美
国总统奥巴马(Barack Obama)上个月在中国时宣布，需要解决美国的赤字，以避免“二次衰退”。这一声明引发人们猜测，美国的主要债权人中国告诫奥巴马要打理好自家的财政状况。尽管大多数分析人士过去一年中都在说中国陷入了“美元陷阱”，但奥巴马讲话的时机和地点表明中国已从上一次的严重美元危机中吸取了一些重要教训。最重要的是，他们似乎明白，“美元外交”是让美国政策更有利于保护中国2万亿美元外汇储备价值的有用工具。
为了理解这一点，有必要对美国上世纪70年代末的主要债权人面临的问题做一个简短的历史回顾。1978年，对美元情况的担忧排到了国际经济议程的首位。随着美元的疲软日渐侵蚀西德和石油输出国组织(Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, 简称：欧佩克)等美国贸易伙伴的竞争力，或威胁其美元储备的价值，它们的担忧情绪与日俱增。欧佩克面临着一个特别尖锐的问题，因为美元作为石油结算货币，这意味着石油出口国除了积累美元之外别无选择。比如，在1978年6月，有人估计沙特阿拉伯的海外资产和储备为650亿美元，据说其中有80%为美元资产。
虽然中国的美元储备规模远远超过了70年代末的沙特阿拉伯，但沙特仍面临着实质上的“美元陷阱”困境：任何将储备从美元转向另一种货币的重大举措都会加速美元的下跌，侵蚀剩余储备的价值。
然而，欧佩克国家没有被动地接受积累不断贬值的美元的命运，它们采取了认真仔细的外交对策，给美国施加压力，最终促使美国实施了更强硬的通货膨胀政策。首先，欧佩克国家公开讨论采用美元以外的货币对石油定价，如国际货币基金组织(International Monetary Fund)的特别提款权。欧佩克要求对采用另一种货币进行石油结算的影响进行研究，欧佩克一个下属委员会提出用一篮子货币对石油定价。欧佩克的成员国科威特说，它将接受英镑，而不是美元。
其次，一些欧佩克成员国提出了在严重通胀情况下用提高油价弥补美元价值下跌的可能性。由于刚刚经历了石油禁运，此举引起了美国决策者的关注。
最后，至少有一个石油出口国决定将储备资金投资于其它货币。1978年沙特将部分盈余资金转换为瑞士法郎和德国马克，而不是以美元形式持有，实际上一度将美元转为德国马克。这些转换的相对数值较小，但却已足以引起华盛顿官员的关注。
这些举措同沙特官员幕后不断要求美国控制通胀的压力结合到了一起。曾出现过令人难忘的一幕：美国财政部长布卢门撒尔(Michael Blumenthal)和他的主要助手非常担心欧佩克债权人的影响，以至打断了沙特财政大臣的迪斯尼世界之旅，解释美国政府有关美元的计划。
虽然难以单独判断欧佩克“美元外交”的影响，但几乎可以肯定地说，它促进了卡特政府对通货膨胀的政策调整，包括1978年8月捍卫美元，并最终在1979年任命了对通胀持强硬态度的沃尔克(Paul Volcker)担任美国联邦储备委员会(Federal Reserve)主席。
陷入“美元陷阱”的国家不再像最初那样封闭。中国似乎正在采用欧佩克的一些做法，呼吁建立新的全球储备货币，以及与巴西和俄罗斯讨论不使用美元进行交易的方式。
虽然作为美国最大债权人，中国能对美国的经济政策产生重要影响，但这也让中国容易受到美国其它债权人举动的冲击。9个国家（或欧佩克这样的国家集团）共持有至少1,000亿美元的美国国债。可以想像一下其中一、两个债权人对美元失去信心，抛售大量美元资产的情形。这一举动可能会引发信贷挤兑，因为惊慌的债权人会试图在美元崩溃前抛售美国国债。
可能产生这种情形的情况不一定需要反映美国经济的基本面。一些国债拍卖认购不足、高于预期的消费者价格指数报告或显示赤字高于预期的中期预算评估都可能改变债权人对通货膨胀前景的预期。
“美元陷阱”看法的支持者认为，理性的债权人都不会通过抛售美元破坏其资产价值。但是，如果债权人认为，美国并不是真的想遏制通货膨胀，并预计美元的跌势将会持续，那么以尽可能高的价格抛出美元资产对债权人而言就是非常合理的做法。
我们从中得到的教训是，美中经济关系的稳定在很大程度上依赖于美国其他主要债权人的预期：它不再仅仅是两个超级大国间的事情。此外，美国的金融战线拉得越长，它就越容易受到看似微不足道的金融事件的摆布。
虽然中国可以利用“美元外交”找到摆脱困境的出路，但美国却几乎没有可行的替代办法减少赤字，并最终紧缩银根。如果美国政府没有足够的意愿控制货币供应和自己国家的债务，它就面临着对手日益制约美国的经济政策选择，或全球对美元信心崩溃的前景。这两种情况对美国来说都不是好兆头，这也是国会和政府应该更认真看待美元问题的理由。
（编者按：Joel Harris最近在牛津大学完成了商科研究生学业。之前，他曾在乔治•布什政府中担任商务部政策主任。）
Joel Harris
U.S. President Barack Obama made news in China last month when he announced the need to tackle the U.S. deficit to avoid a 'double-dip recession.' The statement triggered speculation that America's chief creditor admonished the President to get his fiscal house in order.
While most analysts have spent the past year arguing China is caught in a 'dollar trap,' the timing and location of Mr. Obama's statement indicates the Chinese have learned some key lessons from the last great dollar crisis. Most importantly, they appear to understand that 'dollar diplomacy' is a useful tool to make U.S. policies more favorable to protecting the value of China's $2 trillion in reserves.
