毫无疑问，总有一天伯考维茨也会像别人一样失败。不过目前为止，在他的Fairholme Fund成立的头10年中，这只基金令大部分华尔街公司都羞愧得无地自容了。据理柏(Lipper)说，Fairholme的平均年回报率约为13%。也就是说，如果最初投资1万美元的话，现在能获得约3.5万美元。这只基金是过去10年中表现最佳的基金。同期，标准普尔500指数下挫。今年以来，Fairholme股价又涨了10%，而标准普尔500指数则仅涨了约2%。
世界过时了。晨星公司(Morningstar)说，Fairholme是今年卖出最快的国内股票基金。据跟踪金融行业的Financial Research Corp.估计，今年以来，投资者已经向该基金投入了约30亿美元，总资产达到了近150亿美元。华尔街其他公司的表现又如何呢？同期，美国投资者实际上从其他股票基金中撤出了数十亿美元资金。
他们和以往一样放弃了华尔街。
更具有讽刺意味的是，伯考维茨恰恰是在1999年，也就是90年代的大泡沫接近顶峰的时候推出了Fairholme。当时正是两种传说的全胜时期：一个是股市总是表现出众，一个是你无法战胜市场，所以你应该停止努力，干脆向指数基金屈服。此后的10年将这两个传说都埋葬掉了。伯考维茨和他的投资者则一直在它们的坟墓上跳舞。
他是如何做到的？晨星公司分析师布林(Mike Breen)解释道，和另外一位知名的逆向投资家巴菲特(Warren Buffett)一样，伯考维茨也喜欢在自己看好的少数几只股票上押大注。他会在买进之前，对这些股票进行严格的压力测试──正如布林形容的，他试图毙掉公司。（记者无法联系到伯考维茨进行置评。）与巴菲特不同的是，他乐于不断地变换持股。在准确判断时机的情况下，他在两年前能源股接近高点时卖出，在大部分低迷时间坚守抗跌股，去年买进了金融股。布林说，他对投资组合进行了三、四次重大调整。
有人可能想说伯考维茨非常幸运，他的一些调整时机肯定暗示了他有如神助。但别忘了，许多投资者都希望表现更好，不可避免一些人肯定会获得成功。华尔街经典书藉《客户的游艇在哪里》（Where Are The Customers' Yachts）作者施韦德（Fred Schwed）在这本书里说，如果举行一个掷硬币大赛，有人会成为赢家，在这点上他们无疑将被追捧为掷硬币的天才。
但这不仅是运气的问题。近期哈佛商学院的科恩（Randolph Cohen）、伦敦政治经济学院的波尔克（Christopher Polk）以及高盛的希利（Bernhard Silli）发表了一份研究报告（“最好的想法”），发现了支持伯考维茨向较少股票大量押注策略的证据，这与基金公司（及他们的行销部门）推行的传统智慧截然相反。简言之，好的基金经理确实会选择正确的股票。他们最信赖的“最好想法”股票也就是他们主要持有的股票，这些股票表现优异的几率很高。
问题是基金行业决定了基金经理的投资组合中其余部分是垃圾股，所以他们的基金看起来跟其他人的一样，这样更容易销售。
目前Fairholme的投资组合看起来都错了，至少根据传统智慧判断是这样。伯考维茨把近三分之二的资金都投在仅10只股票上，其中多数对于主流投资者来说还是听起来相当“高风险”的股票。许多是严重受创的金融股，主要包括美国国际集团（AIG）、花旗集团（Citigroup）、美国银行（Bank of America）、债券发行机构MBIA、破产购物中心拥有者General Growth Properties，以及佛罗里达地产股The St. Joe Co。他基金中的15%为现金。
他的这些押注是对的还是错的，显然还需要观察。尽管这些股票看起来风险很高，但伯考维茨是逆势买入的。很明显他认为这些股票买得很便宜，任何可能出现的涨幅都将超过跌幅。有几次他真的获得了额外收入。像花旗集团等一些股票，被认为股价将进一步下跌的投机客大举卖空，当伯考维茨及其基金开始买入的时候，推高了股价，这无疑会使一些投机客面临挟仓的局面，如果这些投机客被迫买回股票以回补他们的头寸，这将进一步推升股价，这才是双赢。
结果很难量化。即使这近来帮助了Fairholme，也不能持久。这把投资者置于什么境地？伯考维茨是得到允诺的救世主吗？还是他拿着你的钱去冒险？答案是：可能两者都不是。伯考维茨是杰出的投资者，但他还没有找到圣杯，这根本就不存在。他可能在某一点上犯错误，而人类总有这样的倾向。集中的投资组合将有更大的效应，虽然人们认为希布纳（Ken Heebner）（CGM精选基金）、尼格伦（Bill Nygren）（奥克马克基金）和米勒（Bill Miller）（Legg Mason价值基金）等最后一批“超级投资者”都神乎其神，但投资者却化了很大的代价发现其实不然。这些人每人都有表现优异的辉煌时刻，但最后却惨败而归。投资者在大好时期涌入基金，认为他们终于找到了需要的唯一一支基金，最后却以卖出告终。
那关键是什么？任何投资Fairholme的人都想知道他们持有什么。但为大涨大跌作好准备吧。Fairholme确实是值得拥有的好基金，但它只能作为投资组合的一部分，没人是无所不知的。
Brett Arends
（编者按：本文作者Brett Arends是《华尔街日报》网络版专栏作家，他的专栏《投资回报》帮助投资者分析最新时事并做出相应投资决定。）
No doubt the time will come when Mr. Berkowitz, too, trips up. But so far, in its first decade, his Fairholme Fund has put most of Wall Street to shame. Fairholme has made an average annual return of about 13%, says Lipper, inc.. That's turned an initial investment of $10,000 into about $35,000. It's the top fund of the past decade. Over the same period, the Standard & Poor's 500 Index has lost money. So far this year, Fairholme is up another 10%. The S&P 500: About 2%.
