中
国领导人已经打响发令枪，银行大战或许马上就要上演。上周中国央行在下调利率以提振经济增长的同时，还采取措施允许市场在贷款和存款利率的设定过程中发挥更大作用。这启动了中国金融行业一轮期待已久的改革，但同时也有可能令银行业的主要利润来源受损。
旧的利率设定方式存在什么问题？改革涉及哪些利害关系？“中国实时报”(China Real Time)栏目在《华尔街日报》驻香港图表制作人员的帮助下做出了回答。
中国银行业高度集中。中国工商银行(Industrial and Commercial Bank of China)、中国建设银行(China Construction Bank)、中国农业银行(Agricultural Bank of China)和中国银行(Bank of China)这四大国有银行控制着接近50%的存款。美国前四大银行控制的存款比例为35%。
由于政府设定了高额存贷款利差，银行每贷出一块钱都能稳赚一笔不小的利润。
这等于是拿到了一张印刷钞票的牌照。中国大银行的利润相当可观。尽管2011年经济增长放缓、小企业遭遇信贷紧缩，工商银行还是实现了32%的利润增长，其中大部分都来自利差收入。
中国领导人担心，赚钱太容易已经让大银行变得懒惰，也就是太愿意继续向支撑中国上阶段经济增长的国有企业和基建项目贷款，而不太愿意开始向即将推动下阶段经济增长的小企业和创业家贷款。小企业贷款只占银行贷款总额的18%。
对储户而言，低利率限制了家庭收入的增长，不利于政府启动消费使之成为增长引擎。低利率还促使储户退出银行系统寻找更高回报，而这正是中国房地产泡沫的促成因素之一。
而对借款人来说，低利率助推了投资高增长，进而支撑了经济的高增长，但它也导致了浪费，并造成工业部门过剩产能的积累。投资占中国国内生产总值的比重已从2000年的35.3%猛增至2011年的49.2%，家庭消费所占比重则是反方向变化。
中国央行上周四公布的新制度是向利率市场化迈出的坚实一步。
现在银行将可以按低于基准贷款利率20%的利率放贷（之前的最大折扣是10%）。在存款方面，银行将可以为储户提供超出基准存款利率10%的溢价。四大银行已经宣布将为储户一年期存款提供3.5%的利率，比基准利率3.25%高出0.25个百分点。
其影响将是净利差受到挤压。之前一年期最高存款利率与一年期最低贷款利率之间的差额是2.4个百分点，现在则变为1.5个百分点。
这对银行来说并不全是坏事。利率下调将有助于刺激贷款增加，这样一来，数量增加带来的收入就从一个方面抵消了利差下降造成的损失。
但主要还是坏事，因为利差收紧将会冲击利润。对于全国资产规模最大的中国工商银行来说，如果存款利率增加千分之一，那么它2011年的利润就会减少6%。
在上周四之前，银行的传统存贷款业务就已经受到来自多个渠道的威胁。
存款面临的主要风险来自理财产品。理财产品属于短期投资品，为储户提供了类似存款的安全保障，但回报则高出不少。据中国数据提供商万得资讯(Wind)的数据，过去几个星期中国银行业推出的理财产品年化收益率在5%左右，而一年期存款的利率只有3.25%。
中国理财业的具体规模现在尚不清楚，但人们一致认为这个行业在迅速增长。据花旗集团(Citigroup)研究中国银行业的专家何德亮(Simon Ho)估计，2011年底中国理财产品管理的资产已增至人民币5.5万亿元，相当于7%的存款，而2010年底时这一比例还不足4%。惠誉(Fitch)的分析师朱夏莲(Charlene Chu)去年9月认为，这个比例是10%。
一些银行通过扩大其理财业务将能在短期内获益。但最终来看，所有银行都是输家，因为理财产品的利差要远远小于传统存贷款业务的利差。据花旗估计，理财产品的利差在1%左右。
从放贷角度看，银行不再是唯一的贷款资金来源。2002年，93%的融资来自银行贷款。2012年第一季度，这一比例仅为63%。
不断增大的企业债市场让公司有了另一个融资来源。债市收益率不由政府设定，目前低于基准贷款利率。获得AAA最高评级的企业债其一年收益率目前约为3.1%，而基准贷款利率为6.3%。
中国影子银行系统由温州非正式放贷组织、典当行和贷款担保公司等各种机构组成，为借款人提供了传统银行系统之外的信贷渠道。据中国央行温州支行的报告估计，温州市非正式融资额相当于该市银行贷款额的20%。
换句话说，人们存钱的选择范围越来越广，而在获得贷款方面也同样拥有更多选择。因此，早在上周四出现政策转向之前，中国银行业的增长已经在放慢，存贷款业务的利润率也越来越低，而该业务一直是中资银行的主要盈利支点。
盈利能力降低将使得中国银行业更难处理在2009年刺激方案实施期间产生的大量坏账。给地方政府融资平台提供的贷款被认为风险格外高。一项涉及面最广的分析评估得出结论说，2010年底中国地方政府债务总计10.7万亿元，大约相当于银行贷款余额的19.5%。
伯恩斯坦研究公司(Bernstein Research)研究中国银行业的分析师韦纳(Michael Werner)认为，在中国国家开发银行(China Development Bank)等政策性银行以及小型城市商业银行和农村信用社的贷款余额中，借给地方政府的贷款占比最大。
此外，利润降低使得银行更难补充其资本金。按照新规，银行核心资本占银行风险加权资产的比例须至少为9.5%。这一规定是为了防止银行在出现不良贷款后破产。
目前，中国银行业的资本充足率看似可靠。今年第一季度末，中国银行业的核心资本充足率为10.3%。但不断扩大的贷款规模与消化不良贷款的需求意味着，银行总是希望得到更多资本金。在利润水平将走下坡路的情况下，银行自筹资本金的能力以及对外部投资者的吸引力均不如从前。
长期来看，利润率收窄应该会促使银行进行创新。保持盈利能力的方法之一就是提高小企业贷款的比例。高增长的私营企业愿意以高于基准利率的价格获得贷款，这将提振银行的收入，拓宽企业家的融资渠道，帮助推动中国经济的增长。
当然，这不会是一蹴而就的。近期而言，利润率受到挤压意味着利润减少，市场已决定把此事当作是银行股的坏消息来对待。中国四大银行的股价上周五出现暴跌，中国工商银行和中国建设银行的股价分别下跌4.9%和4%，而香港恒生指数(Hang Seng Index)当天只微跌了0.9%。
Tom Orlik
（本文版权归道琼斯公司所有，未经许可不得翻译或转载。）
China's leaders have fired the opening salvo in what might turn out to be the battle of the banks.
Late last week, in parallel with an interest rate cut to boost growth, China's central bank moved to allow the market a greater role in setting lending and deposit rates - kicking off a long awaited reform of China's creaking financial sector and threatening to eat away the main source of banks' profitability.
What's the problem with the old approach to setting interest rates, and what's at stake in reform? China Real Time lays it out with a little help from The Wall Street Journal's chart wizards in Hong Kong.
