中国抵制外界要求汇率偏低的人民币升值的铁壁，出现了一条裂缝。中国央行行长周小川将人民币钉住美元称为一项抵御危机的政策，"迟早"要调整。
让人民币从目前1美元兑6.83元人民币的水平升值，对世界将是一件好事。这倒不是因为缩小中国的贸易盈余将显著提振全球需求（中国贸易盈余不到世界产出的0.5%），而在更大程度上是因为这将遏制又一场廉价信贷"海啸"，前些年正是大量廉价信贷加剧了次贷泡沫。
但重要得多的是，让人民币升值有利于中国。毕竟，目前的荒谬现实是，一个穷国（去年中国人均国民收入约为3000美元）投入大量人力和实物资源，去生产让别国消费者享用的各种产品，而中国百姓却没有享受到这一努力的果实。相反，相当大一部分出口所得投入了储蓄，经过循环后，用于向西方富国放贷。
人民币升值还将有助于减轻有过热危险的中国经济所承受的压力。2009年，中国银行业放贷总额猛增至1.4万亿美元，这使得中国经济在全球经济衰退期间保持增长。代价则是灼热的房地产市场，其销售额比2008年几乎翻了一番。
中国领导人并非不明白这些论点。他们以前曾允许人民币逐步升值：从2005年至2008年，人民币兑美元汇率上升了21%。不过，在政治上，他们承担不起被视为屈从外国压力的代价。在高层官员接连表示不考虑人民币升值的背景下，周小川新调子的意义，也许是为允许人民币恢复升值作好政治铺垫。
如果真是这样，那么这一动向是可喜的。但这只是方程式的一小部分。汇率调整不能变更中国经济的根本结构。从根本上说，中国经济是为出口而打造的，缺乏必要的政治意愿来降低极高的储蓄率，将投资转移到更契合中国公民需要的活动，以及开始降低膨胀的外汇储备。只要重商主义的思维继续主导着有关人民币汇率的辩论，这种根本结构就不太可能改变。
译者/和风
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001031631
A crack has opened in China's monolithic resistance to strengthening its undervalued currency. Zhou Xiaochuan, People's Bank of China governor, called the dollar peg an anti-crisis policy which can "sooner or later" be modified.
Letting the renminbi appreciate from its current value of 6.83 per dollar would be good for the world. Not so much because shrinking China's trade surplus would boost global demand much � it amounts to less than half of one per cent of world output � as because it would forestall a resurgence of the cheap credit tsunami that helped to cause the subprime bubble.
But much more importantly, it would be good for China. It is after all absurd that a poor country (national income per capita was some $3,000 last year) should be devoting its human and physical resources to producing gadgets for the enjoyment of consumers elsewhere when ordinary Chinese are not reaping the fruits from this effort. A large part of the proceeds is instead saved and recycled into lending to rich western countries.
A stronger currency would also help to lift some pressure off an economy running at dangerously high steam. Bank lending jumped to $1,400bn in 2009, which kept growth humming through the global recession. The cost was a red-hot real estate market whose turnover nearly doubled from 2008.
Chinese leaders are not oblivious to these arguments. They have allowed a gradual appreciation of the renminbi before: its value against the dollar rose by 21 per cent between 2005 and 2008. Politically, however, they cannot afford to be seen as caving in to foreign pressure. The point of Mr Zhou's new tones � against a long-ringing chorus that appreciation is not on the cards � may be to prepare the political ground for allowing appreciation to resume.
If so, it is a development to be welcomed. But it is only a small part of the equation. Exchange rate adjustments cannot alter the underlying structure of this economy built for export without the political will to lower an extremely high savings rate, shift investment into activities that better match the needs of Chinese citizens, and start to run down bloated reserves. That is unlikely as long as mercantilist thinking continues to dominate the renminbi debate.
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