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新京报》报道，中国银监会下属北京银监局刚刚完成北京地区房地产贷款压力测试。测试结果显示，房价下跌20%至30%，将引发房地产业相关贷款质量恶化；而房价下跌50%，银行业将不能承受。尽管中国当局惯于通过《新京报》等小型媒体传递微妙的信息，测试国内舆论，但市场可能对这篇特别报道作过多解读，认为中国正在做好准备，迎接房价最高达50%的跌幅。
中国房价已经高入云霄，其走势如何是个难以求解的问题，而中国政府一直以来的种种举措让这个问题引发人们的种种猜测。即使全球经济趋势未随欧元区主权债危机发生转变，情况也是如此。
尽管自4月中旬以来，中央政府看似强硬的房产地控制措施频频出台，包括提高房贷利率及首付要求等，但高层领导对房价确切走势的态度一直含混不明。
过去两年中，中国官方对房价政策提法的演变可谓中国当局被视作语义学大师的经典例证。2008年底，全球金融危机引发房价急剧下调，中国国务院发布声明要促进房地产业"稳定、健康发展"。2009年，房价在巨额财政刺激方案及大量投机的推动下飙升，国务院呼吁采取措施"防止房价过快上涨"。今年初，随着这种警告失败而房价进一步高涨，中国总理温家宝的措辞提升到"坚决遏制部分城市房价过快上涨"这种高度。提请注意，这里说的并非是全国。
然后是一系列的行政紧缩措施出台，以及近几周关于可能出台房产税的无休止的争论，多位中层官员及智囊研究人士对此曾断然否认，然后又表示支持，如此周而复始。
而所有这些措施及争论都无碍中国房价继续上扬，4月份房价年比上涨12.8%，尽管成交量大幅降低。
这个数据表明，购房者与房地产开发商目前处于僵持状态，不仅是因为双方都不愿让步，而且还因为双方都对未来趋势没有把握。
具有讽刺意味的是，中国作为一个社会主义国家，住房市场却在全球商业化程度最高之列，在提供廉价公共住房方面远远落后于新加坡等国家。但仔细观察中国貌似高度资本主义化的房地产市场，就会发现这也是伪装得最好的一个市场：在一个仅需求是由市场驱动而供应完全由政府控制的市场，供方总是占上风。
最新出台的系列紧缩措施都是关于需求面的，旨在增加房产投机者的成本，但普通购房者的成本也加大了。如果中国政府真想降低房价，最简单明了的解决方法应是增加土地供应。近几周来，政府实际上已放开更多土地供应，但数量太小，几可忽略不计。
中国政府迄今的反应再次暴露出最终的政策困局，以及某种程度上政府立场的利益冲突：房地产既是经济增长动力又是通胀来源，对于这种矛盾性，中国政府难以取舍。而作为出售土地的唯一最大受益者，政府实际上也没有降价的动力。
这正是银行压力测试不可能导致政策有实质性改变的原因。这种测试最多显示政府与房产开发商及购房者一样，同样不知房价应该降多少。
但就在压力测试完成前，欧洲经济震荡出人意外地成为关注焦点，温家宝也发出官方思路可能有大转变的暗示。不到两周前，他说，中国必须注重政策的协调配合，以"防止多项政策叠加的负面影响"。
所以就继续猜吧。
Shen Hong
The Beijing Times reported that the Chinese banking regulator's Beijing branch has just completed a so-called stress test on the impact of falling property prices on local lenders. The finding is that a 20%-30% drop in prices would trigger a deterioration in loan quality while a 50% decline is simply unbearable for banks.
While the Chinese authorities are adept at conveying subtle messages and testing domestic opinion via smaller media outlets such as the Beijing paper, one might read too much into this particular article and believe that China is bracing itself for a maximum 50% fall in home prices.
The direction of China's already-sky high property prices remains a million-dollar question and the government has kept on making it an intriguing guessing game. This would be true even if the global economic tides hadn't shifted in the wake of the euro-zone sovereign debt crisis.
Despite the series of tough-looking property-tightening measures that Beijing has unveiled since mid-April, including raising mortgage rates and minimum down payments, the top leadership has been mum and vague about where exactly it wants prices to be.
The evolution of official rhetoric on property prices over the past two years is a classic example of why Chinese authorities are considered masters of semantics: In late 2008, when the global financial crisis triggered a sharp correction for housing prices, the State Council issued a statement urging the 'steady and healthy development' of the real-estate industry. In 2009, when prices surged amid massive fiscal stimulus and rampant speculation, the cabinet called for measures to 'prevent overly rapid price rises.' When that warning failed and prices soared further earlier this year, Premier Wen Jiabao upgraded the wording to 'to resolutely curb excessively fast price gains in some cities' (not across the country, mind you.)
Then came the administrative tightening measures and in recent weeks the incessant chatter about the potential introduction of a property tax, which various mid-level officials and think-tank researchers have helpfully rebuffed, voiced support for, rebuffed and supported again.
