Pete Souza/White House
在美国白宫战情室内，美国总统奥巴马及其国家安全顾问团队实时监控着此次针对乌萨马•本•拉登的反恐行动。
就
当两架载着美国特种部队的武装直升机飞过没有月色的夜空朝本•拉登（Osama bin Laden）的藏身老巢进发之际，此次行动的策划者还无法确定他们的目标就住在那儿。
基地组织领导人本・拉登在距巴基斯坦首都60多公里外被击毙，在未来几天内，安全形势趋紧。《华尔街日报》的Jake Lee、Carlos Tejada以及John Bussey对此进行了讨论。
美国总统奥巴马也选择了一个充满风险的攻击策略：直接袭击这座深处巴基斯坦的房子，而不是利用隐形战机来轰炸。这可能让美国战斗人员在这个像迷宫一般的建筑物内与对方发生面对面的交锋。
从阿富汗南部的洞穴到巴基斯坦东部没有法律约束的省份，这十年来追寻本•拉登的历程让美国倍受挫折。这一次美国官员决定冒险。对美国此次决策的评估显示，它一定程度上是建立在数月以来不屈不挠的策划之上的，但最终做出采取行动的决策靠的是直觉。
AFP/Getty Images
基地组织领袖、一手策划美国历史上最大规模恐怖袭击的本・拉登于当地时间周日在巴基斯坦身亡。美国总统奥巴马周日晚证实了这一消息。
去年12月，美国中央情报局（Central Intelligence Agency）召开了一次秘密会议，以筹措上千万美元的资金，展开一项为期五个月的特别行动。周日击毙拉登的突袭为此次行动画上完美句号。在对白宫、情报机构、五角大楼和国会的近12位官员进行采访并听取相关情况介绍之后，记者撰写了这份报道。
很显然，巴基斯坦阿伯塔巴德（Abbottabad）这座壁垒森严的综合体建筑是为隐蔽某位不希望外人看到自己的人所建的，它成了美国情报机构的兴趣焦点。到去年秋天，美国已经知道这幢建筑内的22位居民大都是本•拉登最信任的一位信使的亲属。“信使”是本•拉登的心腹，专门负责在基地组织领袖和基地组织的全球“朋友”间传递信息。
但在这幢三层高的建筑里也住着另外一家人，其身份至今仍是一个谜团。情报官员知道楼里住着一个成年男性，但始终无法见到他的身影，因为他从不露面。
Anjum Naveed/Associated Press
多年来行踪诡秘的基地组织领袖本・拉登上周日被美军击毙。他最后的藏身地是距离巴基斯坦首都伊斯兰堡约64公里处的一幢住宅。
2002年，就在本•拉登在阿富汗密布洞穴的托拉搏拉（Tora Bora）山区逃脱追捕一年后，通过审讯被中情局扣留的基地组织成员，美国得知了本•拉登一名信使的假名。这名信使是2001年911恐怖袭击事件的幕后策划者哈立德•谢赫•穆罕默德（Khalid Sheikh Mohammed）的门徒，也是此前被捕获的基地组织三号人物阿布•法拉杰•利比（Abu Faraj al-Libbi）的忠实助手。美国官员还未公布这名信使的名字。
此后又花了数年时间美国才知道这名信使的真名。2007年，中情局的分析人员终于知道了此人的名字，并开始寻找他。尽管如此，此人却踪迹难寻。2009年2月，帕内塔就任中情局局长以后首次关于本•拉登的情况通报会令人失望。在那段时间，美国情报人员已经瞥见了这位和其兄弟一起工作的信使。但这两人非常小心，始终没有暴露自己的行踪。
一年多之后才取得了重大突破。2010年8月下旬，中情局得以跟踪这位信使径直到达了他的居住地，也就是位于阿伯塔巴德的那处建筑群。
美国对这处建筑群展开密集调查。来自中情局、国家地理空间情报局(National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency)和国家安全局(National Security Agency)的团队利用卫星和其他监视设备对它进行了研究。帕内塔每周收到一次最新情况报告。
