新闻人物：韩国的鹰派总统 (MAN IN THE NEWS) LEE MYUNG-BAK

韩国官员好以名次表来衡量这个世界。因此当他们的总统李明博(Lee Myung-bak)未能入选《时代》杂志本年度"全球最具影响力的100人"榜单时，他们气得七窍生烟。2010年初的时候，李明博的名气还比不上象牙海岸的足球队员迪迪尔•德罗巴(Didier Drogba)，或者漂亮的女歌手嘎嘎(Lady Gaga)。

身为保守派总统，李明博曾试图忽视朝鲜。他被朝鲜的"边缘政策"推上世界舞台，或许是具有讽刺意味的天命。他对朝鲜半岛当前危机的处理，大大提高了他的声望。当美国国务卿希拉里•克林顿(Hillary Clinton)一再称赞你具有政治家风范，而朝鲜痛骂你是"人渣"时，你肯定做对了一些事。

3月26日晚朝鲜以鱼雷击沉韩国军舰后，多名睡眼惺忪的韩国内阁成员在他们的司机把他们送往地下指挥部的路上，担心冲突在即。另一艘韩国军舰已经朝着北方发射了数枚炮弹，因为该舰从雷达上发现其实可能只是鸟儿的可疑物。历史最终可能这样记载：一场末日战争当晚没有爆发，主要应归功于李明博。这位精明的前商人在童年时经历过海难。

比起2008年刚上任时的灾难性开端，这是一个非凡的转折。当时，由于担心疯牛病在国内蔓延，韩国民众大规模涌上街头示威，抗议进口美国牛肉。刚成立不久的亲美政府陷入风雨飘摇之中，李明博本人的支持率急剧下降到20%左右。随后，李明博与佛教徒爆发了一场恶吵，后者觉得他在政府里安插了太多新教徒，这让局面更加恶化。佛教徒占韩国人口的23%；新教徒占18%。李明博本人是新教徒。

示威者把李明博称作"老鼠总统"，在街头焚烧纸制的巨大老鼠肖像。

那些日子距今似乎已经很遥远了。在军舰沉没事件发生后的几周内，李明博展现出了威信和决心。这一点在控制韩国军方的急躁本能方面起到了至关重要的作用。他先是全力扑在营救工作上，接着要求展开国际调查。

韩国国防部官员称，这次袭击表明，朝鲜低估了李明博。他们认为，朝鲜大概没有料到，李明博会下令打捞军舰残骸和鱼雷，并与国际调查员共享所有信息。韩鲜原以为，李明博会和他们一样隐瞒实情。

朝鲜知道，李明博希望在2010年向世界展示自己的国家——作为"20国集团"的主席国。朝鲜显然以为，他肯定会用援助来安抚自己。

但李明博并非逆来顺受之辈。

此前，朝鲜独裁者金正日把几位韩国总统耍得团团转。在金正日眼里，李明博特别可恶：他中断了对朝鲜的大部分援助，结束了前两位自由派总统的无条件"阳光政策"。李明博上周下令断绝两国贸易关系之前，就已将朝鲜弃核谈判的进展列为援助条件了。

与他的很多做法一样，李明博的对朝政策坚持原则，但不很灵活。他提出向朝鲜提供价值400亿美元的经济刺激和基础设施援助，条件是朝鲜必须同意放弃核武器。该计划的明显缺陷在于，朝鲜绝不会接受它。

童年的贫苦生活养成了李明博坚定的性格。李明博1941年出生在日本，当时他父亲在那里的农场做工。他后来在韩国浦项港长大。由于家境贫寒，他用手推车贩卖水果和火柴，挣钱贴补家用。李明博在学业上极有天赋，考入了首尔名牌大学高丽大学，并担任学生会主席，展现出了政治才能。他曾因参加反对军事独裁者朴正熙的示威而遭到短暂关押。

李明博第一次进入公众视野是作为现代建设(Hyundai Engineering and Construction)的首席执行官。这是触角无所不在的现代集团内部的顶尖团队。李明博曾经有个外号叫"推土机"，还有一部流行电视剧《野望的岁月》(Years of Ambition)以他为原型，这部戏帮助他最终在2002年成为首尔市长。有点怪异的是，剧中李明博的扮演者现在担任韩国的文化部长。

作为一家建筑公司的主管，李明博建造了韩国总统官邸青瓦台(Blue House)。"如果我当时知道自己以后将住在这里，可能会把它造得更好，"去年他接受英国《金融时报》采访时开玩笑说道。

诋毁他的人将他描绘成一个威权统治者，而且他的政府在获取民众信任方面遭遇不少难题。政府经常派大量防暴警察对付抗议游行。国际运动组织也注意到在李明博任期内，韩国的言论自由状况有所恶化。

但他作为企业高管的技能为韩国政坛带来一种清新的经济视野。凭借在董事会会议室里学来的领导之道，他迅速引领韩国走出了经济衰退。李明博还在和韩国最棘手的两个问题作斗争：建立在死记硬背基础上、成本高昂的教育体制，以及进行产业多样化以减少高污染重工业的需要。

去年进军核能源出口行业，或许是他最令人意外的成就。为了赢得阿联酋一笔价值200亿美元的核反应堆销售合约，他与法国总统尼古拉•萨科齐(Nicolas Sarkozy)针锋相对。最终韩国大胜法国，震惊了全世界，人们普遍预测韩国将成为发展中国家的首选核反应堆供应商。

李明博的批评者认为，他过于偏爱大企业。而他赦免三星集团董事长李健熙(Lee Kun-hee)之举，向人们传递出一个关于韩国企业治理的极糟的信号。李健熙被指犯有情节极其恶劣的经济贿赂罪。

但在网球场上，他并没有偏袒的对象。为避免造成行为不当的观感，他拒绝与公司高管或记者打球。他只与教练对打。但即便是那样，他仍然是一个顽强的对手。

"真正让他感到愤怒的是别人以故意输球来讨好他。他希望对手尽可能用力击球，"青瓦台的一名官员表示。

金正日得到了警告。

译者/何黎

http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001032871

South Korean officials love measuring the world in league tables. So they were fuming when their president, Lee Myung-bak, failed to be named as one of Time Magazine's 100 most influential people in the world this year. At the beginning of 2010, he simply was not in the same league as Ivorian footballer Didier Drogba or saucy songstress Lady Gaga.

As a conservative president, Mr Lee has tried to ignore North Korea, so it was perhaps his ironic destiny to be propelled on to the world stage by brinkmanship from Pyongyang. His handling of the present crisis on the peninsula has greatly boosted his stature. When Hillary Clinton, US secretary of state, repeatedly calls you statesmanlike and North Korea lambasts you as a "scumball", you must be getting something right.

After North Korea torpedoed a South Korean warship on the night of March 26, many bleary-eyed cabinet members feared conflict was imminent as their drivers whisked them to the war bunker. A second South Korean ship had already blasted some shells northwards, picking up something on the radar screen that could have just been birds. History may ultimately portray Mr Lee, a hard-nosed businessman who survived a shipwreck himself in his childhood, as one of the key reasons an apocalyptic war did not erupt that night.

It is an extraordinary turn-around from the disastrous beginning to his presidency in 2008 when his pro-US government tottered in its infancy, hit by massive street protests over the import of American beef, feared to spread mad cow disease. His popularity plunged to about 20 per cent, worsened by an ugly spat with Buddhists who felt he was packing his government with fellow Protestant churchgoers. Buddhists make up 23 per cent of the population; Protestants 18 per cent.

To the protesters, he was President Chwi (the rat), rather than Lee. Giant papier mâché rodent effigies were burned in the streets.

Those days seem distant now. In the weeks after the loss of the warship, he exuded authority and resolve. This proved vital in controlling the hot-headed instincts of South Korea's military. He first focused almost exclusively on the rescue operation, before demanding a full international inquiry.

Defence ministry officials say the attack showed how the North underestimates Mr Lee. They think the North Koreans probably did not expect him to dredge up the wreck and torpedo, sharing everything with international investigators. North Korea expected him to do what they do: hush things up.

Pyongyang knew Mr Lee wanted to showcase his nation to the world in 2010 – as president of the Group of 20 leading economies. Surely he'll just pay us off with aid, it evidently thought.

But Mr Lee is a tough nut to crack.

For Kim Jong-il, the dictator who has led a few South Korean presidents round in circles, Mr Lee is a particular figure of hate because he has switched off most largesse to the North, ending the unconditional "sunshine policy" of two previous liberal presidents. Even before severing trade last week, he had made aid contingent on progress in talks to dismantle Pyongyang's atomic bombs.

Like so much of what Mr Lee does, his policy towards the North is principled but inflexible. He has offered $40bn (€33bn, £28bn) of economic incentives and infrastructure, should Pyongyang agree to dismantle its nuclear weapons. The plan's obvious flaw is that North Korea will never accept it.

His single-mindedness was forged in an indigent childhood. Born in Japan in 1941, where his father was a labourer on a ranch, Mr Lee grew up in poverty in the South Korean port of Pohang and helped supplement the family income by selling fruit and matches from a cart. He was an academic high-flyer and got into Seoul's elite Korea University, where he showed his political flair by heading the student union. He was briefly imprisoned for demonstrating against military autocrat Park Chung-hee.

He first came to public attention as chief executive of Hyundai Engineering and Construction, the blue riband outfit within the sprawling Hyundai conglomerate. He was nicknamed the "bulldozer" and was the model for a popular soap opera, Years of Ambition, which eased his eventual path to become mayor of Seoul in 2002. Somewhat bizarrely, the current culture minister is the actor who played Mr Lee's alter ego on television.

As a construction boss, he built the presidential palace, the Blue House. "If I'd known I was going to live here, I'd have done a better job," he quipped in an interview with the Financial Times last year.

His detractors paint him as autocratic and his government has had trouble building trust with the people. It is liable to send alarming numbers of riot police to protests; and international campaign groups have observed a deterioration of freedom of speech under Mr Lee's presidency.

But his skills as an executive have brought a fresh economic vision to South Korean politics. He quickly steered the country out of an economic downturn, with a leadership style learnt in the boardroom. Mr Lee is also battling to combat two of the country's thorniest problems: an expensive education system based on rote-learning and the need to diversify out of dirty heavy industry.

Perhaps his greatest coup was breaking into nuclear power exports last year. He went head-to-head with France's president, Nicolas Sarkozy, to win a $20bn reactor sale to the United Arab Emirates. Seoul shocked the world by trouncing the French and is widely tipped to become the reactor supplier of choice to the developing world.

His critics argue he is too enamoured of big business and that he sent an appalling message about corporate governance in South Korea by pardoning Lee Kun-hee, the chairman of Samsung Group, for egregious financial corruption.

But he has no such favourites on the tennis court. He refuses to play with company executives or reporters to avoid perceptions of impropriety. He only plays coaches. Even then, he is still a dogged competitor.

"The thing that really makes him mad is if anyone tries to flatter him by letting him win. He wants his opponent to hit the ball as hard as they can," said one Blue House official.

Kim Jong-il has been warned.

http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001032871/en

中国不应袒护朝鲜 China's uneasy ties with North Korea

针对3月26日一艘韩国军舰沉没、46名水兵丧生，韩国总统李明博(Lee Myung-bak)呼吁展开独立调查。对此，外界的最初反应是他在拖时间。他很可能确实是在拖时间。若匆忙得出结论称朝鲜用鱼雷击沉了那艘军舰，李明博将面临国内要求报复的巨大压力，可能导致韩国与不可预测、拥有核武器和斯大林主义政权的朝鲜出现危险的军事对抗升级。现在，一项国际调查已经确认，平壤方面要对沉船事件负责，世界拥有这样一个选择，即采取更加慎重和协调的行动。但是，要做出可信的国际回应，就需要朝鲜最重要盟友中国的加入。现在该是北京方面有所作为的时候了。

这一局面令中国领导人感到不自在。一方面，对朝鲜加大压力，对中国没有什么利益可言。对平壤方面施加太大压力，可能结果之一便是引发一场危机，甚至导致朝鲜政权垮台。北京方面担心朝鲜的不稳定局面，以及在极端情况下，数百万难民越过边境进入中国。所有迹象似乎都表明，中国宁可要一个反复无常的朝鲜，也不愿面对一个垮台的国家。另一方面，现状是维持不下去的。朝鲜看上去像是毛时代中央集权的中国的怪诞模仿，其体制恰恰是北京方面已经抛弃的。中国许多年轻人肯定对北京方面扶持这样一个可恶的政权感到难堪。

中国总理温家宝表现出北京方面感觉到压力的一些迹象。他在首尔表示，中国将不会袒护韩国军舰沉没事件的肇事者，这使人们产生一线希望，即下个月中国也许不会在联合国安理会上阻挠针对朝鲜的行动。然而，中国仍在闪烁其词，质疑国际调查（由韩国、美国、英国、澳大利亚和瑞典联合进行）的独立性，并重申其呼吁朝鲜半岛稳定的套话。如果朝鲜能够杀死邻国公民而几乎不受惩罚，那这算哪门子稳定？想像一下，如果有46名中国水兵遇难，北京方面将怎样反应？

就像伊朗和缅甸（另一个中国娇惯的恶劣的附庸国）一样，朝鲜展现了中国“不干涉政策”的局限性。当然，这一切都没有现成的答案。但至少李明博已让世人把注意力集中于中国，并突显出，不干涉并不总是像中国所夸耀的那样，是一种善意的信条。

译者/何黎

http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001032881

When Lee Myung-bak, South Korea's president, reacted to the March 26 sinking of a South Korean warship with the loss of 46 lives by calling for an independent inquiry, the initial reaction was that he was playing for time. He probably was. To rush to the conclusion that North Korea had torpedoed the ship would have put him under pressure to retaliate, risking a dangerous military escalation with his unpredictable, nuclear-armed Stalinist neighbour. Now an international inquiry has confirmed that Pyongyang was responsible, the world has the option to take more measured, co-ordinated action. But to mount a credible international response, China – Pyongyang's most important ally – needs to be on board. The ball is now in Beijing's court.

