2011年4月28日

中国人口达13.39亿 城市化进程迅速 China's Population Rises To 1.339 Bln In 2010 From 1.265 Bln In 2000

国政府周四公布的最新人口普查数据显示,中国人口从2000年的12.65亿增至13.39亿。

Reuters
4月28日,上海人民广场地铁站内的人群。
据国家统计局的数据显示,中国内地最新人口数据反映出,过去10年人口增长率为0.584%。国家统计局从去年11月开始对中国城乡的4亿户家庭进行了调查。

数据显示,从2000年至2010年,中国人口年均增长0.57%,低于1990年至2000年间1.07%的年均增速。

国家统计局局长马建堂说,中国人口老龄化给劳动人口带来了压力。

目前,中国60岁以上人口占了总人口的13.3%,较2000年上升了近3%,65岁以上人口占了近8.9%。14岁以下人口比例为16.6%,较10年前下降了6.3%。

马建堂说,人口老龄化对沿海和发达地区及其劳动人口影响最大,不过全部31个省份都受到了影响。

数据还显示,城市地区人口大幅增加。中国有近半数人口,更确切说是49.68%的人口,如今居住在城市。2000年,城市人口约占36%。

市场观察人士认为,未来五年及更长的时间,迅速的城市化将在世界第二大经济体中国的经济发展中发挥重要作用。

Laurie Burkitt


(本文版权归道琼斯公司所有,未经许可不得翻译或转载。)
 
 
China's Population Rises To 1.339 Bln In 2010 From 1.265 Bln In 2000

China's population has risen to 1.339 billion from 1.265 billion in 2000, new census data released by the government Thursday show.

The new population figure for China's mainland reflects a growth rate of 5.84 per thousand over the decade, according to the data from the National Bureau of Statistics, which surveyed 400 million households in rural and urban China from November last year.

The country's population grew an average 0.57% annually from 2000 to 2010, slower than a 1.07% average annual rise in the period 1990-2000, the data showed.

China's aging population is creating a strain on the country's labor force, said Ma Jiantang, commissioner of the statistics bureau.

People over the age of 60 now account for 13.3% of China's population, up nearly 3% from 2000, while those over the age of 65 account for nearly 8.9%. Those under the age of 14 make up 16.6% of the population, down 6.3% from 10 years ago.

'Aging is affecting coastal and developed areas and their labor forces most, but all 31 provinces are affected,' Mr. Ma said.

The data also show that urban areas are swelling. Nearly half of China's population, or 49.68%, now lives in cities. Around 36% lived in urban areas in 2000.

Market watchers believe faster urbanization will play a significant role in the economic development of the world's second largest economy over the next five years and beyond.

Laurie Burkitt
 

2011年4月27日

百胜是否有胃口吃下小肥羊 Yum Counts On Its Sheep

掉愤怒的小鸟,准备好迎接小肥羊的爆发吧。

在中国餐饮业位居领先地位的百胜餐饮集团(Yum Brands)计划在已持有火锅连锁店小肥羊27%股权的基础上,将其整个吃下。百胜开始扩大在华业务的原因一目了然。百胜在华营业利润占了2010年总营业利润的43%,年增速为26%,而在美国增速只有3%。

百胜在中国一直享受着爆炸性的增长,肯德基(KFC)门店从2001年的500家增至2010年的3,244家。不过,凭藉自身业务发展实现的增长至此也就到头了。通亚公司(Access Asia)的格莱博(Mathew Crabbe)说,进军火锅生意是有道理的,因为这样可以避免与百胜在华现有业务形成竞争关系。目前,百胜在华业务已经通过肯德基和必胜客(Pizza Hut)涵盖了西式快餐。

百胜收购小肥羊有风险。小肥羊市值6.60亿美元,有480家门店,在争夺消费者方面,面临着同样做火锅生意的海底捞和呷哺呷哺的竞争。成本不断上升的农产品和不断上涨的工资加在一起通常占餐馆运营成本的约三分之二,可能会侵蚀利润率。

不过,小肥羊并不是中国市盈率最高的餐馆运营商。该公司2011年的市盈率为18倍,与百胜的市盈率大体相仿,但远远低于中国内地日式连锁餐馆味千拉面27倍的市盈率。假如股价有50%的溢价(这在香港上市的公司中相当普遍),那么百胜将支付7.20亿美元,对应小肥羊的市盈率为27倍。价格不菲,但这就是通过收购中国公司来实现增长的价格。如果百胜能够利用自身在中国的规模来增加收益、提振利润率,那么这个价格看起来还是出得起的。

由于连锁餐馆能够更好地应对消费者对食品安全的担忧、更好地控制不断上涨的原材料和工资,预计麦当劳(McDonald's)等公司会效仿百胜。不过,在小肥羊之后,可供这些公司吃下的成规模餐饮企业也不多了。

Tom Orlik

(本文版权归道琼斯公司所有,未经许可不得翻译或转载。)


Forget Angry Birds, get ready for an explosion of Little Sheep.

Yum Brands, a leader in China's restaurant industry, plans to take its 27% stake in hot-pot chain Little Sheep Group to full ownership. No prizes for guessing why Yum is supersizing its China business. China accounted for 43% of Yum's operating profit in 2010 and rose 26% year on year, versus 3% in the U.S.

Yum has enjoyed explosive growth in China, taking its KFC stores from 500 in 2001 to 3,244 in 2010. But organic growth can go only so far. Mathew Crabbe of Access Asia says a move into hot pot makes sense because it avoids competing with Yum's existing Chinese businesses, which already cover Western fast food through KFC and Pizza Hut brands.

There are risks. Little Sheep, with a market capitalization of $660 million and 480 restaurants, faces brands such as Hai Di Lao and Xiabu Xiabu jostling for customers in a similar market space. Rising costs for agricultural products and higher wages, which together make up about two-thirds of restaurants' operating costs, risk eating into profit margins.

But Little Sheep isn't the most expensive Chinese restaurant operator. Its price/earnings ratio of 18 for 2011 is roughly in line with Yum's own but is far short of, say, Ajisen, a chain of Japanese-style restaurants on the mainland trading at 27 times. A 50% premium to the share price, fairly conventional for companies listed in Hong Kong, would see Yum forking out $720 million and paying 27 times earnings for Little Sheep. Expensive, but that is the price of buying Chinese growth. If Yum can use its scale in China to increase earnings and boost margins, it looks manageable.

With chain restaurants better able to address consumers' concerns about food safety, and control rising costs for raw materials and wages, expect the likes of McDonald's to follow Yum's lead. But after Little Sheep there will be few sizable bites left on the table.

Tom Orlik

2011年4月26日

Lex专栏:澳门博彩业 Macau

要衡量全球大规模的财富转移,几乎再没有比美国赌场运营商永利酒店(Wynn Resorts)公布的每间可供出租客房收入(revpar)更好的指标了。2008年第一季度,永利酒店在拉斯维加斯的revpar为285美元,澳门为244美元。今年第一季度,这些数字分别为211美元和272美元,澳门胜出。

实际上,前葡萄牙殖民地澳门是中国唯一可以合法开赌场的地方,很难看出有什么会扰乱它的增长轨迹。内地游客的签证限制以及新加坡新赌场的开业,已经尽可能地对澳门构成了伤害。今年3月,澳门博彩总收入达到25亿美元,比3年前高出两倍以上。2009年10月在香港上市的澳门永利酒店上周公布一季度利润增长66%,股价升至新高。上市首日,澳门永利与总部位于美国内华达州的母公司Paradise的市账率之差约为10个百分点,如今已扩大到27个百分点。

流动性收紧似乎不大可能抑制需求。正如瑞士信贷(Credit Suisse)所指出的,尽管中国抑制了信贷增长,但赌场的转码数(VIP赌客的投注总额)仍在继续上升。对内地游客的更多限制可能也不会影响需求,因为交通联络的改善会抵消其影响:例如,新建的广州至珠海的轻轨将旅行时间缩短了一半还多。对于赌场而言,最大的风险在于过分热心的扩张。不过如果出现这种情形,投资者最好是在板块内部进行轮动――买入估值低于平均水平、但增长高于平均水平的运营商――而不是彻底退出。是的,这是一个人潮拥挤的行业:澳门永利今年的表现较基准指数高出55个百分点。但有时,智慧就在群众中间。

Lex专栏是由FT评论家联合撰写的短评,对全球经济与商业进行精辟分析

译者/梁艳裳


http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001038287


There are few more elegant indicators of the great global wealth transfer than the revenue-per-available-room rates reported by the US casino operator, Wynn Resorts. In the first quarter of 2008, Wynn's revpar was $285 in Las Vegas and $244 in Macau. In the first quarter of this year, the figures were $211 to $272 in Macau's favour.

It is difficult, indeed, to see what might upset the growth trajectory of this former Portuguese colony, the only place in China where casinos are legal. Restrictions on visas for mainland visitors and the opening of new casinos in Singapore have done much to hurt it. Gross gaming receipts of $2.5bn in March were more than three times that of three years earlier. Wynn Macau, floated in Hong Kong in October 2009, soared to a high this week as it reported first-quarter profit up 66 per cent. Its price/book spread with its Paradise, Nevada-based parent, about 10 percentage points on debut, is now pushing 27.