And the word is out. Fairholme is this year's fastest-selling domestic equity fund, says Morningstar. Financial Research Corp., which tracks the industry, estimates investors have poured about $3 billion into the fund so far this year, raising its total assets to nearly $15 billion. The rest of Wall Street? Over the same period, U.S. investors have actually yanked billions from other stock funds.
They've given up on Wall Street as usual.
It is a double irony that Mr. Berkowitz happened to launch Fairholme in 1999, near the peak of the big 1990s bubble. That was the high water mark of two myths: That stocks 'always outperform,' and that you can't possibly beat the market, so you should stop trying and just give in to index funds. The decade since has buried both of those myths. And Mr. Berkowitz, and his investors, have been dancing on their graves.
How has he done it? Morningstar analyst Mike Breen explains that Mr. Berkowitz-like another famous contrarian investor, Warren Buffett-likes to take big bets on a few names he feels strongly about. He puts those names through tough stress tests-'he tries to kill the company,' as Mr. Breen puts it-before buying. (Mr. Berkowitz could not be reached for comment.) Unlike Mr. Buffett, he's willing to switch around a lot. With remarkable timing, he jumped out of energy stocks near the peak two years ago, hunkered down in defensives for much of the crash, and bought financials last year. 'He's reinvented the portfolio three or four times,' says Mr. Breen.
it's tempting to say Mr. Berkowitz has been very lucky. The timing of some of his market moves has certainly suggested a charmed life. After all, with many investors trying to outperform, inevitably some must succeed. Fred Schwed, in the Wall Street classic 'Where Are The Customers' Yachts,' notes that if you held a big coin-flipping contest someone would emerge as the victor-at which point they would doubtless be hailed for their coin-flipping genius.
But it's not just luck. A recent study ('Best Ideas') by Randolph Cohen at the Harvard Business School, Christopher Polk at the London School of Economics, and Bernhard Silli at Goldman Sachs, found evidence that backs up Mr. Berkowitz's strategy of taking bigger bets on fewer names-and goes very much against the conventional wisdom pushed by the fund companies (and their marketing departments). In a nutshell: Good fund managers can indeed pick the right stocks.Their highest conviction 'best ideas' stocks, often their top holdings, have a good chance of outperforming.
The problem is that the fund industry makes managers pack out the rest of their portfolio with rubbish, so their funds look like everyone else's and can be marketed more easily.
Right now Fairholme's portfolio looks all wrong-at least according to the conventional wisdom. Mr. Berkowitz has nearly two-thirds of the money in just 10 stocks. Most of those are names that sound incredibly 'high risk' to mainstream investors. Many are battered financials. The top names include AIG, Citigroup, Bank of America, bond insurer MBIA, bankrupt mall-owner General Growth Properties, and Florida real estate stock The St. Joe Co. And he holds 15% of the fund in cash.
Whether he's proven right or wrong on these bets, obviously, remains to be seen. The stocks may well seem highly risky. But Mr. Berkowitz bought them by going against the crowd. And clearly he believes he got them so cheaply that the likely gains outweigh any likely losses. In several cases, he's enjoyed an extra bonus. Some of these stocks, such as Citigroup, had been aggressively sold short by speculators who were betting they would fall further. When Mr. Berkowitz and his fund began buying, that pushed the price up-and doubtless subjected some speculators to a squeeze. If those speculators were then forced to buy back stock to cover their bets, that would have driven the stock up even further. A double win.
The results are hard to quantify. But even if that has helped Fairholme recently it's not a sustainable game. Where does this leave investors? Is Mr. Berkowitz the promised savior? Or is he taking crazy risks with your money? The answer is: Maybe neither. Mr. Berkowitz is an excellent investor, but he has not discovered the Holy Grail. None exists. He will probably make a blunder at some point. Human beings have that tendency. In a concentrated portfolio that will have a big effect. Investors found this out the hard way in the case of the last 'super investors' who were thought to walk on water-such as Ken Heebner (at CGM Focus), Bill Nygren (at Oakmark) and Bill Miller (at Legg Mason Value). Each had a terrific run of outperformance, and then fell flat on his face. Investors who had rushed into the fund during the good times, thinking they had found the only fund they ever needed, then dumped it again.
Bottom line? Anyone investing in Fairholme needs to understand what they own. Be prepared for the possibility of a roller coaster. Fairholme is a good fund to own, but only as one part of a portfolio. Nobody has all the answers.
Brett Arends
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