Shrugging off all the measures and the noise, China's property prices rose a record of 12.8% in April from a year ago, though accompanied by dramatically shrinking transaction volumes.
What the data show is that home buyers and property developers are in a standoff, not only because neither side wants to back down but also because both are equally clueless about the future.
Ironically, as a socialist country, China boasts one of the world's most thoroughly commercialized housing markets, trailing well behind nations like Singapore in the supply of cheap public housing. However, a closer look at China's extremely capitalist-looking property market suggests it's also the best disguised one: In a market where only demand is market-driven and supply is totally controlled by the government, the latter always has the upper hand.
The latest tightening measures are all about demand-side factors, aimed at making it costlier for speculators, but also ordinary people to buy a home. If
Beijing genuinely wants to drive down home prices, one of the simplest and most obvious solutions would be to boost land supply. The government has indeed released more land in recent weeks, but the amount is too negligible to be felt.
The government's response so far betrays, once again, the ultimate policy dilemma and to some extent a conflict of interest regarding its stance: Beijing is torn between the competing views of real estate as a growth engine and as a source of inflation. And as the single biggest beneficiary of land sales, the government also has virtually no incentive to depress prices.
That is exactly why such stress tests for banks aren't likely to lead to any concrete policy changes. At best, it simply shows the government is just as clueless as property developers and homebuyers on how much it should allow property prices to fall.
But even before the stress test was completed, Europe's economic woes unexpectedly overtook the center stage and Premier Wen hinted at a likely significant shift in official mindset: He said less than two weeks ago that 'China must focus on policy coordination to work against negative effects that might emerge from the various policies.' (Read: we'll go easy on further tightening.)
So keep guessing.
Shen Hong
While the Chinese authorities are adept at conveying subtle messages and testing domestic opinion via smaller media outlets such as the Beijing paper, one might read too much into this particular article and believe that China is bracing itself for a maximum 50% fall in home prices.
The direction of China's already-sky high property prices remains a million-dollar question and the government has kept on making it an intriguing guessing game. This would be true even if the global economic tides hadn't shifted in the wake of the euro-zone sovereign debt crisis.
Despite the series of tough-looking property-tightening measures that Beijing has unveiled since mid-April, including raising mortgage rates and minimum down payments, the top leadership has been mum and vague about where exactly it wants prices to be.
The evolution of official rhetoric on property prices over the past two years is a classic example of why Chinese authorities are considered masters of semantics: In late 2008, when the global financial crisis triggered a sharp correction for housing prices, the State Council issued a statement urging the 'steady and healthy development' of the real-estate industry. In 2009, when prices surged amid massive fiscal stimulus and rampant speculation, the cabinet called for measures to 'prevent overly rapid price rises.' When that warning failed and prices soared further earlier this year, Premier Wen Jiabao upgraded the wording to 'to resolutely curb excessively fast price gains in some cities' (not across the country, mind you.)
Then came the administrative tightening measures and in recent weeks the incessant chatter about the potential introduction of a property tax, which various mid-level officials and think-tank researchers have helpfully rebuffed, voiced support for, rebuffed and supported again.
Shrugging off all the measures and the noise, China's property prices rose a record of 12.8% in April from a year ago, though accompanied by dramatically shrinking transaction volumes.
What the data show is that home buyers and property developers are in a standoff, not only because neither side wants to back down but also because both are equally clueless about the future.
Ironically, as a socialist country, China boasts one of the world's most thoroughly commercialized housing markets, trailing well behind nations like Singapore in the supply of cheap public housing. However, a closer look at China's extremely capitalist-looking property market suggests it's also the best disguised one: In a market where only demand is market-driven and supply is totally controlled by the government, the latter always has the upper hand.
The latest tightening measures are all about demand-side factors, aimed at making it costlier for speculators, but also ordinary people to buy a home. If
Beijing genuinely wants to drive down home prices, one of the simplest and most obvious solutions would be to boost land supply. The government has indeed released more land in recent weeks, but the amount is too negligible to be felt.
The government's response so far betrays, once again, the ultimate policy dilemma and to some extent a conflict of interest regarding its stance: Beijing is torn between the competing views of real estate as a growth engine and as a source of inflation. And as the single biggest beneficiary of land sales, the government also has virtually no incentive to depress prices.
That is exactly why such stress tests for banks aren't likely to lead to any concrete policy changes. At best, it simply shows the government is just as clueless as property developers and homebuyers on how much it should allow property prices to fall.
But even before the stress test was completed, Europe's economic woes unexpectedly overtook the center stage and Premier Wen hinted at a likely significant shift in official mindset: He said less than two weeks ago that 'China must focus on policy coordination to work against negative effects that might emerge from the various policies.' (Read: we'll go easy on further tightening.)
So keep guessing.
Shen Hong
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