Tightened liquidity seems unlikely to curb demand. As Credit Suisse points out, junkets' rolling-chip turnover � the aggregate bets placed by VIP gamblers � has continued to rise, even as China has restrained credit growth. Further restrictions on mainland visitors may not do it either, given the offsetting effect of improved travel links: a new

light-rail line between Guangzhou and nearby Zhuhai, for example, has cut journey times by more than half. For casinos, the big risk is overzealous expansion. Yet in that event, investors would be better advised to rotate within the sector � buy the operator trading at below-average valuations but experiencing above-average growth � than exit altogether. Yes, this is a very crowded trade: Wynn Macau's performance this year is 55 percentage points better than the benchmark. But sometimes there is wisdom in crowds


http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001038287/en

Lex专栏:澳门博彩业 Macau

要衡量全球大规模的财富转移,几乎再没有比美国赌场运营商永利酒店(Wynn Resorts)公布的每间可供出租客房收入(revpar)更好的指标了。2008年第一季度,永利酒店在拉斯维加斯的revpar为285美元,澳门为244美元。今年第一季度,这些数字分别为211美元和272美元,澳门胜出。

实际上,前葡萄牙殖民地澳门是中国唯一可以合法开赌场的地方,很难看出有什么会扰乱它的增长轨迹。内地游客的签证限制以及新加坡新赌场的开业,已经尽可能地对澳门构成了伤害。今年3月,澳门博彩总收入达到25亿美元,比3年前高出两倍以上。2009年10月在香港上市的澳门永利酒店上周公布一季度利润增长66%,股价升至新高。上市首日,澳门永利与总部位于美国内华达州的母公司Paradise的市账率之差约为10个百分点,如今已扩大到27个百分点。

流动性收紧似乎不大可能抑制需求。正如瑞士信贷(Credit Suisse)所指出的,尽管中国抑制了信贷增长,但赌场的转码数(VIP赌客的投注总额)仍在继续上升。对内地游客的更多限制可能也不会影响需求,因为交通联络的改善会抵消其影响:例如,新建的广州至珠海的轻轨将旅行时间缩短了一半还多。对于赌场而言,最大的风险在于过分热心的扩张。不过如果出现这种情形,投资者最好是在板块内部进行轮动――买入估值低于平均水平、但增长高于平均水平的运营商――而不是彻底退出。是的,这是一个人潮拥挤的行业:澳门永利今年的表现较基准指数高出55个百分点。但有时,智慧就在群众中间。

Lex专栏是由FT评论家联合撰写的短评,对全球经济与商业进行精辟分析

译者/梁艳裳


http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001038287


There are few more elegant indicators of the great global wealth transfer than the revenue-per-available-room rates reported by the US casino operator, Wynn Resorts. In the first quarter of 2008, Wynn's revpar was $285 in Las Vegas and $244 in Macau. In the first quarter of this year, the figures were $211 to $272 in Macau's favour.

It is difficult, indeed, to see what might upset the growth trajectory of this former Portuguese colony, the only place in China where casinos are legal. Restrictions on visas for mainland visitors and the opening of new casinos in Singapore have done much to hurt it. Gross gaming receipts of $2.5bn in March were more than three times that of three years earlier. Wynn Macau, floated in Hong Kong in October 2009, soared to a high this week as it reported first-quarter profit up 66 per cent. Its price/book spread with its Paradise, Nevada-based parent, about 10 percentage points on debut, is now pushing 27.

Tightened liquidity seems unlikely to curb demand. As Credit Suisse points out, junkets' rolling-chip turnover � the aggregate bets placed by VIP gamblers � has continued to rise, even as China has restrained credit growth. Further restrictions on mainland visitors may not do it either, given the offsetting effect of improved travel links: a new

light-rail line between Guangzhou and nearby Zhuhai, for example, has cut journey times by more than half. For casinos, the big risk is overzealous expansion. Yet in that event, investors would be better advised to rotate within the sector � buy the operator trading at below-average valuations but experiencing above-average growth � than exit altogether. Yes, this is a very crowded trade: Wynn Macau's performance this year is 55 percentage points better than the benchmark. But sometimes there is wisdom in crowds


http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001038287/en

2011年4月24日

亚洲别走西方老路 iToys won’t fix Asia’s broken growth model

 

亚洲领导人面临通胀快速上升、本币坚挺以及不请自来的资本流入等问题。但在这些问题背后,他们面临着一个更加深刻的选择:要么奉行近几十年来推动世界发展的消费驱动型资本主义,要么深吸一口气,改弦易辙,寻找到一条可持续的新路。

以往,受制于金融危机前大行其道的正统理论,亚洲别无选择。在思想上对西方亦步亦趋的亚洲,遵循着有关建立“自由市场”和“小政府”的共识路线。然而,如果继续沿这条路走下去,该地区的前景将一片黯淡,面临不均衡的出口主导型增长、粮食和水资源短缺以及环境严重退化。

从表面上看,大多数亚洲国家似乎仍在仿效这一西方模式。但实际情况要复杂得多。各国政府开始觉察到发展给社会和环境带来的后果。当前各国——不论是民主制的印度,还是一党制的中国——面临的两难困境在于,如何在保持实力的同时,着手解决这个问题。

事实上,目前正在发生一些变化。譬如,中国正在探索碳税和资源税,印度环境部长在挑战处置开发与合理利用资源之间关系的陈规陋俗。老挝已延后决定是否在湄公河下游修建一座大坝——但在此之前,人们就已逐渐认识到,近几十年的发展是建立在许多资源(尤其是水资源)定价过低基础上的,早该出台新的污染定价机制了。

此外,一些探索不同资本主义模式的试验已经拉开了序幕。依然是在中国,有关方面正在拟定计划,建设有优良公路、铁路、学校和水利系统的新型中小城镇。这些计划旨在遏止农民工涌入大城市的潮流,同时化解公众对食品安全和治安方面日益加重的担忧。倘若事实证明中国能够建成更加繁荣昌盛的农村,越南和印尼等其它人口密集国家可能会跟风效仿。

但是,这些举措虽然可取,却不足以把亚洲推上一条新路。中国和印度尤其需要提高能源税和金融交易税,同时大幅降低工资税、特别是穷人的工资税。北京市政府近期对私人购车施加了限制;其它地方也有必要出台类似措施。香港和新加坡等富裕城市则需出台提高能效的法规。

在农业方面,当务之急是减轻农业产业化对水资源和土地使用的影响,为降低粮食生产对化学品及石油的依赖铺平道路。科技也能发挥一定作用,前提是必须把着重点从生产更多消费性电子产品,转回到研制智能公共交通网络和高效水资源管理上面。此外应鼓励资源保护和循环利用措施。

当然,这种把“资源合理定价”当作政策制定核心要素的创举,在政治上势必带来巨大挑战。这类措施将增加汽车保有、航空旅行和肉类消费的成本,因为它们会揭示这些行为真实的经济和社会成本。但是,这类措施将切实造福贫困人群的主体,即目前基本上享受不到公民权的几十亿农民和农村居民。因此,这类措施从长远来看将提高政府的合法性。

不过,在过渡时期,这类措施将引起许多人的不安——不仅仅是在现行模式中拥有既得利益的企业和国家,也包括几十亿曾被告知他们也可以向往过上西方式生活的亚洲人民。但是,另辟蹊径是不可避免的。如果从现在起就行动起来,正视当前面临的资源约束,那么亚洲的前景将是光明的。而如果到2030年仍未另辟蹊径,那么亚洲不仅实现不了全民繁荣,也将无缘于任何一种形式的繁荣。

本文作者为全球未来研究所(Global Institute For Tomorrow)总裁,著有《消费经济学:亚洲在重塑资本主义和拯救地球中的作用》(Consumptionomics: Asia’s Role in Reshaping Capitalism and Saving the Planet)一书

译者/何黎


http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001038231


 

Asian leaders face fast-rising inflation, strong currencies and unwanted influxes of capital. But behind these they face a more profound choice. Either they pursue the consumption-fuelled capitalism that has driven world growth in recent decades. Or they can take a deep breath, change direction and find a sustainable new path.

Under the orthodoxy that held sway until the financial crisis, Asia had no options. Intellectually subservient to the west, it followed the consensus of freer markets and smaller states. But if this continues, the region will face a bleak future of unbalanced export-dominated growth, food and water shortages, and major environmental degradation.

On the face of it, it seems as if most Asian nations are still emulating this western model. But the truth is more complex. Governments are waking up to the social and environmental consequences of their growth. The dilemma now is what to do about it, while retaining power – be that in democratic India, or one-party China.

Indeed, changes are happening. For instance, China is exploring carbon and resource taxes, while India’s environment minister is challenging conventions about the links between development and the fair use of resources. Even before Laos deferred a decision to build a dam on the lower Mekong River, there was also a growing recognition that recent decades of growth had been based on underpricing many resources and especially water – and new pollution pricing mechanisms are overdue.

