外界正逼迫中国调整人民币估值。纠缠在这个问题上是错误的。全球经济所需要的，是中国经济保持增长，并降低其经常项目盈余。
有些人（中国国内外的都有）认为，就全球市场份额而言，这是一场静态的零和游戏。这毫无益处。主要问题在于增长，以及全球需求的复苏。全球需求不足，是由于美国储蓄上升，这是本轮危机所造成的，但这种局面有可能持续下去。中国可以做出重大贡献——大约相当于全球需求缺口的三分之一。中国较高的增长率数字以及不断回升的贸易额（其中进口增长速度高于出口），表明中国的危机应对策略正在生效。但是，中国可能不得不对这些措施加以抑制，以避免经济过热、通胀和资产泡沫。另外，在一个把资金完全用在投资上的发展中国家，盈余没有任何战略意义。
把注意力完全集中在汇率上面，似乎是基于以下假设：它是盈余的主要根源，也是消除盈余的主要政策工具。而现实情况要复杂得多。在中国，要减少盈余，需要进行深层次的结构性改革，在很大程度上与美国降低赤字一样。高储蓄深深植根于中国的经济结构之中。政府直接或通过掌握国有企业，控制了过多的收入。家庭收入仅占国内生产总值(GDP)的60%，远低于国际标准；家庭储蓄占可支配收入的30%，这一比例则偏高。这使得家庭消费占到GDP的40%-45%。要维持增长、更好地利用目前规模庞大的国内市场、引导经济实现向中等收入过渡相关的结构性变革，降低盈余而又不损及增长，上述两项比率都必须大幅调整。
如果不进行这些结构性改革，而实现人民币的浮动和可兑换（即停止资本管制），结果很可能是储蓄和贸易盈余继续高企、私人储蓄流向海外投资领域，而经济增长缓慢。汇率升值本身并不能消除盈余。
迅速增加内需，对于维持中国经济的高增长是必要的。不管怎么说，传统的出口行业都在衰落。收入正在上升。相对优势正转移向高附加值行业。为拉动增长，引导经济结构性改革（向中等收入过渡这一复杂过程是其中一个重要方面），需要增加内需，开拓新的出口行业。从这个角度来说，中国的经济利益与全球的经济利益是一致的。过剩储蓄约占GDP的10%。这部分储蓄必须转化为家庭消费。
中国国内存在这样一种观点：为保持在供应方面进行结构性改革的压力，人民币有必要升值。升值力度不够，将导致结构性改革陷入停滞，进而影响生产力增长和收入。
中国存在希望保持现状的既得利益者。危机可能会暂时增强他们的地位。他们在这个问题上也倾向于静态零和游戏的观点。敦促汇率升值会促使他们采取强有力的行动。但这股反抗是暂时的。没有人会认为，在未来20年内，中国的收入要达到发达国家水平，会依赖以出口为导向、附加值相对较低、劳动密集型的制造加工行业。
随着劳动密集型出口行业衰落，人民币升值会让广大农村人口变得没有多少发展余地吗？这是中国国内担心的一个问题。在当前发展阶段，盯住汇率机制和补贴都不可取。在发展的初步阶段，制造业是吸纳劳动力的一大行业。但在将来，以出口为导向的制造业，不会成为就业机会的主要来源。就业机会主要将来自国内经济、逐渐壮大的中产阶层以及他们所消费的服务业。
因此，中国要实现增长，就必须进行结构性改革，转向国内市场，消除经常项目盈余，使人民币逐步升值。公平地讲，人们可以把汇率视为触发更深层结构性改革的因素。问题在于目前所传出的信号。把目光局限在汇率上面，反映了对转型的复杂性没有充分理解。这种态度有利于中国国内外持零和观点的人士。
迈克尔•斯宾塞(Michael Spence)是2001年诺贝尔经济学奖得主、增长与发展委员会(Commission on Growth and Development)主席
译者/何黎
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001030998
China is being pressed to revalue its currency. It is a mistake to become obsessed by this. What the global economy needs is for China to grow and for its current account surplus to fall.
Some (inside and outside China) see this as a static zero-sum game for global market share. This is unhelpful. The main issues are growth and the restoration of global demand. The latter is in short supply because of the rise in US savings, caused by the crisis but likely to persist. China has a big contribution to make – in the order of a third of the deficit in global demand. Its high growth figures and rebounding trade, with imports outgrowing exports, suggest the crisis policies are working. But they may have to be reined in to avoid overheating, inflation and asset bubbles. Further, surpluses serve no strategic purpose in a developing country that is fully financing its investment.
The singular focus on the exchange rate appears based on the assumption that it is the key cause of the surplus and the main policy instrument for removing it. The reality is more complex. Reducing the surplus in China involves deep structural change, much as reducing the US deficit does. The high savings in China are embedded in the structure of the economy. The government controls too much income directly and through ownership of the state-owned enterprises. Household income at 60 per cent of gross domestic product is way below international norms and household saving at 30 per cent of disposable income is high. This puts household consumption in the range of 40-45 per cent of GDP. A significant change in both these ratios is needed to sustain growth, make better use of the now large domestic market and guide the structural change in the economy associated with the middle-income transition, and to reduce the surplus without damaging growth.
Without these structural changes, if the currency were floating and convertible (no capital controls), the outcome is most likely to be continued high savings, a trade surplus matched by an outflow of private savings to foreign investments and slow growth. Exchange rate appreciation by itself will not get rid of the surplus.
Rapidly rising domestic demand is essential to sustaining high growth in China. The traditional export sectors are in decline anyway. Incomes are rising. Comparative advantage is shifting to high value-added sectors. Domestic demand and new export sectors are needed to drive growth and guide the structural transformation of the economy, much of which is in the complex middle-income transition. In this dimension, China's economic interests and global ones are aligned. The excess savings are in the order of 10 per cent of GDP. That needs to turn into household consumption.
It is understood within China that an appreciating currency is needed to sustain pressure for structural change on the supply side. Insufficient appreciation will cause the structural shifts to stall. That will impact productivity growth and incomes.
There are vested interests in China in the status quo. The crisis may have temporarily strengthened their hand. They too tend to hold a static zero-sum version of the issue. Pressing for exchange rate appreciation strengthens their hand. But this resistance is temporary. No one thinks that the transition to advanced country incomes in the next two decades will be built on export-oriented, relatively low value-added, labour-intensive, manufacturing-processing industries.
Will an appreciating currency leave the large rural population few options to advance as labour-intensive exports decline? It is a concern inside China. At this stage of growth, neither a pegged exchange rate nor subsidies are desirable. The export-led manufacturing sector – a big employer in earlier stages of growth – will not be the main source of jobs in the future. That will come instead from the domestic economy, the growing middle class and services they consume.
So China's growth will require structural change, a shift to the domestic market, the elimination of the current account surplus and an appreciating currency. To be fair, one can view the exchange rate as a trigger for deeper structural reform. The problem is the signal being sent. A narrow focus on the exchange rate signals an incomplete understanding of the complexity of the transition. It plays into the hands of the zero-sum proponents inside and outside China.
The writer received the 2001 Nobel memorial prize in economics and chairs the Commission on Growth and Development
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