世
界从数十年来最严重的经济危机中艰难复苏，而中国似乎已经实现了一个奇迹。去年经济增幅接近9%，同时截至12月31日政府负债与GDP比率仅为20%左右。中国是像老话说的那样，享受了免费的午餐吗？事实远非如此：中国政府通过地方政府创建的数以千计的投资实体为规模极其庞大的刺激计划提供了资金。如果北京方面不马上意识到这个问题并制止，为刺激计划提供了大部分资金的中国各家银行可能很快面临巨额贷款拖欠，规模甚至与中国庞大的财政能力和外汇储备相当。
2008年底，中国政府宣布了5,880亿美元的刺激计划，随后地方政府积极推出了在未来几年投资逾四万亿美元的多项计划。这些远非空想的白日梦。中央政府允许甚至鼓励地方政府从银行大肆借贷以支持基础设施项目。官方数据显示，由于中国法律禁止银行直接贷款给政府机构，地方政府建立了大约8,000家投资公司。银行向这些实体的放贷归入"企业贷款"。
北京方面已无法确定地方政府投资机构从银行贷款以及从债券和证券投资者那里筹集的资金数额。不过，其数额巨大是毫无疑问的。去年9月，中国媒体援引政府人士的话报道称，这些机构已借贷8,800亿美元。全国人大财政经济委员会副主任委员尹中卿1月份接受《二十一世纪经济报道》采访时披露，2009年一年时间地方政府的投融资平台借贷7,350亿美元。
不过，上述数字只是猜测。国家审计局去年进行的审计查出了该项数据的诸多问题，以至中国国务院总理温家宝下令对地方投资机构进行另一轮大规模审计。在完成彻底的审计、公布结果之前，没有人真正了解地方政府借贷的总规模。
为了获得独立的估计数字，我从数千个信息来源搜集了数据，包括监管文件、债券评级报告以及政府-银行合作协议的新闻发布。我估计，2004-2009年底地方投资机构的借贷总规模为1.6万亿美元左右。这个数据绝非精确值，因为级别较低的政府实体和小银行的放贷难以跟踪。不过，我搜集的证据表明，问题的严重程度远高于政府此前预计。以1.6万亿美元计，地方政府负债约占中国2009年GDP的三分之一，相当于中国外汇储备的70%。
虽然地方政府预算有限，但它们可以出售土地获得收入，以此支付贷款利息和最终的本金。事实上，中国各地政府2009年共出售价值2,330亿美元的土地，从下半年的房地产飙升中获益。不过，地方投资工具要完全通过出售土地所得偿还利息和债务的话，房地产热潮就必须在未来很多年一直持续，以保证土地的高需求。更糟糕的是，银行已经承诺向地方投资实体发放另外的逾1万亿美元贷款。如果中央政府不限制银行向这些实体放贷，这些机构将背负更沉重的债务，这样一来，要么就必须出售更多土地，要么就会导致巨额不良贷款的形成。
中央政府已经下令银行放缓向地方投资工具发放贷款。不过，要防止灾难性后果还需采取更强有力的措施。首先，政府需要下令银行停止向所有地方投融资平台的新投资项目或上马不久的投资项目发放贷款。这也会减缓整体的放缓速度，并抑制不断加剧的通胀。第二，由于县级政府的财政状况最差，也最没有能力偿还银行贷款，中央政府应当承担几乎所有县级投资工具的债务。虽然这样会令中国的债务占GDP比率大幅上升，但以国际标准衡量总规模仍然很低。
突然缩减向地方投资工具的放贷会产生一波不良贷款潮，但加大对市场机制的依赖会在未来几年里轻松解决这个问题。首先，银行将完全收回向状况良好的地方实体发放的贷款，这部分约占地方政府贷款总额的一半。至于其余部分，政府需要允许银行直接向国内外投资者出售次级或不良贷款。中央政府无需担心中国的上市银行会将不良贷款以低于市场的价格出售，因为这些银行要向股东交待。银行以及投资银行和不良资产投资者也应当想办法将地方债务证券化，出售给国内外投资者。海外投资者应当会对以人民币计价的证券感兴趣，因预期人民币币值不久后将重估。
北京的"改革开放"四字真言近年来越发让人觉得空洞，因越来越多的财政资源投入了国有领域。不过，为解决地方政府债务问题而进行适时、大胆和市场导向的干预将让中国再次走上改革之路。
（编者按：本文作者史宗瀚为美国西北大学(Northwestern University)助理教授，著有Factions and Finance in China: Elite Conflict and Inflation一书。本文仅代表作者观点。）
Victor Shih
[Editor's Note: Mr. Shih is assistant professor of political science at Northwestern University and the author of 'Factions and Finance in China: Elite Conflict and Inflation' (Cambridge University Press, 2008).]