Some experiments in different models of capitalism are also beginning. Again in China, plans are developing to build a new network of smaller cities and towns, served by improved roads, railways, schools and irrigation. These aim to stop the flow of rural workers into large cities, while addressing growing concerns about food security and safety. If China shows it can create more prosperous rural communities, other densely populated countries, such as Vietnam and Indonesia, may follow.

However, these worthy actions will not be enough to put Asia on a new path. Instead, China and India in particular need to raise taxes on energy and financial transactions, while slashing taxes on salaries, particularly for the poor. Beijing’s city government recently imposed restrictions on private car ownership; similar measures are needed elsewhere, along with rules to improve energy efficiency in rich cities such as Hong Kong and Singapore.

In agriculture the priority is to mitigate the effect of industrial agriculture on water and land use, paving the way for a less chemical- and petroleum-dependent food production. Technology can play a part too, but only if effort is redirected away from producing more iToys and back towards smart public transport networks and efficient water management. Resource conservation and recycling measures must also be encouraged.

Of course, a radical plan to put the accurate pricing of resources at the centre of policymaking will present considerable political challenges. These measures would make car ownership, air travel and meat consumption more expensive, by revealing their true economic and social cost. But actions of this type will actually benefit the majority of poorer citizens; those billions of farmers and countryside dwellers who are now largely disenfranchised. Thus they will, in the long run, make governments more legitimate.

In the interim, however, such actions will upset many people – not just the companies and countries with vested interests in today’s model, but also the billions of Asians who have been told that they too can aspire to a western way of life. But the choice remains stark. If Asia acts now, and accepts the resource constraints that confront it today, it has a bright future. But if by 2030 no alternative is adopted, Asia will say goodbye not just to the goal of achieving prosperity for all, but also to achieving any form of prosperity.

The writer is chief executive of the Global Institute For Tomorrow, and author of Consumptionomics: Asia’s Role in Reshaping Capitalism and Saving the Planet


http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001038231/en

末日博士看空中国经济? Boom vs Doom: is Roubini right on China?

 

“末日博士”鲁里埃尔•鲁比尼(Nouriel Roubini)对中国及其当前的增长模式持悲观看法或许没什么可惊讶的。基于近期对中国的“两次访问”,这位神奇的博士给出了毁灭性的预测。

那么,这位以预测出美国住房市场崩盘及随后的全球信贷危机而闻名的奇人,是不是会再捧回一个诺查丹玛斯预言奖呢?

让我们感受一下他对中国的看法吧,该文最初发表在Project Syndicate上:

“中国内部到处充斥着在实物资本、基础设施和不动产方面的过量投资。在一个访问者眼中,证据就是那些光鲜靓丽却旅客寥寥的机场和高速列车(这将减少45个计划兴建中的机场的客流量),通往偏僻之地的高速公路,数千座高大的中央与地方政府建筑,空无一人的新城区,以及被迫关闭以避免引发全球价格下跌的崭新铝冶炼厂。

“中国大概会在2013年后遭遇一场硬着陆。事实上所有与过度投资有关的历史场景——包括上世纪90年代的东亚地区所发生的一切——都会以一场金融危机和/或长期的低增长来谢幕。”

鲁比尼竟然给伟大中国的崩盘确定了一个时间,真是胆大。过去20年间,有许多人做过类似的尝试,但都遭遇惨败。鲁比尼很聪明,他并没有限死具体时间,而且如果你对他的话进行重新措辞,你会发现他实际上是在说自己认为未来两年中国不会遭遇硬着陆。

有人对他的悲观分析提出了反驳,指出中国的过度建设与过度投资已经持续了十几年,而且每当投资与基础设施似乎已经超量时,经济增长又追赶了上来,消化了闲置产能。毕竟中国人口众多。

另一些人或许还会指出,大部分建设项目的质量很差,这意味着不到十年或二十年,老旧的基础设施就不得不被拆除,进行重建。

但鲁比尼很可能是正确的,他关于中国对过度投资的沉迷最终将造成巨大浪费并导致未来经济增长大幅放缓的论述也相当有说服力。

“任何国家都不可能拥有足够的发展速度,足以在将50%的GDP重新投资的情况下最终避免遭遇巨大的产能过剩和令人忧心的不良贷款问题。”

“继续沿着这条投资导向的道路走下去,将使已经暴露出来的制造业、房地产和基础设施产能饱和现象进一步恶化,并在固定资产投资增长无法继续扩大的情况下加剧未来的经济放缓。但直到2012-13年领导层换届之前,中国的政策制定者们或许都能在继续罔顾可以预见的巨额成本的情况下,维持一个高增长率。”

他对于中国政府十二五计划的看法同样悲观。

他正确的指出,十二五计划与上一个五年计划惊人的相似,都宣称要实现经济平衡发展,提高消费占GDP的比重,但这两个目标政府都未实现。

鲁比尼还说,计划细节显示出经济增长依然要仰仗投资(包括兴建公共住房)来推动。这个看法也是正确的。

他开出的药方是一套综合性改革措施,包括:实施更迅速的货币升值,面向家庭的大规模财政转移支付,税收和/或国有企业的私有化,解除户口制度限制以及放宽财政管制。

北京的中央官员们显然了解、而且或许也赞同鲁比尼的许多观点,但由于上述这些改革措施实施起来相当困难,他们不太可能对他的建议给予太多关注。

译者/何黎


http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001038234


 

It probably comes as no surprise that Nouriel Roubini – also known as Dr Doom – is bearish on China and its current growth model. Based on “two trips” to China recently the good doctor has come up with a devastating prognosis.

So is the man famous for predicting the downfall of the US housing market and subsequent global credit crisis about to notch up a second nostradamus award?

Here’s a taste of his views on China, as first published on Project Syndicate:

“China is rife with overinvestment in physical capital, infrastructure and property. To a visitor, this is evident in sleek but empty airports and bullet trains (which will reduce the need for the 45 planned airports), highways to nowhere, thousands of colossal new central and provincial government buildings, ghost towns and brand-new aluminium smelters kept closed to prevent global prices from plunging.”

“Eventually, most likely after 2013, China will suffer a hard landing. All historical episodes of excessive investment – including East Asia in the 1990s – have ended with a financial crisis and/or a long period of slow growth.”

Mr Roubini is a brave soul to put a date on the great China collapse. Many have tried and failed miserably to do the same thing over the last two decades. He cleverly leaves the exact timing open and if you rephrased his comments they would actually say he thinks China will not suffer a hard landing in the next two years.

Some people counter his grim analysis by pointing out China has been over-building and over-investing for well over a decade and every time it looks like there is too much investment or infrastructure, growth catches up and spare capacity disappears. There are a lot of people in China after all.

Others might also argue that the poor quality of much of the construction also means that within a decade or two all the old infrastructure will have to be torn down and rebuilt.

But Mr Roubini may well be right and makes a convincing argument that China’s addiction to over-investment will eventually cause massive waste and much slower growth down the road.

“No country can be productive enough to reinvest half of GDP in new capital stock without eventually facing immense overcapacity and a staggering non-performing loan problem.”

“Continuing down the investment-led growth path will exacerbate the visible glut of capacity in manufacturing, property and infrastructure, and thus will intensify the coming economic slowdown once further fixed-investment growth becomes impossible. Until the change of political leadership in 2012-13, China’s policymakers may be able to maintain high growth rates, but at a very high foreseeable cost.”

His assessment of the government’s latest five-year plan (2011-2015) is equally gloomy.

He points out, correctly, that the latest five-year plan looks remarkably similar to the last one, with its rhetoric on rebalancing the economy and increasing the share of consumption in GDP, both goals where the government failed miserably.

Mr Roubini is also right when he says the plan’s details reveal continued reliance on investment, especially public housing to boost growth.

His prescription is a mix of reforms including: faster currency appreciation, substantial fiscal transfers to households, taxation and/or privatisation of state-owned enterprises, liberalisation of the household registration, or hukou, system, and an easing of financial repression.