This makes life uncomfortable for China's leaders. On the one hand, they have little interest in piling pressure on North Korea. A possible outcome of squeezing Pyongyang till the pips squeak is to provoke a crisis or even a collapse of the regime. Beijing fears North Korean instability and the possibility, in extreme circumstances, of millions of refugees crossing the border into China. Every indication suggests it would prefer a volatile North Korea to a failed state. On the other hand, the status quo is untenable. North Korea looks like a grotesque parody of Mao's centrally controlled China, precisely the sort of system that Beijing has left behind. Many younger Chinese must find it embarrassing that Beijing is propping up such an odious regime.

Wen Jiabao, China's premier, has shown some signs that Beijing feels the pressure. In Seoul, he said China would not protect whoever sank the warship, offering a glimmer of hope that Beijing might not block action at the United Nations Security Council next month. Yet China is still obfuscating, questioning the independence of the international inquiry – conducted by South Korea, the US, the UK, Australia and Sweden – and reiterating its tired call for stability on the peninsula. What kind of stability is it if Pyongyang is able to kill citizens of neighbouring countries with virtual impunity? Imagine how Beijing would have reacted if it were 46 dead Chinese sailors.

As with Iran and Burma – another nasty client-state coddled by China – North Korea points up the limits of Beijing's policy of non-interference. Of course, there are no easy answers. But at least Mr Lee has put the spotlight on China and revealed that non-intervention is not always the benign doctrine Beijing makes it out to be.

http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001032881/en 

股市那点事（之七）：券商那点事

    近来，海通证券星光熠熠，颇有超越兴业证券之势。只不过，不是美名。海通证券的问题浮出水面，有些像是当年的三鹿，让行业的潜规则也逐渐被兜底。想起网上的黑色恶搞语言：蒙牛、伊利、光明语重心长地对三鹿说：“你加三聚氰胺就加三聚氰胺嘛，干吗加那么多？”估计，很多券商也很想跟海通说类似的话。

 

    在几年前，笔者的股票账号里也时常出问题的，倒是没有碰到被券商偷偷摸摸地卖股票的现象，只是资金账号里莫名其妙地多了不少钱。曾经一度起了贪念，想一口气把钱取出来，心想不取白不取。后来，许霆案发了，被判了无期徒刑，笔者才庆幸没有被贪念扼住，要不然，得罪了金融机构，咱老百姓不会有好果子吃。

 

    笔者是能够想明白券商为何把钱存到客户账号里的，这多半有点洗钱的意思，虽然券商多为否决，并声称是系统出现了问题。可是，券商为什么要私自卖掉客户手中的股票呢？有些券商的解释，是找不到客户，有很多账户不合规，所以就清理了一些账户。真的就这么简单？深圳证监局并未立案调查，我们只能待解剖并人肉。

 

    上个月，券商系也有一件喧闹的事。正在紧锣密鼓筹备上市事宜的兴业证券，被一封网络举报信给打懵倒地。举报信中称，一些证券从业人员利用手中的“特权密钥”，跟踪券商自营账户，获取机密交易信息。“老鼠仓”演绎成鼠灾，从基金经理那里传染出疫情，使得银行、保险、信托以及券商都受到感染。这些“老鼠仓”的涌现，使得市场的三公原则荡然无存，也使得相关法律法规像是很多学校里面的“校长信箱”，信箱锁上早已锈迹斑斑。

 

    当然，相比于“王益被双规牵出的券商借壳黑幕”、“创业板超募事件”、“证券公司员工捣腾客户账户为佣金”、“券商国债标位操纵”、03年“徐工科技暴跌黑幕”、早年“君安证券掏空玩花账事件”、“大棚证券挟持国有资本”等一系列事件来说，海通证券和兴业证券还算是玩得比较中规中矩了。

http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_4b63593b0100jard.html

股市那点事（之四）：值得玩味的多空调查

    跟踪了一段时间“新浪财经-中证报联合多空调查”，发现了一些很有意思的事情，拿来与大家分享。参与这个多空调查的人数不多，一般不到1万人，但由于参与的人形形色色，如此管中窥豹，也可算是代表着市场的整体心理动向。

 

    在4月15日收盘之后，认为后市上涨的网友占53.3%，满仓的网友为47.3%，空仓的网友为15.9%。

 

    随着行情在4月15日中期见顶3181点之后，股指一路狂跌，截止4月30日，股指跌幅已近10%，很多前期强势的个股开始出现暴跌，跌幅在是20%以上。五一之后，股指继续下行。期间，5月5日走出一根光头小阳线，而且量能放大，明显有很多朋友仔当天杀进抢反弹。然而5月6日股指突然暴跌，跌幅达到4.11%，其时，股指跌幅已近14%，很多个股跌幅已经超过30%。

 

    在5月6日收盘之后，认为上涨的网友锐减为29.8%，认为下跌的网友则达到54.3%，可以说多空阵营已经完全逆转，空方开始雷声震天。然而，即便如此，很多人仍然抱着超跌后有反弹的心理，满仓的网友不但没有因为股指的暴跌而减少，反而增至47.4%，比4月15日收盘之后还多。

 

    5月6日暴跌之后，股指并没有停止暴跌的步伐，5月11日大跌1.9%，5月18日暴跌5.07%，这两天都属于放量下跌。其时，股指跌幅已近20%，很多个股跌幅超过40%，众多指标股终于扛不住了，纷纷展开补跌。5月20日，股指继续下挫，跌幅为1.23%。

 

    在5月20日收盘之后，认为上涨的网友为27.8%，认为下跌的网友占到57%，市场一片悲观心理。于是，满仓的网友锐减至38%。

 

    为了让大家看得更清楚，笔者绘制草图如下：

    看完上述文字和图片之后，大家会有什么样的感受呢？笔者的感受如下：

 

    第一，在危险来临的时候，大部分人仍然认为自己睡在温床里，对后市充满信心；而在行情出现转机之前，市场往往处于异常悲观的心理之中。从4月15日有53.3%的网友看涨，到5月20日的27.8%的网友看涨，我们可以明显看出，大多数人看涨的时候未必是机会，大多数人看跌的时候未必是风险；

 

    第二，当行情出现连续下跌，悲观情绪逐渐笼罩市场的时候，看涨的网友迅速减少，看跌的网友迅速增加。然而，很多网友，可以说是很多股民，虽然看空，却未必做空，仓位依然不变，始终保持满仓。这是一种很奇怪的心理，明明自己认为后市还可能会继续下跌，却仍然抱着自己的股票不动，以侥幸心理应对变化莫测的市场。事实证明5月6日当时仍然抱有幻想的股民，之后要付出惨重的代价。笔者疑惑：我们为什么不能做到知行合一呢？

 

    第三，当我们由于未能及时纠正错误，遭受惨痛的损失之后，我们则开始后悔起来，5月20日，相信很多朋友都会想，早知道5月6日抛掉该多少，至少会少亏很多。当行情仍然没有转机的希望，很多人这个时候开始亡羊补牢，殊不知为时已晚。很多满仓的朋友开始减仓，很多买了股票的割肉斩仓，却一不小心将股票扔到了地板上。结果，很多朋友却是倒在了黎明前最黑暗的时刻。我们为什么不能及时纠正错误，而是在后悔的心理作用下，再一次做出错误的抉择呢？

 

    第四，4月19日的时候，MACD指标发出死叉卖出信号，之后MACD指标一直处于弱势状态，绿柱越来越大。KDJ指标也在大多数时间内指示不可操作，RSI指标大多数时间内都指示市场处于弱势……可是，为什么我们很多朋友连这些最为常用和最为基本的指标都视而不见呢？如果我们不看这些技术指标，那我们又靠什么对市场和个股进行研判呢？难道仅仅凭感觉？或者，在自己的资金出现亏损面前，所有的判断都是以个人主观情绪为主导？

 

    总结来看，很多情况下，我们败，不是败给别人，是败给我们自己。

 

    新浪财经和中证报的联合调查，很多朋友可能没有注意，那么笔者建议大家有时间的时候，不妨看一看。看的目的不是随大流，而是要看清楚，真理到底掌握在多数人手里，还是掌握在少数人手里。

 

    5月24日收盘之后，认为后市会继续上涨的网友占53.3%，认为后市会下跌的占23.8%；满仓的网友占45.5%，空仓的网友26.5%。看来，除了看涨的情绪被上涨激发之外，在操作上实质上出现了分化，满仓的网友和空仓的网友都在增加。那么，这又意味着什么呢？笔者的观点是：跳空的大涨未免有些操之过急，而大涨之后立刻看多则未免有些心浮气躁，目前的政策面不支持走出V型反转，那么当前的大涨未必值得我们太过于乐观。抱有一颗平常心吧，希望股市能震荡上扬。

http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_4b63593b0100j7go.html

股市那点事（之二）：股市会走熊两年？

    今天看了老韩的一篇文章，文章的标题为《A股市场还会不会跌破2000点？》。看老韩的文章有好些年了，印象中，老韩很少会用这种寻常股评人士为吸引眼球而瞎弄的标题，一般情况下，他文章的标题就是结论。所以，我很认真地看完了这篇文章。这里给大家一点阅读建议：老韩写文章不太喜欢分段，经常一段文字几千字，读起来有些喘不过气。所以，我们可以将文字复制再下来，粘贴到WORD文档中，自己再进行简单的分段，这样读起来会觉得轻松许多。

 

    老韩的文章一向以气势磅礴、论据充分、观点鲜明著称，这篇文章也不例外。老韩在第一段文字中，即明确地指出，2785点被跌破后，下一目标点位是2357点，接着就是2000点。而且老韩也慎重地指出：中国股市不但已经进入熊市，而且这个熊市是超级大熊市。和寻常股评人士的分析论据不同的是，老韩并没有死板死眼地端着技术分析在那里煞有介事地说着自己都没底气的话，而是用一系列的事件和数据来为自己的观点做佐证。

 

    论据一：欧洲主权债务危机

 

    老韩认为，此次欧洲主权债务堪比美国次贷危机，全球金融市场将持续动荡，中国股市的外围环境将处于严峻甚至恶劣的的状态，并同时给中国经济和中国股市的运行带来长期的不确定因素。

 

    美国通过“允许持有有毒资产的金融机构撇帐”、“美国财政部出资8000亿美元收购金融机构的‘有毒资产’”、“政府以国家信用为担保，为美联储与财政部的救市行为提供支持”这“三位一体”的救市政策引导美国经济逐步走出了次贷危机的困境，并且实现了经济的逐步复苏。

 

    但是，欧元区如果要解决当前的危机，却不能效仿美国，因为欧元区根本没有美国那样完善的机制。欧元区乃至整个欧盟决策机制低效复杂，和中国一样，要不断地开这个会开那个会。这样一来，就会使得欧元区在面对重大危机时反应迟钝，继而使得反危机机制难以顺利建成。现今除了希腊之外，葡萄牙、西班牙、意大利和爱尔兰都出现了危机。老韩认为，一旦西班牙爆发主权债务危机，那就相当于美国次贷危机中的雷曼兄弟破产，整个欧洲的主权债务危机就会全面爆发。其进一步发展的结果是：欧洲主权债务危机的救助难度比美国次贷危机还要大、德国就很可能退出欧元区、欧元区乃至整个欧盟的解体、整个欧洲倒退10年、世界经济也将面临重大灾难、德国和法国也会被拖累而陷入困境……由于欧盟是中国的第二大贸易伙伴，中国的外汇储备中大约有30%是欧元，因此无论是欧元的暴跌还是欧元区的解体，都将给中国经济带来重大冲击，并且给中国经济转型造成重大障碍。

 

    论据二：中国经济的深层次矛盾已经到了全面爆发期

 

    老韩认为，2008年中国经济下滑，并不能完全归责于美国美国次贷危机，更重要是国内的两个自身弊端：一是高层实施了错误的货币紧缩政策，二是因为中国经济在经历了30多年的粗放型甚至掠夺性的高速发展之后，原有的发展模式已经走到了尽头，深层次的矛盾开始逐渐显露。

 

    出现错误并不怕，怕就怕没有正视错误，没有用高明的手段改正错误。2008年的四万亿投资看似救了股市一把，实则是在极度宽松的货币政策之下，泛滥的流动性流入了产能过剩的企业、房地产和股市，从而使得中国经济的发展模式更为畸形，产能过剩更加突出，结构性矛盾严重激化，劳动力成本大幅上升导致中国经济的成本优势逐渐丧失，新的经济成长点与新的产业群也远没有形成。尤为严重的是，2008年房地产原本处于合理调整趋势之中，却被管理层的救市政策硬生生地打断，管理层虽然圆满地完成了“保八”任务，但高昂的房价进一步削弱中国社会的消费能力、扼杀了人们创新的激情与动力。

 

    老韩进一步指出：去年的四万亿救市之所以会失败，中国经济之所以更深地陷入困境，最主要的原因就在于：我们总是用浅层次手段（大规模释放流动性）来解决深层次矛盾（产能过深、结构扭曲、产业不能高级化与升级换代、中国因创新能力不足导致国际竞争力下降），并且把浅层次的成就（保8成功）论证为深层次的成功，以为是中国拯救了整个世界。去年一年的决策失误，在未来的五年中都很难矫正。美国经济经过这一轮的次贷危机，就出现了一大批新的技术与产业，产业结构又上了一个新的台阶。而在我国，却失去了一次重大的在危机中调结构的机会，经济的发展已经在相当大的程度上陷入困境。

