商品贸易前所未有地下滑了11.8%，严重打击了这个出口主导型地区。亚洲各地无一幸免，要么陷入严重衰退，例如日本、台湾、马来西亚和泰国，要么经济大幅滑坡，例如中国、印度和韩国。但亚洲在两次危机期间的外汇储备积累——从1998年的不到1万亿美元至2009年的近5万亿美元——使其免于遭受了雷曼兄弟(Lehman)破产后的金融动荡。
其次，这里有中国因素。我的足迹遍及亚洲，决不会弄错亚洲以中国为核心的新特征。我记得，在亚洲危机之后，我在英国《金融时报》写过一篇文章，指出中国一定会取代日本，成为地区增长的龙头。大多数人对此表示怀疑，就连我自己也承认，转换的速度比我预期的还要快。
但中国显然已经成为亚洲地区的主导经济力量。过去10年，日本、韩国和台湾等出口主导型经济体全都调整了自己的对外出口方向：它们最大的出口市场曾经是美国；现在则是中国大陆。结果，"亚洲梦"现在更像是"中国梦"。这一点无疑在回归中国近13年的香港体现得非常明显，但我也在整个亚洲地区的业务交易中再三看到这一点。
这让亚洲陷入了险境——越来越依赖于中国实现可持续增长和繁荣。但中国面临的挑战不容小视——最近的房地产和信贷泡沫，以及富士康(Foxconn)深圳工厂问题所体现的劳资压力，都突显了这一点。但就像行政手术措施看起来有可能抑制泡沫的危害一样，生产力迅速增长应该会抵消最低薪资延期上涨的影响，将单位劳动力成本保持在掌控之中。这并不是降低中国最艰巨的结构性要求——刺激私人消费的需求越来越迫切。
我希望，在中国的"十二五"（2011-16年）规划中，中国能够实现有利于消费的转变，从而满足这一结构性要求。这转而将为韩国、日本和台湾等东亚供应商提供支持。然而，如果不能推动这种转型，从西方吹来的盘旋不去的后危机逆风，就会削弱中国的增长动力。届时，以中国为核心的亚洲其它地区就可能陷入困境。
第三，亚洲不能只是因为安然度过了全球危机，就想当然地以为自己发现了经济繁荣的不二法门。在一个日益复杂和一体化的世界里，困境的演变方式是无法预测的。2008-09年危机跨产品的蔓延方式与1997-98年的跨境蔓延截然不同。亚洲必须为不可避免的下次危机做准备，而不是陶醉于新发现的适应力的光环之中。
在这一点上，亚洲要做的还有很多。上世纪90年代末，出口约占发展中亚洲GDP的35%。10年后，这一比例上升到45%。就在2008-09年危机的余震可能对美国和欧洲的需求产生长远影响之际，亚洲地区却已变得更加依赖外部需求。
在这种背景下，关键是亚洲要再次适应——转向更加依赖于自己的内部市场。如今亚洲在危机后必须要做到的是刺激私人消费——与上世纪90年代末危机后修复金融脆弱性的要求截然不同。
我看好亚洲——未来3年甚至会比我最近在该地区任职期间更好。我认为中国肯定已经明白——中国在后危机时代别无选择，只能把本国13亿消费者转变为内部增长的主要来源。
但在离开亚洲之际，我非常担忧世界其它地区并不明白这点。我尤其担心美国打击中国的持续论调——特别是美国今年即将进行中期选举。我害怕，前所未有的国内储蓄不足导致的巨额多边贸易赤字，会促使美国犯下大错——通过对中国实施贸易制裁，寻求以双边"疗法"来促进就业。
美国比以往任何时候更有必要停止将自己的挫折归咎于他人。它应该自我反省，深刻明白自己是自酿苦果。这是美国的再教育要求，是我去耶鲁大学(Yale University)执教的主要原因。
本文作者为摩根士丹利(Morgan Stanley)亚洲董事长，著有《未来的亚洲》(The Next Asia)一书。他将于7月1日到耶鲁大学任教。
译者/君悦
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001033030
Asia has come through the global crisis of 2008-09 with flying colours. As chairman of Morgan Stanley's Asia businesses over the past three years, I have been privileged to witness this extraordinary resilience first-hand. As I now head back to the US, three lessons stand out.