The Mandarins in Beijing are certainly aware of and probably agree with many of the points Mr Roubini is making, but because of the difficulties in implementing any of these reforms they are unlikely to pay much attention to his advice.


http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001038234/en

大伤元气的双汇发展是否值得投资

傅峙峰

3月15日,中央电视台3•15晚会曝光的瘦肉精事件将双汇发展(000895)推向了舆论的风口浪尖。双汇发展3月16日开始停牌,4月19日复牌后遭到资金的猛烈抛售,截至4月21日,股价已从停牌前的77.94元跌至62.9元,跌幅达19.2%。4月22日,又因媒体报道了公司未披露信息而临时停牌。

尽管媒体、消费者和投资者现在都在道德层面上对双汇进行无情的谴责,但站在资本市场的角度,双汇发展是否依然存在投资价值和机会,无疑是一个避不开的问题。

短期内,双汇发展的股价更多的是受到资金博弈的影响,这使得任何对双汇发展的估值评价,都可能显得苍白无力。市场对双汇发展的估值存在一定分歧:比较乐观的研究机构认为,双汇发展在65元以下就存在介入的价值;也有保守的研究机构表示,55元以下双汇发展的介入机会才会来临;当然市场也对双汇重组预案中实际控制人的56元要约收购价充满兴趣;也有极度悲观的投资者表示,现在双汇发展的股价或许只是在半山腰。

65元和55元的估值是基于对双汇发展20倍左右的动态估值预期,存在着在悲观情绪下市场是否认可的疑虑。56元的要约收购价则要看此次资产注入的具体实施,但鉴于出事的济源双汇正是拟注入资产,这个过程是否会存有变数,现在也无法下定论。

无论是65元、55元还是56元,这三个价格能否代表双汇发展股价的安全边际,都是具有一定风险和不确定性的。双汇发展流通市值接近400亿元,盘子可谓不小,同时又有大量的公募基金参与其中,该股的定价权难有一家独大之说,现在股价只能是在恐惧、贪婪、抄底和出逃等多种情绪冲击下随波逐流。因此,短期内介入受市场冲突情绪激荡的双汇发展,并非是一个明智之举,除非抱有明确的赌博心态。

现在机构对双汇发展的盈利预测和估值预测开始体现出混乱的迹象。招商证券的业绩和估值预测是基于双汇发展重组预案中2011年3元的每股收益承诺,以及25倍市盈率给出的,认为公司的价值中枢在75元。广发证券不考虑资产注入,预期双汇发展2011年每股收益为1.82元,而将2012年盈利预测简单换成之前预测2013年的2.22元,给予2012年25倍市盈率,股价安全边际为55元。中投证券也是按照3元的业绩承诺进行业绩预测,但估值表述则是“瘦肉精事件前市场对双汇的估值在25-30倍之间,目前公司股价被低估”。海通证券干脆表示“由于近期波动较大,我们并未给出确切盈利预测”,而以56元要约收购价作为安全边际。

从以上各机构的盈利和估值分歧可以看出,不仅是估值系统出现混乱,而且有些还显得无厘头。比如,广发证券将2012年盈利预测换成之前的2013年盈利预测,为何如此操作令人费解。中投证券以瘦肉精事件前的估值来评判公司股价被低估,似乎完全漠视了瘦肉精事件的影响。另外,如果以3元的业绩承诺作为盈利预测和估值预测的基准,只考虑双汇发展的短期和静态状况,并不能反映出双汇发展未来因商誉受损带来的经营风险。当然,配以20-25倍的市盈率,也只能说是合理的估值标准,也未必能够充分反映双汇发展在经营风险下应有的估值折价。

更为关键的是,机构普遍预期双汇发展经营销售会快速恢复,核心理由是双汇发展发货量的快速恢复。这里就有一个概念要区分,发货量并不代表销售量,因为中间还有个渠道环节。如果去参与了双汇集团的万人职工大会和经销商大会,或者阅读媒体的相关报道,都会发现在这两个大会上,经销商和集团员工都群情激昂高呼“万岁”,两者团结一心想必渠道铺货是没有问题的。然而,双汇至今在所有问题的处理上,顾及了公司员工、经销商、投资者和券商机构,唯独漏掉了企业生存的根基──消费者。无论经销商再如何大规模铺货,消费者不来购买,只能是公司产品积压在销售环节,最终无法实现营收增长。

从长远去判断双汇发展是否还有投资的价值,关键点落在双汇如何重建受损的商誉。经过这次危机之后,双汇生产销售各环节的要素都还在,原材料采购环节可以依靠加强管理来确保产品质量,从这些方面考虑,双汇是有能力恢复正常经营的。但是,从企业自身恢复正常运作,到消费者信心和商誉的修复,中间需要一个时间过程,还需要在公共关系和市场营销等方面做出更大的投入。

如果以三聚氰胺事件对奶业的影响和双汇的瘦肉精事件作比较,两者之间既有明显差异又有共同点。首先,三聚氰胺事件是整个奶业受到冲击,消费者在品牌选择方面,蒙牛、伊利、光明都无太大差异。但此次猪肉精事件中只有双汇受到冲击,因此消费者会选择其他品牌作为替代,双汇的商誉修复面临竞争者的挤压和挑战。

其次,三聚氰胺事件发生在2008年金融危机时期,当时三聚氰胺事件加上危机双重效应叠加,造成奶业股受到重创,如今市场环境不同,双汇发展只受到单一事件的冲击。

最后,人类的记忆的确不怎么可靠。三聚氰胺事件后消费者很快又恢复了对牛奶的信心,当然其中有政府监管的功劳也有媒体宣传的功劳,但显现出的是这种不具恐怖冲击力的负面事件,无法在大众心中打下无法磨灭的烙印。瘦肉精和三聚氰胺一样,不会造成急性的病痛,消费者对其认识停留在感性且肤浅的层面,因此也难以连累到猪肉,毕竟猪肉还是大部分消费者离不开的食物。

因此,双汇发展恢复到危机前的情况,并不是没有可能,但这条路很难比三聚氰胺事件中的奶业走的更顺畅。如果考虑基本面修复,投资者必须要有充分的耐心,在随后的几个月甚至更长时间里密切关注双汇在商誉修复和终端销售上作出的努力和效果。就股价变化而言,虽然双汇被杀到和2008年伊利或光明那种超低估值水平并不太现实,但现在双汇的股价并没有体现出十分让人放心的安全边际。危机产生的投资机会是错杀的机会,而无论从市盈率还是从市净率角度来看,现在双汇并不十分便宜,那冒着短期风险介入也就没有必要了。

(本文作者傅峙峰是《华尔街日报》中文网专栏撰稿人。文中所述仅代表他的个人观点。您可以写信至Horatio.fu#dowjones.com与作者联系。)

(本文版权归道琼斯公司所有,未经许可不得翻译或转载。)

2011年4月22日

通策医疗:大市场中的小公司

    通策医疗于3月16日发布2010年度报告,适值又与友人谈及其经营状况,归结起来主要有以下几点:

    1、关于通策医疗种植牙业务。种植牙也叫人工种植牙,它是通过医学方式,将与人体骨质兼容性高的纯钛金属经过精密的设计,制造成类似牙根的圆柱体或其他形状,以外科小手术的方式植入缺牙区的牙槽骨内,经过 1-3 个月后,当人工牙根与牙槽骨密合后,再在人工牙根上制作烤瓷牙冠。因不具破坏性,种植牙已被口腔医学界公认为缺牙的首选修复方式。种植牙由于人工牙深植牙骨内,可承受正常的咀嚼力量,功能和美观上几乎和自然牙一样,因此被人们称为人类的第三副牙齿。其旗下子公司宁波口腔医院采用的种植牙系统是ITI系统。ITI是非理植型两段式种植体系统的代表,一期手术后暴露于口腔在非覆盖状态下愈合,并不需要二期手术,在骨整合完成后可直接接上基台完成修复。ITI系统有利于颈部软组织的附着及预防牙周软组织的感染。种植体位置的精确和标准化的准备工作可达到初始稳定性。这个系统精确设计的骨预备方式在达到较理想的初期稳定性方面,较其他种植系统容易且可靠。种植牙价格约为10000元/颗,公司于2009年就成立了种植中心,全年种植牙达到1800颗,贡献营收约2000万元。      

    2、关于杭州通策义齿制造有限公司。所谓的义齿,是指牙齿脱落或拔除后,为恢复咀嚼、美观、发音等功能所镶补的假牙通策义齿是通策医疗全资子公司,成立于2010年,注册资本为300万元,主要从事加工口腔科材料,如合金烤瓷、烤瓷、全瓷,合金冠、活动支架等。义齿也属于医疗器械,列入国家药品监督的范围。尤其是定制式义齿生产企业,必须严格遵照“医疗器械质量管理体系用于法规的要求”。义齿生产企业很多,但既有医院又有义齿生产企业的却不多。据了解目前杭州具备自己制作烤瓷牙资格的医疗机构只有3家,除了杭州口腔医院外,还有浙江省口腔医院以及邵逸夫医院口腔科。自产材料的优点是量身订做,注重细节,这样既有利于降低成本,又能够提高医疗质量。而其他医疗机构,则需提供患者的牙齿模型,到相关有资质的厂家订购烤瓷牙。不过因为通策义齿为新投资的公司,目前尚未盈利。   

    3、去年年底并购昆明市口腔医院,今年年初与昆明市妇幼保健院合作办院,其意义重大。昆明市口腔医院是云南省成立最早的口腔专科医院,在根管治疗、口腔种植修复、牙颌畸形矫正、窝沟封闭、微创充填等方面处于全省领先水平,年门诊量超过30000人次,营业收入约1000万元。而昆明市妇幼保健院则更早,它始建于1901年,是云南省历史上最早的一家西医医院。现为省内规模最大、功能齐全、优势突出,集医疗、保健、教学、科研为一体的综合性妇幼医疗保健机构。这是云南省唯一一家“三级甲等妇幼保健院”。目前医院设置床位320张,在职职工433人,专业技术人员398人,拥有业务用房20000平方米。妇科为昆明市一级重点学科,产科年分娩量为昆明地区第1位。届时通策医疗将拥有80%的控股权。这是公司在做实口腔医疗服务的同时,进军综合医疗服务领域的重要一步,彰显通策医疗未来发展的战略,公司未来战略目标就是打造一个顶级的医疗服务集团。  

