中
国能不能大规模脱手美国国债、转投美国实体经济中的资产？2009年年初，中国总理温家宝表达出更积极地管理外汇储备、寻求分散美国国债头寸的意图，引起了关注。目前中国持有超过1万亿美元的美国国债，另外持有5,000亿美元美国政府支持机构的债券。北京方面能否实现其2.4万亿美元外汇储备多元化的问题，不仅关乎美国国债和其他证券的市场需求，也关乎对中国影响美国之能力的评估。接下来几个星期，随着美国决定是否将中国定性为汇率操纵国，这将成为一个突出问题。能不能分散外汇储备的问题，在很大程度上取决于北京方面能否找到替代性的储值渠道。中国在2009年尝试过一个渠道，即通过直接投资把资金转移到实体经济中，这番经历让人看到了寻找替代性投资性机会的困难与局限。温家宝2009年1月就外储问题初次发言后，是年2月，国家外汇管理局在2月份宣布决定，将根据"走出去"战略，把外汇储备转移给中国企业用于在海外做直接投资。商务部和国务院国有资产管理委员会的高层官员也做了类似表态，并表示全球资产价格受压为中国抄底自然资源和其他行业提供了良机。国外企业听到这种声音，要么担心贱卖宝贵资产将提高中国的竞争实力，要么是乐见并购交易将很快活跃，而华盛顿的官员们则是紧张地打着算盘，看这是否有可能对美国国债的需求产生不良影响。
中国并没有像一些人预测的那样，买下整个世界，成为直接投资净输出国。中国2009年的对外直接投资从2008年的560亿美元下降到了450亿美元左右。非金融行业投资达到430亿美元，同比增长6%。考虑到危机期间全球外资直投(FDI)急跌三到四成，这种增长非常引人注目，但它远低于前几年两位数甚至三位数的增长。2009年，中国直接投资流入量达900亿美元，所以中国仍然是直接投资净流入国，净流入量接近450亿美元之多。作为主权财富基金的中国投资有限责任公司(CIC)在境外从事了数起股权直接投资，几家政府投资工具还支持了在非洲和其他地方进行的一些资源类投资。但相比中国4,000亿美元的外汇储备增长幅度，这些投资数额并不多。
从本质上讲，加大对外直接投资所受到的限制，在很大程度上属于商业范畴。经济合作与发展组织(OECD)的监管壁垒、韩国与欧洲工会的不肯让步和美国的消费者保护与法律遵守都已经足够让人清醒，而几家确实是想一显身手的中资企业，比如腾中重工(Tengzhong Automotive)，又因为过于大胆而被政治家和审批部门否决或贬低。即使是那些大公司在国外展开收购也没有做好充分准备，本周中国政府一份有关中铝收购力拓(Rio Tinto)股权的报告就证明了这一点。中国正在发现，不管是在美国印第安纳州的米沙沃卡运营汽车制造工厂，还是在自然资源领域收购公司，都不是购买美国国债的现成替代选择。北京方面不可能只管按一个按钮，就把简单的国债头寸变为复杂的海外直接投资。
未来几年，中国的投资经理们（不管是主权财富基金还是民间基金）将不可避免地从美国国债扩展到更加多元的投资组合，寻求积极回报，而这种趋势无疑将涉及更多直接投资。中国制造商将缓慢地进一步向经合组织国家的消费者靠拢，因为这些国家才是其产品利润之所在。但它们只能缓慢进行。在实体经济中做直接投资的各种困难，将在将来一段时间极大地限制中国如此分散投资的速度。
当然，如果北京方面真的希望它的公司更多地投资国外，其实还有一种更简便的办法。很简单，首先是不再强迫企业把美元兑换成人民币，以此操纵汇率，而是让那些赚取了美元的公司自己决定怎样才能把这笔外汇管理得最好。
（编者按：Daniel H. Rosen是专注中国的顾问机构Rhodium Group的负责人，彼特森国际经济研究所(Peterson Institute for International Economics)访问学者、哥伦比亚大学兼任副教授。）
Daniel H. Rosen
Could China move out of US Treasurys and into U.S. real economy assets in a big way? In early 2009, China's Premier Wen Jiabao drew attention by announcing an intention to manage foreign-exchange reserves more actively, and seek to diversify away from U.S. government holdings. China currently holds more than $1 trillion of U.S. Treasurys and another $500 billion of U.S. government-backed agencies. The question of Beijing's ability to diversify its $2.4 trillion foreign exchange holdings is not only relevant for the market demand for Treasurys and alternative securities but also for assessing China's leverage over the U.S. This issue will be prominent over the coming weeks, as the U.S. decides whether to designate China a currency manipulator.
