我们都知道，中国和美国紧密地交织在一起。两国关系是世界经济的中央断层线。双方相互依存，却被互不理解所支配。
直到上周，我才第一次踏上中国大陆――英国《金融时报》在北京、上海和香港三地举办了一系列有关中国未来国际角色的辩论，决定派我像旋风一样转战各地。这样走马观花的游历，根本不足以让我就中国那些宏大的问题发表预测。
但这段体验让我充分领会到，当前全球最强大的两个国家之间，在观感上的分歧有多么深。无论是对全球经济，还是对投资者来说，这都可能带来深远的影响。
就在《金融时报》的记者们举办高雅的辩论会之际，中国领导层与美国国会议员隔着太平洋，展开了一场更为激烈的对话。中方事实上警告美国，在人民币问题上莫管闲事。而美国议员的回应则是加大对奥巴马政府施压，要求其宣布中国为汇率操纵国。此举将有可能为美方实施贸易制裁铺平道路。与此同时，西方投资者越来越确信，中国目前存在泡沫。但在中国眼里，所有这些问题都有着不同的解读。
首先，无论西方持何看法，中国外交政策的目标并非摧毁美国经济。相反，其中心不过是不受外界干预，以及极其敏感的台湾问题。美国方面极少提及自己仍向台湾出售武器，但这种军售在中国被视为一种蓄意且不必要的挑衅。这影响了中国在人民币问题上的辩论。
此外，与我们多数人一样，中国领导层不喜欢被人指手划脚。美国对中国施压，要求人民币升值，就美国国内政治而言是有效的，但实际上降低了升值的可能性。若没有这种压力，升值也许很快就会成为现实。
所有这些都成问题的原因在于，尽管中国只求管好本国的利益，但它的规模过于庞大，无法不对其它地区产生重大影响。棘手的汇率问题就是一个典型例子。
中国存在泡沫吗？一般说来，这个问题会招来一阵哄笑――无论是中国还是西方的投资者。答案分成两部分。首先，他们会说，中国当然存在泡沫。其次，这无关紧要。
由散户投资者拉动的上海股市效率低下，那些最大上市公司的控股股东都是中国政府。关键要点在于，投入上海股市的资金一般不是借来的钱，在经济中所占比重也不大。中国能够继续沿着自己的盛衰周期前进，不会对其它地区造成太大的连带损害。
至于房价，没人否认中国的大城市目前存在泡沫。但同样，人们会摆出理由称，这些泡沫不见得会对整体经济带来严重的涟漪效应。相当大部分的市场由现金推动，而抵押贷款尚未在资本市场上转售。因此，房价下跌不会像2006年以后的美国那样，对经济造成灾难性的破坏。
许多人相信，中国的银行会遭受沉重打击。这对银行股东（包括政府）而言是个问题。但对整体经济来说，却不一定如此。
至于去年银行放贷的疯狂扩张，西方人担心，这将是中国国内爆发信贷危机的征兆，但实际上，许多资金只是在不同的政府机构之间转账。似乎没人否认当时的扩张有些过头。但中国方面的看法是，政府有办法应付这个问题，同时保持经济的良好增长。
对于那些有意看好中国长期增长前景的人而言，中国股市可能不是最理想的选择，至少如果你感兴趣的是对某个股指进行消极投资的话。上海股市的效率实在太低了，与实体经济的联系太过勉强，使消极投资算不上一个好策略。
反过来，对于那些寻求好买卖、并能亲历亲为做一些真正研究的积极投资者而言，低效率的市场应该能创造机遇。
看好中国的投资者不妨采取这样的策略：投资于中国必须从海外进口的大宗商品。或者，从长远来看，在相对更稳定的股市寻找对中国出口的企业，或许也行得通。
但各色看涨者都应注意到，至关重要的中美经济关系正受到误解的影响。而且，人们普遍对中国充满信心，当然也有可能证明是错误的。但不管怎样，中国方面的观点是信心满满的。
译者/陈云飞
China and America, we all know, are closely intertwined. Their relationship is the central faultline of the world economy. They are mutually reliant. And yet it is governed by mutual incomprehension.
Until last week, when the Financial Times saw fit to whiz me through Beijing, Shanghai and Hong Kong for a series of debates on the country's future international role, I had never set foot in mainland China. Such a whistlestop tour does not remotely qualify me to prognosticate on China's grander questions.
But the experience did ram home just how deep the differences in perceptions are between what are now the world's two most powerful countries. This could have profound implications for the world's economy, and for investors.
While FT journalists were holding polite debates, an uglier transpacific dialogue was emerging between the Chinese leadership, which in effect told the US to mind its own business when it came to China's currency, and US congressional politicians, who responded by upping pressure for their administration to declare China a currency manipulator. Such a move would pave the way for trade sanctions. Meanwhile, western investors grew ever more loudly convinced that China is in a bubble. All of these issues look different from China.
First, whatever the western perception, Chinese foreign policy is not aimed at crashing the American economy. Rather, it revolves around being left alone and around the extremely sore spot of Taiwan. Continued US weapons sales to the island, barely mentioned in the US, are seen as a deliberate and unnecessary provocation. This colours the Chinese debate on the currency.
Also, like most of us, China's leadership dislikes being told what to do. Pressure from the US for an upward revaluation is good domestic politics but reduces the chances of such a revaluation happening. Without such pressure, an appreciation would come soon.
All of this is a problem because, while China wants merely to look after its interests at home, it is so big that it cannot do so without having big effects elsewhere. The vexed issue of the currency provides the classic example.
Is China in a bubble? Generally, this is met with laughter (by Chinese and western investors alike). The answer is two-fold. First, they say, of course there are bubbles in China. Second, it does not matter.
The Shanghai stock exchange is an inefficient market driven by retail investors, where the government maintains controlling stakes in the largest players. The critical points are that investments in Shanghai stocks are not bought with borrowed money, generally, and do not account for a large chunk of the economy. It can continue its boom and bust cycle without causing great collateral damage elsewhere.
As for property prices, nobody denies that there are bubbles in the big cities. But again, the argument is that these need not have big ripple effects on the broader economy. Much of the market is fuelled with cash, while mortgages have not been resold on capital markets. A fall in property prices could not, therefore, have the disastrous economic effects that the fall in US property prices had after 2006.
China's banks will take it hard, many believe. That is a problem for the banks' shareholders, including the government. But it need not necessarily be a problem for the broader economy.
As for last year's drastic expansion of loans, which westerners fear will presage China's own domestic credit crisis, many were in effect transfers between government agencies. Nobody seems to deny that the expansion was overdone. But the Chinese view is that the government has the tools to handle the problem and still keep the economy growing nicely.
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001031854
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