《后危机时代，亚洲有被美国孤立的危险》(Asia Alone:The Dangerous Post-Crisis Divide from America)，戴尚志(Simon Tay)著，Wiley
出版社出版，单价24.95美元/16.99英镑。
上月，美国国务卿希拉里•克林顿(Hillary Clinton)向出席亚洲安全会议的代表们表示，美国支持和平解决南中国海的领土争端问题。美国将愿意协调多边谈判。与会的27个国家中，有12个表示支持她的倡议，其中包括越南及其它长期以来一直与中国存在海事争议的国家。但中国不高兴。它声称，几乎整个南海——包括航运通道和油气储量——都属于中国。它更喜欢在双边基础上与邻国打交道，拒绝企图将南海问题"国际化"的努力。
乔治•W•布什(George W. Bush)任总统期间，伊拉克与阿富汗战争分散了美国的注意力，太平洋地区被忽视了好几年。如今，"太平洋总统"巴拉克•奥巴马(Barack Obama)正寻求重新接触变化迅速的亚洲。希拉里的干预表明，在忙着巩固与中印（亚洲极为重要的新秀）的关系之际，华盛顿并没有忘记更广大的区域。关于奥巴马政府区域政策背后的两难困境，《后危机时代，亚洲有被美国孤立的危险》一书作出了出色的解读。全书充满了智慧，且颇具可读性。
戴尚志是一位新加坡学者，他全面诠释了亚洲视角；该地区在历史上常常遭到外来者的殖民。更妙的是，与那些赞美陈腐而自以为是的"亚洲价值观"的人不同，戴尚志避开了吹毛求疵的基调。他的观点务实、着眼全球。他看到了，对于在中国车前灯照射下的亚洲，美国在某种程度上的介入有一些好处。
戴尚志颇为机敏，他不希望美国扮演警长的角色，以求制衡中国不断扩大的实力。相反，他给出了下述论点。自二战以来，美国一直在亚洲扮演超级强大力量（如果说基本上是友善的话）的角色，维持和平（除朝鲜半岛与越南外）、支持经济增长。他写道："长久以来，美国是亚洲人的共同参照。就像围绕毂的辐条一样，亚洲人与美国的关系比相互之间要更为亲近。 "
这种附属关系已经结束。1997年亚洲危机后，它便开始破裂。与美国关系密切的国际货币基金组织(IMF)开出的一剂苦药，让双方起了争端。自1997年以来，亚洲一直蓬勃发展，尽管是依靠美国需求的支撑。该地区在政治上已经变得更加一体化，如今，复杂的贸易协定网又将它们捆绑在了一起。而且，许多亚洲人觉得，美国已经失足——无论是道德上（在阿布格莱布监狱(Abu Ghraib)、在关塔纳摩湾(Guantánamo Bay)），还是经济上（在华尔街）。
戴尚志并没有为旧式师徒关系的消逝感到遗憾。但他确实看到了实力真空带来的危险。美国可能会转向贸易保护主义，亚洲则会转向骄傲自大导致的孤立。"亚洲国家、尤其是中国是这场危机的相对赢家，这种感觉十分明显。"此外，尽管他承认亚洲需要增加消费、减少对美出口，但他担心，如果没有政治再平衡的配合，这种经济再平衡可能会让双方分道扬镳。
这种情况非常有可能发生（或许比较遥远）。戴尚志认为这会很危险。的确，他有些担忧中国的实力。他在书中写道："亚洲的一个情景是，各国向崛起的中国建立新的朝贡体系，'北京共识'将深入人心，以及或许会重提'亚洲价值'以证明政府强大地位的合理性。"他还担心，如果没有美国这个"牵头合作伙伴"，亚洲各国可能会互相争吵，甚至会发生战争。亚洲陷于孤立，可能会导致诸如南海争端之类的纠纷，引发中日等世仇国家的怒火，或者产生新的冲突——或许在中印之间。
戴尚志称，尽管东盟(ASEAN)取得一些进展，刚刚培育出区域一体化的感觉，但亚洲仍缺乏欧盟(EU)那样的稳定机制。"美国主导地位令他们恼火，但亚洲并没有团结的历史，也没有独自走向未来的公认领导"。
在本书的最后三分之一部分，戴尚志敦促建立一种新型的跨太平洋关系，美国作为"在亚洲地区有重大利益的关键合作伙伴"发挥缓和影响力。亚洲不需要在美中之间选择，而是应该与两方面都搭建桥梁。戴尚志表示，只有一个强大、但更谦逊的美国才能掌握与一个新兴超级大国和一个快速发展地区打交道的技巧。否则的话，亚洲只能独立行事。在他看来，这是一个亚洲迄今还未准备好的挑战。
作者是英国《金融时报》亚洲版主编
译者/何黎
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001034326
Asia Alone:The Dangerous Post-Crisis Divide from America
By Simon Tay (Wiley, $24.95 £16.99)
Last month, Hillary Clinton told delegates at an Asian security gathering that the US supported the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes in the South China Sea. The US would be willing to facilitate multilateral negotiations, the secretary of state said. Twelve of the 27 nations attending, including Vietnam and other countries that have long-running maritime disputes with China, supported her initiative. Beijing was unhappy. It claims almost all of the South China Sea – with its shipping lanes and oil and gas deposits – for itself. China prefers to deal with its neighbours one by one, rejecting attempts to "internationalise" the issue.