As the world struggles to recover from the most severe economic slowdown in a generation, China seemingly has accomplished a miracle. Growth registered at almost 9% last year, yet the government debt-to-GDP ratio still stood around a modest 20% as of December 31. Has China enjoyed the proverbial free lunch?
Far from it: The Chinese government has financed much of an enormous stimulus package through thousands of investment entities created by local governments. If Beijing doesn't soon recognize this problem and put a stop to it, banks in China, which have provided the bulk of the funding, may soon face delinquent loans that rival even China's enormous fiscal and foreign-exchange capacity.
After Beijing announced a $588 billion stimulus package in late 2008, local governments enthusiastically rolled out plans to invest more than $4 trillion over the following few years. These were far from idle pipe dreams. The central authorities permitted and even encouraged local governments to borrow heavily from banks to finance infrastructure projects. Because Chinese law forbids banks from lending directly to government institutions, these governments set up some 8,000 investment companies, according to official figures. Banks lending to these entities class the outlays as 'enterprise loans.'
Beijing is no longer sure how much money local investment entities have borrowed from banks and raised from bond and equity investors. The amount, however, must be large. In September, the Chinese press, citing government sources, suggested that these entities have borrowed $880 billion. In a January interview with the Twentieth Century Business Herald, a Chinese newspaper, the vice chairman of the Finance and Economic Committee of the National People's Congress, Yi Zhongliu, revealed that local investment entities borrowed some $735 billion in 2009 alone.
These are mere guesses, however. A National Audit Agency audit conducted late last year uncovered so many problems with the data that Premier Wen Jiabao ordered another large-scale audit of local investment entities. Until a thorough audit is completed and the results announced to the public, no one really knows the total scale of local borrowing.
To obtain an independent estimate, I collected data from thousands of sources, including regulatory filings, bond-rating reports and press releases of government-bank cooperative agreements. I estimate local investment entities' borrowing between 2004 and the end of 2009 totals some $1.6 trillion. The data are far from perfect because borrowing by low-level government entities and lending by small banks are difficult to track. Nonetheless, my evidence suggests that the scale of the problem is much larger than previous government estimates. At $1.6 trillion, the local debt is roughly one-third of China's 2009 GDP and 70% of its foreign-exchange reserves.
Although local budgets are limited, regional governments can sell land to raise money to pay interest and ultimately principal. Indeed, local authorities across the country sold land worth $233 billion in 2009, benefiting from the real-estate upsurge in the second half of the year. For local investment vehicles to fully repay interest and debt through the sale of land, however, the real-estate boom must continue for years to come, sustaining high demand for land. Worse, banks have already pledged more than a trillion dollars in additional credit lines to local investment entities. If the central government does not restrict bank lending to them, these entities will go deeper into debt, thus either requiring the sale of much more land or the creation of a pile of nonperforming loans.
The central government is already ordering banks to slow lending to local investment vehicles. However, stronger actions are needed to forestall disaster. First, the government needs to order banks to stop lending to all new or newly started investment projects undertaken by local entities. This also would slow the overall amount of lending and constrain rising inflation. Second, since county governments are in the poorest fiscal shape and have the least ability to repay banks, the central government should take over the debt of almost all of the county-level investment vehicles. Although this will increase China's debt-to-GDP ratio significantly, the total would still be low by international standards.
A sudden contraction of lending to local investment vehicles will generate a wave of nonperforming loans, but a greater reliance on market mechanisms can easily solve this problem over the next few years. First, banks will fully recover the debt of the healthiest local entities, which may account for half of total local debt. For the remainder, the government needs to allow banks to directly sell subprime or distressed loans to both foreign and domestic investors. Beijing need not fear that China's listed banks will sell their nonperforming loans at below-market prices, as these banks report to shareholders. Banks, in conjunction with investment banks and distressed-asset investors, should also explore ways to securitize local debt for sale to both domestic and international investors. The latter in particular would have a healthy appetite for yuan-denominated security, anticipating a currency revaluation soon.
Beijing's mantra of 'reform and opening' rings increasingly hollow in recent years as a larger share of financial resources is poured into the state sector. However, a timely, bold and market-oriented intervention to resolve the local-debt problem would once again put China on a path of reform.
