对于中国经济和资产市场，全球情绪已经从几个月前的欢欣雀跃，转变为严重担忧去年信贷显著增长的副作用。
众多评论员都对信贷过度增长和投资过剩的泡沫提出了警告，称这些现象有可能引发经济动荡。批评人士还指出，中国4万亿元人民币（合5850亿美元）的经济刺激方案、以及去年新增银行贷款激增33%，都是流动性过剩和放贷标准降低的明显标志。还有人对地方政府投资实体的隐藏债务风险表示担忧，而媒体对中国"鬼城"以及空置商业地产的报道，被当作局部投资过剩的证据。
对房地产市场最坏情况的担心，有一定的事实基础，我们过去也曾着重指出，一些大城市的房价上涨难以维持，而且去年房地产市场的繁荣，可能在一定程度上是受到了银行贷款流向不当的推动。然而，中国的房地产市场与美国或迪拜的房地产市场存在本质区别。
和美国次贷危机爆发前家庭杠杆率的惊人涨幅不同，中国家庭债务大概只相当于GDP的17%，而美国约为96%，欧元区为62%。中国购房者在贷款前必须支付最低30%的首付款，而第二套房首付比例最低为40%。
尽管中国住宅市场的价格上涨看起来非常迅猛（2009年涨幅逾20%），但我们不应孤立地看待这些整体数据。过去5年，城市家庭收入的复合年增长率达13.2%，而房价的复合年增长率为11.9%。在一些地区性市场确实存在过热现象。例如，同一时期，北京、上海、深圳和杭州的房价增幅比收入增幅高出逾5个百分点。不过，这种现象可以被看作新增城市财富被用于投机的一种征兆，而不是对杠杆的滥用。
美国次贷危机的核心诱因是过高的杠杆率和抵押贷款证券化的共同作用。这两个因素在中国市场都不存在。中国商业地产部门也引发了同样严重的担忧。2009年商业地产价格上涨16%，尽管租金收益率很低，且北京和上海高档写字楼的空置率分别高达21%和14%。不过，高档商业地产的入住率和租金水平都已开始回升。
中国房地产部门的症结是，在一个投资选择有限的经济体里，中国的投资者将房地产视为保值工具。对于存在缺陷的刺激政策以及房地产市场过热的不少担忧，我都有同感――但即使房价出现调整，也不会触发在过度杠杆化经济体可能呈现出的那种劫难。
政府决策者显然对资产泡沫的风险，以及过度投机行为可能推动房价超出普通购房者承受范围感到忧虑。政府正在权衡在全国范围出台物业税的潜在价值，同时还对购房不满两年再次出售的房主恢复征收营业税。
中国房地产市场的长期起伏要归因于这样一个事实：封闭的资产账户和不够发达的资本市场使得中国人没有多少投资选择。对住宅地产的投资兴趣，催生了高端公寓住宅存量和对平价住房的大众市场需求之间的不协调。必须通过鼓励平价住房的开发来解决这种失衡局面――这也是中国政府的重要政策行动之一。
一些看空中国的人士最近还对另一个问题提出警告，即中国地方政府投资公司的隐藏债务风险。根据官方估算，这类投资主体未偿付的债务总余额超过6万亿元人民币，大概相当于GDP的20%，一些人批评称这个数字被低估了。据一份报告称，地方投资中介机构的隐藏债务可能造成的最坏情况是，2012年左右将爆发一场大规模金融危机。
展望未来，尽管某些地方政府或许将很难偿付债务，但大部分公共部门债务的风险似乎并不像有些人认为的那么严重。
许多观察家担心，中国经济增长过快，并迅速指出局部地区的产能过剩，作为整个经济体系即将崩溃的例证。尽管中国经济的一些领域确实应当受到更密切的监控，但怀疑论者那种危机迫在眉睫的观点，并没有多少根据予以支撑。
本文作者是摩根大通(JPMorgan)中国证券市场部董事总经理兼董事会主席
译者/管婧
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001031692
Global sentiment towards China's economy and asset markets has turned from exuberance just a few months ago to overriding concern about the side-effects of last year's remarkable credit growth.