    4、通策医疗原来拥有13家医疗机构,依据2010年度报告,实际上只有4家实现正收益:杭州口腔医院,贡献了净利润4379万元,增长84.40%占公司净利润88%。宁波口腔医院净利润408万元,增长68.64%,占公司净利润8.2%,很有潜力;黄石现代口腔医院净利润85万元,增长85.06%,有所好转;沧州口腔医院最差,净利润仅18万元,增长为-84.34%,出现下滑趋势。其他7家因投产时间不长,目前处于负收益阶段,但业绩开始显现。还有2家因业绩持续下滑,已被结业清算。杭州口腔医院采取的是中心医院+分院的模式:利用平海路总院的品牌和资源优势,相继开设了5家分院,占据了杭州口腔医疗服务50%左右的市场份额。“杭口模式”是成功的典范,因此,通策医疗未来的方向就是如何将“杭口模式”成为公司在其他地区医院参照的样本。

    5、关于口腔医疗的市场前景及成长性。据统计在美国60%以上的人每年至少进行2次口腔健康检查与清洁,而我国60%的民众却从未看过牙医,仅有不到2%的居民有定期进行口腔检查和清洁的习惯。按照国际公认比率每4000人拥有1名口腔医生来计算,我国现有13亿人口,应配有32.5万名口腔医生。然而截至2007年,我国大陆注册口腔执业医师仅有11.75万名,存在很大缺口。最近十年来口腔医疗平均增长50%,有人认为,预期在现在的基础上,以现在的发展趋势还将保持最少20年平均40%以上的成长性。口腔医疗产业是一个快速发展、具有巨大潜力的市场,其行业的景气度正处于生命周期的初始阶段。随着生活水平的不断提高,民众的口腔保健意识也将日益加强,社会对口腔医疗服务的需求也越来越巨大,因此成长空间不可小觑。

                                                             

                                                              (个人观点,只供参考,请勿据此投资)

    相关链接:东风随春归,发我枝上花


http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_519b8db201017i4s.html

巨星科技2010年度业绩交流会要点

1、巨星科技销售渠道的对象都是最大的工具销售商(世界500强企业),每年的业务稳中有涨,在中国除了巨星科技,目前还没有其他企业能够提供一站式的服务。

2、2010年净资产收益率没有前两年高,是因为公司在2010年上市,大幅增加了公司的净资产,而2010年公司产能已经饱和,募投扩产项目正在建设之中。

3、针对史丹利开始在国内建厂的形势,巨星科技将充分发挥渠道、技术、资金、管理等综合优势,继续完善现有渠道及营销网络,形成了多级市场相互依托、平衡发展的局面。

4、有人问,公司2010年对劳氏的销售收入6个亿左右,相应应收款3个亿左右,这是什么原因?财务总监倪淑一答,劳氏的销售和应收款情况同客户账期相一致。

5、关于巨星科技2011年国内市场的销售目标和实际进展。董事会秘书何天乐答,国内市场目前发展良好,今年将加大投入。

6、针对巨星科技在扩展内销方面如何应对国内外消费习惯的不同的问题,公司正在加大研发投入,研发适应国内市场消费者习惯的产品。

7、关于出口退税,倪淑一说,对出口退税公司息息相关,无论从07年度的下调及09年度的上调,巨星科技均依靠不断创新和新产品开发来消化成本压力。

8、“十二五”规划对于产业升级转型提出了很多指导和规划,而巨星科技近几年的发展正是得益于及产业的转型升级,因此公司在未来的日子里也将继续加大研发投入,做好产业升级转型。

9、在考虑收购一些公司或者扩展新的领域上,巨星科技一直在考虑有关发展,但目前还在寻找和公司主营业务有关的业务。

10、关于公司发展今年的有利因素和不利因素。董事长仇建平说,2011年,随着国际金融危机的影响逐步减弱和全球刺激经济政策的逐渐退出,工具行业增速已经逐渐步入正常轨迹。国际市场特别是美国市场需求的稳步恢复和增长,为公司产品在国外市场的销售提供了较为良好的外部环境。国内市场随着节能减排、环境保护、劳动保护等法律政策的日趋完善,企业生产加工方式革新的需求越来越强烈,这为公司产品在国内市场的应用和推广提供了难得的机遇。
    11、巨星科技在市场方面的开拓的计划是,紧紧抓住世界经济回升和国内经济快速发展的有利时机,提高公司产品在国内外市场的占有率,强化国际高端市场与自有品牌市场的拓展。

12、有人问,公司在股权激励方面有何考虑和安排?仇建平说,公司主要骨干和高管已经有持股,目前暂不考虑股权激励。

13、有人问,目前公司在国内最主要的竞争对手,以及会如何应对竞争。仇建平说,巨星科技目前是亚洲第一的手工具公司,目前在国内没有大的竞争对手。

14、有人问,手持式电动工具在未来的市场中应该有很好的市场,可是2010年度第四季度业绩明显低于前几个季度。仇建平说,四季度经营正常,公司主要出口欧美消费品市场。由于受圣诞节影响,二三季度是公司销售旺季。

15、随着劳动力成本和原材料价格的提升,巨星科技将依靠不断创新和新产品开发来消化成本上升压力。

16、巨星科技目前是以手工具为主要业务,2010年由于电动产品结构进行了调整,因此收入有所下降,但手持式电动工具是巨星科技未来一段时间主要发展的业务和利润增长点,因为手持式电动工具的市场规模比较大。

17、仇建平说,巨星科技在未来3年内,力争做到每年30%左右的增长。这是巨星科技的奋斗目标。

 

相关链接:巨星科技:在稳健成长中前行


http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_519b8db201017i8y.html

2011年4月21日

再谈估值溢价:有一种思维叫“辩证”

前面谈了一篇“溢价与泡沫”的区别, 本篇我想再补充或者强调几个观点:

 

第一,溢价和泡沫都是市场的客观存在,学会分清其区别有助于我们更好的把握估值的本质。研究和理解“溢价”的存在理由,完全不代表“拥抱泡沫”,恰恰相反,这正是规避“估值陷阱”的一个参考(因为你不理解为什么产生的溢价,所以也就会错误的认为泡沫=溢价)。在一些特定的阶段,一些特定的行业以及公司,会在整个商业环境上体现出远远超越其他行业(公司)的经营优越性,这种优越性进一步体现在行业业绩增长水平的提高以及相当长时期内业绩维持的高确定性,从“DCF3要素原理”而言,一个生存周期很长、正处于业务扩张初级阶段、竞争优势明确而确定性高、其生意的特性又是具有很强的现金创造能力的生意,其估值的基准一定应该是相对较高的。

 

申银万国曾做过一个长期数据研究:研究的10个国家中有8个国家医药板块相对全市场溢价,其中5个国家溢价超过30%。美国药品市场发展成熟,印度本国经济和中国类似,1980-2008年,美国医药板块相对美国市场平均溢价20%,印度医药板块相对印度市场平均溢价49%。在医药经济快速发展或者美国经济减速阶段,美国医药板块相对大势估值溢价幅度在30-50%,印度在向国际市场快速发展的1997-2002年相对印度大势估值溢价幅度达到50-200%。2005-2008年4月中国医药板块估值相对大势平均溢价34%,溢价处于国际市场中间水平,07年3月和08年1月由于市场对中国医改的预期以及板块风格变化,溢价水平开始超过50%。英国和日本是全民免费医疗卫生体制且政府价格管制严厉导致企业盈利降低,其医药板块估值溢价最低。

 

1970年-2007年美国6次通货膨胀和经济减速的平均数据反映,市场表现最好的板块分别是能源、原材料和医药;在香港上市的李宁、百丽等成长性良好的消费品企业2008年估值都有30倍,相对香港市场溢价超过100%......

 

放在整个世界环境中,估值溢价现象也是一个客观事实,而且这种事实并不能简单的用“泡沫”去理解,因为那背后的商业和基本面逻辑是清楚的。当然上述数据还是泛泛的行业性研究,其中必然包括很多泡沫性个体。这也是我在谈溢价现象的时候一定会强调:真正可享有经常性估值溢价的,一定是少数的个体。我在举例一个可能的溢价合理性例子的时候,一定会同时举一个可能的泡沫的例子,正是对这点的强调。

 

谈到公司似乎离我们理解比较远,其实谈谈自然人也是一样的。为什么你可以获得50万年薪而我只能获得10万?为什么30-40岁的人最容易获得高速的成长和薪资的快速提升而不是18岁或者80岁?自然人的“溢价”现象其实每天就发生在我们的身边,理由其实与公司没有本质性的差别:不同的人在知识素养,专业深度,实业历练,人脉资源,年龄结构,智商情商上的差别,形成了薪资溢价(其中当然也有“泡沫”,比如互联网初期随便一个编辑就可以拿万八千的,或者某人是靠吹牛b拿到高薪)。公司在产业空间,行业特点,生意属性,竞争优势,历史证据,发展阶段等等方面同样必然形成估值的差异,其中的佼佼者具备了经常性的估值溢价还那么难以理解吗?