 

    论据三：中国股市内部矛盾日益激化

 

    老韩认为，由于目前中国经济受到产能过剩和结构性矛盾的严重困扰，通货膨胀的压力也空前严重，整个中国的经济面临着巨大的“滞胀”危险，因此，货币政策必然会由之前的宽松转为从紧。而且，如果中国政府充分意识到当前的危机格局，则无论全球经济发生怎样的变化，都应当毫不懈怠地打压房价，而且方向需要调整，力度还要加大，否则一旦引起房价再度大幅反弹甚至暴涨，那对中国经济与社会发展就都将带来灾难性的后果。

 

    如此一来，打压地产的目标没有达到，那么市场的利空不会出尽，地产股和银行股这市场两大权重板块则将不断地面临政策打压。其实，这一点，我们从股指期货以及融资融券出来之后就可以看到了，机构其实近来一直在利用地产股和银行股融券对市场进行砸盘。

 

    除此之外，老韩还指出，去年年底机构预测股市时之所以普遍看好，是建立在上市公司盈利水平在今明两年大幅提高的基础上的，如果今明两年的中国经济大幅走低，或者远低于市场预期，那么上市公司的盈利水平与估值水平就需要重新考虑，股市走好的客观基础也就将被彻底颠覆。

 

     综合来看，老韩不看好中国经济的发展模式，中国的高速增长时代已经成为过去。在当前这样一个经济与社会的全面转型期和阵痛期，作为国民经济“晴雨表”的股市自然难以幸免。2000年是这波调整的必然目标，中国股市要走出两年以上的熊市。

 

    说真的，看完并转述完老韩的文章，心里觉得颇为沉重。笔者不敢断定老韩的判断是绝对正确的，但是老韩的观点确实言之凿凿，任何辩白似乎都会显得苍白无力。

 

    近来看了其他股市经济学家和名人的言论。其中——

 

    老龚（龚方雄）认为，A股现在很“便宜”，“A股整体市盈率仅在18倍-20倍，低于长期以来市场平均水平的25倍”。而且，老龚还认为，“中国的城市化率目前为46%，要达到中等发达国家70%以上的城市化水平，还将有大量人口融入城市，所以房地产业未来的发展依旧拥有强劲动力”。这个观点似乎与老韩的观点颇为格格不入，大有雌雄之别。在笔者看来，老龚的观点明显十分狭隘，仅仅从行业的角度顺带股市的分析判断，却没有将自己的立场拔高几段，从整个宏观经济的角度去思考。倾巢之下，焉有完卵？如果中国经济都面临着重大危机，那么房地产市场还能如何逞强？房地产泡沫早破比晚破好，否则中国难免会重蹈当年日本的覆辙。

 

    老花（花荣）认为，下周行情可以适当乐观。这话勿用细辩，将老花的话拿到老韩面前，立即显出了老花的狐狸像，而且是一副小肚鸡肠。我们很多做股评的人始终围绕着一两天的行情在那里纠结，猜错了想尽法子遮掩，猜对了得意洋洋恨不得让全世界的人都知道。不知这些人有没有认真想过，股民炒股博的不是一两天的盈亏，而是一段时间下来的总体盈亏。

 

    笔者没有老韩那样的学识来支撑自己富有底气的研判，也无意对市场的短期的涨跌做过多的论断，笔者只想提醒各位朋友，当前行情吉凶难测，在没有走出明显的转机之前，持有熊市思维，以保住本金为上策。笔者在多年前就坚守右侧交易模式，如今看来，依然如是，对于大多数股民来说，只有右侧交易才能让自己在股市中做到全身而退。朋友们，不论老韩的观点正确与否，谨慎点，总不会错。

 

    注：为保持老韩愿意，文中部分段落为直接转载老韩原文。

    老韩博文地址：http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_4cfc228c0100j1t5.html?tj=1

http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_4b63593b0100j417.html

PayPal在中国开辟特有收入模式 PayPal Finds a Niche in China

作

为EBay旗舰的消费购物服务在中国遇到了困难，但得益于在线支付业务PayPal的快速增长，它在中国比很多人想象的更为成功。

在中国这个用户数量全球居首的互联网市场。Ebay的传奇多年来一直在褪色，因其在消费者对消费者(C2C)电子商务市场输给了阿里巴巴集团(Alibaba Group)旗下零售网站淘宝网(Taobao.com)。但PayPal中国区总经理田毓中(Alan Tien)说，在淘宝和阿里巴巴支付平台支付宝(Alipay)仍对商户只收取少量佣金或不收佣金（这是一种用来同eBay竞争的策略）的时候，PayPal已经找到了一条以佣金为基础、适合于中国的收入模式。

田毓中掌管着PayPal在中国国内的支付平台"贝宝"，并负责为公司的国际网站吸引中国客户。他说他的主要精力集中在后者，因为那里才是收入增长所在。

受支付宝低费率的制约，贝宝仍然难以从中国国内的交易中取得明显的收入。田毓中说，只要支付宝不改变现有收费模式，他就无能为力。另外，多数消费者购买的很多产品，往往仍然是通过银行网站直接支付，或采用货到付款的支付方式。

支付宝针对国内交易收取的费率低到不能再低，被淘宝占去后剩下的电子商务市场也已经很小。田毓中说，在这种情况下，PayPal中国就不去跟支付宝直接竞争，而是向中国的小企业商户传授电子商务的运作方式，教它们怎样把产品卖给PayPal在世界上的8,000多万用户。

田毓中说，虽然支付宝在中国国内占据了优势，并且仍在利用低费率积累国内的用户基础，但PayPal在全球范围内有一个多年积累起来的庞大网络，还有一个用于侦测欺诈、保护客户的精密系统，这是任何竞争对手都难以复制的，而这样的优势也可以充分利用。

这个战略包括与敦煌网(DHGate.com)甚至是阿里巴巴旗下批发网站全球速卖通(AliExpress)展开合作。PayPal中国区的其他客户还包括针对来华外国游客的旅游网站，或游戏网站等虚拟产品销售商。该公司计划在今年开始接受中国银联(China UnionPay)作为支付手段，这样中国消费者就能够从PayPal的全球商户网络购物。

但说服中国商户接受PayPal并不是一个容易的过程。虽然PayPal在西方市场拥有很高的品牌认知度，并且可以主要依靠在线广告吸引客户，但它在中国的认知度很低，而很多中国卖家以前也从来没有考虑把业务搬到网上。PayPal中国区做的一项重要工作，事实上是让销售团队给有可能做国际电子商务的商户（如希望出售自产无牌产品的合同制造商）打电话，让他们相信，如果把产品放到网上购物广场，或建立自己的网站，他们可以拥有一个更大的市场。

田毓中说，我们打电话过去，一开始很多人都不知道我们在说什么，但你让他们头脑中有这样一个概念后，他们可能会听到别人提起，过几个月可能又会想起他们曾经接到过PayPal的这个电话。PayPal中国还在网上购物软件的选择上为中国客户提供建议，并解答汇率方面的疑问。（商户必须独力应对可能出现的汇率问题。）

田毓中说，这一切带来的结果是在中国实现了"高双位数"的增长，但他没有透露具体数字。PayPal对中国商户收取3.4%的基础费率。

在被问到PayPal有朝一日成为eBay最大业务的可能性时，田毓中说，公司的增长潜力比网上市场大得多；当其他公司为某个具体领域的消费支出而竞争时，PayPal有可能为包括零售和租金在内的各种领域、各种形式的支付提供服务。

Loretta Chao

http://cn.wsj.com/gb/20100519/rth161806.asp

EBay's flagship consumer shopping service has struggled in China, but the company is more successful here than many may think, thanks to its fast-growing online payment business, PayPal.

The company's legacy in the world's largest Internet market by number of users has for years been tainted by losing the consumer-to-consumer e-commerce market to Alibaba Group's retail website Taobao.com. But while Taobao and Alibaba's payment platform, Alipay, still charge little to no sales commission to merchants--a strategy the Chinese company used to undercut eBay--PayPal's China General Manager Alan Tien says the company has found a commission-based revenue model that works in China.

Tien, who oversees PayPal's domestic Chinese payment platform Beibao as well as the acquiring of customers in China for the company's international website, says he focuses most of his energy on the latter, because that's where the revenue growth is.

Alipay's rates still make it difficult for Beibao to post significant revenue from domestic transactions in China, and Tien says there's nothing he can do about that so long as Alipay charges the way it does. Also, most consumers typically still use direct payments through their bank websites or cash-on-delivery for many of their purchases.

Rather than trying to compete with Alipay's cutthroat rates for domestic sales in China, where the market for non-Taobao online sales is still small, PayPal China teaches Chinese small-business sellers how e-commerce works and how to sell their products to more than 80 million PayPal users world-wide, he says.

While Alipay has the advantage within China and continues to use low rates to build its local user base, Tien says, PayPal has a massive global network built over years and a fine-tuned system for detecting fraud and protecting customers, which is difficult for any competitors to replicate, and such advantages can be leveraged.

Part of this strategy includes linking up with e-commerce websites like DHGate.com or even Alibaba Group's online wholesale Web site, AliExpress. PayPal China's other customers include travel websites serving overseas travelers coming to China, or vendors of virtual goods like online game websites. The company also plans to begin accepting China UnionPay as payment this year, so Chinese consumers can purchase from PayPal's global merchant network.

Convincing Chinese merchants to accept PayPal isn't an easy process, however. While PayPal enjoys brand recognition in Western markets and can acquire customers largely through online advertising, it has very little recognition in China, where many sellers have never considered taking their businesses online. In effect, a crucial part of what PayPal China does is using a sales team to call potential international e-commerce merchants, like contract manufacturers who want to sell their own non-branded products, and convincing them that they can tap a larger market by listing their products in online malls or creating their own websites.

'In China, many people we call have no idea what we're talking about' at first, Tien says. 'But after you get the idea in their head, they may hear someone else mention it, and then maybe months later they will remember that they got this call from PayPal.' To further help its cause, PayPal China also advises Chinese customers on their options for online shopping software, and answers concerns about currency exchange. (Merchants must handle any foreign-exchange interactions on their own).

The result of all this: growth in the 'high double digits' in China, Tien says, though he won't disclose specifics. PayPal charges a 3.4% base rate to Chinese merchants.

When asked about the prospect of PayPal some day becoming eBay's biggest business, Tien said the company has vastly more growth potential than online marketplaces do; while those businesses compete for a specific portion of consumer spending, PayPal could potentially serve all types of payments in all areas of spending, from retail to rental fees.

Loretta Chao

http://cn.wsj.com/gb/20100519/rth161806_ENversion.shtml

美国“对话”代表团的华丽阵容 Many Officials At Summit

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数人都会同意，世界最强大的两个国家之间应该展开对话。不过，凡事都不要走过了头。

Bloomberg News

美国国务卿克林顿和财政部长盖特纳出席中美战略与经济对话。

一年一度的美中战略与经济对话于周一启幕，看一看美方的参会人员名单，人们会很容易地以为美国政府的多数行政部门暂时都要搬到北京办公去了。华盛顿方面拟定的代表团人数在周三时将达到200人左右（到时候可能还会更多），其中部长和专业部门负责人至少有15位。

除了国务卿希拉里•克林顿(Hillary Clinton)和财政部长蒂莫西•盖特纳(Timothy Geithner)这两位联席团长以外，代表团还包括：
美联储主席本•贝南克(Ben Bernanke)；
商务部部长骆家辉(Gary Locke)；
卫生与公共服务部部长凯瑟琳•赛贝林斯(Kathleen Sebelius)；
美国贸易代表罗恩•科克(Ron Kirk)；
经济顾问委员会主席克里斯蒂娜•罗默(Christina Romer)；
白宫科技政策办公室主任约翰•霍尔德伦(John Holdren)；
美国进出口银行董事长弗雷德•赫希贝格(Fred P. Hochberg)；
联邦存款保险公司董事长谢拉•贝尔(Sheila Bair)；
美国贸易和开发署署长里欧卡蒂亚•扎克(Leocadia Zak)。

当然还有美国驻华大使洪博培(Jon Huntsman)及其庞大使馆的1,100多名工作人员。很多工作人员将被指派去协助这次超大峰会的工作。

中国方面显然无意屈居人后。财政部部长助理朱光耀在上周四的一次吹风会上说：至于中国代表团的组成，我想告诉你们，作为这一轮战略与经济对话的东道主，中国有一支非常庞大的团队；中国代表团的规模肯定会超过美国代表团，因为中国是东道主。

升级为“战略与经济对话”之前的“战略经济对话”就已经是一场相当庞大的活动。“战略经济对话”始于2006年，每半年举行一次，美方代表团一直由当时的美中关系主导者、美国前财政部长亨利•鲍尔森(Henry Paulson)率领，成员包括能源部和环境保护署等其他部门，但对话的重点很明确，那就是经济。

随着奥巴马政府上台，连同希拉里•克林顿这个强势的国务卿上台后，“战略经济对话”中间加了一个“与”字，变成“战略与经济对话”，其范围也一下覆盖了差不多是双边关系的全部，再考虑到美国和中国都是举足轻重的大国，等于世界上的大部分重要话题都包括进去了。在对话内容涉及面扩大一倍多的同时，奥巴马政府同北京方面一起把对话频度减半，变为一年一次。

问题来了：在一年大约两天的时间里，就那么几场会谈，中间还夹杂有媒体拍照和宴会活动，这一方几百位官员，那一方也是几百位官员，那么他们到底能不能取得什么实质性的“成果”（即宣布有关即将采取哪些措施的实际宣言和协议）呢？恐怕不能。

纽约咨询公司Eurasia Group分析师Damien Ma在上周三发表简报说，我们对今年战略与经济对话取得明显成果的期望不高。他说，汇率等热门话题将局限于口头范围，这场为期两天的对话不太可能达成实质性的步骤。他说唯一的成果可能是在绿色能源方面，并认为周一和周二某些讨论的目的将只是暗示其他双边会谈的议程，比如7月份美中商贸易联合委员会(Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade)的会谈。

但就算是没有成果，让两国官员一年聚在一起聊一次可能还是有意义的。正如Damien Ma所言，对话可以显示出双方敢于在避免直接冲突的情况下提出尖锐的话题。考虑到双边关系的重要性，这肯定是具有某种价值的。不过话说回来，这一点用不着这200多位官员悉数到场或许也可以实现，对话正在进行的时候，华盛顿总还是要有人来做决定的吧。

Jason Dean

http://cn.wsj.com/gb/20100524/rec113835.asp

Most people would agree that it's desirable for the world's two most powerful countries to talk. But can you have too much of a good thing?