To understand this, it's worth a brief historical review of the problem facing major U.S. creditors in the late 1970s. In 1978, concern about the dollar's health reached the top of the international economic agenda. U.S. trading partners, such as West Germany and the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), grew particularly worried as the dollar's weakness eroded their competitiveness or jeopardized the value of their dollar-denominated reserves. OPEC faced an especially acute problem, because the dollar served as oil's invoice currency, meaning the oil-exporting nations had no alternative to dollar accumulation. In June 1978, for example, one estimate put Saudi Arabia's foreign assets and reserves at $65 billion -- 80% of which were said to be held in dollars.
While China's dollar reserves are orders of magnitude larger than those held by Saudi Arabia in the late 1970s, the Saudis still faced the fundamental 'dollar trap' predicament: Any major effort to shift reserves from dollars to another currency would accelerate the dollar's decline and erode the value of the remaining reserves.
Yet rather than passively accepting a fate of accumulating increasingly devalued dollars, the OPEC countries engaged in careful diplomacy, bringing pressure to bear on the United States that ultimately contributed to a tougher inflation policy. First, OPEC countries publicly discussed pricing oil in a currency other than the dollar, such as the International Monetary Fund's special drawing rights. The cartel requested a study on the effect of invoicing oil in an alternative currency, and an OPEC committee proposed using a basket of currencies to price the commodity. One member of the cartel -- Kuwait -- said it would accept sterling instead of dollars.
Second, some OPEC members raised the possibility of an oil-price hike to compensate for the erosion of the dollar's value through unchecked inflation. Fresh from the experience of the oil embargo, this move raised concerns among U.S. policy makers.
Finally, at least one oil exporter decided to invest reserve funds in other currencies. In 1978 Saudi Arabia placed some surplus funds into Swiss francs and German marks, instead of holding them in dollars, and at one point actually moved money from dollars to marks. These shifts appear to have been relatively small amounts, but large enough to get the attention of officials in Washington.