建筑物建于2005年，位于市郊一条狭窄的土路末端。主体结构是一栋三层高的楼房，临街的窗户很少。三楼有一个平台，还有一堵七英尺（约2.1米）高的墙，以防其他人看到内部。
一位美国官员说，情报人员一看到它，就知道其中有问题。
间谍们甚至无法通过翻捡垃圾寻找线索。和几乎所有邻居们不一样的是，居住在这处建筑群内的人们都是自行焚烧处理垃圾。
2010年9月，奥巴马听说了这处建筑群，并得知里面可能住着反恐战争的重要目标──那位信使及其家人，以及他的兄弟一家。
一位美国官员说，除此以外，住在里面的还有第三个神秘家庭。这位官员说，有一名成年男性，情报人员不知道他长什么样，但知道他住在里面，还有一名可能是其妻子的女性以及不止一名孩子；这个家庭与乌萨马•本•拉登可能有的家庭相符。第三个家庭的成员从未离开这处居所。
2010年11月，帕内塔下令全国反恐中心(National Counterterrorism Center)给出10个方案，以更好地了解住在这处建筑群内的到底是什么人。反恐中心递交了38个方案，但只有少数可行。一位美国官员说，这当中要注意权衡，越是深入，打草惊蛇的风险也越高。
Associated Press
本•拉登最后的藏身地是距离巴基斯坦首都伊斯兰堡约64公里处的一幢住宅。图为建筑内的一间卧室。
证据仍不充分，但中情局局长帕内塔在2010年12月认定，已掌握的情报已经具备足够的说服力，可以采取行动。他和国会议员举行了一次秘密会议，希望获得数千万美元的资金来实施一个对那处建筑群展开大规模情报搜集的宏大计划。
帕内塔于2010年12月从国会拿到钱后，中情局分析师对于本•拉登住在那里的可能性仍然没有统一意见。一些人认为可能性有60%，其他人说是80%。一位官员说，这种不确定性让帕内塔很为难，但他认定，即使本•拉登住在那里的可能性只有一半，美国民众也会对展开行动持支持态度。
2011年2月，帕内塔相信制定行动计划的时候到了。他和美军特种部队司令部负责人威廉•麦克雷文(William McRaven)中将会面，要求派出一支小团队来制定行动方案。
开始时，美国偏爱的行动方案是轰炸。这种方式会让美军的风险降到最小，最有可能击毙居住在这座综合体建筑里的所有居民，但同时也可能摧毁证明本•拉登潜伏在这座建筑里的任何证据。
如动用直升机发起突袭，情况会更复杂，但更有可能拿到本•拉登确实藏身在这座建筑里的证据。一些美国官员生怕再重复美军在索马里的军事惨败“黑鹰坠落”(Black Hawk Down)，当时美军对索马里军阀展开了拙劣的袭击，造成多名美军士兵阵亡。
Associated Press
本•拉登身亡后，巴基斯坦军队在他最后的藏身地巡逻。
奥巴马对这些顾问说，机会来了。
两周后，奥巴马对其国家安全顾问团队说，希望他们开始进行对这座建筑的袭击演习。该顾问团队在阿富汗建造了一个该建筑物的实体模型，以充分考察袭击演习的成效。
4月份，帕内塔每天都要召开会议。一次他在会上说，这是我们得到的最佳线索，我们必须查明这座建筑里到底有些什么人。
4月19日，帕内塔对奥巴马说，美国中情局认为本•拉登在那里。其他顾问向奥巴马介绍了袭击行动的准备工作，包括演习的情况。一位政府官员说，奥巴马让这些顾问假定这是实现计划目标的一个良机，并说我们必须做好准备。
也是在4月19日同一天，尽管风险增加，奥巴马还是对突击式直升机攻击行动给予了临时批准。美国高级官员说，要能正确识别本•拉登的身份，这已成了决定性因素。
4月29日周五早上八点，奥巴马在白宫外事接待室(Diplomatic Room)召集国家安全顾问多尼伦(Tom Donilan)、白宫幕僚长戴利(William Daley)和白宫反恐首席顾问布伦南开会，对行动进行了授权。