Reading the list of U.S. participants in the annual U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue that starts Monday, one could be forgiven for thinking that most of the executive branch of the U.S. government is temporarily relocating to Beijing. Washington's planned delegation as of Wednesday numbered about 200 people (and it could end up being more), including at least 15 Cabinet secretaries and agency chiefs.

Among them, in addition to mission leaders Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner: Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, Commerce Secretary Gary Locke, Health and Human Services Secretary Kathleen Sebelius, U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk, Council of Economic Advisers Chairwoman Christina Romer, White House Office of Science and Technology Policy Director John Holdren, U.S. Export-Import Bank Chairman Fred P. Hochberg, Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. Chairwoman Sheila Bair, and U.S. Trade and Development Agency Director Leocadia Zak.

And then, of course, there is Ambassador Jon Huntsman and his staff of more than 1,100 at the giant U.S. Embassy in Beijing, many of whom will be assigned to help work on the mega-summit.

The Chinese clearly have no intention of being outdone. 'As for the make up of the Chinese delegation, I want to tell you as the host of this round of the S&ED [that] China has a very big team,' Assistant Finance Minister Zhu Guangyao told a briefing Thursday. 'The size of the Chinese delegation will certainly be larger than the U.S. delegation because China is the host.'

The U.S.-China talks were already a rather unwieldy affair in the pre-ampersand era. Former Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, who dominated the U.S. relationship with China and spearheaded the semi-annual Strategic Economic Dialogue from its start in 2006, included other agencies such as the Energy Department and the EPA, but the focus of the talks was explicitly economic.

With the Obama administration, and its much more powerful secretary of state, the 'and' was added, turning it into the S&ED (or, our preferred shorthand, the SnED) and, in a stroke, making its purview encompass almost the totality of bilateral relations--which, given the size and importance of the U.S. and China, includes most of what is important to talk about in the world. And while more than doubling the range of content, the Obama administration--in conjunction with Beijing--halved the number of sessions per year, to one.

So the question is whether hundreds upon hundreds of officials in a handful of meetings scattered between photo ops and banquets spread over roughly two days a year can actually get anything substantive accomplished. Measured in terms of 'deliverables' (diplo-speak for actual announcements or agreements to do things), probably not.

'Our expectations for significant deliverables at this year's S&ED are low,' Damien Ma, analyst at New York-based consulting firm Eurasia Group, wrote in a note Wednesday. He said 'headline issues like currency' will reside 'in the rhetorical realm. Concrete steps are unlikely to be reached in the two-day session.' Ma said the only deliverables may be on green energy, and argued that some of the discussion on Monday and Tuesday is merely aimed at signaling agendas for other bilateral meetings, such as the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade, or JCCT, slated for July. (Don't ask.)

But even without deliverables, there may be value to having American and Chinese officials get together for an annual chat. As Ma said, the event can 'showcase both sides' comfort in raising thorny issues without outright conflict.' The importance of the relationship being what it is, that is certainly worth something--although perhaps it could be accomplished without all 200-plus of those officials, just in case somebody needs to make a decision in Washington when the SnED is in session.

Jason Dean

http://cn.wsj.com/gb/20100524/rec113835_ENversion.shtml

中国房价走势之谜 Property Price Guessing Game

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新京报》报道，中国银监会下属北京银监局刚刚完成北京地区房地产贷款压力测试。测试结果显示，房价下跌20%至30%，将引发房地产业相关贷款质量恶化；而房价下跌50%，银行业将不能承受。

尽管中国当局惯于通过《新京报》等小型媒体传递微妙的信息，测试国内舆论，但市场可能对这篇特别报道作过多解读，认为中国正在做好准备，迎接房价最高达50%的跌幅。

中国房价已经高入云霄，其走势如何是个难以求解的问题，而中国政府一直以来的种种举措让这个问题引发人们的种种猜测。即使全球经济趋势未随欧元区主权债危机发生转变，情况也是如此。

尽管自4月中旬以来，中央政府看似强硬的房产地控制措施频频出台，包括提高房贷利率及首付要求等，但高层领导对房价确切走势的态度一直含混不明。

过去两年中，中国官方对房价政策提法的演变可谓中国当局被视作语义学大师的经典例证。2008年底，全球金融危机引发房价急剧下调，中国国务院发布声明要促进房地产业"稳定、健康发展"。2009年，房价在巨额财政刺激方案及大量投机的推动下飙升，国务院呼吁采取措施"防止房价过快上涨"。今年初，随着这种警告失败而房价进一步高涨，中国总理温家宝的措辞提升到"坚决遏制部分城市房价过快上涨"这种高度。提请注意，这里说的并非是全国。

然后是一系列的行政紧缩措施出台，以及近几周关于可能出台房产税的无休止的争论，多位中层官员及智囊研究人士对此曾断然否认，然后又表示支持，如此周而复始。

而所有这些措施及争论都无碍中国房价继续上扬，4月份房价年比上涨12.8%，尽管成交量大幅降低。

这个数据表明，购房者与房地产开发商目前处于僵持状态，不仅是因为双方都不愿让步，而且还因为双方都对未来趋势没有把握。

具有讽刺意味的是，中国作为一个社会主义国家，住房市场却在全球商业化程度最高之列，在提供廉价公共住房方面远远落后于新加坡等国家。但仔细观察中国貌似高度资本主义化的房地产市场，就会发现这也是伪装得最好的一个市场：在一个仅需求是由市场驱动而供应完全由政府控制的市场，供方总是占上风。

最新出台的系列紧缩措施都是关于需求面的，旨在增加房产投机者的成本，但普通购房者的成本也加大了。如果中国政府真想降低房价，最简单明了的解决方法应是增加土地供应。近几周来，政府实际上已放开更多土地供应，但数量太小，几可忽略不计。

中国政府迄今的反应再次暴露出最终的政策困局，以及某种程度上政府立场的利益冲突：房地产既是经济增长动力又是通胀来源，对于这种矛盾性，中国政府难以取舍。而作为出售土地的唯一最大受益者，政府实际上也没有降价的动力。

这正是银行压力测试不可能导致政策有实质性改变的原因。这种测试最多显示政府与房产开发商及购房者一样，同样不知房价应该降多少。

但就在压力测试完成前，欧洲经济震荡出人意外地成为关注焦点，温家宝也发出官方思路可能有大转变的暗示。不到两周前，他说，中国必须注重政策的协调配合，以"防止多项政策叠加的负面影响"。

所以就继续猜吧。

Shen Hong

http://cn.wsj.com/gb/20100528/rec114059.asp

The Beijing Times reported that the Chinese banking regulator's Beijing branch has just completed a so-called stress test on the impact of falling property prices on local lenders. The finding is that a 20%-30% drop in prices would trigger a deterioration in loan quality while a 50% decline is simply unbearable for banks.

While the Chinese authorities are adept at conveying subtle messages and testing domestic opinion via smaller media outlets such as the Beijing paper, one might read too much into this particular article and believe that China is bracing itself for a maximum 50% fall in home prices.

The direction of China's already-sky high property prices remains a million-dollar question and the government has kept on making it an intriguing guessing game. This would be true even if the global economic tides hadn't shifted in the wake of the euro-zone sovereign debt crisis.

Despite the series of tough-looking property-tightening measures that Beijing has unveiled since mid-April, including raising mortgage rates and minimum down payments, the top leadership has been mum and vague about where exactly it wants prices to be.

The evolution of official rhetoric on property prices over the past two years is a classic example of why Chinese authorities are considered masters of semantics: In late 2008, when the global financial crisis triggered a sharp correction for housing prices, the State Council issued a statement urging the 'steady and healthy development' of the real-estate industry. In 2009, when prices surged amid massive fiscal stimulus and rampant speculation, the cabinet called for measures to 'prevent overly rapid price rises.' When that warning failed and prices soared further earlier this year, Premier Wen Jiabao upgraded the wording to 'to resolutely curb excessively fast price gains in some cities' (not across the country, mind you.)

Then came the administrative tightening measures and in recent weeks the incessant chatter about the potential introduction of a property tax, which various mid-level officials and think-tank researchers have helpfully rebuffed, voiced support for, rebuffed and supported again.

Shrugging off all the measures and the noise, China's property prices rose a record of 12.8% in April from a year ago, though accompanied by dramatically shrinking transaction volumes.

What the data show is that home buyers and property developers are in a standoff, not only because neither side wants to back down but also because both are equally clueless about the future.

Ironically, as a socialist country, China boasts one of the world's most thoroughly commercialized housing markets, trailing well behind nations like Singapore in the supply of cheap public housing. However, a closer look at China's extremely capitalist-looking property market suggests it's also the best disguised one: In a market where only demand is market-driven and supply is totally controlled by the government, the latter always has the upper hand.
The latest tightening measures are all about demand-side factors, aimed at making it costlier for speculators, but also ordinary people to buy a home. If

Beijing genuinely wants to drive down home prices, one of the simplest and most obvious solutions would be to boost land supply. The government has indeed released more land in recent weeks, but the amount is too negligible to be felt.

The government's response so far betrays, once again, the ultimate policy dilemma and to some extent a conflict of interest regarding its stance: Beijing is torn between the competing views of real estate as a growth engine and as a source of inflation. And as the single biggest beneficiary of land sales, the government also has virtually no incentive to depress prices.

That is exactly why such stress tests for banks aren't likely to lead to any concrete policy changes. At best, it simply shows the government is just as clueless as property developers and homebuyers on how much it should allow property prices to fall.

But even before the stress test was completed, Europe's economic woes unexpectedly overtook the center stage and Premier Wen hinted at a likely significant shift in official mindset: He said less than two weeks ago that 'China must focus on policy coordination to work against negative effects that might emerge from the various policies.' (Read: we'll go easy on further tightening.)

So keep guessing.

Shen Hong

http://cn.wsj.com/gb/20100528/rec114059_ENversion.shtml

戴姆勒和比亚迪合资在中国开发电动汽车 Daimler, BYD In JV To Develop Electric Car For China Market

德

国汽车制造商戴姆勒公司(Daimler AG)与中国的比亚迪股份有限公司(BYD Co.)周四成立一家合资公司，将为中国市场开发一种全电动汽车，在新成立的公司中，双方各占一半股权。两家公司称，他们相信中国有潜力跨入全球最大的零排放汽车市场之列。

戴姆勒是豪华汽车品牌梅赛德斯-奔驰(Mercedes-Benz)的母公司，而比亚迪是中国电池及汽车制造业的领军企业之一。双方合资在中国南部工业城市深圳成立深圳比亚迪-戴姆勒新技术有限公司(Shenzhen BYD Daimler New Technology Co.)，预计两家将总共投资6亿元人民币(8790万美元)作为注册资本。

比亚迪董事长王传福(Wang Chuanfu)与戴姆勒董事长蔡澈(Dieter Zetsche)周四在北京签约达成最终协议。蔡澈说，新成立的合资公司将充分利用中国广大的电动汽车潜在市场从而获利。

周四戴姆勒还说，该公司今年计划在华销售至少10万辆梅赛德斯-奔驰，至2015年，梅赛德斯-奔驰在华年销售量可能上升至30万辆。去年梅赛德斯-奔驰在华的销售量为6.7万辆。

戴姆勒还说计划投资约2亿欧元(约2.44亿美元)在北京设厂为在中国生产的汽车提供汽车引擎，以扩增该公司的在华业务。

北京戴姆勒公司发言人黑尔(Trevor Hale)在一封邮件中说，对戴姆勒而言，这是个具有历史意义的决定，因为这将是该公司第一次在德国之外生产赛德斯-奔驰汽车引擎。新的汽车引擎生产厂将由戴姆勒与其在华主要合作伙伴北京汽车工业控股有限责任公司(Beijing Automotive Industry Holdings Co.)合营。

据熟悉与比亚迪此次合作事宜的一位戴姆勒高管称，计划生产的电动汽车可能大体上采用比亚迪的e6型汽车的纯电动助推系统。e6是一种全电动电池汽车，比亚迪公司于今年初在深圳开始向出租车运营公司销售。

周四宣布的这款汽车将装备戴姆勒的汽车安全等技术。

最近，戴姆勒的工程师和设计师们在比亚迪深圳总部附近的一家宾馆驻扎，以便同比亚迪的工程师与设计师密切合作，制造出合资公司的第一部新品牌汽车。比亚迪部分股权为巴菲特(Warren Buffett)的中美能源控股公司(MidAmerican Energy Holdings Co.)持有。

熟悉合作情况的戴姆勒高管说，戴姆勒和比亚迪最早有可能于10月份在巴黎车展上展出这款合作开发汽车的样车。

中国国内对全电动汽车和其他高度电能化汽车（如插电式混动汽车）的热情日渐高涨，一个原因在于，人们相信中国政府将开始推出专门的刺激措施支持私人购买清洁能源汽车。

日本的日产汽车公司(Nissan Motor Co.)计划于12月在美国、欧洲和日本，于明年在中国推出一款名为"Leaf"（中文名"聆风"）的全电动紧凑型汽车。该公司的高管说，他们预计中国政府将出台每部电动车最高六万元人民币的购车补贴措施。中国媒体曾报道说，政府可能不久就会推出约五万到六万元的购车补贴。

但是，就在比亚迪王传福等汽车业高管呼吁中国政府为私人购买全电动汽车提供补助的时候，中国政府的一些官员也曾指出一些人对补助消费者、提振电动车销量存在的保留意见。

中国主要经济规划机构国家发展和改革委员会的高级官员陈建国，去年在天津的一个论坛上说："（政府内部）有人也提出，……能够买汽车的人相对比较富裕，政府是不是有必要给予补贴？"

但人们还是预料政府会出台某种政策，支持私人购买电动汽车，所以在未来几年，一些汽车生产商有可能在中国推出新的电动汽车，从而对比亚迪和戴姆勒构成竞争。

除了日产，日本的三菱汽车公司(Mitsubishi Motors Corp.)也计划于2012年以前在中国推出全电动汽车。日本丰田汽车公司(Toyota Motor Corp.)和美国通用汽车公司(General Motors Co.)准备很快在中国试销插电式混动汽车。

Norihiko Shirouzu

（更新完成）

http://cn.wsj.com/gb/20100528/bch073946.asp?source=rss

Germany's Daimler AG (DAI, DAI.XE) and China's BYD Co. (1211.HK) set up a 50-50 joint venture Thursday to develop an all-electric car for the Chinese market, saying they believe China has the potential to be among the world's largest markets for zero-emission vehicles.