The answer to the diversification question largely depends on whether Beijing can find an alternative store of value for those dollars. China's 2009 experience with one of these alternatives channels -- shunting dollars into the real economy via direct investment -- illustrates the difficulties and limitations of seeking alternative investment opportunities. After Premier Wen's initial comments in January 2009, China's foreign-exchange manager (SAFE) in February announced a decision to channel foreign exchange to China's corporations to make direct investments abroad, under the rubric of China's 'Going Out' strategy. High-ranking officials from the Ministry of Commerce and Sasac - the state owned enterprise overseer -- followed with similar statements, adding that globally depressed assets offered an ideal opportunity for China to buy into natural resources and other sectors cheaply. Businesses abroad listened to this with either fear that a fire sale of valuable assets would enhance China's competitiveness or glee that M&A deal flow would soon boom, while officials in Washington anxiously did the math to see if this could negatively impact demand for U.S. government securities.
Predictions that China would buy up the world and turn into a net exporter of direct investment did not materialize. China's 2009 outbound foreign direct investment fell to about $45 billion, down from $56 billion in 2008. Non-financial sector investment grew 6% year-on-year to $43 billion -- very impressive given that FDI crashed 30-40% globally amidst the crisis, but far from the double- and triple-digit growth rates seen in previous years. With $90 billion of direct investment flowing in in 2009, China remained a net direct investment importer to the tune of nearly $45 billion. China's sovereign wealth fund CIC took a handful of direct stakes abroad, and government vehicles backed some resource investments in Africa and elsewhere, but the amounts were small beside Beijing's $400 billion in foreign-exchange holdings growth.
The limits to ramping up direct investment outflows are largely commercial in nature. If challenges including OECD regulatory barriers, South Korean and European labor union assertiveness, and U.S. consumer protection and legal compliance were not sobering enough, several Chinese firms that did try to take the plunge - like Tengzhong Automotive - were denied or belittled by politicians and approval authorities for being too bold. Even the largest companies were ill-prepared for international takeovers, as a Chinese government report attested this week with regard to Chinalco's gambit for a stake in Rio Tinto. China is discovering that neither running an automobile manufacturing facility in Mishawaka, Indiana, nor acquiring companies in the natural-resources space is a ready substitute for phoning in a purchase order for US Treasury bills and notes. Beijing cannot simply press a button and switch from easy government debt holdings to complicated direct investment overseas.
In the years ahead, China will inevitably see its wealth managers (sovereign and private) expand from U.S. Treasurys to a more diverse portfolio, in pursuit of positive returns, a trend that will definitely include more direct investment. Chinese manufacturers will slowly creep closer to their OECD consumers because that is where all the margins for their products lie; but they can do so only slowly. The challenges of making real direct investments will put a significant speed limit on such Chinese diversification for some time to come.
Of course, if Beijing really does want its firms to invest more dollars abroad, there is an easier way to make that happen. It is simple: stop forcing them to trade in the dollars for renminbi in order to manipulate the exchange rate in the first place, leaving the question of how best to manage a dollar portfolio to the firms which earned that foreign-exchange to begin with place.
(Daniel H. Rosen is the principal of Rhodium Group, an advisory firm focusing on China, and is also a visiting fellow with the Peterson Institute for International Economics and an adjunct associate professor at Columbia University.)