 

为什么有些企业从长期来看股价总是围绕着净资产作上下波动难以真正获得高的资产溢价,而有些企业却相当长时间内都可以维持着很高的净资产溢价?如果只是1,2年还可以以市场偏好来解释。如果这个特性在10年甚至几十年,在中国也在世界其它国家中都出现着,那么请问,这个客观事实的背后是什么?

 

第二,研究估值溢价的内在逻辑并不代表改变了“安全边际”的原则。安全边际、错误定价是“买入”时的第一原则(内在价值评估是前提),这是无须赘述的。但是,如果将买入看做是一个只有类似2008年那种大股灾中才能出现的机会,是否会犯另一种“推向极致”的错误呢?人这辈子还有几次买入机会呢?这不显得过于荒谬了吗?我不得不说,所谓的安全边际真的是艺术性比较强的,我并未发现有什么放之四海而皆准的计算方式存在,而反而针对不同个体的生意性质、发展阶段、行业特性有强烈的关联性。

 

重要的是,懂得识别“合理溢价”与“高度泡沫”之前的区别,而不是混为一谈。前者才可能在合理价格出现时果断的拥有一个好的生意。而后者只能永远感叹“太贵了”却忽略了任何一个贵族股票其实都曾经一二再而三的给出过n多次的合理价格,根本不存在“上不了车”这一说。

 

第三,估值溢价的存在不代表调整不会发生。

就短中期而言,决定股价走势的往往是资金偏好和市场情绪,跌多了涨涨,涨多了跌跌没有什么可解释的意义。

另外,所谓的估值溢价也有一个基准,这种溢价肯定是存在于一定的“范围”内的,不可能说无限的溢价,否则将从溢价状态转入阶段性的泡沫状态无疑。当然这种估值基准的磨合是个复杂的动态平衡的过程,大盘指数估值水平这一基本基准的波动,也必然将影响估值溢价的上限和下限。

 

正因为这种复杂性,我个人强烈的不建议对于可能具备估值溢价特征的企业进行经常性的“称重”行为来试图进行“价值波段”,这几乎是百分之百会失败的尝试(请参考《权衡投资的加法与减法》一文)。股市既然会出现阶段性的低估,那么就必然也会出现阶段性的高估,在这2者之间试图进行精确的衡量和套利,是个美丽和危险的陷阱。

 

最重要的是搞清楚这笔投资的性质是什么。同样的巴菲特,在投资中石油是标准的低估型价值投资,一旦回归中等估值立刻套现;在投资比亚迪时是标准的成长型价值投资,市场错误定价时介入但是1年后已涨了10倍照样一股不卖。何解?不是投资的人变了,而是投资的性质完全不同,着眼点完全不同,逻辑完全不同,行为自然完全不同。

 

第四,任何事物都有其两面性。就如同我们经常谈的估值问题,他有泡沫,但也有合理溢价;反过来说,毫无疑问,均值回归原理是投资界的地球引力,没有任何行业的任何公司可以逃逸(就如同上述举的美国医药行业的估值溢价例子,当前美国的医药企业的平均估值已经下降到十几倍的地步,几乎失去了任何的估值溢价)。这是一种客观事物发展的规律,在对待这种客观规律时,我觉得无非3种态度:

1,对客观事实视而不见

2,只看硬币的一面而忽视另一面

3,尽量客观的分析事物的2面性

 

我的问题是,哪种方式更有利于我们投资能力的发展呢?视而不见只能让我们离市场的真相越来越远;只强调均值回归而完全不理解估值溢价的合理性则会在偏执中放弃掉很好的投资机会(同样,只强调估值溢价而认识不到均值回归同样会在偏执中遭受严重的损失);只有客观的对事物的2面性进行分析,才有助于我们投资认知能力的提高,不是吗?

 

 

总之,溢价现象不是兴奋买入的理由,正如同高企的价格也不是慌乱卖出的理由,只有看懂这背后的逻辑,才有可能尽量做出正确的决策,尽量避免做出错误的决策,从而使得投资这一本质上的概率游戏,形成更加有利于自己的局面。


http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_5dfe996b0100o0vh.html

复制巴菲特的“幻想”与学习巴菲特的“现实”

有时候想想,真的很不可思议。

巴菲特和芒格的办公室只有几个人,却操盘着全世界最大的控股集团,掌控着将近600亿美元的资金的投向。这如果不是有一种极大的智慧,在自身能力极其深厚的前提和基础上,又将本来异常复杂纷乱的投资予以“单纯化、简单化”到一个惊人的程度,怎么可能实现?

反观我们的基金们(包括华尔街的基金),管理着少得多的资金,却动用着庞大几十倍甚至几百倍的人力资源规模,而投资绩效却远远的无法堪比,什么叫差距?这就是。而在这样的差距下,还老出现基金经理、研究员过劳死的现象,而巴菲特和芒格古稀之年却健康快乐,天天跳着踢踏舞去办公室。什么叫境界?这就是。


不要说什么复制巴菲特这种不知道天高地厚的话——想一想,不要考虑他的财产的惊人规模和商业模式上的特殊性,只考虑他原本就具备的极高天赋,以及在此基础上惊人的努力和学习热情,对人性的深刻洞悉和比钢铁更坚定的意志,在古稀之年依然保持旺盛的学习热情和动力,就像一个巨人依然在以超音速的速度向前狂奔,光这点,有几个人堪比?想想追赶这样的人,如果是一场比赛,真的让人不寒而栗。

幸运的是,我们不是对手,但却由此得到了一个极好的精神导师和学习榜样。

为什么巴菲特如此的迷人?不仅仅是因为他取得了前所未有的投资成就,更是因为他的智慧,他幽默的谈吐,他积极向上的人生价值观。

找一个好的榜样,是异常重要的。好的榜样可以让我们思维开阔,心态平和,人生观积极主动,鞭策我们不断的向上再向上。。。。虽然可能永远赶不上那个榜样,但是回头一看,已经超过其它人n个身位了。而与不好的榜样为伍,则会让自己越来越消沉,走上歪路而不自知,或者永远只在原地打转转,最终与榜样一起沉没。

 

就拿巴菲特来说吧,也曾痴迷技术分析长达10年而只不过是芸芸众生中的一个。后来结识了第一个榜样格雷厄姆,从此走上价值投资也是他个人的成功之路。又过了多年,他又遇到了第二个榜样芒格,开始更加辩证和深刻的理解了投资中对象与价格的关系,从而跃上了前人从来无人能够登上过的高峰。

 

所以,从这些大师们的身上,只要能学到一些智慧,我们就受用终生了,这还不够吗?

巴菲特的道路和传奇也许是不可复制的,但是巴菲特的思想和智慧,却是完全可以被借鉴而让人受益无穷的。

作为一个普通人而言,复制巴菲特是不可能的。但是取得巴菲特百分之一,千分之一,甚至万分之一的成功,又有什么不可能的呢?以巴菲特500亿美元的资产规模算大约3000亿人民币,千分之一就是3亿人民币,万分之一就是3000万人民币,难道这还不够吗?难道时代没有赋予我们这样的“长长而湿滑的雪道”吗?


http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_5dfe996b0100rogj.html

伦敦--全球最火爆的房地产市场? The world's hottest real-estate market?

不愿使用"泡沫"这个过分夸大的词汇,但在谈到伦敦的房地产市场时,这还是无法避免。

这里正在发生的一切简直就是荒谬。

从任何一家房地产代理商的窗口往里望去,你会认为人们都疯了。然后你会意识到价格是以英镑计算的,将之转换成美元的话,你还得在原来的价格数字基础上再加60%。

在并不时尚的泰晤士河南岸,带一座小花园的一居室公寓要价50万英镑(约合80万美元),这是真的吗?切尔西一套不算大的两居室公寓竟然要价200万美元?

就像网球名将麦肯罗(John McEnroe)在温布尔登常说的那样,你一定在开玩笑。

尽管英国的大部分地区还在竭力同财政紧缩、实际工资下降和预算减少做斗争,但伦敦的房地产市场已经再次受到另一轮楼市狂热的严重影响。这可是伦敦的房地产市场,全球最好的市场啊!

高端地产经纪公司Knight Frank统计的一项指数显示,伦敦市中心高档物业的价格已接近甚至有可能超过几年前令人晕眩的峰值水平。地产经纪的玻璃窗上贴满的价格条也同样揭示了这一点。

这就好像雷曼兄弟倒闭以及之后的金融危机全然没有发生过。

到底怎么了?

