中国对外国企业正变得越来越小气？近几个月来，媒体成篇累牍地刊载这样的故事，暗示在华外企将被不断上涨的经济民族主义浪潮所淹没。
目前，许多在华外企的赢利比以往任何时候都多，但它们抱怨称，商业环境正不断恶化。中国经济的“蛋糕”不断扩大，但外企能够分享的部分，比它们的中国竞争对手要少。
毫无疑问，中国已不再渴求外国资金。但我们一直觉得，说“中国小气”是过于夸大其词。现在，我们掌握了一些具体的证据来支持自己的观点：即中国没有向外企发起协同的打击行动。
上周，中国政府出台了一些新规，降低了地方政府对相当规模的外企投资的审批难度。此外，最明显的是，中国科技部(Ministry of Science and Technology)取消了4个月前出台的规定。这些规定在政府采购所谓的 “自主创新”产品上，对外企存在明显的歧视。
中国政府的退让，一定程度上归因于外国商会的强烈抵制。但同时也反映出中国在规则制定上的一种惯常模式：作为对一条宽泛政令的回应，一些荒唐的规定不经充分咨询就起草出台。
一旦出台，这些规定就会招致强烈的抗议，政府最终会明智地对它们做出一些修改。自主创新的规定并不证明中国密谋驱逐外企，而仅仅是中国规则制定中程序混乱的最新例证。
中国国务院2006年开始推动“自主创新”，该计划旨在支持本国的技术创造与商业化。随后，在2009年11月，几家部委宣布，将执行相关政府采购规定，即只采购拥有完全本土知识产权、注册商标和品牌的产品。
两周前，中国科技部撤销了该计划中争议最大的一些条款。在海外注册的知识产权如今可以在中国使用。资格鉴定不再要求注册商标与品牌第一注册地是中国。另外，有资格竞标的产品，不再需要拥有达到或超过国际标准的技术。
为何会出现这样的转变？来自于外国公司的压力无疑起到了一定作用。它们认为，去年11月出台的规定，是一种常见的排外情绪。
在今年3月份的一次调查中，中国美国商会(American Chamber of Commerce)发现，38%的会员觉得自己在中国市场上不受欢迎，这一比例较2008年的23%有所上升。28%的企业表示，它们正因为自主创新政策而丢掉业务。
在行业集团与外国政府官员发起协同游说攻势之后，中国政府最近在政策上做出了让步。去年12月末，中国欧盟商会(EU Chamber of Commerce)向科技部提交了一封抗议书，部长万钢立即回复，这是不多见的。
科技部出台最初的规定时，似乎并没有考虑到外企可能作出的反应，几乎没有一位高层官员对此给予应有的关注。对中国官僚机构而言，科技部如此迅速，以闪电般的速度，在四个月后取消上述条款，表明它非常严肃地对待外企的反对意见。
但这种政策让步的关键原因，可能在于各部委官员意识到它们行不通。不仅中国政府自身需要使用外国技术与知识产权的产品，而且，它也难以区分中外技术，难以证明某种产品包含“先进的”技术。
最终，政策的制定者得出了结论：若推动自主创新的规定过度严格，最终将阻碍本国企业和经济的发展。美国印第安那大学(Indiana University)中国政治与商业研究中心主任斯科特•肯尼迪(Scott Kennedy)表示：“他们明显做过了头，而他们自己也意识到了这一点。”
译者/何黎
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001032479
Is China getting meaner to foreign companies? In recent months the press has been full of stories suggesting that a rising tide of economic nationalism was about to drown foreign firms.
Although many foreign companies are more profitable than ever in China, they complain that the business environment is deteriorating. China's economic pie continues to grow, but foreign companies are being offered smaller slices than their Chinese competitors.
There is no doubt that China is no longer desperate for foreign capital. But we always thought the “mean China” idea was greatly exaggerated, and now there is some concrete evidence to support our view that there is no concerted campaign against foreign businesses.
Last week, Beijing issued new rules that make it easier for local governments to approve sizeable investments by foreign companies. And, most notably, the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) backed down on regulations it had issued four months earlier, which expressly discriminated against foreign firms in government procurement of so-called “indigenous innovation” products.
The climb-down owed something to fierce resistance by foreign chambers of commerce. But it also reflected a common pattern in Chinese regulation: in response to a broad policy mandate, silly rules are drafted with inadequate consultation.
Once published, the rules generate a storm of protest, and are eventually revised in a more sensible direction. The indigenous innovation rules were just the latest example of China's chaotic regulatory process, not evidence of a conspiracy to drive foreign firms out of the country.
The State Council began to promote “indigenous innovation”—a plan to support the creation and commercialization of domestic technology—in 2006. Then in November 2009 a handful of ministries announced they would implement rules limiting government procurement to products with entirely home-grown intellectual property, trademarks and brands.
Two weeks ago, MOST backtracked on the most contentious elements of this plan. Intellectual property can now be licensed for use in China from abroad. Accreditation no longer requires that trademarks and brands are first registered in China. And eligible products no longer need to have technology that reaches or surpasses international standards.
Why? Pressure from foreign companies, which saw last November's rules as part of a general pattern of anti-foreign sentiment, certainly played a role.
In a March survey, the American Chamber of Commerce found that 38% of its members felt unwelcome in the Chinese market, up from 23% in 2008. Twenty-eight percent of firms said they were losing business specifically because of indigenous innovation policies.
The recent policy retreat came after concerted lobbying by industry groups and foreign politicians. The EU Chamber of Commerce in China sent a protest letter to MOST in late December, and received the rare treat of a prompt reply from minister Wan Gang himself.
It appears that MOST issued the original rules without considering the likely reaction from foreign companies, while none of the top brass had paid much attention to them at all. The fact that the ministry backtracked so quickly—four months is lightning speed for the Chinese bureaucracy—suggests it took the foreign opposition very seriously.
But the key reason for the policy retreat probably came when ministry officials realized that they were unworkable. Not only does the Chinese government itself need products with foreign technologies and intellectual property, it is difficult to distinguish Chinese from foreign technology, and to prove that a product includes “advanced” technology.
Finally, policy makers came to the conclusion that overly strict rules on promoting indigenous innovation would ultimately hinder domestic businesses and harm the economy. “They had obviously overreached, and they knew it,” says Scott Kennedy, director of Indiana University's research center for Chinese politics and business.
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