A number of commentators have warned of credit excesses and an overinvestment bubble, which they say could bring economic turmoil. Critics have also pointed to China's Rmb4,000bn ($585bn) stimulus programme and last year's 33 per cent surge in new bank lending as obvious hallmarks of excess liquidity and a lowering of lending standards. Some have raised concerns about hidden debt risks among local government investment entities, while media reports of Chinese "ghost cities" and empty commercial property are cited as evidence of local excesses.
The worst-case fears concerning the property market are based on a layer of truth and we have previously highlighted the untenable nature of price increases in some big cities, as well as the possibility that last year's boom was partly fuelled by misdirected bank loans. However, there are crucial differences between China's property markets and those of the US or Dubai.
Unlike the dramatic increase in household leverage that precipitated the US subprime crisis, Chinese household debt amounts to approximately 17 per cent of gross domestic product, compared with roughly 96 per cent in the US and 62 per cent in the eurozone. Home buyers in China are required to make minimum downpayments of 30 per cent before receiving a mortgage, and at least 40 per cent for a second home.
Although price increases in the Chinese residential market appear rapid (more than 20 per cent in 2009), such headline figures cannot be viewed in isolation. Over the past five years, urban household incomes grew at a 13.2 per cent compound annual growth rate, compared with an 11.9 per cent CAGR in home prices. Pockets of overheating can be found in some regional markets. In Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen and Hangzhou, for instance, prices outpaced income growth by more than 5 percentage points over the same period. But, this can be seen as a symptom of new urban wealth being put to speculative use, rather than the profligate use of leverage.
The combination of excessive leverage and mortgage securitisation were at the epicentre of the US subprime crisis. Both these factors are absent in the Chinese context. The commercial property sector has inspired just as much concern, with prices rising 16 per cent in 2009, in spite of low rental yields and prime office vacancy rates as high as 21 per cent and 14 per cent in Beijing and Shanghai, respectively. Yet occupancy and rental rates have started to pick up for prime properties.
The crux of the problem with the Chinese real estate sector is that property is seen by the country's investing class as a store of value, within an economy that offers its citizens limited investment options. I share many of the concerns about flawed incentives and overheating in the property market � but even if prices were to correct, this would not trigger the type of devastation that might arise in an over-leveraged economy.
Policymakers are clearly concerned about the risk of asset bubbles and the threat that excessive speculation could drive prices beyond affordability for average home buyers. The government is weighing the potential value of introducing a national property tax and, in the meantime, has reimposed a business tax on homeowners who resell their properties within two years.
The perennial ups and downs of China's property sector arise from the fact that closed capital account and underdeveloped capital markets leave citizens with few investment options. Investment interest in residential property has fuelled a mismatch between the stock of higher-end apartment buildings and the mass-market need for affordable housing. This imbalance must be resolved by spurring the development of affordable housing � one of the government's big policy initiatives.
A more recent warning issued by some China bears is that of hidden debt risk among Chinese local government investment companies. Official estimates of the total outstanding loan balance for such investment entities exceed Rmb6,000bn � or roughly 20 per cent of GDP � a figure that has been criticised by some as being too low. According to one report, the worst case scenario from hidden borrowing by local investment intermediaries is a large-scale financial crisis around 2012.
Looking ahead, while certain local administrations might struggle to service debt, the magnitude of public sector debt risks do not appear as severe as some have suggested.
Many observers are concerned that China's economy has grown too rapidly, and are ready to point to pockets of overcapacity as proof of an imminent system-wide collapse. While some areas of the economy do deserve closer monitoring, there is little to support the sceptics' views of an imminent crisis.
Jing Ulrich is managing director and chairman of China equities & commodities at JPMorgan
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