过去几周，华盛顿方面对中国及人民币汇率加大了口头攻势。在美中关系正面临一系列其它敏感问题之际，我们中的一些人不太明白，国会为何会在这个问题上如此激动。美国财政部将于4月15日发布两年一次的定期报告，决定是否将中国列为汇率“操纵国”，很难说清国会中的众说纷纭会对谁有所助益。
事实上，从宏观经济角度来看，选择现在对人民币施压的时机再糟糕不过。大概四周前，巴拉克•奥巴马(Barack Obama)总统宣布，计划在未来5年将出口增加一倍。这是一个雄心勃勃的计划，但鉴于美元以往的疲软走势和众多大型新兴国家（其中包括中国）的强劲内需，美国还是有机会实现这一目标的。那么为何还要执意走上以牙还牙的报复之路呢？这只会让事态朝着相反的方向发展。
美国决策部门应重点关注的根本问题有三个：中国的内需、中国与世界其它地区的贸易，以及汇率。
有相当清楚的证据表明，现在中国内需其实过于强劲，其水平显然无法为那些声称中国没有为世界经济尽到“应尽义务”的指责提供证据。大约13年来，高盛一直在使用自有指标衡量中国国内生产总值(GDP)，即所谓的高盛中国活动指数(GSCA)。目前，该指数年增长率超过14%。事实上——这也有些讽刺意味——如果美国和其它国家政府能够闭嘴，中国的政策制定者可能反而会更为积极地采取行动，来缓解其经济增长带来的通胀压力，包括引入更加灵活的汇率机制。
观察一下各种指标，无论是来自中国本土企业或在华开展业务的全球性企业的坊间数据、消费与投资的官方数据、还是重要的贸易数据，我所说的一切就会一览无遗。与消费者行业任何层次的企业进行对话，无论是乐购(Tesco)、沃尔玛(Walmart)还是路易威登(Louis Vuitton)，他们的证据都会支持上述数据。中国的消费大概正以15%的速度增长，相当于美国消费2%至3%的增长率。
至于中国与世界其它地区的贸易往来，自经济危机触底以来，（贸易增长的）真正原因在于中国强劲的进口，而不是出口的复苏。即将发布的贸易数据（有趣的是，该数据将比美国财政部报告早几天发布）可能会再次证明中国进口增长巨大，无论是绝对增幅还是相对于出口而言。这一点不仅在中国贸易数据中有所体现，在许多其它贸易大国的数据中同样明显。事实上，德国对华贸易表现出极其强劲的增长，如果当前的势头得以延续，截至明年春季，中德贸易额将超越中法，这是相当惊人的。去年中国经常账户盈余相当于GDP的5.8%，显著低于华盛顿许多所认为的当前水平。2010年这一比例可能接近3%——恰巧低于彼得森国际经济研究所(Peterson Institute for International Economics)所认为的“均衡”水平：4%。
由此我将谈到第三个问题：汇率。我职业生涯的很大一部分都在研究汇率模型，因此熟悉这些模型的所有隐患。这些年来，高盛已开发出自己的汇率模型，包括适用于人民币的模型。目前，我们的模型显示，人民币汇率十分接近其合理水平，这个结果有些怪异。情况并非一直如此。过去，该模型曾显示人民币被低估了20%左右，但过去5年的汇率变动已将其抵销。当然，对于该模型的准确性，我们并不象对普通汇率模型那么有把握，因为中国经济增长形势和整个世界都在发生着翻天覆地的变化。
这将我们带回到了这个问题的讽刺性。既然眼下有越来越多的证据表明，如果美国收手，事态将朝着有利于它的方向发展，美国决策部门为何还要不断采取保护主义措施呢？此外，对于那些在中国政府里拥有影响力的人而言，有一点应该（而且大概已经）变得明显起来，即维持人民币盯住美元的僵硬汇率机制，已经失去其在后危机时期的作用，最近中国央行(PBoC)行长自己就已经注意到了这一点。
本文作者是高盛首席经济学家。
译者/管婧
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001032051
In the past few weeks, Washington has upped the rhetoric concerning China and its currency. Coming at the time when there are a number of other sensitive issues facing the US-China relationship, it is not obvious to some of us why Congress is so excitable about this issue. With the biannual decision of the US Treasury on whether to name China as a currency “manipulator” due on April 15, it is far from clear that all this noise is helpful to anyone.
Indeed, from a macro-economic perspective, the timing could not seem more inappropriate. About four weeks ago, President Barack Obama announced a plan to double exports over the next five years. This is ambitious, but given the past weakness of the dollar and the strength of domestic demand in many big emerging countries, China included, the US has a chance of reaching its goal. So why go down a path of tit-for-tat retaliation that would take things in the opposite direction?
There are three fundamental issues that US policymakers should focus on: domestic demand in China, China's trade with the rest of the world, and exchange rates.
With respect to domestic demand in China, there is rather clear evidence that, if anything, it is currently too strong, and certainly not at a level to justify accusations that China is not doing its “bit” for the world economy. For about 13 years we have used our own proprietary gross domestic product indicator for China, the so-called Goldman Sachs China Activity index. At the moment, this is growing at an annual rate of more than 14 per cent. Indeed, and somewhat ironically, it is likely that if Washington and others could keep quiet, Chinese policymakers would probably be more eager to do things to ease the inflationary pressures arising from this growth, including introducing more flexibility to the exchange rate.
Looking at a number of indicators, whether they be anecdotal from domestic or global companies that do business in China, published data on consumption and investment, or, importantly, the trade data, all of this is clear. Speak to anyone involved at any level of the consumer business, whether it be Tesco, Walmart or Louis Vuitton, and their evidence backs up the data. Chinese consumption is probably growing at about 15 per cent, similar to a 2-3 per cent rate for the US consumer.
As far as China's involvement with the rest of the world goes, the real story since the worst of the crisis is not China's recovering exports but China's strong imports. The forthcoming trade release – interestingly due a few days before the Treasury report – is likely to demonstrate enormous import growth again, absolutely and relative to exports. This is seen not just in Chinese data, but in that from many other important trading nations. Indeed, quite remarkably, Germany's trade with China is showing such strong growth that by spring next year, on current trends, it might exceed that with France. China last year reported a current account surplus of 5.8 per cent of GDP, significantly lower than apparently assumed as the current level by many people in Washington. In 2010, it could be closer to 3 per cent – incidentally below the 4 per cent level deemed as “equilibrium” by the Peterson Institute for International Economics.
Which brings me to the exchange rate. I have spent a lot of my career working on exchange rate models and am familiar with all the pitfalls. We have developed ours over the years at Goldman Sachs, including for the renminbi. At the moment, rather oddly, our model suggests that the renminbi is very close to the price that it should be. This has not always been the case. The model used to suggest the currency was undervalued by about 20 per cent, but it has moved by that degree over the past five years. We are, of course, less sure about the accuracy of this model than is usual with currency models, given the huge changes going on with China's growth dynamics and the world as a whole.
This brings us back to the irony of the question. Why are US policymakers pushing the protectionist buttons at the very time when there is growing evidence that events would otherwise play out in their favour? Moreover, it should and probably does seem obvious to those who matter in Beijing that keeping the renminbi rigidly pegged to the dollar has lost its post-crisis usefulness, something that the governor of the People's Bank of China has himself recently noticed.
The writer is chief economist at Goldman Sachs
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