帕内塔给美国海军上将麦克雷文(Adm. McRaven)打电话说，朋友，一切由你掌握，给你献上我最衷心的祝福，而我能做的就是为你祈祷。
周日上午，奥巴马给这次军事行动下达了最后命令，此前由于天气原因，行动被推迟了24小时。帕内塔去了教堂。奥巴马打了九洞高尔夫。
据巴基斯坦官员看过的情报显示，本•拉登至少从自去年8月就一直占据着这座庞大建筑，它占地超过一英亩(约合0.405公顷)，建在种满了尤加利树的绿色农田里。居民说，这座建筑自2005年就一直有人居住。
建筑的中心位置是一座三层高的楼房，建筑物四周被大约14英尺(约合4.2米)高的混凝土墙围起，围墙上方有带刺铁丝网，还有监控摄像头。有些附近居民说，这座建筑还有地下区域。
周日夜幕降临后，几架美国直升机将特种作战部队一支分队从阿富汗贾拉拉巴德空军基地带到此处。由于建筑物高墙造成的“涡旋”，一架直升机重重撞向地面后严重受损，这堪称美国此次军事行动最令人揪心的时刻。
帕内塔在七楼由会议室改成的作战指挥室里监控此次行动。奥巴马和他的高级助手们在白宫战情室实时关注行动的进展。布伦南说，当时感觉像是度秒如日。
突击队员意识到可能必须放弃一架直升机，他们用了40分钟时间边开火边搜查这座建筑的每一个部分。最后搜查到主楼时，在二层和三层找到了本•拉登及其家人。美国官员说，本•拉登在被击毙前试图用枪自卫。
本•拉登的尸体起初得到了突击队队员的确认，该处建筑内一个被确认是他妻子的女人也指认这是本•拉登的尸体。
突击队还接到命令要拿走具有情报价值的物品。一位美国情报官员说，他们拿走了所有能找到的东西，包括电脑硬盘；情报人员正在仔细检查这些物品，不放过任何可能从中获得的信息。
袭击结束后当地电视台获得的一段录像显示，在据报本•拉登被击毙的那间屋子里，有一张血迹斑斑的床。
美国国防部一位高官说，本•拉登是被“美国子弹”打死的，这就排除了他是被自己的卫兵打死以防被活捉的可能。美国突击队打出的子弹至少有一枚击中了本•拉登的左眼。
另有三名成年男子在突袭中被打死，包括上述两名信使和本•拉登的一个成年儿子。一名妇女被其中一名男子用作“盾牌”，结果被打死。另有两名妇女受伤。突击队离开前，机组人员毁掉了受损的那架美国直升机。
美东时间周日下午3点50分，奥巴马首次得知本•拉登的尸体得到了初步确认。晚上7点01分，奥巴马获知这具尸体“很有可能”是本•拉登。
据一位高级情报官员说，本•拉登的尸体不仅得到了突击队的确认，也得到了他一个妻子的确认。中央情报局专家对比了尸体图片和公开的本•拉登照片，以95%的把握确定这就是他。周一上午，初步DNA分析表明，尸体的DNA和本•拉登多名家庭成员的DNA“差不多100%”相符。
按照死后24小时之内必须安葬的伊斯兰传统，本•拉登的尸体已在周一被海葬。美国一位高级国防官员说在卡尔文森号航空母舰的甲板上举行了宗教仪式。遗体被装在一个负重的袋子内。一位军事官员宣读了准备好的宗教致辞。
一位高级国防官员说，致辞结束后，遗体被置于一个准备好的平板上，然后平板缓缓倾斜，遗体随之滑入海中。
Siobhan Gorman / Adam Entous / Zahid Hussain
（更新完成）
（本文版权归道琼斯公司所有，未经许可不得翻译或转载。）
As two choppers packed with American special forces skimmed their way across a moonless sky toward Osama bin Laden's lair, the mission's planners still weren't even sure their target lived there.
