目前这种感觉相当熟悉。中国多年来施行的人民币盯住美元政策，使得美国政府连续发难，指责人民币汇率低估。参议员和众议员威胁要对中国征收惩罚性关税。这简直就是2005年的翻版。
当时，这些威胁没有付诸行动，主要是因为中国允许了人民币缓慢升值。但这一次他们看起来更加认真——尤其是正在精心准备针对中国的报复性措施，这表明美国政府更愿意付诸行动，而不只是虚张声势。
那么，发生了什么变化呢？一个明显变化就是白宫和国会易主。2005年的时候，小布什(George W. Bush)政府反对实施征收汇率关税这样的措施，国会由共和党控制，也降低了此类措施通过的可能性。相比之下，现任总统巴拉克•奥巴马(Barack Obama)在贸易问题上表现出更多的疑虑，在采取行动减少享受补贴的进口方面也更为急迫。去年，他批准对中国轮胎征收紧急关税——这是一种小布什多次拒绝使用的措施。
但保守的美国企业研究所(American Enterprise Institute)的学者菲利普•列维(Philip Levy)表示，迄今为止最大的变化是全球金融危机之后的经济形势。他表示：“以前人们指出，赤字的好处是美国能够从中国手中廉价借钱。既然美国目前陷入了流动性陷阱（在这种情况下，利率手段已无法推动支出），廉价借款对美国就没有一点好处了。”
列维补充称，随着在华投资的美国企业发现在那里做生意的难度越来越大，目前美国政府在与中国方面进行对抗时，来自商界的阻力有所减轻。
然而当努力迫使中国允许人民币升值时，美国持续面临着同样的问题：设计出一种符合国际贸易规则的措施。纽约州民主党参议员查尔斯•舒默(Charles Schumer)和南卡罗莱纳州共和党参议员林塞•格雷厄姆(Lindsey Graham)将几年前的提案完善后重新提了出来。
早先版本的提案中，只是建议对中国进口产品征收27.5%的关税，这严重违反了世贸组织(WTO)规则。新的提案则要狡猾得多，因为它在计算对被视为得到补贴的进口商品征收的紧急“反补贴税”时，允许使用汇率失调的概念。其它可能的措施还包括反对此类国家在国际货币基金组织(IMF)中获得更多投票权，以及禁止联邦政府从这些国家的企业采购。
值得注意的是，上述提案降低了实施此类措施的门槛。广受期待的汇率报告决定的是相关国家是否因贸易目的而“操纵”汇率，但《舒默-格雷厄姆法案》 (Schumer-Graham bill)仅仅关注“失调的”汇率。美国财政部将于4月15日发布汇率报告。
人们仍然强烈怀疑此类措施的合法性。小布什政府时期的前商务部高层官员戴维•斯普纳(David Spooner)指出，只考虑汇率低估、而不考虑汇率高估的因素，可能会有失公平地扩大紧急关税的规模。而且人们还远未清楚，汇率失调是否像WTO规则定义的那样，是一种“伴随出口”的补贴。
一些人还质疑美国在汇率问题上单独与中国对抗的政治智慧。小布什政府时期负责国际经济事务的高官丹•普莱斯(Dan Price)表示，其它贸易伙伴国可能看到出口被中国产品取代。
普莱斯表示：“美国应该避免采取行动，将这种合理的多边关切演变为……中美相互指责不断升级的双边问题。”
处于争论核心的一位议员有着类似的担忧。众议院筹款委员会（主管贸易）代理主席、密歇根国会议员桑德尔•莱文(Sander Levin)长期以来一直批评中国及其汇率政策。但他反对仓促采取行动。
莱文表示，日前召开的筹款委员会听证会应该在财政部汇率报告出台之前，创造“一种更强的认知感和紧迫感”。
但人们仍远未清楚，他们是否会采取那种单边行动，从而将这种冲突从激烈的口水仗升级为可能具有爆炸性的法律行动。
译者/君悦
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001031901
It all feels rather familiar. Several years of fixing the renminbi to the dollar has brought Beijing under sustained fire from Washington for undervaluing its currency. Senators and congressmen are threatening to hit China with punitive tariffs. It's 2005 all over again.
Back then the threats came to nothing, not least because China allowed the renminbi to crawl higher. But this time they look more serious. In particular, the precision with which retaliation against China is being prepared suggests more willingness to unsheathe the sabre rather than just rattle it.
So what has changed? One obvious answer is the occupancy of the White House and Capitol Hill. In 2005, the administration of George W. Bush set its face against actions such as currency tariffs, and Republican control of Congress made it less likely. Barack Obama, president, in contrast, has signalled more scepticism towards trade and more urgency to act to reduce subsidised imports, agreeing last year to emergency tariffs on Chinese tyres using a measure repeatedly rejected by Mr Bush.
But Philip Levy, fellow at the conservative American Enterprise Institute, says that by far the biggest change has been the economic situation following the global financial crisis. “Previously, people pointed out that the benefit of the deficit was that the US could borrow cheaply from China,” he says. “Now that the US is in a liquidity trap [where interest rates have lost their power to prompt spending], cheap borrowing is no favour to it at all.”
Mr Levy adds that as US companies with investments in China are finding it increasingly hard to do business there, the White House now gets less pushback from the business community when it confronts Beijing.
Yet the US continues to face the same problem in trying to force China to allow the renminbi to rise: devising a measure compatible with international trade rules. Charles Schumer and Lindsey Graham, respectively a Democratic senator from New York and a Republican senator from South Carolina, have revived and refined their bill of several years ago.
The earlier version would simply have slapped 27.5 per cent tariffs on Chinese imports, a gross violation of World Trade Organisation rules. The new bill is more subtle, as it would permit exchange rate misalignment to be used in calculating the size of emergency “countervailing duties” imposed on imports deemed to be subsidised. Other potential measures would include opposing more votes for such countries at the International Monetary Fund and forbidding federal government procurement from their companies.
Significantly, the bill lowers the bar for such measures. While the much awaited currency report from the US Treasury, to be released by April 15, decides whether exchange rates have been “manipulated” for trade purposes, the Schumer-Graham bill merely looks for “misaligned” currencies.
Great doubts remain about the legality of such measures. David Spooner, a former senior commerce department official during George W. Bush's presidency, notes that taking account of undervalued but not overvalued currencies could unfairly inflate the size of emergency tariffs. And it remains far from clear that exchange rate misalignment is an “export-contingent” subsidy as defined by WTO rules.
Some also question the political wisdom of the US going it alone in confronting China over its currency. Dan Price, the senior official on international economics in the Bush White House, says other trading partners may see exports displaced by Chinese production.
“The US should avoid actions that would reframe this legitimate multilateral concern . . . into a bilateral US-China issue with escalating recriminations on both sides,” he says.
One of the lawmakers at the heart of the debate has similar concerns. Sander Levin, the Michigan congressman who is acting chairman of the House ways and means committee, with jurisdiction over trade, has long been a critic of China and its currency policy. But he warns against precipitate action.
Mr Levin said ways and means committee hearings today should produce “a greater sense of knowledge and a greater sense of urgency” ahead of the Treasury's currency report.
But it remains far from clear they will produce the kind of unilateral action that will escalate this conflict out of heated rhetoric into potentially explosive legislation.
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