China's banking sector is concentrated. The big four state owned banks -- Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, China Construction Bank, Agricultural Bank of China, and Bank of China, control almost 50% of deposits. The same number for the top four banks in the U.S. is 35%.
A wide government-set margin between the deposit and lending interest rates means the banks are guaranteed a substantial profit on every yuan they lend out.
That amounts to a license to print money. China's big banks are massively profitable. In 2011, despite a slowdown in the economy and a credit crunch for small businesses, ICBC clocked profit growth of 32%, most of it from the interest margin.
China's leaders worry that easy profits have made the big banks lazy -- too willing to continue channeling loans to state owned enterprises and infrastructure projects that drove the last stage of China's growth, and not willing enough to start lending to small businesses and entrepreneurs that will drive the next stage. Loans to small business account for just 18% of banks' loan book.
Low interest rates for savers crimp household income, stymieing the government's attempts to kick start consumption as a driver of growth. They also push savers to exit the system in search of higher returns -- a contributing factor to China's real estate bubble.
Low rates for borrowers fueled breakneck investment that supported growth at high levels, but also contributed to waste and the build-up of excess capacity in industry. Investment as a share of China's gross domestic product soared to 49.2% in 2011, from 35.3% in 2000, while the share of household consumption moved in the other direction.
The new system announced by the People's Bank of China on Thursday represents a concrete step toward interest rate liberalization.
Banks will now be allowed to lend at a discount 20% below the benchmark loan rate (prior to the change the maximum discount was 10%). On deposits, banks will be allowed to offer savers a 10% premium to the benchmark deposit rate. The big four banks have already announced that they will offer savers a 3.5% return on their 1-year deposits, a quarter percent above the 3.25% benchmark.
The impact will be to narrow the net interest margin. Prior to the change, the spread between the ceiling on 1-year deposits and the floor on 1-year loans was 2.4 percentage points. Now it is 1.5 percentage points.
It's not all bad news for the banks. Lower interest rates will help spur more lending -- so higher volume will help offset lower margins.
But it is mainly bad news. A tighter interest margin will hit profits. For ICBC, China's largest bank by assets, a tenth of a percent increase on interest paid on deposits would have eaten away 6% of 2011 profits.
Even before Thursday's move, banks' traditional loan deposit business was already under threat from multiple channels.
On the deposit side, the main risk comes from wealth management products -- short-term investments that offer savers some of the security of a deposit but substantially higher returns. Products launched in the last few weeks by China's banks offer annualized returns of around 5%, compared to 3.25% for a 1-year deposit according to data from Chinese data provider Wind.