First, Asia learnt the painful lessons of the 1997-98 regional crisis very well. That crisis stemmed largely from Asia's vulnerability to the vicissitudes of international capital flows. Lacking in foreign exchange reserves, overly exposed to short-term external debt and with rigid currency pegs, the region stood little chance when the hot money started to flee. When Thailand went, Indonesia, South Korea, Taiwan and most of the others in developing Asia were quick to follow.
By contrast, for Asia, the latest crisis was primarily an external demand shock. The unprecedented 11.8 per cent drop in the volume of global trade in goods in 2009 hit this export-led region extremely hard. No country was spared either sharp recession (Japan, Taiwan, Malaysia and Thailand) or major slowdown (China, India and South Korea). But Asia's build-up of foreign exchange reserves in the period between the two crises – from less than US$1,000bn in 1998 to nearly $5,000bn in 2009 – insulated it from the financial upheaval that followed Lehman's collapse.
Second, there is the China factor. As I have criss-crossed the region, there has been no mistaking Asia's new China-centric character. I remember penning a piece in the Financial Times after the Asian crisis arguing that China was bound to supplant Japan as the leader of regional growth. Most were sceptical and even I concede that the transition occurred with greater speed than I anticipated.
But China has clearly arrived as the region's dominant economic force. In the past 10 years, export-led economies such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have all redirected their overseas shipments. Their largest export market was once the US; now it is China. The "Asian dream", as a result, is now much more a Chinese dream. That is certainly evident in Hong Kong nearly 13 years after the handover to China, but I also have seen it repeatedly in my business dealings across the region.
That puts Asia in a tight spot – relying more and more on China for sustained growth and prosperity. Yet China's challenges can hardly be minimised – as underscored by the latest property and credit bubbles, as well as the labour-related pressures seen in the recent problems at Foxconn's Shenzhen plant. But just as surgical administrative measures seem likely to contain the damage from the bubbles, rapid productivity growth should offset deferred minimum wage rises and keep unit labour costs in check. That does not diminish China's most daunting structural imperative – an increasingly urgent need to stimulate private consumption.
I am hopeful that China will pull this off with a pro-consumption shift in the 12th Five Year Plan (2011-16). That, in turn, would provide a boost for its East Asian suppliers – namely, South Korea, Japan and Taiwan. If, however, China fails to engineer this transition, its growth dynamic will be impaired by lingering post-crisis headwinds blowing from the west. The rest of a China-centric Asia could then be in trouble.
Third, Asia cannot presume that just because it weathered the global crisis it has discovered the holy grail of economic prosperity. In an increasingly complex and integrated world, trouble has an unpredictable way of mutating. The cross-product contagion of 2008-09 was very different from the cross-border contagion of 1997-98. Asia must prepare for the inevitable next crisis rather than bask in warm glow of its new-found resilience.
On that score, Asia has a full plate. In the late 1990s, exports made up about 35 per cent of developing Asia's gross domestic product. Ten years later, that ratio had risen to 45 per cent. The region has become more dependent on external demand just as the aftershocks of the 2008-09 crisis are likely to take a lasting toll on this demand in both the US and Europe.
In this context, it is critical for Asia to adapt yet again – to move towards greater reliance on its own internal markets. Asia's post-crisis imperative is now to stimulate private consumption – very different from the imperative of repairing financial vulnerability after the crisis of the late 1990s.
My bet is on Asia – that the next three years are going to be even better than they were during my recent stint in the region. I think China definitely gets it – that the post-crisis era leaves it with little choice other than turn to its own 1.3bn consumers as a major source of internal growth.
But I leave Asia with one big worry – that the rest of the world doesn't get it. I worry, in particular, about the steady drumbeat of China-bashing in Washington – especially as we approach mid-term elections this year. I fear that America, with a massive multilateral trade deficit that stems from an unprecedented shortfall of domestic saving, will make a major mistake in seeking a bilateral "remedy" to a jobless recovery by imposing trade sanctions on China.
More than ever, the US needs to stop taking out its frustrations on others. It should look in the mirror and deepen its understanding of the self-inflicted nature of its problems. This is America's re-education imperative. That is a key reason why I am heading off to Yale.
The writer is the chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia and author of The Next Asia. He will be joining the faculty of Yale University on July 1
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