重大的全球实力转移，往往伴随着国际储备货币的变更。因此，中国正采取措施拓宽国际投资者使用人民币的范围，是很说明问题的。北京方面相信，主导全球经济与主导全球货币体系是分不开的。
国际化人民币的措施并非新事。香港各银行提供离岸人民币账户已有六年多，而中国与外国央行之间的货币互换协议自2000年以来一直存在。但近期中国在这方面的步伐却有所加快。针对海外人民币转移的限制已经放松，允许企业用人民币结算跨境贸易的一个项目得到扩大。上周开放国内债券市场的决定，意义尤其重大。在那之前，人民币的海外持有者几乎没有投资机会。
不过，这只是些小步骤。对于中国能否走完人民币迈向储备货币地位的旅程，情况远非明朗。
要成为储备货币，人民币必须能够完全自由兑换——无论是在资本账户还是在经常账户上。但这将意味着使中国受到全球资本的摆布，而这正是中国一直在防范的（其庞大的外汇储备就证实了这一点）。更自由的资本流动，也可能对中国国内银行产生破坏稳定的作用，在繁荣时期制造流动性泡沫，在局面恶化时切断信贷供应。银行业将再也不是宏观经济政策的有效工具（就像它在本次危机期间按照政府指令大举放贷那样）。它将成为经济动荡加剧的来源，而非药方。
对中国政府来说，更难以承受的前景是丧失对人民币的控制。在大量资本流入的情况下，保持盯住汇率是极其困难的。而如果外国对人民币需求的上升推高人民币的币值，中国的出口导向型增长模式（这种模式有赖于人民币低估）可能会变得不可持续。
几十年后，中国将成为全球最大经济体。人民币最终取得储备货币地位是顺理成章的事。中国不宜过早推进这一过程，以免影响经济稳定。但是，中国越早启动国内改革、让自己对这一转变做好准备，就越容易适合新的国际角色。
译者/和风
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001034332
Great power shifts are usually accompanied by changes in the international reserve currency. So it is telling that China is taking steps to broaden the use of the renminbi among international investors. Dominance of the global economy, Beijing believes, goes hand-in-and with dominance of the global monetary system.
Measures to internationalise the renminbi are nothing new. Hong Kong banks have offered offshore renminbi accounts for more than six years, and currency swap agreements with foreign central banks have been in place since 2000. But they have accelerated in recent months. Restrictions on offshore transfers have been eased and a programme allowing companies to settle cross-border trades in renminbi expanded. Last week’s decision to open up domestic bond markets was particularly significant. Until then there were few investment opportunities for international holders of renminbi.
These are, however, only small steps. Whether China will be able to stomach the rest of the renminbi’s journey to reserve currency status is far from clear.
A reserve renminbi would have to be fully convertible, on the capital account as well as the current account. But this would imply opening up China to the whims of global capital – precisely what it has been protecting itself against (as its huge foreign exchange reserves attest). Freer capital flows may also prove destabilising for domestic banks, creating liquidity bubbles in good times and choking off the credit supply as conditions deteriorate. No longer would the banking sector be an effective instrument of macroeconomic policy, as it has been during the crisis with its government-induced lending sprees. It would be a source of, and not a remedy to, increasing economic volatility.
Even less palatable for the government is the prospect of losing control over the renminbi. Maintaining a currency peg in the face of massive capital inflows is extremely difficult. And if increasing foreign demand for the renminbi pushes up its value, China’s export-led growth model – which relies on an undervalued currency – may become unsustainable.
China will become the world’s largest economy in the next few decades. It is natural that the renminbi eventually attains reserve currency status. China should not push this process forward prematurely, lest it destabilises its economy. But the sooner it starts the domestic reforms that will prepare it for such a shift, the easier it will find its new international role.
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