伦敦投资公司Peel Hunt 的分析师哈代(Robin Hardy)是这么向我解释的:伦敦的房地产就像21世纪的瑞士银行帐户。埃及、叙利亚和南欧的富豪正抓紧将资金从动荡的国内转移到这里。由于没有其它更为理想的投资渠道,这些人便将钱砸在了有"百万富翁游乐场"之称的伦敦市中心的物业上。

哈代说,如果你的目标只是保本,那么置业是一种相对安全的投资方式。这些富豪认为,相比把钱存在大马士革的一家银行里,在斯隆街(Sloane Street)投资一套公寓更为安全。

高端房地产代理商Foxtons告诉我,今年该公司在斯隆广场(Sloane Square)的分支机构售出的房屋中有80%为海外买家所购买。

这不过是一个已经流传了一段时间的故事的最新进展。海湾酋长、俄罗斯寡头、印度新贵以及中国富豪,伦敦已然成为国际超级富豪的游乐场。俄罗斯人的钱已经涌入这座城市至少十年。本地一位对冲基金经理告诉我,伦敦地产是"俄罗斯资金的洗钱机"。

从杰明街(Jermyn Street)到旧邦德街(Old Bond Street)的那些最高档的购物区里你能看出端倪。

石油和新兴市场的繁荣支撑此地的房价至少已有十年的时间。通过给予外国人优惠的税收政策,英国巧妙地助推了这一趋势。

我的一个朋友几年前曾向我介绍一位海湾国家酋长是如何坚定地在海德公园(Hyde Park)北面买下一套又一套的公寓。这位酋长喜欢每年夏天来伦敦小住两个月以躲避海湾的炙热。他总是要带上一大家子人和随从。他并不在意价格,只想买下尽可能多的公寓。

还有其它因素在起作用。伦敦已成为欧洲的金融重心。巨大的赚钱机器早已开到了伦敦城老金融区之外。实力雄厚的对冲基金和神秘的大宗商品交易公司占领了伦敦高档社区的大街小巷,以及重新开发的Docklands的塔楼。这也成为了助推伦敦房价的主要因素。

住房供应是有限的,特别是在那些最佳区域。伦敦对于哪些区域的土地可以作何种使用有着严格的法律规定,所以伦敦新开发的房地产项目很少。

低利率也是推涨伦敦房地产市场的一个因素。笔者的一位朋友曾说,他那明显价格过高的住房每年的按揭成本却很低,因为他的可调息按揭贷款目前的借款利率只有1%。

照伦敦人的说法,这里的房地产奇迹能够无限期延续下去。房价将持续高涨。伦敦的房地产业将不会再遇到多少熊市。大多数熊市都已经历过了。

但几个不利因素却是人们决定投资伦敦房地产之前应该考虑到的。

首先,伦敦那些晚上彻夜黑灯的住宅越来越多。这个周日我与一位相交最久的朋友去酒吧,他向我描述了伦敦市中心一年到头都不大被使用的房屋如何越来越多。你只需在大街上漫步时抬头望一下,就能看到街边建筑物的窗户很少是亮着的。

房地产经纪公司莱坊(Knight Frank)新近进行的一项研究发现,那些国际精英们决定卖掉在伦敦的住房时给出的最重要理由之一不过是,他们不大用得着这些房子。

第二个令人担忧的因素是,越来越多货真价实的英国人被挤出了伦敦。过去10天笔者在与英国议会一位伦敦籍议员和伦敦一家基金的高管共进晚餐时,他们都哀叹说,那些开始在伦敦讨生活的年青人已不再负担得起伦敦人以往常住的那些房子了。高涨的房价已经把他们挤出了伦敦。许多中产阶级也面临同样的命运。这种局面最终将无法维持下去。它将扼杀伦敦这座城市的活力。

第三个问题是,利率无法永远停留在1%的低水平。利率迟早都要升上去,当那一天真的到来时,许多住房贷款都将因不堪重负而无法偿还。珍惜现在的幸福时光吧。

第四个问题是经常被人遗忘。在互联网和现代科技大行其道的今天,像伦敦这种居住成本高的大城市,其比较优势其实是在下降的。20年前,如果你想在英伦三岛经营一只对冲基金,你或许不得不在伦敦开展相关业务。而如今再也不是这种情况了。你可以在伦敦以外的地方运营这只基金,而那里的生活成本会低很多,生活质量也会比伦敦好很多。

第五个问题可能是对房主最为不利的,那就是租房收益率的大幅下降。

据莱坊说,过去10年伦敦黄金地段的房屋售价已经增长了一倍,而伦敦黄金地段的房屋租金只上涨了不到10%。二者相抵,导致房主的租房毛收益率平均只有3.6%,低于10年前6%的水平。我与房主和租户们交流后发现,一些房主的租房毛收益率甚至更低。

如果你再将买卖、维修房屋的成本以及房产税和物业费从房屋租赁收益中减去,一些房主靠出租房子就算能有所收益,也几乎赚不到什么钱了。

那些捍卫当前房价合理性的人通常会立即反驳说,人们投资买房不是为了赚取那点租房收益,他们是为了赚取资本利得!

这种论调真够呛,在一个理性的市场上,收益率是资本利得的推动力。某种资产的价格之所以上涨,是因为其所有人正在从这份资产上赚大钱,从而引得其他人也想拥有这种资产。那种认为人们会把一种不挣钱资产的价格持续推高的想法,往好里说也是痴心妄想。

伦敦的房价会调头下行吗?如果会,将出现在什么时候? 这当然谁也说不好。不过对那些生活和工作在英国的人来说,结论是显然的。如果我回到英国居住,可能的话我会尽量避免生活和工作在伦敦。如果我非得住在伦敦,我会选择租房。

Brett Arends

(本文版权归道琼斯公司所有,未经许可不得翻译或转载。)


I hesitate to use the overplayed word 'bubble.' But in the case of London property, it's hard to avoid.

What's happening here is absolutely ridiculous.

Look in the window of any real-estate agent here and you think people have gone crazy - and then you realize that the prices are in British pounds, and that to convert to dollars you have to add another 60%.

Half a million pounds ($800,000) for a one-bedroom condo with a small garden on the southern, unfashionable side of the river Thames? Really? And $2 million for a modest two-bedroom condo in Chelsea?

As John McEnroe used to say at Wimbledon, you cannot be serious.

While the rest of Britain grapples with austerity, falling real wages and budget cuts, London real estate - super-prime London real estate, the best of the best - is back in the grip of another mania.

According to an index maintained by high-end real-estate firm Knight Frank, prime central London prices are nearing and may even be surpassing the giddy levels seen at the peak a few years ago. The brokers' windows tell the same story.

It's like that whole Lehman thing never even happened.

What's going on?

'London property is the 'Swiss bank account' of the 21st century,' Robin Hardy, an analyst at London investment firm Peel Hunt, explained to me. Rich people in places like Egypt, Syria and southern Europe are rushing to get their money away from the turmoil, and for want of a better alternative, they are plunking it down in the 'millionaire's playground' of central London.

'It's seen as a relatively safe place to put your money if your objective is capital preservation,' he said. They think money is 'safer invested in an apartment in Sloane Street than in a bank account in Damascus.'

Foxtons, a high-end real-estate agency, told me that 80% of its sales this year at its Sloane Square branch have come from overseas buyers.

This is just the latest twist to a story that's been running for some time. Gulf sheikhs. Russian oligarchs. Newly rich Indian and Chinese tycoons. London has become a magnate for the international super-rich: a millionaire's playground. Russian money has been flooding in for at least a decade. One hedge-fund manager here told me London property was a 'laundromat for Russian money.'

You can see it in the fanciest shopping districts, from Jermyn Street and Old Bond Street.

The booms in oil and emerging markets have been very good for prices here for at least a decade. Great Britain, through generous tax treatment of foreign nationals, has cleverly encouraged the trend.

A friend of mine a few years ago described how a Gulf sheikh was steadily buying up more and more of her condo development just north of Hyde Park. The sheikh liked to come to London for two months every summer to escape the Gulf heat, and he liked to bring his extended family and entourage. He didn't care much about price, and he wanted as many condos as he could get.

There are other factors at work. London has become the financial capital of Europe. The giant money machine has spread far beyond the old financial district of the City of London. High-powered hedge funds and secretive commodity firms crowd the alleys and lanes of Mayfair and the towers of redeveloped Docklands. The windfalls have long been seen as a major driver of property prices.

Housing supply is limited, especially in the best areas. London has tough zoning laws, so there is very little new development.

And you can also throw into the mix low interest rates. A friend explained how his grossly overpriced home cost him very little every year, because he is paying just 1% interest on a flexible mortgage.

To hear people tell it here, this miracle will go on indefinitely. Prices will keep rising skyward. You no longer encounter many bears of London property. Most have given up.

But there are a couple of wrinkles that should give people pause.

First, you see more and more dark windows. On Sunday I went to a pub with one of my oldest friends. He described how more and more properties in central London were simply unused most of the year. You'd look up at the windows as you walked down the street, and very few were lit up.

A recent study by Knight Frank found that one of the top reasons the international elite gave for selling a London home was simply that it was surplus to their needs.

The second concern is that more and more actual British are being crowded out of the city. Over dinners in the past 10 days, both a London member of Parliament and a top executive at a fund firm here have bemoaned the fact that young people can no longer afford to move into the usual London neighborhoods when they start their careers here. They've been priced out. Many of the middle-class are suffering the same fate. Ultimately, this simply becomes unsustainable. It will strangle the city's vitality.

The third problem is that 1% interest rates will not last forever. Sooner or later they will have to rise, and when they do, a lot of home loans will become unmanageable as well as unrepayable. Happy times.