Daimler, owner of luxury-car brand Mercedes-Benz, and BYD, one of China's leading battery and auto makers, are expected to invest a total of 600 million yuan ($87.9 million) in the joint venture, Shenzhen BYD Daimler New Technology Co. The money is to be used as registered capital for the joint venture in the southern industrial city of Shenzhen.

BYD Chairman Wang Chuanfu and Daimler Chairman Dieter Zetsche signed a contract in Beijing Thursday to finalize the agreement. 'Our new joint venture is well positioned to make the most of the vast potential of electric mobility in China,' Mr. Zetsche said.

(This story and related background material will be available on The Wall Street Journal Web site, WSJ.com.)

Daimler also said Thursday that it is aiming to sell at least 100,000 Mercedes-Benz vehicles in China this year, up from the 67,000 it sold in 2009. By 2015, Mercedes-Benz sales in China are likely to increase to 300,000 vehicles a year, the company said.

To strengthen and expand its presence in China, the German company said it plans to invest about EUR200 million, or about $244 million, to build a plant in Beijing to produce engines, which will be used to power vehicles it produces in China.

'For Daimler, this is a historic decision because this will be the first time ever that we're going to produce engines for Mercedes-Benz cars outside of Germany,' Trevor Hale, a Beijing-based Daimler spokesman, said in an email message. The new engine plant will be jointly operated with Beijing Automotive Industry Holdings Co., Daimler's main joint-venture partner in China.

According to a Daimler executive familiar with the BYD collaboration, the planned car is likely to be loosely based on the pure-electric propulsion system used in BYD's e6, an all-electric battery car that the Chinese company began selling to taxi operators in Shenzhen earlier this year.

The car announced Thursday will be enhanced with Daimler's vehicle-safety and other technologies.

Daimler engineers and designers recently established a base at a hotel near BYD's headquarters in Shenzhen to work closely with their counterparts at the Chinese company, which is partially owned by Warren Buffett's MidAmerican Energy Holdings Co., in order to come up with the joint venture's first car for the new brand.

The Daimler executive familiar with the collaboration said Daimler and BYD might display a prototype of the jointly developed car as early as the Paris auto show in October.

One reason for the growing enthusiasm in China around all-electric cars and other heavily electrified vehicles, such as plug-in electric hybrids, is the belief that the Chinese government will start offering special incentives to support private buyers' adoption of clean-energy cars.

Executives at Japan's Nissan Motor Co. (NSANY, 7201.TO), which plans to launch an all-electric compact car called the Leaf in the U.S., Europe and Japan in December, and in China next year, say they expect the Chinese government to set purchase incentives of as much as CNY60,000 for electric cars. Chinese news reports have said incentives of about CNY50,000 to CNY60,000 are likely to be announced soon.

Still, even as auto executives such as BYD's Mr. Wang urge the Chinese government to subsidize private purchases of all-electric battery cars, some Chinese government officials have pointed to reservations about providing consumer incentives to spur electric-car sales.

'Why do we need to provide subsidies and rebates for wealthy private buyers who would be the first in line to buy electric cars? That's a question some of us in the government are asking,' said Chen Jianguo, a senior official at the National Development and Reform Commission, China's main economic-planning agency, at a conference in Tianjin last year.

Yet, in anticipation of some type of policy support for private electric-car purchases, some auto makers are likely to launch electric cars in China over the next few years, creating competition for BYD and Daimler.

In addition to Nissan, Mitsubishi Motors Corp. (MMTOY, 7211.TO) of Japan also plans to launch all-electric cars in China by 2012, while Toyota Motor Corp. (TM, 7203.TO) of Japan and General Motors Co. of the U.S. are gearing up to test-market plug-in hybrid electric cars in China soon.

Norihiko Shirouzu

http://cn.wsj.com/gb/20100528/bch073946_ENversion.shtml

经济回暖美国人跳槽忙 More Workers Start To Quit

随

着就业市场开始松动，人力资源经理们或许会越来越频繁地突然接到员工的通知：我辞职。他们已经很久没有听到这句话了。

美国劳工统计局(Bureau of Labor Statistics，简称BLS)数据显示，今年2月，自愿离职的人数自2008年10月以来首次超过被解雇或免职的人数。今年2月之前，BLS记录的裁员人数连续15个月超过辞职人数，自BLS10年前开始跟踪这些数据以来，这是第一次长期出现这种情况。根据BLS的数据，自开始记录以来，每个月自愿离职的人数平均约为270万人。但自2008年10月开始，平均值降至172万人。今年3月，平均约为187万人。

近期的市场气氛预示未来几个月离职人数可能继续增多。人力资源咨询公司Right Management公司2009年底所做的调查显示，60%的工人说到市场好转时打算离职。Right Management公司负责全球解决方案的高级副总裁海德(Michael Haid)说，研究结果着实令人震惊，这给公司带来的震动可能会成本非常高昂。

招聘人员及人力资源专家说两股力量造成了员工离职人数的增长。首先，衰退期间，工作岗位如此稀缺，员工离职以取得职业进步的自然流动停滞。大量员工等待更好时机以另谋高就。美国独立出版集团Bureau of National Affairs数据显示，2009年月度自愿离职人员的流动率中间值为0.5%，仅为2008年的一半。

宾夕法尼亚大学沃顿商学院(University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School of Business)人力资源中心主任卡普利(Peter Cappelli)说，衰退期间，即使听说有空缺，员工们也不愿换老板。在世事本已不确定之时换工作，想想就令人十分害怕。但这种不确定性正在消失，员工变得更乐于接到招聘人员的电话。

公司在经济衰退期间大举削减开支和裁员的作法影响了员工的士气，这是让公司更难以留住员工的另一个因素。去年夏天为管理研究机构──世界大型企业联合会(Conference Board)所做的调查发现，工作成就感降低的驱动因素包括对工资的满足感降低及对工作的兴趣减少。2009年，34.6%的工人对自己的工资感到满足，较之1987年的比例降幅超过七个百分点；约51%的工人说对工作感兴趣，比1987年减少19%。

Joe Light

http://cn.wsj.com/gb/20100527/bus102125.asp?source=rss

As the job market begins to loosen up, human-resource managers might increasingly be surprised by an announcement from employees they haven't heard in a while: 'I quit.'

In February, the number of employees voluntarily quitting surpassed the number being fired or discharged for the first time since October 2008, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Before February, the BLS had recorded more layoffs than resignations for 15 straight months, the first such streak since the bureau started tracking the data a decade ago. Since the BLS began tracking the data, the average number of people voluntarily leaving their jobs per month has been about 2.7 million. But since October 2008, the average number dropped to as low as 1.72 million. In March, it was about 1.87 million.

And recent sentiment indicates that the number of employees quitting could continue to grow in the coming months. In a poll conducted by human-resources consultant Right Management at the end of 2009, 60% of workers said they intended to leave their jobs when the market got better. 'The research is fairly alarming,' says Michael Haid, senior vice president of global solutions for Right Management. 'The churn for companies could be very costly.'

Recruiters and human-resource experts say the increase in employees giving notice is a product of two forces. First, the natural turnover of employees leaving to advance their careers didn't occur during the recession because jobs were so scarce. This created a backlog of workers waiting for better times to make a move to better jobs. The median monthly voluntary turnover rate in 2009 was 0.5%, half of the rate in 2008, according to the Bureau of National Affairs.

During the recession, even if they heard of an opening, employees were reluctant to switch employers, says Peter Cappelli, director of the Center for Human Resources at the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School of Business. 'The idea of moving when the world was already in uncertainty was quite scary,' he says. But those hang-ups are disappearing, and employees are becoming more receptive to recruiter calls, he says.

Another factor making it harder for companies to retain employees is the effect of the heavy cost-cutting and downsizing during the downturn on workers' morale. A survey conducted last summer for the Conference Board, a management research organization, found that the drivers of the drop in job fulfillment included less satisfaction with wages and less interest in work. In 2009, 34.6% of workers were satisfied with their wages, down more than seven percentage points from 1987. About 51% in 2009 said they were interested in work, down 19 percentage points from 1987.

Joe Light

http://cn.wsj.com/gb/20100527/bus102125_ENversion.shtml

人民日报连发五文剑指股市内幕交易

http://www.sina.com.cn  2010年05月26日 08:44  新浪财经

　　新浪财经讯 内幕交易猛于虎！5月18日，最高人民检察院和公安部明确操纵证券市场和内幕交易的立案追诉标准，对利用未公开信息从事交易、证券交易成交额累计在50万元以上的情形将立案追诉。随后，人民日报连续发表五篇文章，剑指我国股市的内幕交易。

　　5月19日，《证券市场违法行为将遭严打》

　　18日发布的《最高人民检察院、公安部关于公安机关管辖的刑事案件立案追诉标准的规定(二)》，对公安机关经济犯罪侦查部门管辖的内幕交易、操纵证券市场等违法行为立案追诉标准作出了规定。

　　5月21日，《是巧合，还是内幕信息泄露》

　　5月19日，宏达股份(13.61,0.00,0.00%)出现异动，成交放出6.7亿元的巨量，是前一个月平均每天2亿多成交量的近3倍，并且股价以涨停报收。19日晚间，公司即发布重大资产重组停牌公告，称大股东正在酝酿对公司的重大资产重组，将停牌最多一个月。这被外界质疑重组消息提前泄露，19日当天大量买入宏达股份的资金可能涉嫌利用内幕信息从事证券交易。

　　5月25日，评论《打击内幕交易，须强化执行力》，报道《公众呼吁严查可疑交易》

　　上市公司重大资产重组停牌前，大量资金“先知先觉”反常买入——在目前的证券市场，这种情况已经让很多普通股民见怪不怪了。

　　内幕交易猛于虎！既然打击内幕交易已经标准清晰，有法可依。那么，下一步的难点就集中在执行力上了。希望有关部门狠下决心，对一些可疑交易进行清查，还清白者以清白，还违法者以颜色，还投资者以信心！

　　5月26日，《香港如何严打内幕交易》

　　作为全球最重要的证券市场之一，香港证券市场以其规模庞大、资金雄厚闻名于世。其中，可与伦敦、纽约等大市场相媲美的严格监管措施，是最令投资者放心的因素。

　　整体而言，香港建立了一整套外部制衡机制确保证监会公平、公正执法，整个香港社会也在努力营造公平正义的社会氛围，不给违规行为提供可乘之机。

http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/y/20100526/08448003396.shtml

中美摆出和解姿态 CHINA AND US SEEK TO STEADY RELATIONS

美国和中国昨日在北京举行的高层对话中踮着脚尖“起舞”，竭力避免在双方有分歧的朝鲜、汇率等棘手问题上暴露不和。

今年初，美中关系一度似乎在快速恶化，甚至出现了爆发贸易战的可能性。在那之后，两国政府在公开言论中都尽力摆出和解姿态，尽管双方在所有大问题上都没有什么取得进展的迹象。

美中之间的年度对话最初聚焦于经济问题，但奥巴马(Obama)政府扩大了磋商范围，把安全问题纳入其中。这一对话基本上是华盛顿方面主导的努力，目的是与中国政府加强接触，在应对各种全球问题方面争取中国的支持，尽管中国现在在这些会议上不像以往那样安于守势，并且还拿出自己的愿望清单。

中国国家主席胡锦涛承诺，中国将改革实际上盯住美元的汇率政策（这是华盛顿方面与中国交涉的一个重点），但他并未暗示政策变化的时机。

他说：“中国将继续按照主动性、可控性、渐进性原则，稳步推进人民币汇率形成机制改革。”

在朝鲜问题上，对于3月份韩国“天安”舰遭到击沉一事，美国国务卿希拉里•克林顿(Hillary Clinton)选择低调鼓励中方支持奥巴马政府对朝鲜的批评。

“我可以说，中方认识到我们所面对情况的严重性，”她表示。“他们理解韩国方面的反应，他们也理解我方对朝鲜半岛和平与稳定的独特责任。”

中国副总理王岐山敦促美国结束对具有潜在军用价值的“军民两用”技术的出口管制，辩称这样的出口有助于减少中国对美贸易顺差。

住在北京的乔治华盛顿大学(George Washington University)中国问题专家沈大伟(David Shambaugh)表示，这一峰会是两国政府之间的“有用的缓冲区”，目前双方“显然正试图给（今年早些时候）曾急转直下的关系带来一些稳定。”

不过，他表示，虽然美国和中国需要一个讨论长期利益和潜在分歧领域的论坛，但不清楚每年一度的两天会议能否达到这个目的，因为中国的体制“不适合于把所有重要人物放在一个房间里，让他们在众目睽睽之下处理各项主要问题”。而在美国，还没有足够的人接受把中国当作一个平起平坐的对手的想法。

国际货币基金组织(IMF)前中国经济学家、现任职于美国康奈尔大学(Cornell University)的埃斯瓦尔•普拉萨德(Eswar Prasad)表示，如果北京方面在未来数周内不改变其汇率政策，中国的汇率在美国可能成为一个竞选话题。

“如果中国不快点采取行动，美国财政部将很难抵挡国内要求其把中国列为汇率操纵国的政治压力，”他表示。

译者/和风

http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001032768

The US and China tip-toed around each other at high-level talks in Beijing yesterday, going out of their way to avoid open disagreements on North Korea, exchange rates and other thorny issues that divide them.

