尽管拥有种种光鲜的现代化标志，但当代中国在许多地方让人感受到19世纪的气息：新修的铁路打开内陆地区，还有所有那些狄更斯时代般的工厂。在钢产量达到天量之际，一种充满自信的新国家认同感正在这个欲在世界上占据一席之地的国家形成。
在亚洲各地，你都可以感受到同样的气息：不只是中国，印度、韩国和澳大利亚也都在大力投资本国海军，打造能进军远洋的新蓝水舰队。该地区的外交也是如此：战后美国主导亚洲的时代，正被一种更不稳定的实力平衡所取代。
希拉里•克林顿(Hillary Clinton)上月底在河内发表的精彩讲话，突显出这出正拉开帷幕的地缘政治大戏。在赶赴女儿婚礼途中，这位美国国务卿在该地区一会议上称，美国愿在各方（包括中国）就南海有争议岛屿展开的谈判中充当调停人。
在这些有争议岛屿中，有许多比礁石大不了多少，但它们邻近很大一块世界贸易往来所使用的海上通道，因此具有巨大的战略价值。就这点而论，希拉里的讲话可谓一场外交战的最显著标志之一，这场外交战将界定亚洲未来数十年的格局，而美中两国间的较量将成为外交战的主旋律。
希拉里的讲话目的有二。一是强调美国将重新参与亚洲外交。在乔治·W·布什(George W. Bush)总统任内，一些亚洲国家的政府觉得，美国已对亚洲地区丧失兴趣。不管这种印象是否有道理，希拉里正在告诉亚洲各国领导人：美国不打算退出亚洲外交舞台。
更重要的是，此番讲话意在向亚洲表明美国对中国及其看似不可避免的崛起的态度。自韩国"天安舰"今年3月沉没以来，美国政府就利用中国政府不愿批评朝鲜这一点强化美韩关系，并离间中韩两国。在东南亚对中国在南海的意图日渐猜疑之时，美国以"自然而诚实的经纪人"身份出现在各方面前。
这一战略的大致轮廓并不新颖——自冷战结束起，美国一直在经济议题上与中国展开接触，在外交上则对中国进行遏制。美国与印度达成核合作协议，在一定程度上就是出于这种考虑。
但是，奥巴马(Obama)政府还必须设法把失去的时间弥补回来。在过去十年左右的时间里，中国已在亚洲抢先美国一步。事实证明，阿富汗和伊拉克这两场战争是北京方面得到的战略礼物。在美国追歼基地组织(al-Qaeda)、搜寻大规模杀伤性武器的同时，中国与多个曾对其疑心重重的邻国解决了边境争端——从北边的俄罗斯到南边的越南（尽管印度不在其内）。中国经济持续十年的两位数增长，推动亚洲经济轴心发生转移：它把输油管道铺设到了中亚，对缅甸、印尼和菲律宾的自然资源项目进行了投资，还为在印度洋修建新港口提供了融资。
中国乐于与美国在经济议题上展开接触，加入世贸组织(WTO)，并大量购买美国国债，但北京方面同时也加快了针对美国的军力建设。中国的战略规划者并不是准备与美国开战，而是要通过发展他们称为"反介入"武器的一系列导弹系统，来逐步铲除美国在亚洲水域的主导地位。
但在过去一年左右，中国在亚洲的魅力攻势遭遇到了麻烦，尤其是在南海——对许多亚洲国家来说，南海是一个晴雨表，从中可看出强大的中国会如何对待它们。主张拥有帕拉塞尔群岛（西沙群岛）和斯普拉特利群岛（南沙群岛）全部或部分岛屿主权的，有越南、马来西亚、菲律宾、台湾和文莱。但在中国地图上，这些岛屿位于一条圈定其领海的U形线内，这条线向南延伸，囊括了大部分南海。
在局势日益紧张之际，有报道称，中国已向其它亚洲国家表示，它们不得甩开中国讨论南海问题。据美国官员称，北京方面现在还表示，它把南海视为一项"核心利益"，与台湾和西藏并列。此举不可避免会招致一些反弹。不出所料，越南这个该地区实行着与中国相似的列宁主义政体的国家，对昔日的死对头美国展开游说，劝其介入南海问题。（美国海军乔治•华盛顿(George Washington)号航空母舰上周末访问了越南。）就连新加坡的李光耀(Lee Kuan Yew)也在去年呼吁美国保持其在太平洋的"超级大国"地位，尽管他在过去十年的大部分时间里都在赞美北京方面。
在亚洲新上演的这场外交较量中，中国仍在很大程度上拥有"后劲"。美国面临债务和赤字，而中国经济可在未来一、二十年内轻松实现8%的年增长，它的海军力量也将不可避免的加强。
但希拉里已在南海问题上为北京方面设下了陷阱。如果中国站出来反对美国把手伸进它的后院，并以地区大国的身份出现在各方面前，它有可能会把心怀戒惧的邻国推入美国阵营。的确，这是一种更具普遍意义的外交考验——未来数十年，中国在亚洲都会面临这种考验。亚洲国家越依赖中国经济，就越对中国的强大感到不安。现在，球在很大程度上已踢到了中国一边。
译者/何黎
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001034058
For all its slick modernity, there are plenty of 19th-century echoes about contemporary China with the new railroads that are opening up the hinterland and all those Dickensian factories. Amid the mountainous production of steel, a confident new national identity is being forged in a country that wants to stake its claim in the world.