-0-
Copyright (c) 2010 Dow Jones & Company, Inc.
[Editor's Note: Mr. Shih is assistant professor of political science at Northwestern University and the author of 'Factions and Finance in China: Elite Conflict and Inflation' (Cambridge University Press, 2008).]
As the world struggles to recover from the most severe economic slowdown in a generation, China seemingly has accomplished a miracle. Growth registered at almost 9% last year, yet the government debt-to-GDP ratio still stood around a modest 20% as of December 31. Has China enjoyed the proverbial free lunch?
Far from it: The Chinese government has financed much of an enormous stimulus package through thousands of investment entities created by local governments. If Beijing doesn't soon recognize this problem and put a stop to it, banks in China, which have provided the bulk of the funding, may soon face delinquent loans that rival even China's enormous fiscal and foreign-exchange capacity.
After Beijing announced a $588 billion stimulus package in late 2008, local governments enthusiastically rolled out plans to invest more than $4 trillion over the following few years. These were far from idle pipe dreams. The central authorities permitted and even encouraged local governments to borrow heavily from banks to finance infrastructure projects. Because Chinese law forbids banks from lending directly to government institutions, these governments set up some 8,000 investment companies, according to official figures. Banks lending to these entities class the outlays as 'enterprise loans.'
Beijing is no longer sure how much money local investment entities have borrowed from banks and raised from bond and equity investors. The amount, however, must be large. In September, the Chinese press, citing government sources, suggested that these entities have borrowed $880 billion. In a January interview with the Twentieth Century Business Herald, a Chinese newspaper, the vice chairman of the Finance and Economic Committee of the National People's Congress, Yi Zhongliu, revealed that local investment entities borrowed some $735 billion in 2009 alone.
These are mere guesses, however. A National Audit Agency audit conducted late last year uncovered so many problems with the data that Premier Wen Jiabao ordered another large-scale audit of local investment entities. Until a thorough audit is completed and the results announced to the public, no one really knows the total scale of local borrowing.
To obtain an independent estimate, I collected data from thousands of sources, including regulatory filings, bond-rating reports and press releases of government-bank cooperative agreements. I estimate local investment entities' borrowing between 2004 and the end of 2009 totals some $1.6 trillion. The data are far from perfect because borrowing by low-level government entities and lending by small banks are difficult to track. Nonetheless, my evidence suggests that the scale of the problem is much larger than previous government estimates. At $1.6 trillion, the local debt is roughly one-third of China's 2009 GDP and 70% of its foreign-exchange reserves.
Although local budgets are limited, regional governments can sell land to raise money to pay interest and ultimately principal. Indeed, local authorities across the country sold land worth $233 billion in 2009, benefiting from the real-estate upsurge in the second half of the year. For local investment vehicles to fully repay interest and debt through the sale of land, however, the real-estate boom must continue for years to come, sustaining high demand for land. Worse, banks have already pledged more than a trillion dollars in additional credit lines to local investment entities. If the central government does not restrict bank lending to them, these entities will go deeper into debt, thus either requiring the sale of much more land or the creation of a pile of nonperforming loans.
The central government is already ordering banks to slow lending to local investment vehicles. However, stronger actions are needed to forestall disaster. First, the government needs to order banks to stop lending to all new or newly started investment projects undertaken by local entities. This also would slow the overall amount of lending and constrain rising inflation. Second, since county governments are in the poorest fiscal shape and have the least ability to repay banks, the central government should take over the debt of almost all of the county-level investment vehicles. Although this will increase China's debt-to-GDP ratio significantly, the total would still be low by international standards.
A sudden contraction of lending to local investment vehicles will generate a wave of nonperforming loans, but a greater reliance on market mechanisms can easily solve this problem over the next few years. First, banks will fully recover the debt of the healthiest local entities, which may account for half of total local debt. For the remainder, the government needs to allow banks to directly sell subprime or distressed loans to both foreign and domestic investors. Beijing need not fear that China's listed banks will sell their nonperforming loans at below-market prices, as these banks report to shareholders. Banks, in conjunction with investment banks and distressed-asset investors, should also explore ways to securitize local debt for sale to both domestic and international investors. The latter in particular would have a healthy appetite for yuan-denominated security, anticipating a currency revaluation soon.
Beijing's mantra of 'reform and opening' rings increasingly hollow in recent years as a larger share of financial resources is poured into the state sector. However, a timely, bold and market-oriented intervention to resolve the local-debt problem would once again put China on a path of reform.
-0-
Copyright (c) 2010 Dow Jones & Company, Inc.
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