在与金融市场的博弈中，欧洲各国政府正在考虑是将赌注加倍还是放弃。上周末公布的救助方案规模惊人。但问题在于这套方案是否超越了权宜之计。答案是否定的。按照最初的设计，欧元区已经失败。除非进行大刀阔斧的改革，否则欧元区将难以为续。
那么政府计划怎么做？首先，欧洲各国政府已经承诺了5000亿欧元（其中4400亿欧元以贷款担保形式提供给陷入困境的欧元区国家，另外600亿欧元用于扩大现有的国际收支援助安排）。其次，国际货币基金组织(IMF)看来还将另行提供2500亿欧元（合3200亿美元）。第三，欧洲央行(ECB)决定购买受到冲击的成员国的国债，这令德国央行(Bundesbank)行长埃克塞尔•韦伯(Axel Weber)大感懊丧。最后，美联储(Fed)重新开启了货币互换额度，为外国银行提供美元资金。这是在恐慌情绪驱动下对市场恐慌做出的应对举措。它让我们想起了2008年的秋天。
这套计划会有用吗？假设计划得到批准，那么答案应该是肯定的，市场已经得出了这样的结论。该计划显著提高了做空财力疲弱国家国债的成本。相对于国内生产总值(GDP)，欧元区的公共债务略低于美国。如果具有信誉的政府决定向信誉不那么好的政府提供支持，它们完全可以这么做，但仅就眼下而言。
为什么有必要出台这些激进的干预措施？毕竟，这与欧元区设计者的最初设想很不相符。要回答这个问题，我们必须回到这个货币联盟项目刚开始的时候。欧洲货币联盟建立在三个核心假设之上：第一，公约设定的赤字上限，能够约束成员国的财政赤字；第二，如果这种手段失灵，"不救助"条款将约束它们；第三，随着时间推移，成员国经济将逐渐趋同。可惜，这三个假设没有一个成为现实。
首先，事实证明，公约设定的赤字上限既无效也不适用。无效是因为在它们本该发挥约束作用的时候却被漠视。这一点在希腊身上体现得淋漓尽致，因为该国的数据完全是杜撰的。不适用是因为，今天财政赤字庞大的一些国家（特别是西班牙）曾经轻松达到了财政标准——只要他们的泡沫经济在不断膨胀：西班牙在2005、2006和2007年都实现了财政盈余。
其次，市场早就不再关注隐隐若现的财政虚弱迹象了，他们对所有欧元区国债的评级都大同小异。比利时鲁汶大学(Leuven university)的保罗•德•格劳威(Paul De Grauwe)为欧洲政策研究中心(Centre for European Policy Studies)撰写了一篇颇具讽刺性的文章。在文中他指出："政府债务危机的根源，是大部分私人部门过去的挥霍无度，尤其是金融行业。"金融市场为挥霍提供了资金，如今却惊恐万分，拒绝为由此产生的清理问题提供融资。在周期的每一个阶段，它们的行动都在助长周期性波动。
第三，由此推断，欧元区经济的发展是一个趋异而不是趋同的过程。大致的外部平衡掩盖了逐渐显现的一种现象，即一方面是拥有大规模经常账户盈余和对应巨额资本输出的国家（以德国为最），另一方面是状况完全相反的国家（西班牙最为突出）。在内需疲软、通胀率低的国家，实际利率居高不下，而内需强劲、通胀率高的国家正相反。其结果不仅是巨额财政赤字（鉴于现在私人部门支出骤减），还有必要重获失去的竞争力。不过在欧元区内部，这只有在工资下降、生产率增速高过德国（这意味着失业率飚升）、或者两者兼备的情况下才能实现。
现在各国政府正努力应对危机后果。但通过一味强调不会出现违约，它们只是在保护金融部门免尝自身蠢行的恶果，而指望负债国家的人民来埋单。在困境国家无法恢复增长的情况下，这样的交易能否被接受？我看很难。
那么接下来我们该怎么做？首先我们必须认识到，到目前为止我们所做的一切，不过是争取到了一些时间。在欧元区第一场真正的危机中，各国政府被迫采取孤注一掷的举措来防止违约，因为融资手段已经枯竭。现在它们面临许多重大选择。
第一个也是最根本的选择是，欧元区该走向更大程度的一体化，还是走向解体？答案必须是前者。当然，恢复各国的主权货币不是不可想象。但这将导致金融体系发生内爆，因为目前以欧元计价的资产与负债之间的关联性将变得不可确定。将会有大量资金出逃至被视为安全的国家的银行。
第二个选择是如何管理趋异。欧元区不能只依赖市场，而是必须在经济上涨时期管治趋异，在经济下行时期为调整提供缓冲。因此成立一只货币基金至关重要。任何此类管治都必须既能影响需求不足经济体的政策，也能影响那些需求过剩经济体的政策。即便是前者到现在也应该已经领悟了：追根究底，何必要积攒那些无价值的外国资产呢？
第三个选择是如何推动竞争力的改善。这意味着改革劳动力市场。或许还意味着以法律手段一次性调整名义工资。
第四个选择是如何巩固团结。位于布鲁塞尔的智库Bruegel提出了一个有意思的想法，即欧元区国家应该合并至多相当于GDP总量60%的国家债务，从而创造出全球两大公共债券市场之一。
最后一个选择是如何对过剩债务进行重组。必须允许欧元区进行债务重组，否则将造成巨大的道德风险（不是像人们所担心的那样出现在政界人士中，而是在金融家中）。
正如我的同事沃尔夫冈•明肖(Wolfgang Munchau)明确指出的那样，现在是真相大白的时候了，尤其是对德国政府而言。欧元区的继续存在，绝对符合德国的长期利益，这不仅是因为这是战后欧洲一体化政策的顶点。货币联盟还保护了德国工业的竞争力，从而让德国经济在国内需求停滞的情况依然得以增长。
德国倾向于相信只要对财政赤字国家严格纪律，一切都会好转。这是错误的。相反，真正的解决之道，在于创建一种能够承认现实、并作出回应的体系。该体系必须随机应变，能够遏制趋异，为债务重组创造条件，并推动经济调整。否则迎接我们的只有失败。现在我们所需要的是做出明智抉择的勇气。
译者/管婧
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001032590
Governments are playing double or quits in their game with financial markets. The package they announced last weekend is dramatic. But the question is whether it is more than a temporary solution. The answer is: no. As initially designed, the eurozone has failed. It will succeed only if radically reformed.