After a period at the start of the year when relations appeared to be deteriorating rapidly, raising the possibility of a trade war, both governments were at pains to strike a conciliatory note in their public comments, even though there were few signs of progress on any of the big subjects.

The annual meeting, which began focusing on economic issues but which the Obama administration broadened to include security, is essentially a Washington-led effort to engage more with the Chinese government and to enlist its support in managing global issues, although China is less defensive these days than it used to be at such meetings and also brings its own wish-list.

President Hu Jintao pledged that China would reform a currency policy that in effect pegs the renminbi to the US dollar – one of Washington's priorities in its dealings with China – although he gave no hints of the timing of any policy shift.

“China will continue to steadily advance the reform of the formation of the renminbi exchange rate mechanism under the principle of independent decision-making, controllability and gradual progress,” he said.

On North Korea, Hillary Clinton, the US secretary of state, opted for low-key encouragement of China to back the administration's criticisms of Pyongyang over the sinking of a South Korean warship, the Cheonan, in March.

“I can say that the Chinese recognise the gravity of the situation we face,” she said. “They understand the reaction by the South Koreans and they understand our unique responsibility for peace and stability on the Korean peninsula.”

Wang Qishan, a vice- premier, urged the US to end export controls on “dual-use” technology that has potential military applications, arguing that such exports could help reduce China's trade surplus with the US.

David Shambaugh, a China expert at George Washington University who is based in Beijing, said the summit was a “useful buffer” for two governments that were “clearly trying to bring some stability to a relationship that had been in a downward spiral” earlier in the year.

However, although the US and China needed a forum to discuss long-term interests and potential areas of disagreement, he said, it was not clear whether the annual two-day meeting could achieve this as the Chinese system “is not suited to putting all the main players in a room to deal with the main issues in public”. In the US there was not enough acceptance of the idea of dealing with China as an equal.

Eswar Prasad, a former China economist at the International Monetary Fund and now at Cornell University, said China's exchange rate could become an election issue in the US if Beijing did not shift its currency policy in the coming weeks.

“If China does not act soon, the US Treasury is going to be hard-pressed to fend off domestic political pressures to label China a currency manipulator,” he said.

http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001032768/en 

“红杉军”闹事为他信？ THAILAND'S CRISIS GOES BEYOND RED AND YELLOW

谁会认为泰国不好？人民可爱动人、海滩令人沉醉、绿咖喱鸡妙不可言。仰慕者表示，连续的政变和稍现即逝的宪法让这个国家的政治史显得问题重重，但实际上并不像看起来那么糟糕。政治动荡掩盖了一种奇特的稳定状态，正是这种稳定使泰国成为外国人投资和海外度假偏爱的目的地。没错，这个国家依然存在贫穷和严重的贫富不均。但东南亚哪个国家不是如此？不过泰国人民似乎对自己的命运没有什么不满，而且至少没有人在挨饿。就连现任总理、在牛津接受教育的阿披实•维乍集瓦(Abhisit Vejjajiva)看起来也是个非常得体的家伙，而且还相当有魅力。

洗个冷水澡清醒清醒吧。没有人会忌妒许多人对这个“微笑之国”(land of smiles)怀有好感。但对泰国怀有的这种亲切但又模糊的情绪正与现实日益相左。若非如此，当目睹阿披实政府对要求举行大选的民众进行镇压（特举一例）、并射杀了60多名平民时，全世界却表现得相对镇静，对此又该如何解释呢？

类似去年伊朗武力镇压民主示威游行之后国际社会的那种声讨局面几乎没有出现，更不用说对1989年天安门事件的谴责了。想象一下，如果在希腊，叫嚣着反对厉行节俭的示威人群遭到轻型机关枪扫射，国际社会会爆发出怎样的强烈抗议。

当然，这种比较存在瑕疵。与所有的混乱冲突一样，泰国的局势绝不是黑白分明的——或者用泰国人的话说，黄红分明。色码无法阐明事情的全貌。分析师过于迫切地寻找简单化的解释，比如城乡冲突、农民与城市精英群体的冲突、以及拥护共和者和拥护民主立宪者的冲突。正如阿披实政府所断言的，红杉军民主运动无疑也存在一些暴力成分。尽管19日许多因害怕而投降的示威者是手无寸铁的女性，但也有一些年轻男子携有磨尖的棍棒和自制炸药。酒店和其它公共场所都遭到了攻击。

另外，由被赶下台的泰国前总理他信•西那瓦(Thaksin Shinawatra)作为民主体制的形象代言人，确实也是漏洞百出——许多示威者就是以他的名义举行集会的。在2001至2006年担任总理期间，他信被控利用职权偏袒其家族企业和裙带关系，同时泰国警方被指责假借打击贩毒之名非法杀害了数千人。泰国最高法院进行了缺席审判，判处他信因公私利益冲突罪入狱两年。严格来说，这让他信成为了逃避法律责任的亡命徒，就和阿披实政府对他的定性一样。

但这远非事情的全貌。那些现在只会呼吁大家冷静、要求回归原状的人必须直面其它一些事实。首先，他信是泰国历史上最受拥护的总理，是唯一干满了整个任期又再次当选的总理。他是以泰国的传统方式——2006年的一场军事政变——被赶下台的。在随后的选举中——经过了一段荒唐可笑、混乱不堪的军事统治时期后——一个忠于他信的政府执掌了政权。这届政府以及其后一届亲他信政府都根据军制宪法的可疑条款被解散。不希望和他信有任何瓜葛的人最终在2008年得偿所愿，根据一项议会协议临时拼凑而成了阿披实领导的政府——但尚未得到民众认可。

其次，红杉军抗议群体明显代表的是合理的社会诉求——这个事实可以说比他信及其政治盟友被撵下台的方式更能说明问题。试图将成千上万走上街头的泰国民众（大多是穷苦出身）描述成“恐怖分子”、或是他信的雇佣兵，实在是说不过去。

他信是增强泰国人民（主要来自北部和东北，但不限于此）政治权利意识的催化剂，他们此前一直被隔绝在政治经济权利的魔法圈之外。他信执行的那些相对温和的政策（例如廉价医疗和更好的信贷获取渠道）为他赢得了民众几近狂热的拥护，这就是原因所在。给“他信经济”(Thaksinomics)冠以污名，说它不过是民粹主义者对乌合之众的贿赂，是一种高傲的表现。对于那些急切希望紧紧抓住自己的安逸现状不放的人，这也是自私的行为。

和泰国前几次的政治僵局不同，这一次泰国受人尊敬的国王普密蓬•阿杜德(Bhumibol Adulyadej)没有采取行动来安抚局势。也许像有些人所宣称的那样，这是因为他已年迈体衰。但也有可能是因为，据他判断，这次泰国社会底层人士的力量无法轻易得到遏制。截至19日晚，曼谷街头已经恢复了几分平静。但没有人会误认为这代表着潜在的紧张局面已经得到解决。最乐观地来看，要解决问题必须进行公正的选举——并尊重选举结果。最悲观地来看，这意味着更多流血冲突，或是在曼谷或是在乡村地区。即便是泰国最热忱的拥趸也必须意识到，这场危机尚未结束。

译者/何黎

http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001032756

Who could think badly of Thailand? The people are lovely, the beaches divine and the green chicken curry outstanding. The country's apparently troubled political history of serial coups and quick-vanishing constitutions, say its many admirers, is not as bad as it appears. It masks an odd kind of stability that has made Thailand a favoured destination for foreign investment and foreign vacations alike. True, there is poverty and great disparity of wealth. Where in south-east Asia isn't there? But the people appear pretty content with their lot, and at least no one is starving. Even the current prime minister, the Oxford-educated Abhisit Vejjajiva, seems like a thoroughly decent chap, and terribly dishy to boot.

Now take a cold shower. No one would begrudge the goodwill that many people have for the Land of Smiles. But warm and fuzzy sentiments towards Thailand are increasingly at odds with reality. How else to explain the relative equanimity with which the world has just witnessed Mr Abhisit's government crush those calling for elections (of all things), shooting dead more than 60 civilians?

There has been little of the international condemnation that followed last year's crackdowns against pro-democracy demonstrators in Iran, let alone those in Tiananmen Square in 1989. Imagine the outcry if, in Greece, the rowdy anti-austerity demonstrators had been mown down with sub-machine guns.

Certainly, such comparisons are imperfect. The situation, like any messy confrontation, is far from black and white – or yellow and red in the Thai parlance. The colour codes do not tell the whole story. Analysts too readily reach for simplistic explanations of city versus countryside, peasants versus an urban elite, and republicans versus monarchists. Doubtless too, as Mr Abhisit's government maintains, the Red Shirt pro-democracy movement does contain a violent fringe. Though many of the demonstrators terrified into surrender yesterday were unarmed women, some of the young men were carrying sharpened staves and homemade explosives. Hotels and other public places have been attacked.

It is also true that Thaksin Shinawatra, the ousted former prime minister in whose name many of the demonstrators rallied, is a deeply flawed poster-boy for democracy. As prime minister from 2001 to 2006, he was accused of using his power to favour the businesses of his family and associated cronies, while Thai police were blamed for thousands of extra-judicial killings in the name of a war on drugs. Thailand's Supreme Court sentenced him in absentia to two years in jail for conflict of interest. Technically, that makes Mr Thaksin the fugitive from the law Mr Abhisit's government says he is.

But this is far from the whole story. Those who would now simply call for calm and a return to the status quo ante must face other facts. First, Mr Thaksin was the most popular prime minister in Thailand's history, the only one to serve a full term and be re-elected. He was ousted, in traditional Thai fashion, by a military coup in 2006. In subsequent elections – after a laughably haphazard period of military rule – a government loyal to Mr Thaksin came to power. That administration, and the following pro-Thaksin incarnation, were both dissolved under dubious clauses of the military-imposed constitution. Those who did not want anything to do with Mr Thaksin finally got their way in 2008 when the government of Mr Abhisit – which has yet to win a popular mandate – was stitched together in a parliamentary deal.

Second, and almost more telling than the way in which Mr Thaksin and his political allies were bundled out of power, is the fact that the Red Shirt protesters clearly represent legitimate social grievances. Attempts to portray the tens of thousands of mainly poor Thais who took to Bangkok's streets as “terrorists” or paid mercenaries of Mr Thaksin simply do not wash.

Mr Thaksin was a catalyst for the political empowerment of Thais – mainly, but not exclusively, from the north and north-east – who had previously been excluded from the magic circle of political and economic power. That is why the relatively modest policies he put in place – such as cheap healthcare and better access to credit – won him almost fanatical allegiance. To brand Thaksinomics as merely populist bribes for a rented rabble is condescending. For those desperately seeking to cling on to their comfortable existence, it is also self-serving.

