中国国家审计署(National Audit Office)4月底对中国农业银行(ABC)总行和11家分行进行了审计，发现这家中国资产规模第四大的银行存在高达数百亿元人民币的违规贷款。
此次审计发生在一个尴尬的时刻：几个月后，中国农行将在香港和上海首次公开发行(IPO)，预计筹资额将达300亿美元，创下全球之最。
它也及时提醒人们，尽管经历了十年的大规模改革，中国国家主导的欠发达银行业仍然面临着巨大挑战。
中国的银行，如中国工商银行(ICBC)和中国建设银行(CCB)，如今已跻身全世界规模最大（按市值计）和最盈利的银行之列，但就在10年前，中国的整个银行体系还处于技术性破产的境地。
从上世纪90年代末开始，中国政府展开了一系列的注资和不良贷款剥离行动，成功恢复了多数大型银行的活力，然后将它们的少数股权出售给外国投资者，最后通过一些全球规模最大的IPO将它们推向股市。
这一进程还没有完全结束，农行和很多规模较小的银行尚未公开上市，但总体来看，这一改革取得了巨大成功。
"毫无疑问，中国银行业较10年前有了长足的进步，当时它们大多已资不抵债，"惠誉评级(Fitch Ratings)分析师朱夏莲(Charlene Chu)说。
"它们的资产负债表、信息披露和财务状况都有了大幅改善，但要成为其它国家那种真正的商业银行，它们仍有很长的路要走，有时投资者对它们的进步评价有点言过其实了。"
多数分析师认为，所有中资银行（它们的多数股权基本上仍归国家所有）面临的最大挑战，就在于其贷款的质量，尤其是在经历了去年国家指令性的疯狂放贷之后。去年中国银行业新增贷款较上年翻了一番，达到9.6万亿元人民币（合1.4万亿美元）。
"中国的情况非常像西方2007年和2008年时的情形――那是一场流动性催生的资产泡沫，"独立风险顾问董乐明(Lonnie Dounn)说。
"随便走在中国的一条大街上，看看有多少空置多年的建筑物，然后问问自己，它们为何不是一些银行资产负债表上的不良贷款呢？"
董乐明表示，大部分银行的资产质量数据"完全缺乏可信度"。他还说："很多贷款永远也收不回来，但银行仍然不断展期，只要利息支付还在继续，就称之为优质贷款。这是属于隐性政府支出，最终将在政府不得不再次重组银行资本结构时体现在银行纾困计划中。"
虽然在银行上市前后就位的风险管理程序改善了对它们的监督状况，但分析师表示，去年的信贷狂潮使过去取得的很多成果都化为乌有。
按揭贷款和房地产开发贷款去年大幅上升，帮助吹大了房地产泡沫，如今政府正努力在不戳破泡沫的情况下给泡沫放气。
另一个令人关切的领域是向地方政府融资平台发放贷款的大幅增长。
中国省市一级政府不得通过发售债券或银行贷款直接融资，所以它们经常通过设立隐含政府巨额债负担保的空壳公司来避开相关规定。
法国巴黎银行(BNP Paribas)估计，去年约有3万亿元人民币的新增贷款流向了这些地方政府融资平台，其中大部分贷款仅由省级政府提供信用担保，而没有实际抵押物。
令人担心的是，许多使用这些贷款的桥梁、下水管道和公园等项目将几乎或者根本没有回报，迫使地方政府只得寻找其它方式偿还贷款或违约。
好消息是，中国的银行监管机构被认为是其所有金融监管机构中最有效率的一个，并且它们已采取初步措施来防范潜在问题。
银监会已经开始遏制贷款的过度增长，限制向某些行业发放贷款，迫使银行筹集新的资金，为日后资产质量恶化提供缓冲。
中国的一些银行已宣布，将通过发售股票或可转换债券筹措至少930亿美元资金。
"我们知道今后会出资产质量问题，但至于这是否会导致一场银行业的系统性危机，那就是另外一个问题了，"朱夏莲说。
译者/功文
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001032626
Following an audit of the headquarters and 11 branches of Agricultural Bank of China at the end of April, China's National Audit Office revealed that it had found lending irregularities amounting to tens of billions of renminbi.
The audit came at an embarrassing time for the country's fourth-largest lender by assets, which is just a few months away from an initial public offering in Hong Kong and Shanghai, which is expected to be the world's largest, at about $30bn.
It also provides a timely reminder of the challenges that still face China's underdeveloped, state-dominated banking sector despite a decade of frenetic reform.
Chinese lenders, such as Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and China Construction Bank, are now among the most valuable (by market capitalisation) and profitable banks in the world, but just 10 years ago the entire banking system was technically insolvent.
In a series of bail-outs and bad loan carve-outs starting in the late 1990s, the government succeeded in reviving most of the country's largest lenders before selling minority stakes to foreign investors and then listing them in some of the world's biggest IPOs.
That process is still not completely finished, with Agricultural Bank and a number of smaller banks yet to sell shares to the public, but by most accounts the exercise has been a huge success.
"Without a doubt Chinese banks have come a very long way from a decade ago when they were mostly insolvent," says Charlene Chu, an analyst at Fitch Ratings.
"Their balance sheets, disclosure and accounting are all dramatically better but in terms of becoming real commercial banks as we know in other countries, they still have a way to go and sometimes investors believe they've made more progress than they really have."
Most analysts agree that the biggest challenge facing all Chinese banks, which are almost still majority owned by the state, is the quality of the loans on their books, particularly after a state-directed lending spree that saw the volume of new loans double last year from a year earlier to Rmb9,600bn ($1,400bn).
"What's been happening in China is very similar to what was going on in the west in 2007 and 2008 � it's a liquidity-fuelled asset bubble," according to Lonnie Dounn, an independent risk consultant.
"Walk down any major street in China and see how many buildings have been empty for years then ask yourself how are they not bad loans on some bank's balance sheet?"
Mr Dounn says that most banks' asset quality numbers "completely lack credibility". He adds: "A lot of loans are never going to be repaid but the banks keep rolling them over and calling them good loans as long as the interest payments continue. This is implicit government spending and will eventually show up in a bank bail-out when the government has to recapitalise the banks again."
While risk management procedures that were put in place before and after the banks' IPOs have improved their oversight, analysts say that last year's credit binge reversed a lot of the gains.
Mortgage lending and lending to property developers soared last year, helping to inflate a real estate bubble that the government is now trying to deflate without causing it to pop.
Another area of concern is the boom in lending to the funding vehicles of local governments.
Provincial and municipal governments are not allowed to raise money directly through bond sales or bank loans, so often get round this by setting up shell companies with an implicit state guarantee to take on large debt loads.
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