These moves were combined with consistent pressure from Saudi officials behind the scenes regarding the need for the U.S. to curb inflation. In one memorable episode, Treasury Secretary Michael Blumenthal and his key aides were so concerned about the impact on the OPEC creditors that they interrupted the Saudi Finance Minister's Disney World vacation to outline the administration's plans for the dollar.
While it is difficult to isolate the impact of OPEC's 'dollar diplomacy,' there can be little doubt it contributed to the Carter administration's policy shift on inflation, including the defense of the dollar in August 1978 and ultimately the appointment of inflation hawk Paul Volcker as Federal Reserve chairman in 1979.
Nations caught in a 'dollar trap' are not as confined as it might first appear. China appears to be using some of the OPEC playbook, calling for a new global reserve currency and discussing ways to trade with Brazil and Russia without using the dollar.
While its position as the largest U.S. creditor gives China important influence over U.S. economic policy, it also makes China vulnerable to the moves of other U.S. creditors. Nine countries (or groups of countries, such as the oil-exporting nations) hold $100 billion or more in U.S. Treasuries. It is possible to imagine a scenario in which one or two of these creditors lose faith in the dollar and sell a significant portion of their dollar assets. Such a move could spark a credit run, as panicked creditors attempt to sell Treasury bonds before a dollar collapse.
The circumstances that could give rise to such a scenario would not necessarily need to reflect the underlying fundamentals of the U.S. economy. A few undersubscribed Treasury auctions, a higher-than-expected consumer price index report or a mid-session budget review indicating a larger deficit than forecast could shape creditor expectations regarding the prospects for inflation.
Proponents of the 'dollar trap' view argue no reasonable creditor would undermine its asset values by a starting a dollar sell-off. However, if a creditor believes the U.S. is not serious about containing inflation and expects the dollar's decline to persist, it is perfectly rational for the creditor to sell dollar assets at the best possible price.
The lesson here is that the stability of U.S.-China economic relations is highly contingent on the expectations of other major U.S. creditors: It is no longer solely the province of the two superpowers. In addition, the more the U.S. becomes financially overextended, the more it is at the mercy of seemingly insignificant financial events.
While China can use 'dollar diplomacy' to find a way out of a difficult situation, the U.S. has few viable alternatives to deficit reduction and eventually tightening the money supply. If the U.S. government cannot muster the will to rein in the money supply and the national debt on its own, it faces the prospect of a rival power increasingly constraining U.S. economic policy options or a collapse in global confidence in the dollar. Neither scenario bodes well for the U.S., which is all the more reason for Congress and the administration to get serious about the dollar.
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Mr. Harris recently completed graduate studies in business at the University of Oxford. Previously, he served as policy director to the U.S. Secretary of Commerce during the administration of George W. Bush.
U.S. President Barack Obama made news in China last month when he announced the need to tackle the U.S. deficit to avoid a 'double-dip recession.' The statement triggered speculation that America's chief creditor admonished the President to get his fiscal house in order.
While most analysts have spent the past year arguing China is caught in a 'dollar trap,' the timing and location of Mr. Obama's statement indicates the Chinese have learned some key lessons from the last great dollar crisis. Most importantly, they appear to understand that 'dollar diplomacy' is a useful tool to make U.S. policies more favorable to protecting the value of China's $2 trillion in reserves.
To understand this, it's worth a brief historical review of the problem facing major U.S. creditors in the late 1970s. In 1978, concern about the dollar's health reached the top of the international economic agenda. U.S. trading partners, such as West Germany and the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), grew particularly worried as the dollar's weakness eroded their competitiveness or jeopardized the value of their dollar-denominated reserves. OPEC faced an especially acute problem, because the dollar served as oil's invoice currency, meaning the oil-exporting nations had no alternative to dollar accumulation. In June 1978, for example, one estimate put Saudi Arabia's foreign assets and reserves at $65 billion -- 80% of which were said to be held in dollars.
While China's dollar reserves are orders of magnitude larger than those held by Saudi Arabia in the late 1970s, the Saudis still faced the fundamental 'dollar trap' predicament: Any major effort to shift reserves from dollars to another currency would accelerate the dollar's decline and erode the value of the remaining reserves.