Unlike in previous stand-offs, Bhumibol Adulyadej, Thailand's revered king, has not acted to calm the situation. That may be, as some contend, because he is old and in failing health. Just as likely, he has judged that the forces of Thailand's underclass cannot, this time, be so easily contained. By last night the streets of Bangkok had returned to a sort of calm. Yet few could mistake this for any kind of resolution of the underlying tensions. At best, such resolution will require fair elections – and respect for the result. At worst, it will mean more bloody confrontation, in Bangkok or in the countryside. Even the most ardent fan of Thailand must realise this isn't over yet. 

http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001032756/en 

中国走进尼日尔 A RICHER SEAM

尼亚美（尼日尔首都）的狮子们即将飞黄腾达。这些难以捉摸的猫科动物们或许不知道这一点，但当它们搬到尼亚美动物园宽敞的"新家"时，将成为当代非洲争夺战的最新受益者。

与中国政府以及代表它的企业在尼日尔的其它慷慨之举相比，狮子们造价6万美元的围场，只能算是最起码的恩惠。尼日尔是一个贫瘠的西非国家，其1500万民众更习惯于饥饿与贫困。

中国与非洲许多国家签署了协议，以基础设施和现金换取它们的资源，以维持自身经济的高速增长。在与尼日尔签署了类似协议之后，中国不仅获取了又一个非洲石油来源，而且还将获得铀的开采权——这或许是唯一一种比原油更为敏感的大宗商品。此外，对于那些担忧非洲大陆资源争夺战可能重新导致冷战时期灾难性的边缘政策的人而言，中国此举将尼日尔推到了领头羊的位置。

在距离动物园几个街区处，两条殖民地时期铺设的大道在这里交汇。一条是戴高乐将军大道(Avenue du Général de Gaulle)，以确保法国在其非洲殖民地独立很长时间之后，仍能保持对其控制权的法国领袖戴高乐命名。另一条则是铀大街(Avenue de l'Uranium)，正是这种金属使得尼日尔成为法国核驱动经济的基石。

过去十年的大部分时间里，中国都在与西方集团争夺非洲的石油与矿产品。但它同时还有着雄心勃勃的核实力目标，中国对储量稀少的铀资源的追逐，让人们更为关注上述竞争。

过去三年，随着中国开始重新进军非洲，尼日尔与法国的关系急转直下。该国政府将铀开采权授予中国国核海外铀资源开发公司(Sino-U)及其它勘探公司，打破了法国国有控股核集团阿海珐(Areva)长达40年实际意义上的垄断。

中国的竞争，带来了尼日尔首座炼油厂及造价7亿美元水力发电大坝的动工，更别说北京慷慨提供的数亿美元"签约奖金"。受此影响，尼日尔向法国方面开出了更为苛刻的条件，作为批准阿海珐开采大型新矿的交换。新矿将使尼日尔成为全球第二大铀生产国，仅次于哈萨克斯坦。

然而，今年2月份的一场政变，加剧了那些认为这种疏远中存在危险隐患的人们的焦虑情绪。尽管在这场政变中，种族对抗和机会主义都起到了各自的作用，但马马杜•坦贾(Mamadou Tandja)成为第一位可能由于接受中国示好而直接导致其下台的非洲领导人。"正是因为坦贾有了中国的钱，所以他觉得可以无视欧盟、西非经济共同体(Ecowas)和美国，" 尼日尔前任部长穆罕迈德•巴祖姆(Mohamed Bazoum)表示。他目前就职于"顾问委员会"，这是一个由夺取政权的军政府创立的机构。

尼日尔局势的动荡不安，令西方情报机构感到焦虑，他们考虑的是基地组织(al-Qaeda)在边界形同虚设的撒哈拉地区的存在。毒品、军火和假货在这里自由流动。用于制造"脏弹"的铀原料有可能遭遇同样的命运，这是西方国家最大的安全梦魇之一。欧洲正为自身对俄罗斯天然气资源的依赖感到不安，并寻求借助核能来抗击气候变化，值此之际，尼日尔的铀资源可能也具有重要的战略意义。

从2004年坦贾成为尼日尔历史上第一位当选连任总统开始，他就着手松开尼亚美与巴黎之间的脐带联系。从2007年起，尼日尔新发放约150张铀勘探许可证，而尼日尔高达半数的出口收入来自于铀金属。坦贾政府曾指责阿海珐公司为撒哈拉地区的图阿雷格(Tuareg)叛军提供资助。这些叛军劫持尼日尔侨民，并在北部矿区铺设地雷，以此胁迫政府，要求在铀开采利润中分得更大的份额。尼日尔与法国的关系因此降至冰点。尽管法国方面对上述指控予以否认，尼日尔还是将阿海珐公司两名资深高管驱逐出境。

与此同时，尼日尔本土透明运动组织Rotab负责人阿里•伊德里莎(Ali Idrissa)表示，中国为获得阿泽利克铀矿开采权所支付的300亿非洲金融共同体法郎（简称：非郎）中，有250亿非郎（合4700万美元）被用于购买军火以镇压叛乱。中国石油天然气集团公司(China National Petroleum Corporation)为阿加德姆油田开采权支付的好处费更多——约为3亿美元，相当于尼日尔年出口额的近三分之一。该集团计划投入50亿美元，开采出尼日尔的第一桶石油。

有了新财政支持以抵消被冻结的援助，坦贾开始放纵自己的独裁倾向。在2008年10月中国炼油厂的开工典礼上，一群坦贾的支持者上演处女秀，此后频频现身。他们身穿写有tazartché字样的T恤衫，这在当地豪萨语中意为"连续"——表明他们要求在一年之后的大选时，延长坦贾的任期，超出宪法规定的上限。

接下来的几个月里，坦贾发起了挑战尼日尔现行制度的运动。当国民议会和宪法法院先后拒绝支持他谋求连任的计划时，他解散了这两家机构。坦贾不顾国内抗议和非洲及西方国家的制裁，在去年8月的全民投票中获胜，此次投票遭到了反对派的抵制。

译者/何黎

http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001032739

The lions of Niamey are going up in the world. The cramped cats may not know it, but when they move to their spacious new enclosure at the zoo in the capital of landlocked Niger, they will be the latest beneficiaries of a latter-day scramble for Africa.

Their $60,000 (£42,000, €49,000) pen is the merest nicety compared with the rest of the largesse that Beijing and companies acting on its behalf are lavishing on an arid west African nation of 15m people more accustomed to hunger and penury.

Following the same bargain it has struck across the continent – swapping infrastructure and cash for resources to sustain its breakneck growth – China has secured access not only to another source of African oil but also to what is perhaps the single commodity considered more sensitive than crude: uranium. It has also turned Niger into a bellwether for those who fear that the struggle to secure the continent's resources risks re-creating the ruinous brinkmanship of the cold war.

A few mud-red blocks from the zoo, two colonial thoroughfares converge. One, Avenue du Général de Gaulle, is named for the French leader who ensured his country's stamp remained on its African colonies long after independence. The other, Avenue de l'Uranium, bears the name of the metal that has made Niger the bedrock of France's nuclear-powered economy.

China has vied with western groups in Africa for oil and minerals for the best part of a decade. But it also has ambitious nuclear power targets and its quest for uranium – repositories of which are few and far between – has thrown the rivalry into sharper focus.

In the past three years, as China embarked on its new thrust into Africa, relations between Niamey and Paris plunged. The award of uranium concessions to China's Sino-U and other prospectors broke the de facto 40-year monopoly of Areva, France's state-controlled nuclear group.

The competition has seen work start on Niger's first refinery and a $700m hydroelectric barrage, not to mention hundreds of millions of dollars in "signature bonuses", courtesy of Beijing. It helped the country wring tougher terms from France before granting permission for Areva's vast new mine, which will make the country the world's second-biggest uranium producer after Kazakhstan.

Yet a February coup d'etat heightened the anxiety of those who see danger in a stand-off. Although ethnic rivalries and opportunism played their part in the putsch, Mamadou Tandja became the first African leader whose downfall could be traced directly to his embrace of Chinese suitors. "It was because Tandja had Chinese money that he felt he could mock the European Union, Ecowas [the regional bloc], the US," says Mohamed Bazoum, a former minister who now serves on the "consultative council" created by the military junta that seized power.

The volatility in Niger is worrying to western intelligence agencies as they contemplate al-Qaeda's presence in the effectively borderless lands of the Sahara. Drugs, weapons and counterfeit goods flow freely. That uranium destined for a dirty bomb could do the same ranks among the west's security nightmares. Niger's uranium could also prove of strategic importance as Europe frets about its dependence on Russian gas and looks to nuclear energy to help combat climate change.

From 2004, when he became the first president in Niger's history to be re-elected, Mr Tandja set about loosening Niamey's umbilical bond to Paris. From 2007, Niger granted some 150 new permits to prospect for uranium, which accounts for up to half its export earnings. Relations with France reached their nadir when his government accused Areva of funding the Tuareg rebels of the Sahara who kidnapped expatriates and laid landmines in the northern mining region, demanding a greater share of the uranium spoils. Two senior Areva officials were ejected from the country in spite of French denials.

Meanwhile, CFA Fr25bn ($47m, £33m, €38m) of a CFA Fr30bn bonus that China paid for rights to mine at Azelik went on arms to combat the rebellion, says Ali Idrissa, head of Rotab, a local transparency campaign. China National Petroleum Corporation paid a far larger bonus – some $300m, equivalent to about one-third of Niger's annual exports – for the Agadem oil block. It plans to spend $5bn to produce Niger's first oil.

With fresh financial support that would offset frozen aid, Mr Tandja began to indulge his authoritarian streak. At the October 2008 ceremony to mark the start of construction at the Chinese refinery, a band of supporters made the first of several appearances. Their printed T-shirts bore the word tazartché, or continuity in the local Hausa language – a demand that Mr Tandja should extend his rule beyond its constitutional limit a year later.

Over the next few months, Mr Tandja waged a campaign against Niger's institutions. When the national assembly and then the courts refused to back his plans to remain in office, he dissolved them. Defying protests at home and sanctions from Africa and the west, he triumphed in a referendum last August that the opposition boycotted.

Memories are still fresh of the way repressive kleptocrats such as Zaire's Mobutu Sese Seko and Ethiopia's Mengistu Haile Mariam played Washington and Moscow against one another to keep themselves in guns, funds and power before the fall of the Berlin Wall. Today's emissaries from east and west come bearing energy contracts rather than ideology.

Rights groups denounce Beijing for its readiness to do business with authoritarians in Sudan or Angola provided the oil keeps flowing. Yet they note that relationships such as Washington's cosy ties to Equatorial Guinea's petro-dictatorship deprive the west of any moral high ground.

Even Mr Tandja's critics would not liken him to a Mobutu or a Mengistu. But that is partly because he failed to cling to power. "He became arrogant," says one western diplomat. "He counted too much on the Chinese to be there."

Perhaps Mr Tandja had not acquainted himself with China's policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of African states. When young officers stormed the presidential palace on February 18, Beijing was as silent as it had been while he amassed power. The toppled president remains under lock and key. The junta pledged elections by February and has barred its own members from contesting them – so those overseeing the transition are not themselves participants. The soldiers have signalled they have no plans to break with China, although they intend to audit all Tandja-era mining permits.

If Mr Tandja set too much store by his Chinese allies, perhaps Beijing also invested too much in him – and his family. One son, Ousmane, was Niger's commercial attaché in China. According to people familiar with the matter, he has close links to Trendfield Holdings, a British Virgin Islands-registered consultancy that helped China secure its uranium permits and is funding the lion enclosure at Niamey zoo. (El-Moctar Ichah, head of Trendfield's Niger subsidiary, dismisses such claims as "speculation".)

France's critics say its subdued criticism of both Mr Tandja's authoritarianism and the coup undermined democratic forces in Niger. "There is a sense of neo-colonialism – that France has no friends, only interests," says one French expatriate.

Those interests may remain secure. "Fundamentally, Areva is still the big partner," says another western diplomat. Olivier Muller, Areva's managing director in Niger, dismisses talk of damaging rivalry with China. "It's like in oil: there are enough blocks to produce," he says. "You might compete for the blocks you want but after [they are assigned] you co- operate. In the next 10 years . . . all the so-called 'competitors' will share infrastructure."

Areva's €1.2bn ($1.5bn, £870m) Imouraren mine is on track to start production in 2013. It is slated to yield 5,000 tonnes of uranium a year, doubling Areva's output in the country. Mr Muller says the negotiations with Mr Tandja were tough but that Areva's agreement to increase payments to the government by 50 per cent had more to do with rising global prices than competition. He describes Salou Djibo, the previously unknown officer and former United Nations peacekeeper now heading the  junta, as "a nice guy", adding: "I met the president for an hour this morning . . . If you have one hour with the president, it has gone well. If not, you get five minutes. Obviously, we don't talk politics, just business."

Xia Huang, China's ambassador in Niamey, says Beijing's bonds to Niger are  unshaken and that grander projects are in the offing, including pipelines and coal-fired power stations. China, he says, has offered Africa a "more profitable option" than other partners have. With a little overstatement, he adds: "This country has already seen uranium extraction for nearly 40 years. But when one sees that the direct revenues from uranium are more or less equivalent to those derived from the export of onions each year, there's a problem."

Beijing's critics are unbowed. Mr Idrissa, the transparency campaigner, repeats charges heard across the continent. Chinese companies prefer to import their own labour and, when they do employ locals, they do so in poor conditions and at low wages, he says. "They are going to take our riches and go," Mr Idrissa concludes.