The fourth issue is one that often gets forgotten. In the age of the Internet and modern technology, the comparative advantages of big, expensive cities like London are actually in decline. Twenty years ago, if you wanted to run a hedge fund in the British Isles, you probably had to do it in London. That is no longer the case. It is a lot cheaper - and the quality of life much better - if you move out of town.

The fifth problem, though, is probably most ominous: the plunge in rental yields.

According to Knight Frank, while prime London sales prices have doubled in the past 10 years, prime London rents have risen by less than 10%. The net result is that landowners are getting a gross yield of maybe 3.6% on average, compared to more than 6% a decade ago. Conversations I've had - with renters and owners - suggest some are getting even less.

Once you subtract all the costs of buying and selling a home, maintenance, taxes and condo fees, some landlords are making very little - if anything.

As usual, the defenders of current prices are quick with a rebuttal: 'But people aren't investing for the yield,' they say. 'They are investing for the capital gains!'

Alas for this argument, in a rational market, yields are the drivers of capital gains. The price of an asset goes up because the current owners are earning so much money that outsiders want in. The idea that people will keeping bidding up prices of an asset that makes no money is quixotic at best.

Will it turn? If so, when? It's anyone's guess. But for those living and working in Britain, the conclusions are pretty obvious. If I moved back to this country, I would avoid living and working in London if at all possible. And if I had to be in London, I'd rent.

Brett Arends

观点:中国高通胀的真正原因 Opinion: Beijing Chases the Inflation Dragon

国决策者过去一年半的种种行为都似乎表明,他们可在经济继续以8%甚至更高速度增长的同时,轻易解决通货膨胀问题。如今他们开始意识到,这个问题比预想得更为严重,但却仍对经济过热的根源存在误解。其实,真正的原因在于过去两年中国大幅增加货币供应,这些供应目前仍在不断向实体经济渗透。

上周五发布的经济数据显示,3月份消费者价格指数(CPI)同比上升5.4%,为三年来最高升幅。由于中国政府在为过热的经济降温方面出手太慢,通胀率尚未达到峰值。这里的出手太慢意味着,除非决策者让中国GDP的实际增长率大幅降至近年来的一般增速以下,否则中国就可能面临通胀失控的风险。

Getty Images
上个月,中国总理温家宝在北京出席一次新闻发布会。
中国决策者倾向于把通胀原因归咎为供应方面的因素,如造成粮食短缺的恶劣天气等。但真正的原因在于北京方面为应对2008年末中国陷入经济衰退而出台的经济刺激方案。广义货币供应量的增长在2009年和2010年上半年占GDP的比重接近40%,远远高于2003年占比27%的峰值。

中国政府增加货币供应量的做法无疑提振了经济增长。中国经济于2009年春天开始了强劲复苏,但仅在几个季度内就开始变得过热。到2009年中期,通胀开始在各个领域加速。消费品价格、房价和工资全都开始以更高的速度增长。以此来看,很难说中国的通胀不是一种货币现象。

货币供应过多带来的种种危害正在逐一显现。中国可能正处于一种恶性的工资-通胀螺旋式上升的边缘,而这种形式的上升可能不利于当局对经济的控制。3月份实际通胀率很可能高于官方通报的5.4%,这也是当前中国政府忙不迭地实行紧缩政策的原因。尽管如此,它的行动还是开始得太晚了。通胀率一年多来不断上升,而实际存款利率在有关当局开始真正退出货币刺激政策之前,已有近一年都为负值。

为了理解政策反应滞后对经济增长意味着什么,很重要的一点就是要追踪在商业周期的不同阶段货币供应对通胀水平的推动作用。如果一国的实际产出超过其潜在产出,这个国家就会出现经济过热,通货膨胀也会开始抬头。对潜在产出的定义可以一定水平的闲置生产能力为依据。只要产出和价格之间存在相互推动、交替上升的现象,基本上就可以说,一定有某些生产能力被闲置。一个经济体越是不断接近其有限资源被完全利用的水平,就有越来越多的商品通过提价的方式来把那些未经利用的资源投入生产。

2008年末和2009年初,中国就曾出现过闲置生产能力,这是由于以前维持中国工厂满负荷运转的外部需求突然大幅减少,中国经济随即陷入衰退,实际产出低于潜在产出,年均通胀率的升幅迅速放缓,并在2009年初变为负值。然而到2009年中期,中国经济增长开始强劲反弹,闲置生产能力也开始被完全利用,出现了过多的人民币追逐过少的产品和服务的现象。到2009年秋季,实际产出水平已经超过了经济潜能,并一直延续至今。如果在那时中国政府就开始收紧政策,通胀问题不会失控到今天这个地步。

好消息是,近来中国政府做出的紧缩努力可能已开始初见成效。广义货币供应(M2)可以帮助我们更好地看清最近的趋势。按每季度的年化统计数据来看,中国的广义货币供应从去年10月高达28.5%的增长率已放慢至今年3月的8.4%。上周五,中国第一次发布了有关GDP季度实际增长率的统计数据。数据显示,中国实际GDP增长率从去年第四季度的2.4%减缓至今年第一季度的2.1%。宏观经济预测顾问公司Lombard Street Research对中国GDP季度实际增长率做了自己的估测,结果表明,官方数据可能对今年第一季度经济增长放缓的程度有所淡化。

中国政府似乎有很大的决心,一定要赢得抗通胀斗争的胜利。另外,决策者也表现出,他们知道中国的增长模式需摆脱过去那种信贷推动的投资热,并且知道这种模式的转变意味着改变中国经济的内在结构,放慢经济增长速度。但问题是,面对经济增速大大放缓以及随之而来的社会和政治问题,中国准备好了吗?

DIANA CHOYLEVA

(本文作者DIANA CHOYLEVA是宏观经济研究机构Lombard Street Research的主管。)

(本文版权归道琼斯公司所有,未经许可不得翻译或转载。)


Chinese policy makers have acted for the last year and a half as if their inflation problem could be solved easily while growth continues to tick along at 8% or faster. Now they are starting to realize that the problem is more serious. But they still misunderstand why China is overheating. The root cause is a massive increase in the money supply over the past two years that is still filtering through the economy.

Data released last Friday showed consumer prices in March rose by 5.4% year-on-year, the highest in three years. And there's more yet to come, as Beijing was too slow to start cooling China's red hot economy. Being too slow means that unless policy makers bring real GDP growth sharply below trend, China is at risk of runaway inflation.

There is a tendency among Chinese policy makers to attribute the cause of inflation to supply-side factors, like bad weather that creates food shortages. But the real cause is Beijing's stimulus plan after China's economy plunged into recession in late 2008. The increase in broad money as a share of GDP was close to 40% in 2009 and the first half of 2010, much higher than the previous peak of 27% in 2003.

Beijing's monetary boost certainly revived growth. The rebound that started in the spring of 2009 was spectacular, but within just a couple of quarters the economy had overheated. By the middle of 2009 inflation began to accelerate, and it did so on all fronts. Consumer prices, property prices and wages all began to rise at a faster pace. Against this evidence, it is hard to argue that inflation in China has been anything else but a monetary phenomenon.

The dangers of this monetary excess are becoming evident. China may be on the brink of a vicious wage-inflation spiral, which could undermine the authorities' grip over the economy. Actual inflation could well be higher than the official 5.4% in March. That's why Beijing is now hurriedly tightening. Still, this policy action comes too late in the day: Inflation had been on the rise for over a year and real deposit rates had been negative for nearly a year before the authorities began a meaningful withdrawal of the monetary stimulus.

It is important to trace the monetary impetus to inflation through the stages of the business cycle to understand what the delayed policy response now means for growth. An economy is overheated and inflation starts to rise if the level of actual output is above the economy's potential. Potential output can be defined on the basis of a given degree of spare capacity: Wherever there is a tradeoff between higher output and higher prices, essentially some capacity must remain idle. The closer an economy approaches the full use of its limited resources, the more prices rise to pull unused resources into production.

There was spare capacity in the economy in late 2008 and early 2009, because the external demand that kept China's factories chugging had slumped, pushing the economy into recession. So actual output fell below potential, and annual inflation slowed quickly, turning negative in early 2009. By mid-2009, growth had rebounded strongly and spare capacity started getting used up, with too many yuan chasing too few goods and services. By the fall of 2009 the level of actual output was already above the economy's potential and has stayed there since. If the tightening had begun then, inflation wouldn't have gotten as bad.

The good news is that the recent tightening efforts may have begun to bite. On a three-month annualized basis, a better guide to recent trends, broad money, or M2, growth slowed to 8.4% in March from as high as 28.5% last October. China published quarterly real GDP growth for the first time last Friday, showing growth slowed to 2.1% in the first quarter of this calendar year from 2.4% in the fourth quarter last year. Lombard Street Research estimates its own quarterly real GDP growth for China, which suggests that the official data could be understating the extent of the slowdown in the first quarter.

Beijing seems serious about winning the battle with inflation. Policy makers have also shown that they understand the need for China's growth model to move away from the credit-fuelled investment binges of the past, and that this means structurally lower growth. The question is, how prepared is Beijing to accept much slower growth and its social and political consequences?

(Ms. Choyleva is a director at Lombard Street Research. )

DIANA CHOYLEVA