The same echoes can be felt across other parts of Asia where not just China, but India, South Korea and Australia are all investing heavily in their navies, building new blue-water fleets to take to the oceans. And so it is with the region's diplomacy, where the postwar era of US dominance is being replaced with a more uneasy balance of power.
This emerging geopolitical drama was underlined by a fascinating statement in Hanoi at the end of last month by Hillary Clinton. En route to her daughter's wedding, the US secretary of state told a regional meeting that the US was willing to act as a mediator in talks over the islands in the South China Sea disputed by, among others, China.
Many of the islands in question might be little more than rocks, but given that they are close to the sea lanes for a significant chunk of world trade, they have huge strategic importance. As such, Mrs Clinton's speech is one of the most striking symbols of the diplomatic battle that will define Asia for the next few decades – a tussle between the US and China to be the dominant voice.
The Clinton statement had two goals. One was to emphasise that in Asian diplomacy, the US is back. During the presidency of George W. Bush, some Asian governments felt that the US had lost interest in the region. Whether this impression was justified or not, she was telling Asia's leaders that the US is not packing its bags any time soon.
Most of all, the speech was a message to the region about China and its seemingly inevitable rise. Since the sinking of South Korea's Cheonan warship in March, Washington has taken advantage of Beijing's reluctance to criticise North Korea to boost its ties with Seoul and drive a wedge between China and South Korea. As suspicions grow in south-east Asia about China's intentions in the South China Sea, the US is presenting itself as the natural honest broker.
The broad outlines of this strategy are not new – since the end of the cold war, Washington has approached China through a mixture of engagement on economic issues and diplomatic containment. The nuclear deal with India was partly motivated by such considerations.
But the Obama administration also has to make up for lost time. Over the last decade or so, China has stolen a march on the US in Asia. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq proved to be a strategic gift for Beijing. While the US was chasing al-Qaeda and hunting for WMD, China settled border disputes with a string of once suspicious neighbours – from Russia in the north to Vietnam in the south (although not India). As a decade of double-digit growth in China helped shift the axis of the Asian economy, Beijing drove pipelines into central Asia, invested in natural resources projects in Burma, Indonesia and the Philippines, and financed new ports in the Indian Ocean.
China has been happy to engage with the US on economic issues, joining the World Trade Organisation and stockpiling Treasury bonds, but Beijing has also accelerated a military build-up that has the US in its sights. Rather than preparing for a fight with the US, Chinese planners want gradually to squeeze the US out of its dominant position in Asian waters by developing a series of missile systems they describe as "anti-access" weapons.
Yet in the last year or so, China's charm offensive in Asia has run into trouble – not least in the South China Sea, which for many Asian countries is a barometer of how a powerful China might treat them. The Paracel and Spratly islands are claimed in full or in part by Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Brunei. On China's maps, however, the islands are inside a U-shaped line of its territorial waters, which stretches down to cover most of the South China Sea.
Amid rising tensions, China has reportedly told other Asian countries not to discuss the issue among themselves. According to US officials, Beijing also now says it considers the area a "core interest", alongside Taiwan and Tibet. Some push-back was inevitable. Sure enough, Vietnam – the one country in the region with a Leninist political system comparable to China's – lobbied its old nemesis in Washington to get involved. (The USS George Washington aircraft carrier visited Vietnam at the weekend.) Even Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew, who has spent much of the past decade praising Beijing, called last year on the US to remain the Pacific's "superior power".
In Asia's new diplomatic contest, the momentum is still very much with Beijing. While the US faces debts and deficits, China could easily grow by 8 per cent a year for one if not two more decades and its naval power will also inexorably expand.
Yet Mrs Clinton has laid a trap for Beijing in the South China Sea. If China stands up to US interference in its backyard and presents itself as the regional power, it risks pushing wary neighbours into the US camp. Indeed, this is the broader diplomatic test that China faces in Asia over the coming decades. The more dependent Asian countries become on China's economy, the more uneasy they will be about its power. The ball is very much now in Beijing's court.
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