What is the plan? First, European governments have committed €500bn (€440bn in loan guarantees to eurozone members in difficulties, and a €60bn increase in a balance of payments facility). Second, the International Monetary Fund will, it appears, put up an additional €250bn ($320bn, £215bn). Third, the European Central Bank has, to the chagrin of Axel Weber, president of the Bundesbank, decided to purchase the bonds of members under attack. Finally, the US Federal Reserve has reopened swap lines, to provide foreign banks with access to dollar funding. This is a panic-driven response to market panic. It reminds us of the autumn of 2008.
Will the plan work? On the assumption that it is ratified, the answer should be yes, as markets concluded (see chart). It greatly increases the cost of betting against the debt of weak governments. The public debt of the eurozone is slightly lower than that of the US, relative to gross domestic product. If the creditworthy governments decide to support the less creditworthy ones, they can do so, for now.
Why has such radical intervention been found necessary? It is, after all, hardly what the designers had in mind. This is where we need to go back to the beginning of the project for a currency union. It rested on three central assumptions: first, treaty-defined limits would constrain fiscal deficits of members; second, to the extent that this failed, the "no bail-out" clause would constrain them; and, third, member economies would converge over time. Alas, none of this has proved to be true.
First, the treaty-defined limits on deficits proved both ineffective and irrelevant. They proved ineffective, because, when they should have been binding, they were ignored. This was most spectacularly true of Greece, which made its figures up. They proved irrelevant, because some countries that have big deficits today, notably Spain, easily met the fiscal criteria, so long as their bubble economy was inflating: Spain ran a fiscal surplus in 2005, 2006 and 2007.
Second, markets long paid no attention to emerging fiscal frailty, rating all eurozone bonds similarly. As Paul De Grauwe of Leuven university states, in a mordant note for the Centre for European Policy Studies: "The source of the government debt crisis is the past profligacy of large segments of the private sector, and in particular the financial sector." The financial markets financed the orgy and now, in a panic, are refusing to finance the resulting clean-up. At every stage, they have acted pro-cyclically.
Third, the story of the eurozone economy has, in consequence, been one of divergence, not convergence. The rough external balance masked the emergence of countries with huge current account surpluses and corresponding exports of capital, notably Germany, and of others with the opposite condition, notably Spain (see chart). In countries with weak domestic demand and low inflation, real interest rates were high; in countries with strong demand and higher inflation, the reverse was true. The result is not just huge fiscal deficits, now that private- sector spending has collapsed, but a need to regain lost competitiveness. But, inside the eurozone, this is possible only with falling wages, higher productivity growth than in Germany (and so soaring unemployment), or both.
Now governments are struggling to cope with the aftermath. But, in insisting that there will be no defaults, they are protecting the financial sector from its stupidity. The people of indebted countries are expected to pay, instead. Is this going to prove an acceptable bargain, in the absence of a return to growth in stricken countries? Hardly.
So where do we go from here? We must start by recognising that all we have done is buy a little time. In the eurozone's first real crisis, governments have been driven to desperate attempts to prevent defaults, as finance has dried up. Now they confront big choices.
The first and most fundamental is whether to go towards greater integration or towards disintegration. The answer has to be the former. Of course, it is possible to imagine a return to national currencies. But this would cause the financial system to implode, since the relations between assets and liabilities now in euros would become so uncertain. There would be massive capital flight into the banks of those countries deemed safe.
The second is how to manage divergence. The eurozone cannot rely on markets alone. It will have to police divergence in upswings and cushion adjustment in downswings. This is why a monetary fund is essential. Any such policing must influence the policies of both demand-deficient and excess-demand economies. Even the former should now understand this: why, after all, accumulate worthless foreign assets?
The third is how to facilitate changes in competitiveness. This means labour market reform. It may also mean legal means for adjusting nominal wages, on a one-off basis.
The fourth is over how to reinforce solidarity. One interesting idea, from the Brussels-based think-tank, Bruegel, is that eurozone countries should pool up to 60 per cent of GDP of their national debts, thereby creating one of the world's two largest public debt markets.
The last is over how to restructure excess debt. This must be allowed. The alternative creates vast moral hazard, not among politicians, as has been feared, but among financiers.
As my colleague, Wolfgang Münchau, has made plain, this is now a moment of truth, especially for Berlin. The survival of the eurozone is overwhelmingly in Germany's long-term interests, not just because it is the capstone of a postwar policy of European integration. The currency union has also protected the competitiveness of German industry and so allowed the economy to grow, despite the stagnation of domestic demand.
The German inclination is to believe that everything would be fine if deficit countries were placed under greater discipline. This is false. The answer, instead, is to create a system that recognises and responds to reality. It must be changed, to contain divergence, facilitate debt restructuring and promote economic adjustment. It is either this or failure. What is now needed is the courage to choose wisely.
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