Some of the analysts who assessed the intelligence put the chances as low as 60%.
President Barack Obama had also chosen a risky attack option: A direct raid on the house, deep within Pakistan─potentially putting American fighters in face-to-face combat within a maze-like compound─instead of simply bombing the place from a Stealth aircraft.
After a decade of frustration, chasing bin Laden's shadow from the caves of southern Afghanistan to the lawless provinces of eastern Pakistan, U.S. officials decided the risk was worth taking. An examination of the American decision shows the extent to which it was built upon on months of tenacious planning─but that ultimately, it came down to gut instinct.
'What swayed people was there was no other plausible explanation' for who else might be hiding in the home, one U.S. official said. The other possibility, some suspected, was al Qaeda's No. 2, Ayman al-Zawahiri.
In December, the Central Intelligence Agency called a secret meeting to line up tens of millions of dollars in funding, kicking off a five-month scramble that climaxed in Sunday's dramatic events. This account is based on interviews and briefings with nearly a dozen officials from the White House, intelligence agencies, Pentagon and Congress.
Clearly, the focus of the U.S. spy community's interest─a walled compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan─was built to shelter someone who didn't want to be seen. By last fall, the U.S. had figured out that most of its 22 residents were relatives of one of bin Laden's most trusted 'couriers,' a close confidant responsible for shuttling messages among al Qaeda leaders and friends world-wide.
But there was also another family in the sprawling, three-story building, and it remained a deep mystery. Intelligence officials knew there was an adult male in there, but they couldn't catch a glimpse. He never stepped in to view.
For more than a decade, the U.S. had sought bin Laden, and missed half a dozen times. Amid these frustrations, the seeds of last weekend's mission were sown.
In 2002, just a year after bin Laden had escaped in the cave-riddled mountains of Tora Bora in Afghanistan, interrogations of CIA detainees revealed the nom de guerre of one of his couriers. The man, who hasn't been named by U.S. officials, was a protégé of the mastermind of the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, and a trusted assistant to Abu Faraj al-Libbi, a former al Qaeda No. 3 previously captured.
It took several more years simply to learn that courier's real name. In 2007, CIA analysts finally obtained it, and set out to find him. Still, the trail remained cold. Mr. Panetta's first briefing on bin Laden as CIA chief, in February 2009, was discouraging. Spies around that time had 'caught a glimpse' of the courier, who was working with his brother. But the two men had been extremely careful about covering their tracks.
The big break took more than a year. In late August 2010, the CIA was able to follow the courier directly to the place where he lived: the Abbottabad compound.
The property came in for intense scrutiny. Teams from the CIA, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and National Security Agency studied it with satellite and other surveillance equipment. Mr. Panetta got weekly updates.
Built in 2005, the compound was on the outskirts of the town center, at the end of a narrow dirt road. The main structure: a three-story building with few windows facing outward. There was a terrace on the third floor with a seven-foot wall, preventing people from seeing inside.
'Once they saw it, they knew they were on to something,' a U.S. official said.
Spies couldn't even rustle through the trash for clues. Unlike almost all the neighbors, the residents of the compound burned their garbage.
In September, Mr. Obama was told about the compound and informed that it might be housing valuable targets in the war on terror─the courier and his family, as well as the family of the courier's brother.
In addition, 'There was a mysterious third family living there,' a U.S. official said. 'There was an adult male they couldn't visualize but knew he was there. There was also a female, potentially a wife and children, whose family matched Osama bin Laden's potential family.' Members of the third family never left the residence.
In November, Mr. Panetta directed the Counterterrorism Center to provide 10 proposals to gain better intelligence on who was at the compound. They delivered 38, but only a few were viable. 'That was the balance, the more you creep in, the more you risk tipping him off,' a U.S. official said.