After years of neglect during the presidency of George W. Bush, when the US was distracted by wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Barack Obama, the "Pacific president", is seeking to re-engage with a fast-changing Asia. Mrs Clinton's intervention signals that Washington has not forgotten the wider region in its rush to cement ties with China and India, the really important kids on the block. Asia Alone, an intelligent and readable book, is an excellent guide to the dilemmas behind the Obama administration's regional push.
Simon Tay, a Singaporean academic, fleshes out an Asian perspective in an area too often colonised by outsiders. Better still, he avoids the carping tone of those from the region who extol the tired righteousness of "Asian values". His is a pragmatic, international voice that sees virtue in some sort of US presence in a region caught in Chinese headlights.
Mr Tay is too subtle to want the US to act as sheriff, a counterweight to China's growing power. Instead, his thesis goes as follows. Since the second world war, the US has acted as an imperious, if largely benign, presence in the region, keeping the peace (Korea and Vietnam aside) and championing economic growth. "The enduring common reference for Asians has been the US," he writes. "Like spokes joined to a central hub, Asians have been more closely connected to the US than to each other."
That subservient arrangement is over. It began to splinter after the 1997 Asian crisis. The two sides fell out over bitter medicine prescribed by the International Monetary Fund, a body closely associated with the US. Since 1997, Asia has prospered, albeit on the back of US demand. The region has become more politically integrated, and a complex network of trade agreements now binds it together. Meanwhile, many Asians feel the US has stumbled – morally (in Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo Bay), and economically (on Wall Street).
Mr Tay doesn't mourn the passing of the old, pupil-mentor relationship. But he does see dangers in a vacuum. The US could drift into protectionism, Asia into hubris-induced isolation. "The sense that most Asian nations and especially China are relative winners from the crisis is palpable," he says. And while he agrees that Asia needs to consume more and ship less of what it produces to the US, he worries such economic rebalancing – if not countered by political rebalancing – could set both on separate paths.
This is a real, if perhaps distant, possibility. Mr Tay thinks it would be dangerous. Part of his concern is, indeed, over Chinese power. "A new tributary system to a risen China is one scenario for Asia, with the spread of the Beijing consensus and perhaps a reincarnation of 'Asian values' to justify the strong role of the state," he writes. He also fears that without their US "lead partner",
Asians could bicker, or even fight. Being alone could ignite disputes like that in the South China Sea; fan the flames of old animosities like that between Japan and China; or kindle new ones, perhaps between China and India.
Despite progress by the Association of South East Asian Nations, which has nurtured a fledgling sense of regionalism, Asia lacks the stabilising institutions of the European Union, he argues. "American dominance has rankled with them, but Asians have no history of unity, and no agreed vision of leadership to step into a future with Asia on its own."
In the last third of the book, Mr Tay urges a new kind of trans-Pacific relationship, with the US as a tempering influence, "an essential partner with vital interests in the region". In slightly strained language, he invokes what he calls the "Power of &". The region need not choose between the US and China, but should build bridges to both. Only a strong, but more humble America can pull off the trick of dealing with an emerging superpower and a fast-growing region, he says. The alternative is for Asia to go it alone. In Mr Tay's opinion, that is a challenge for which it is not yet ready.
The writer is the FT's Asia editor
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