Yet rather than passively accepting a fate of accumulating increasingly devalued dollars, the OPEC countries engaged in careful diplomacy, bringing pressure to bear on the United States that ultimately contributed to a tougher inflation policy. First, OPEC countries publicly discussed pricing oil in a currency other than the dollar, such as the International Monetary Fund's special drawing rights. The cartel requested a study on the effect of invoicing oil in an alternative currency, and an OPEC committee proposed using a basket of currencies to price the commodity. One member of the cartel -- Kuwait -- said it would accept sterling instead of dollars.
Second, some OPEC members raised the possibility of an oil-price hike to compensate for the erosion of the dollar's value through unchecked inflation. Fresh from the experience of the oil embargo, this move raised concerns among U.S. policy makers.
Finally, at least one oil exporter decided to invest reserve funds in other currencies. In 1978 Saudi Arabia placed some surplus funds into Swiss francs and German marks, instead of holding them in dollars, and at one point actually moved money from dollars to marks. These shifts appear to have been relatively small amounts, but large enough to get the attention of officials in Washington.
These moves were combined with consistent pressure from Saudi officials behind the scenes regarding the need for the U.S. to curb inflation. In one memorable episode, Treasury Secretary Michael Blumenthal and his key aides were so concerned about the impact on the OPEC creditors that they interrupted the Saudi Finance Minister's Disney World vacation to outline the administration's plans for the dollar.
While it is difficult to isolate the impact of OPEC's 'dollar diplomacy,' there can be little doubt it contributed to the Carter administration's policy shift on inflation, including the defense of the dollar in August 1978 and ultimately the appointment of inflation hawk Paul Volcker as Federal Reserve chairman in 1979.
Nations caught in a 'dollar trap' are not as confined as it might first appear. China appears to be using some of the OPEC playbook, calling for a new global reserve currency and discussing ways to trade with Brazil and Russia without using the dollar.
While its position as the largest U.S. creditor gives China important influence over U.S. economic policy, it also makes China vulnerable to the moves of other U.S. creditors. Nine countries (or groups of countries, such as the oil-exporting nations) hold $100 billion or more in U.S. Treasuries. It is possible to imagine a scenario in which one or two of these creditors lose faith in the dollar and sell a significant portion of their dollar assets. Such a move could spark a credit run, as panicked creditors attempt to sell Treasury bonds before a dollar collapse.
The circumstances that could give rise to such a scenario would not necessarily need to reflect the underlying fundamentals of the U.S. economy. A few undersubscribed Treasury auctions, a higher-than-expected consumer price index report or a mid-session budget review indicating a larger deficit than forecast could shape creditor expectations regarding the prospects for inflation.
Proponents of the 'dollar trap' view argue no reasonable creditor would undermine its asset values by a starting a dollar sell-off. However, if a creditor believes the U.S. is not serious about containing inflation and expects the dollar's decline to persist, it is perfectly rational for the creditor to sell dollar assets at the best possible price.
The lesson here is that the stability of U.S.-China economic relations is highly contingent on the expectations of other major U.S. creditors: It is no longer solely the province of the two superpowers. In addition, the more the U.S. becomes financially overextended, the more it is at the mercy of seemingly insignificant financial events.
While China can use 'dollar diplomacy' to find a way out of a difficult situation, the U.S. has few viable alternatives to deficit reduction and eventually tightening the money supply. If the U.S. government cannot muster the will to rein in the money supply and the national debt on its own, it faces the prospect of a rival power increasingly constraining U.S. economic policy options or a collapse in global confidence in the dollar. Neither scenario bodes well for the U.S., which is all the more reason for Congress and the administration to get serious about the dollar.
---
Mr. Harris recently completed graduate studies in business at the University of Oxford. Previously, he served as policy director to the U.S. Secretary of Commerce during the administration of George W. Bush.
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