Looming over the operation was an equally pressing worry: The U.S. might tip off the Pakistanis, who weren't deemed trustworthy enough to keep the secret. The Pakistanis had provided the U.S. some information on the courier, but may not have realized his significance, a U.S. official said. Some U.S. officials had long suspected elements of the Pakistani government or military were aiding bin Laden.
The evidence remained circumstantial. Nevertheless, in December, CIA chief Leon Panetta decided the intelligence in hand was compelling enough to act. He called a secret meeting with lawmakers to seek tens of millions of dollars to fund an intensive program aimed intensive collection of intel about the property.
After Mr. Panetta secured the money from Congress in December, CIA analysts remained split on the likelihood bin Laden was even there. Some put the chances at 60%; others said 80%. Mr. Panetta struggled with the uncertainty, one official said, but concluded the American public would back an operation even if the odds were only 50-50.
In February, Mr. Panetta believed it was time to begin planning an operation. He met with Vice Adm. William McRaven, who heads the military's special operations command, and asked for a small team to game out the options.
An early favorite: a bombing raid. That approach would minimize risk to American troops and maximize the likelihood of killing the residents of the compound. But it might also have destroyed any proof bin Laden was there.
A helicopter raid would be more complex, but more likely to deliver confirmation. Some officials were wary of repeating a fiasco like Black Hawk Down in Somalia, when American forces were killed after a botched raid on a Somali warlord.
John Brennan, the White House chief counterterrorism adviser, said Obama advisers were divided given the risks, the circumstantial evidence, and the uncertainty about the true identities of all the residents. Top national-security advisers briefed the president in the Situation Room on March 14. They told him there was a high-value target at the compound, and most likely it was bin Laden.
'This is a go,' Mr. Obama told the principles.
Two weeks later, Mr. Obama told his national-security team he wanted them to start rehearsing a raid on the compound. The team built a mock-up of the compound in Afghanistan to test out dry runs of possible attacks.
In April, Mr. Panetta was holding daily meetings. 'This it the best lead we have,' he told his team at one meeting. 'We've got to find out what the hell is in that compound.'
On April 19, Mr. Panetta told the president the CIA believed bin Laden was there. Other advisers briefed Mr. Obama on preparations for an assault, including the outcomes of the dress rehearsals. Mr. Obama told them to 'assume it's a go for planning purposes and that we had to be ready,' an administration official said.
That same day, Mr. Obama gave provisional approval for the commando-style helicopter assault despite the added risk. Senior U.S. officials said the need to get a positive identification on bin Laden became the deciding factor.
At 8 a.m. Friday, April 29, in White House Diplomatic Room, Mr. Obama summoned National Security Adviser Tom Donilan, Chief of Staff William Daley and Mr. Brennan, and authorized the operation.
Mr. Panetta called Adm. McRaven. 'It's in your hands, friend,' he told Adm. McRaven. 'I wish you the best. All I can do is pray a hell of a lot.'
On Sunday morning, Mr. Obama gave the mission a final go, after a 24-hour delay due to bad weather. Mr. Panetta went to church. Mr. Obama played nine holes of golf.
The sprawling compound, spread over an acre of lush farmland covered with eucalyptus trees, was occupied by bin Laden at least since August of last year, according to intelligence reviewed by Pakistani officials. Residents said it had been occupied since 2005.
A three-story building sits in the middle of the compound surrounded by concrete walls some 14 feet high that are topped by barbed wire and contained security cameras. Some residents also claimed it had an underground area.
After nightfall Sunday, U.S. helicopters brought the team of Special Operations Forces from an air base in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. One helicopter was badly damaged after hitting the ground hard because of a 'vortex' created by the high walls of the compound, a heart-stopping moment that encapsulated the U.S.'s biggest fears about the mission.
Mr. Panetta monitored the operation from his seventh-floor conference-room-turned-war-room. At the White House, Mr. Obama and his top aides monitored the unfolding action in real time from the Situation Room. 'The minutes passed like days,' Mr. Brennan said.
