观音峡林场绵延伸展在重庆市西北的山脉之间。林场大部分土地受到保护。"我们的目的主要是保存，而不是赚钱。"观音峡林场党支部书记刘思阳表示。
然而，这片林场在商业领域却有着双重身份。去年，当地政府林业局下属的一家公司已把它用作担保品，从一家国有银行贷款3亿元人民币，这些钱用在了重庆市的基础设施项目上。
此类贷款正促使分析师更为密切地关注中国地方政府的财政状况。一些分析师已开始警告，中国的债务状况比公开宣称的要糟糕得多，而且，假如地方政府的这些贷款很多变成坏账，可能给银行体系造成大问题。
"这最终将需要从财政预算和外汇储备中拿出大笔资金进行纾困，"美国西北大学(Northwestern University)学者史宗翰(Victor Shih)表示。
过去一年来，在各国政府预算赤字普遍处于两位数水平之际，中国取得了看起来非同凡响的佳绩。在政府巨额财政刺激方案的推动下，中国经济增长了8.7%。然而，债务在国内生产总值(GDP)中所占的比例却几乎没有变化，仍保持在20%左右的适当水平。
此中玄机在于，大部分刺激资金并非来自常规的财政拨款，而是来自国有金融机构发放的贷款。去年中国新增贷款增长了一倍以上，达到9.6万亿元人民币，近乎是GDP的三分之一。
地方政府的贷款渠道有限，但它们可以成立专门的投资公司，利用公共土地进行担保获得贷款，重庆市林业局下属的那家公司就属于这类投资公司。有些官员私下里承认，去年银行贷款有相当一部分流向了这些投资公司。
本世纪头几年，上海和重庆率先成立起此类公司，但到目前为止，全国已有8000多家这样的公司。
据银监会估算，全国地方政府债务在6万亿元人民币（合8780亿美元）左右。但史宗翰认为，实际数额可能接近11.4万亿人民币，另外，承诺在未来几年内拨付的贷款也有12.7万亿人民币。他估计，如果算上这些贷款，截止2009年底，中国债务占GDP的比例为71%，到2011年则为96%。
"中国房地产市场不存在任何杠杆的说法是错误的，"他表示，"居民买房或许是这种情形，但地方政府却是大规模举债。"
这些债务中会有多少变成不良债务，只能靠猜测。史宗翰认为，北京、上海等大城市政府下属的公司不会有问题，但小城镇和农村地区可能会处境艰难，不良贷款规模可能达到3万亿元人民币。
重庆市长黄奇帆也表示了担忧。他上周说道："就重庆市政府而言，根本不存在债务问题。但我们应该对一些区政府的情况多加注意。"
有理由不必担心出现最坏的情况。在潜在不良债务中，很大一部分来自承诺在未来两年内拨付的贷款。其中部分贷款不能停止发放，否则将导致一些在建工程无法完工。不过，政府已经在采取一些前瞻性措施，要求银行减少对地方政府放贷，并承诺放缓新基础设施项目的建设。
在中期内，北京方面正在讨论两项可能有所助益的改革措施。中国国际金融公司(CICC)经济学家哈继铭表示，政府当局可能会大力发展市政债券市场，开创一条更为稳定的融资渠道。此外，官员们正在研究开征物业税，这将扩大地方政府的税收收入。
最后，地方政府可以通过卖地，来弥补旗下投资公司的亏空。
不过，并非所有用作担保品的土地（如观音峡林场）都具有商业可行性。渣打银行(Standard Chartered)驻上海经济学家王志浩(Stephen Green)估计，这些投资公司用于申请贷款的土地，可能是过去5年内政府卖出土地总和的3倍。
"不知道这场游戏怎样才能不以悲剧收场，"王志浩表示。
"如果地价下跌，或者市场陷入停滞……这场游戏可能永远无法圆满收场。"
译者/杨远
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001031956
The Guanyinxia forest stretches up to the mountains north-west of Chongqing city in central China. Most is protected land. "Our purpose is mainly preservation, not to make money," says Liu Siyang, party secretary of the government bureau that manages the forest.
Yet the same forest has a double life in the commercial world. It has been used as collateral by a company controlled by the local government forestry bureau to help secure a Rmb300m loan it took out last year from a state-owned bank, which was then spent on infrastructure projects in Chongqing.
It is deals like this that are leading analysts to look more closely at local government finances in China. Some are beginning to warn that not only is China's debt position much worse than advertised but that the banking system could also be heading for a large problem if many of these loans turn sour.
"This will eventually require a massive bail-out from the budget and the foreign exchange reserves," says Victor Shih, an academic at Northwestern University in the US.
Over the past year China has pulled off a feat that seems remarkable in an era of commonplace double-digit budget deficits. The economy grew 8.7 per cent after the government launched a huge stimulus programme, yet the debt-to-gross domestic product ratio has barely budged from its modest level of about 20 per cent.
The catch is that most of China's stimulus came not from conventional fiscal spending but from bank loans issued by state-owned financial institutions. New loans last year more than doubled to Rmb9,600, equivalent to nearly a third of GDP.
Local governments have only limited opportunities to borrow money but they can set up special investment companies, such as the one operated by the Chongqing Forestry Bureau, which can use public land as collateral to raise loans. Officials have privately admitted that a significant chunk of last year's bank loans went to these investment companies.
Such companies were pioneered in the early part of the last decade in Shanghai and Chongqing but there are now more than 8,000 across the country.
While the banking regulator puts local government debt at Rmb6,000bn ($878bn €655bn £590bn), Mr Shih estimates it is nearer to Rmb11,400bn, with another Rmb12,700bn of loans committed over the next few years. If these loans are included, he estimates, China's debt-to-GDP ratio was 71 per cent at the end of 2009 and will be 96 per cent by 2011.
"The notion that there is not any leverage in the Chinese real estate market is false," he says. "That might be the case for people buying houses, but local governments are leveraged in a big way."
How much of these debts will go bad is guesswork. Mr Shih reckons the companies owned by big cities such as Beijing and Shanghai will be fine, but smaller towns and rural districts could struggle and that non-performing loans might reach Rmb3,000bn.
Huang Qifan, mayor of Chongqing, has also raised concerns. "For the Chongqing municipal government, there is no debt problem at all," he said last week. "But we should pay more attention to some district governments."
There are reasons not to fear the worst. A large part of the potential bad debts are from commitments to lend over the next two years. A portion of those loans cannot be halted without leaving half-built bridges, but the government is already taking some pre-emptive steps, warning banks to reduce lending to local governments and pledging to slow new infrastructure projects.
In the medium term, Beijing is discussing two reforms that could help. Ha Jiming, an economist at China International Capital Corporation, says the authorities could significantly expand the municipal bond market, providing a more stable financing channel. Officials are also examining a property tax to boost local government revenues.
Finally, the local governments can make up for losses at their investment companies by selling land.
Yet, as the Guanyinxia forest indicates, not all of the land used as collateral is commercially viable. And the volumes could become huge. Stephen Green, an economist at Standard Chartered in Shanghai, estimates that the collateral used to back loans issued to these investment companies is equivalent to three times all the land sold over the past five years.
"It is hard to see how this game can continue without an unhappy ending," says Mr Green.
"If land values fall or the market stagnates . . . this game can never be brought to a successful close."
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