But for others, China's efforts offer an opportunity for industrialisation on a scale never countenanced by the colonisers of old. Ibrahim Iddi Ango, an industrialist and president of the chamber of commerce, is pushing for regulations that would oblige foreign investors to foster the local private sector. He notes that France's Total and others including ExxonMobil of the US sat on the Agadem block for years but balked at Niamey's demands. "Each time the government said, 'build a refinery', they said: 'it's impossible'. The Chinese came and said: 'A refinery? What size?'"

http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001032739/en

中国援建斯里兰卡背后 SRI LANKA BUILDS ON CHINESE SUPPORT

 

在斯里兰卡南海岸偏远的渔业城镇汉班托特(Hambantota)，中国工程师沿着海滩挖了一条通道，把印度洋和内陆的一个巨坑连通起来。坑边高耸的混凝土墙壁，让下边作业的挖土设备相形见绌。

明年，施工方将在这个人工巨坑里灌满水，完成一座国际港的一期工程。这个港口将服务于往来于东亚和中东之间的运油船。

"很多当地人跑来看这个工程，"一位官方导游说道。这位导游把游客带到斯里兰卡总统拉贾帕克萨(Mahinda Rajapaksa)与中国总理温家宝拍过合照的一个位置。

建设这座港口是拉贾帕克萨的主意。他的家族上月在地区议会选举中赢得了好几个席位。不过，虽然民众把这座港口视作一项工程奇迹，分析师却把它看作科伦坡与北京之间关系不断增进的象征。中国为项目一期工程提供了3.6亿美元贷款。在拉贾帕克萨上周庆祝打败反政府武装"泰米尔伊拉姆猛虎解放组织"（猛虎组织）一周年之际，这些建筑工程表明了他的成功在多大程度上要归功于北京。

凭借打败猛虎组织——中国为他提供军火——的胜绩，以承诺建设大型基础设施——其中许多项目也是靠中国资助——拉拢选民，这位留着八字须、总是戴着招牌栗色披肩和身着传统服装的统治者在今年的选举中获得连任。

"自从战争结束后，中国一直在设法挺进斯里兰卡，抓住更多机遇，"新德里智库——政策研究中心(Centre for Policy Research)的战略研究教授布拉马•切拉尼(Brahma Chellaney)表示。

2009年，中国成为斯里兰卡最大的外资来源，为斯里兰卡提供了12亿美元资金，几乎是第二大资金来源——亚洲开发银行(ADB)所提供4.24亿美元贷款的3倍。

除了汉班托特港以外，中方还帮助斯里兰卡建设一座煤电厂、一处石油仓储设施和位于科伦坡的一个表演艺术中心。今年3月，中国承诺再提供2.9美元资金，用于建设一座新机场和升级铁路。

曾演过僧伽罗语影片的拉贾帕克萨已开始依赖中国提供外交支持。去年北京帮助压下了要求联合国调查斯里兰卡战争期间是否存在违反人权行为的呼声。

对中国来说，与斯里兰卡交好，可获得通往印度洋的可靠途径。中国进口石油大多都经过印度洋。有人怀疑，有朝一日，该岛国可能成为中方一个事实上的海军基地。

"中国要崛起为亚洲首屈一指的大国……就必须成为印度洋地区的主导力量，"切拉尼表示。建设大型基础设施需要付出代价。2009财年，由于公共债务激增，斯里兰卡财赤占国内生产总值(GDP)的比例达到近10%的水平，大为超出7%的目标。

为此，国际货币基金组织(IMF)今年2月推迟了总额26亿美元贷款计划中第三批贷款的发放。此举不会引发危机：斯里兰卡政府拥有充足的外汇储备，而该国央行预计今年经济将增长6.5%。

但政界反对派人士称，IMF严格的贷款条件，给了斯里兰卡政府一个借口，让它进一步投入中国及其它要求不那么苛刻的捐助国（如伊朗）的怀抱。

身为反对党"统一国民党"(United National Party)党员的经济学家哈沙•德•席尔瓦(Harsha de Silva)表示："既然不管怎样都会有投资者进来，又何必有良好的管理？"

不管批评人士怎么说，拉贾帕克萨与北京的友谊成果在斯里兰卡随处可见。

译者/杨远

http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001032737

 

At Hambantota, a remote fishing town on Sri Lanka's south coast, Chinese engineers dig a channel through the beaches, connecting the Indian Ocean with a vast inland pit, whose soaring concrete walls dwarf the earth-moving equipment working below.

Next year, project managers will fill this man-made crater with water, creating the first phase of an international harbour that will service the passing ships of the oil trade between east Asia and the Middle East.

"There are a lot of local crowds who come to see this," says an official guide, who takes tourists to a vantage point where Mahinda Rajapaksa, Sri Lanka's president, is pictured standing alongside Wen Jiabao, the Chinese premier.

The port is the brainchild of Mr Rajapaksa, whose family won several seats in the district in parliamentary elections last month. But while the public sees the harbour as an engineering wonder, analysts view it as a symbol of the growing relationship between Co-lombo and Beijing, which lent $360m (€290m, £250m) for the first phase of the project. As Mr Rajapaksa this week celebrates the first anniversary of Colombo's victory over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam separatist group, these building works show how much he owes his success to Beijing.

The moustachioed ruler, known for his trademark maroon shawl and traditional dress, won a second term this year on the back of his victory over the Tamil Tigers – with China providing him with munitions – and by wooing voters with promises of big-ticket infrastructure pro-jects, many of which are again backed by China.

"Since the end of the war, China has been trying to jump in and seize more opportunities in Sri Lanka," says Brahma Chellaney, professor of strategic studies at the Centre for Policy Research, a New Delhi think-tank.

China was Sri Lanka's biggest source of foreign funding in 2009, providing $1.2bn – nearly triple the $424m given by the number two overseas lender, the Asian Development Bank.

Aside from Hambantota's port, projects include a coal-fired power plant, an oil bunkering facility and a performing arts centre in Colombo. In March, China pledged another $290m for a new airport and to upgrade the island's railways.

Mr Rajapaksa, who once acted in Sinhalese films, is starting to rely on China for diplomatic support. Beijing helped thwart calls last year for a UN probe into allegations of human rights violations during the war.

For Beijing, the partnership with Sri Lanka offers secure access to the Indian Ocean through which most of China's oil passes. Some suspect the island could one day serve Beijing as a de facto navy base.

"If China is to emerge as the pre-eminent power in Asia . . . then China has to be the dominant force in the Indian Ocean region," says Prof Chellaney. Big infrastructure projects come at a price. Sri Lanka's fiscal deficit reached nearly 10 per cent of gross domestic product in the 2009 fiscal year compared with a target of 7 per cent, amid soaring public debt.

This led the International Monetary Fund to postpone in February the third tranche of a $2.6bn loan programme. The delay is not sparking a crisis – the government has adequate foreign exchange reserves and the central bank expects the economy to grow 6.5 per cent this year.

But opposition politicians say the IMF's tight conditions give the government an excuse to move further into the embrace of China and other less demanding benefactors, such as Iran.

"What do you need good governance for when investors are coming in anyway?" says Harsha de Silva, an economist and politician with the opposition United National party.

Whatever critics say, the fruits of Mr Rajapaksa's friendship with Beijing can be seen everywhere in Sri Lanka.

http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001032737/en 

中国和印度的城市化 OPINION: INDIA VS CHINA

中印正引领一波城市扩展浪潮，这将推动亚洲复兴，重获其在欧洲与北美工业革命之前所拥有的国际显要地位。到2025年，近25亿亚洲人将居住在城市，占到世界城市人口的近54%。从2005到2025年，中印两国将占到亚洲城市人口增长的逾62%，世界城市人口增长的40%。

1950年，印度的城市化水平高于中国（前者为17%，后者为13%）。但从1950年到2005年，中国的城市化速度远远超出了印度——前者的城市化率升至41%，后者为29%。麦肯锡全球研究所(McKinsey Global Institute, MGI)的新研究显示，该趋势将继续：预计到2025年，中国城市人口将新增4亿，占到该国总人口的64%；印度城市人口将新增2.15亿，占到该国总人口的38%。

历史上此前从未出现过世界上两个人口最多的国家同时（且以如此快的速度）进行城市化。这一进程将会推动两国内部发生一些根本性的变化，而这些变化将会对世界经济产生深远影响，并给投资者带来令人兴奋的新机遇。

从2005到2025年，印度城市人均国内生产总值(GDP)的年增长率将达到6%，中国将达到7.3%。到2025年，印度真正拥有可自由支配收入能力的城市家庭，可能会增长7倍，至8900万户。中国目前拥有5500万户中产阶层家庭。到2025年，该数字可能会增长逾3倍，接近2.8亿户，占中国所有城市家庭的75%以上。对于企业而言，城市人均收入与中产阶层家庭数量的大幅增长，可能会催生众多充满活力的新市场。

那么，哪些市场可能从这些趋势中获益最多？到2025年，印度最大的市场将是交通运输、食品、医疗保健，其次是房地产及公用事业、娱乐及教育。即使印度的消费类别增长较慢，对企业而言，它仍然会提供重要机遇，因为与世界其它地区相比，印度的这些市场仍然增长迅速。如今，在中国的城市，增长最迅速的类别可能是交通运输、房地产及公用事业、个人产品、医疗保健、娱乐与教育。另外，不管是在中国还是在印度，城市基础设施市场规模都将蔚为可观。比如，从2005到2025年，印度每年将需增加7至9亿平方米的建筑面积，而中国可能需要增加16至19亿平方米。同期，印度每年将需增加至少350到400公里的城市轨道交通与地铁线路，而中国则需增加近1000公里。

中印两国城市化的速度和规模所释放出的新市场规模是毋庸置疑的。但尽管如此，企业还必须有实际能力为这些市场服务。城市的管理方式——及其导致的生产率——是影响企业的一个主要因素。在这一点上，中国的情况要远优于印度。印度几乎没有关注城市转型的问题，而中国已经发展出了一套自成一体的实践，覆盖城市化运营模式的方方面面：融资、治理、规划、部门政策、以及城市面貌。印度对城市投资不足，而中国的投资已经走在需求前面，而且中国城市有自由通过将土地资产货币化、以及保留25%的增值税，来募集可观的投资资源。印度每年在城市基础设施上的人均支出是17美元，而中国是116美元。印度城市没有多少实权和责任，而中国的主要城市可享受与省份相当的地位，而且被任命的市长拥有很大的政治权力和授权。印度的城市规划体制未能应对各方对城市空间相互竞争的需求，而中国拥有成熟的城市规划体制，强调旧城区的系统性发展要与土地使用、住房及交通的长期规划相一致。

中印两国之间最鲜明的反差是，中国拥抱城市化，并对其加以塑造，而印度仍然刚刚认识到自己的城市现状，以及城市为其经济和社会转型提供的机遇。

然而，如果印度能够修正其城市运营模式，它仍有可能从下个十年里预计将增加的近2.5亿工作年龄人口中，收获人口结构红利。这种人口结构红利甚至要超过中国——因为中国人口将快速老龄化。到2025年，中国55岁及以上的人口比例将达到近28%，而印度将只有16%——其人口构成要年轻很多。如果印度能够使其城市发挥最优生产率，并最大化城市的GDP产出，其经济将在2005年至2025年间新增逾1.7亿城镇工人。而同期中国的新增城镇工人只有5000万。这事关重大。

多布斯是麦肯锡全球研究所总监、麦肯锡(McKinsey)驻首尔董事。桑科是麦肯锡驻孟买董事。

译者/何黎

http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001032738

China and India are in the vanguard of a wave of urban expansion that is driving the renaissance of Asia toward the global prominence the region had before the European and North American industrial revolution. By 2025, nearly 2.5bn Asians will live in cities, accounting for almost 54 per cent of the world's urban population. India and China alone will account for more than 62 per cent of the Asian urban population growth and a 40 per cent of global urban population growth between 2005 and 2025.

In 1950, India was a more urban nation than China (17 per cent of the population lived in cities compared with China's 13 per cent). But from 1950 to 2005, China urbanized far more rapidly than India to an urbanization rate of 41 per cent compared with 29 per cent in India. New research from the McKinsey Global Institute expects this pattern to continue with China forecast to add 400m to its urban population, which will account for 64 per cent of the total population by 2025, and India to add 215m to its cities whose populations will account for 38 per cent of the total in 2025.

Never before in history have two of the largest nations in terms of population urbanized at the same time—and at such pace. This process will drive fundamental shifts in both countries that will have significant consequences for the world economy and offer exciting new opportunities for investors.

In India, urban per capita GDP will grow at a rate of 6 per cent a year between 2005 and 2025, while China will see a growth of 7.3 per cent. The number of urban households with true discretionary spending power in India could increase seven fold to 89m households in 2025. In China, there are 55m middle-class households today. That number could more than quadruple to nearly  280m in 2025 to represent more than three-quarters of all China's urban households. For businesses, the significant increase in per capita urban incomes and middle-income households offer the potential of vibrant new markets to serve.

So what markets are likely to benefit the most from these trends? In India, by 2025, the largest markets will be transportation and communication, food, and health care, followed by housing and utilities, recreation, and education. Even India's slower growing spending categories will represent significant opportunities for businesses because these markets will still be growing rapidly in comparison with their counterparts in other parts of the world. In China's cities today, the fastest-growing categories are likely to be transportation and communication, housing and utilities, personal products, health care, and recreation and education. In addition, in both China and India, urban infrastructure markets will be massive. For example, between 2005 and 2025, India will need to add between 700m and 900m square meters of floor space a year; in China, the required numbers could be between 1,600m and 1,900m square meters. During the same period, India will need to add at least 350 to 400 kilometres of metro rail and subways annually while the equivalent number in China will be closer to 1,000 kilometres.

There is little doubt about the scale of the new markets in India and China unleashed by the pace and scale of their urbanization. But businesses still need to be able to serve these markets in practical terms. The way cities are run—and the productivity that results—is a major factor for companies. Here, China is in much better shape than India. While India has barely paid attention to its urban transformation, China has developed a set of internally consistent practices across every element of the urbanization operating model: funding, governance, planning, sectorial policies, and shape. India has underinvested in its cities; China has invested ahead of demand and given its cities the freedom to raise substantial investment resources by monetizing land assets and retaining a 25 per cent share of value added taxes. While India spends $17 per capita in capital investments in urban infrastructure annually, China spends $116. Indian cities have devolved little real power and accountability to its cities; but China's major cities enjoy the same status as provinces and have powerful and empowered political appointees as mayors. While India's urban planning system has failed to address competing demands for space, China has a mature urban planning regime that emphasizes the systematic development of run-down areas consistent with long range plans for land use, housing, and transportation.

The starkest contrast between the two countries is that China has embraced and shaped urbanization while India is still waking up to its urban reality and the opportunities that its cities offer for economic and social transformation.

However, if India fixes its urban operating model, it has the potential to reap a demographic dividend from the increase in working age population of around 250m expected in the next decade. This demographic dividend is even larger than that in China, as China is aging rapidly. By 2025, nearly 28 per cent of China's population will be aged 55 or older compared with only 16 per cent in India, whose population profile is much more youthful. If India optimizes the productivity of its cities and maximizes their generation of GDP, the economy could add over 170m urban workers to its labour force between 2005 and 2025 compared with 50m in China over the same period. The stakes are high.

Richard Dobbs is a Director of MGI and a Director of McKinsey, based in Seoul. Shirish Sankhe is a director of McKinsey based in Mumbai.

http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001032738/en