Knowing they would have to abandon one chopper, the team spent 40 minutes, with guns blazing, charging through each of the structures on the compound. Bin Laden and his family were found on the second and third floors of the large main structure, the final building to be searched. U.S. officials said bin Laden tried to defend himself with a gun before being shot.
Bin Laden's body was initially identified by members of the military strike force, and by a woman at the compound identified as one of his wives.
The assault team also had orders to remove items of intelligence value. 'They picked up anything they could get their hands on,' including computer hard drives, said a U.S. intelligence official. 'They're being exploited to find anything we can on them.'
Video footage obtained by local TV channels following the attack showed a bloodstained bed in a room where bin Laden was reportedly killed.
A senior defense official said bin Laden was killed by 'U.S. bullets,' ruling out that he was killed by his own guards to prevent his capture. At least one bullet fired by the U.S. strike team struck bin Laden in the left eye.
Three other adult men were killed, including the two couriers and one of bin Laden's adult sons. One woman was killed when she was used as a 'shield' by one of the men. Two other women were injured. The disabled helicopter was destroyed by the U.S. crew before the strike team left.
At 3:50 p.m. Sunday, the president first learned that bin Laden's body was tentatively identified. At 7:01 p.m., Mr. Obama was told there was a 'high probability' the body was bin Laden's.
Bin Laden was identified not only by the strike team, but also by one of his wives, according to a senior intelligence official. CIA specialists compared photos of the body to known photos of bin Laden and were able to determine with 95% certainty it was him. Monday morning, an initial DNA analysis showed a 'virtually 100%' match of the body against DNA of several bin Laden family members.
Bin Laden was buried at sea Monday, in accordance with Islamic tradition that burial take place within 24 hours of death. A senior U.S. defense official said religious rites were read on the deck of the USS Carl Vinson. The body was placed in a weighted bag. A military officer read the prepared religious remarks.
'After the words were complete,' a senior defense official said, 'the body was placed on a prepared flat board, tipped up, whereupon the deceased's body eased into the sea.'
Siobhan Gorman / Adam Entous / Zahid Hussain
Some of the analysts who assessed the intelligence put the chances as low as 60%.
President Barack Obama had also chosen a risky attack option: A direct raid on the house, deep within Pakistan─potentially putting American fighters in face-to-face combat within a maze-like compound─instead of simply bombing the place from a Stealth aircraft.
After a decade of frustration, chasing bin Laden's shadow from the caves of southern Afghanistan to the lawless provinces of eastern Pakistan, U.S. officials decided the risk was worth taking. An examination of the American decision shows the extent to which it was built upon on months of tenacious planning─but that ultimately, it came down to gut instinct.
'What swayed people was there was no other plausible explanation' for who else might be hiding in the home, one U.S. official said. The other possibility, some suspected, was al Qaeda's No. 2, Ayman al-Zawahiri.
In December, the Central Intelligence Agency called a secret meeting to line up tens of millions of dollars in funding, kicking off a five-month scramble that climaxed in Sunday's dramatic events. This account is based on interviews and briefings with nearly a dozen officials from the White House, intelligence agencies, Pentagon and Congress.
Clearly, the focus of the U.S. spy community's interest─a walled compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan─was built to shelter someone who didn't want to be seen. By last fall, the U.S. had figured out that most of its 22 residents were relatives of one of bin Laden's most trusted 'couriers,' a close confidant responsible for shuttling messages among al Qaeda leaders and friends world-wide.
But there was also another family in the sprawling, three-story building, and it remained a deep mystery. Intelligence officials knew there was an adult male in there, but they couldn't catch a glimpse. He never stepped in to view.
For more than a decade, the U.S. had sought bin Laden, and missed half a dozen times. Amid these frustrations, the seeds of last weekend's mission were sown.
In 2002, just a year after bin Laden had escaped in the cave-riddled mountains of Tora Bora in Afghanistan, interrogations of CIA detainees revealed the nom de guerre of one of his couriers. The man, who hasn't been named by U.S. officials, was a protégé of the mastermind of the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, and a trusted assistant to Abu Faraj al-Libbi, a former al Qaeda No. 3 previously captured.