Could China move out of US Treasurys and into U.S. real economy assets in a big way? In early 2009, China's Premier Wen Jiabao drew attention by announcing an intention to manage foreign-exchange reserves more actively, and seek to diversify away from U.S. government holdings. China currently holds more than $1 trillion of U.S. Treasurys and another $500 billion of U.S. government-backed agencies. The question of Beijing's ability to diversify its $2.4 trillion foreign exchange holdings is not only relevant for the market demand for Treasurys and alternative securities but also for assessing China's leverage over the U.S. This issue will be prominent over the coming weeks, as the U.S. decides whether to designate China a currency manipulator.
The answer to the diversification question largely depends on whether Beijing can find an alternative store of value for those dollars. China's 2009 experience with one of these alternatives channels -- shunting dollars into the real economy via direct investment -- illustrates the difficulties and limitations of seeking alternative investment opportunities. After Premier Wen's initial comments in January 2009, China's foreign-exchange manager (SAFE) in February announced a decision to channel foreign exchange to China's corporations to make direct investments abroad, under the rubric of China's 'Going Out' strategy. High-ranking officials from the Ministry of Commerce and Sasac - the state owned enterprise overseer -- followed with similar statements, adding that globally depressed assets offered an ideal opportunity for China to buy into natural resources and other sectors cheaply. Businesses abroad listened to this with either fear that a fire sale of valuable assets would enhance China's competitiveness or glee that M&A deal flow would soon boom, while officials in Washington anxiously did the math to see if this could negatively impact demand for U.S. government securities.
Predictions that China would buy up the world and turn into a net exporter of direct investment did not materialize. China's 2009 outbound foreign direct investment fell to about $45 billion, down from $56 billion in 2008. Non-financial sector investment grew 6% year-on-year to $43 billion -- very impressive given that FDI crashed 30-40% globally amidst the crisis, but far from the double- and triple-digit growth rates seen in previous years. With $90 billion of direct investment flowing in in 2009, China remained a net direct investment importer to the tune of nearly $45 billion. China's sovereign wealth fund CIC took a handful of direct stakes abroad, and government vehicles backed some resource investments in Africa and elsewhere, but the amounts were small beside Beijing's $400 billion in foreign-exchange holdings growth.
The limits to ramping up direct investment outflows are largely commercial in nature. If challenges including OECD regulatory barriers, South Korean and European labor union assertiveness, and U.S. consumer protection and legal compliance were not sobering enough, several Chinese firms that did try to take the plunge - like Tengzhong Automotive - were denied or belittled by politicians and approval authorities for being too bold. Even the largest companies were ill-prepared for international takeovers, as a Chinese government report attested this week with regard to Chinalco's gambit for a stake in Rio Tinto. China is discovering that neither running an automobile manufacturing facility in Mishawaka, Indiana, nor acquiring companies in the natural-resources space is a ready substitute for phoning in a purchase order for US Treasury bills and notes. Beijing cannot simply press a button and switch from easy government debt holdings to complicated direct investment overseas.
In the years ahead, China will inevitably see its wealth managers (sovereign and private) expand from U.S. Treasurys to a more diverse portfolio, in pursuit of positive returns, a trend that will definitely include more direct investment. Chinese manufacturers will slowly creep closer to their OECD consumers because that is where all the margins for their products lie; but they can do so only slowly. The challenges of making real direct investments will put a significant speed limit on such Chinese diversification for some time to come.
Of course, if Beijing really does want its firms to invest more dollars abroad, there is an easier way to make that happen. It is simple: stop forcing them to trade in the dollars for renminbi in order to manipulate the exchange rate in the first place, leaving the question of how best to manage a dollar portfolio to the firms which earned that foreign-exchange to begin with place.
(Daniel H. Rosen is the principal of Rhodium Group, an advisory firm focusing on China, and is also a visiting fellow with the Peterson Institute for International Economics and an adjunct associate professor at Columbia University.)
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