It took several more years simply to learn that courier's real name. In 2007, CIA analysts finally obtained it, and set out to find him. Still, the trail remained cold. Mr. Panetta's first briefing on bin Laden as CIA chief, in February 2009, was discouraging. Spies around that time had 'caught a glimpse' of the courier, who was working with his brother. But the two men had been extremely careful about covering their tracks.
The big break took more than a year. In late August 2010, the CIA was able to follow the courier directly to the place where he lived: the Abbottabad compound.
The property came in for intense scrutiny. Teams from the CIA, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and National Security Agency studied it with satellite and other surveillance equipment. Mr. Panetta got weekly updates.
Built in 2005, the compound was on the outskirts of the town center, at the end of a narrow dirt road. The main structure: a three-story building with few windows facing outward. There was a terrace on the third floor with a seven-foot wall, preventing people from seeing inside.
'Once they saw it, they knew they were on to something,' a U.S. official said.
Spies couldn't even rustle through the trash for clues. Unlike almost all the neighbors, the residents of the compound burned their garbage.
In September, Mr. Obama was told about the compound and informed that it might be housing valuable targets in the war on terror─the courier and his family, as well as the family of the courier's brother.
In addition, 'There was a mysterious third family living there,' a U.S. official said. 'There was an adult male they couldn't visualize but knew he was there. There was also a female, potentially a wife and children, whose family matched Osama bin Laden's potential family.' Members of the third family never left the residence.
In November, Mr. Panetta directed the Counterterrorism Center to provide 10 proposals to gain better intelligence on who was at the compound. They delivered 38, but only a few were viable. 'That was the balance, the more you creep in, the more you risk tipping him off,' a U.S. official said.
Looming over the operation was an equally pressing worry: The U.S. might tip off the Pakistanis, who weren't deemed trustworthy enough to keep the secret. The Pakistanis had provided the U.S. some information on the courier, but may not have realized his significance, a U.S. official said. Some U.S. officials had long suspected elements of the Pakistani government or military were aiding bin Laden.
The evidence remained circumstantial. Nevertheless, in December, CIA chief Leon Panetta decided the intelligence in hand was compelling enough to act. He called a secret meeting with lawmakers to seek tens of millions of dollars to fund an intensive program aimed intensive collection of intel about the property.
After Mr. Panetta secured the money from Congress in December, CIA analysts remained split on the likelihood bin Laden was even there. Some put the chances at 60%; others said 80%. Mr. Panetta struggled with the uncertainty, one official said, but concluded the American public would back an operation even if the odds were only 50-50.
In February, Mr. Panetta believed it was time to begin planning an operation. He met with Vice Adm. William McRaven, who heads the military's special operations command, and asked for a small team to game out the options.
An early favorite: a bombing raid. That approach would minimize risk to American troops and maximize the likelihood of killing the residents of the compound. But it might also have destroyed any proof bin Laden was there.
A helicopter raid would be more complex, but more likely to deliver confirmation. Some officials were wary of repeating a fiasco like Black Hawk Down in Somalia, when American forces were killed after a botched raid on a Somali warlord.
John Brennan, the White House chief counterterrorism adviser, said Obama advisers were divided given the risks, the circumstantial evidence, and the uncertainty about the true identities of all the residents. Top national-security advisers briefed the president in the Situation Room on March 14. They told him there was a high-value target at the compound, and most likely it was bin Laden.
'This is a go,' Mr. Obama told the principles.
Two weeks later, Mr. Obama told his national-security team he wanted them to start rehearsing a raid on the compound. The team built a mock-up of the compound in Afghanistan to test out dry runs of possible attacks.
In April, Mr. Panetta was holding daily meetings. 'This it the best lead we have,' he told his team at one meeting. 'We've got to find out what the hell is in that compound.'
On April 19, Mr. Panetta told the president the CIA believed bin Laden was there. Other advisers briefed Mr. Obama on preparations for an assault, including the outcomes of the dress rehearsals. Mr. Obama told them to 'assume it's a go for planning purposes and that we had to be ready,' an administration official said.
That same day, Mr. Obama gave provisional approval for the commando-style helicopter assault despite the added risk. Senior U.S. officials said the need to get a positive identification on bin Laden became the deciding factor.
At 8 a.m. Friday, April 29, in White House Diplomatic Room, Mr. Obama summoned National Security Adviser Tom Donilan, Chief of Staff William Daley and Mr. Brennan, and authorized the operation.
Mr. Panetta called Adm. McRaven. 'It's in your hands, friend,' he told Adm. McRaven. 'I wish you the best. All I can do is pray a hell of a lot.'
On Sunday morning, Mr. Obama gave the mission a final go, after a 24-hour delay due to bad weather. Mr. Panetta went to church. Mr. Obama played nine holes of golf.
The sprawling compound, spread over an acre of lush farmland covered with eucalyptus trees, was occupied by bin Laden at least since August of last year, according to intelligence reviewed by Pakistani officials. Residents said it had been occupied since 2005.
A three-story building sits in the middle of the compound surrounded by concrete walls some 14 feet high that are topped by barbed wire and contained security cameras. Some residents also claimed it had an underground area.
After nightfall Sunday, U.S. helicopters brought the team of Special Operations Forces from an air base in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. One helicopter was badly damaged after hitting the ground hard because of a 'vortex' created by the high walls of the compound, a heart-stopping moment that encapsulated the U.S.'s biggest fears about the mission.
Mr. Panetta monitored the operation from his seventh-floor conference-room-turned-war-room. At the White House, Mr. Obama and his top aides monitored the unfolding action in real time from the Situation Room. 'The minutes passed like days,' Mr. Brennan said.
Knowing they would have to abandon one chopper, the team spent 40 minutes, with guns blazing, charging through each of the structures on the compound. Bin Laden and his family were found on the second and third floors of the large main structure, the final building to be searched. U.S. officials said bin Laden tried to defend himself with a gun before being shot.
Bin Laden's body was initially identified by members of the military strike force, and by a woman at the compound identified as one of his wives.
The assault team also had orders to remove items of intelligence value. 'They picked up anything they could get their hands on,' including computer hard drives, said a U.S. intelligence official. 'They're being exploited to find anything we can on them.'
Video footage obtained by local TV channels following the attack showed a bloodstained bed in a room where bin Laden was reportedly killed.
A senior defense official said bin Laden was killed by 'U.S. bullets,' ruling out that he was killed by his own guards to prevent his capture. At least one bullet fired by the U.S. strike team struck bin Laden in the left eye.
Three other adult men were killed, including the two couriers and one of bin Laden's adult sons. One woman was killed when she was used as a 'shield' by one of the men. Two other women were injured. The disabled helicopter was destroyed by the U.S. crew before the strike team left.
At 3:50 p.m. Sunday, the president first learned that bin Laden's body was tentatively identified. At 7:01 p.m., Mr. Obama was told there was a 'high probability' the body was bin Laden's.
Bin Laden was identified not only by the strike team, but also by one of his wives, according to a senior intelligence official. CIA specialists compared photos of the body to known photos of bin Laden and were able to determine with 95% certainty it was him. Monday morning, an initial DNA analysis showed a 'virtually 100%' match of the body against DNA of several bin Laden family members.
Bin Laden was buried at sea Monday, in accordance with Islamic tradition that burial take place within 24 hours of death. A senior U.S. defense official said religious rites were read on the deck of the USS Carl Vinson. The body was placed in a weighted bag. A military officer read the prepared religious remarks.
'After the words were complete,' a senior defense official said, 'the body was placed on a prepared flat board, tipped up, whereupon the deceased's body eased into the sea.'
Siobhan Gorman / Adam Entous / Zahid Hussain
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