The exact size of China's wealth management sector is not known, but everyone agrees it is growing fast. Simon Ho, China bank expert at Citigroup, estimates that assets in wealth management products have risen to 5.5 trillion yuan, the equivalent of 7% of deposits, at the end of 2011, up from less than 4% at the end of 2010. Charlene Chu at Fitch puts the total at 10% in September last year.
Some banks will benefit in the short term by grabbing a bigger share of the wealth management business. But ultimately all the banks lose as the interest spread on wealth management products is much tighter than on traditional loan and deposit business -- around 1% according to Citigroup's estimates.
On the lending side, banks are also no longer the only show in town. In 2002, 93% of finance was bank loans. In the first quarter of 2012, that number was just 63%.
A growing corporate bond market gives businesses an alternative source of finance. Yields in the bond market are not set by the government and are currently lower than the benchmark lending rate. The 1-year yield on the highest AAA-rated corporate bonds is currently about 3.1%, compared to a benchmark lending rate of 6.3%.
China's shadow banking system, comprising everything from the informal lenders of entrepreneurial Wenzhou to pawn shops and loan guarantee companies, is also offering borrowers access to credit outside of the traditional banking system. A report by the People's Bank of China's Wenzhou branch estimates that informal finance equaled 20% of bank loans for the city.
In other words, savers have a growing range of options for where to put their money, and borrowers have more choices on where to get credit. The result is that even before Thursday's policy shift, China's banks were seeing slower growth and lower margins in the loan and deposit business that has always been the mainstay of their profitability.
Lower profitability will make it more difficult for the banks to process large volumes of problem loans made during the 2009 stimulus. Loans to local government financing vehicles are seen as especially risky. The most comprehensive review put local government debt at 10.7 trillion yuan at the end of 2010 -- equivalent to around 19.5% of banks' loan book.
Michael Werner, China bank analyst at Bernstein Research, calculates that policy banks like China Development Bank, and small city commercial and rural banks, have the biggest share of their loan book exposed to the problem.
Lower profits also make it more difficult for banks to replenish their capital base. Under new rules, banks will be required to hold core capital equivalent to at least 9.5% of their risk-weighted assets -- intended to prevent them from going bust if loans start to go bad.
At present, China's banks capital adequacy ratios look solid. For the sector as a whole, the core capital ratio at the end of the first quarter was 10.3%. But expanding the loan book, and paying down bad loans, means banks are always hungry for more capital. With profits set to fall they have less capacity to raise it themselves, and a less appealing pitch to outside investors.
In the longer term, narrower margins should encourage banks to innovate. One way to preserve profitability would be to raise the share of loans to small businesses. With high growth private business willing to pay a premium above the benchmark for access to credit that would boost bank income, and help drive China's growth by improving access to finance for entrepreneurs.
But that won't happen overnight. In the immediate future, lower margins mean lower profits, and the markets have already decided that is bad news for the banks. The share price of China's big four banks plunged on Friday, with ICBC and China Construction Bank down 4.9% and 4% respectively, compared to a 0.9% fall in the Hang Seng Index.
Tom Orlik
Late last week, in parallel with an interest rate cut to boost growth, China's central bank moved to allow the market a greater role in setting lending and deposit rates - kicking off a long awaited reform of China's creaking financial sector and threatening to eat away the main source of banks' profitability.
What's the problem with the old approach to setting interest rates, and what's at stake in reform? China Real Time lays it out with a little help from The Wall Street Journal's chart wizards in Hong Kong.
China's banking sector is concentrated. The big four state owned banks -- Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, China Construction Bank, Agricultural Bank of China, and Bank of China, control almost 50% of deposits. The same number for the top four banks in the U.S. is 35%.
A wide government-set margin between the deposit and lending interest rates means the banks are guaranteed a substantial profit on every yuan they lend out.
That amounts to a license to print money. China's big banks are massively profitable. In 2011, despite a slowdown in the economy and a credit crunch for small businesses, ICBC clocked profit growth of 32%, most of it from the interest margin.
China's leaders worry that easy profits have made the big banks lazy -- too willing to continue channeling loans to state owned enterprises and infrastructure projects that drove the last stage of China's growth, and not willing enough to start lending to small businesses and entrepreneurs that will drive the next stage. Loans to small business account for just 18% of banks' loan book.
Low interest rates for savers crimp household income, stymieing the government's attempts to kick start consumption as a driver of growth. They also push savers to exit the system in search of higher returns -- a contributing factor to China's real estate bubble.
Low rates for borrowers fueled breakneck investment that supported growth at high levels, but also contributed to waste and the build-up of excess capacity in industry. Investment as a share of China's gross domestic product soared to 49.2% in 2011, from 35.3% in 2000, while the share of household consumption moved in the other direction.
The new system announced by the People's Bank of China on Thursday represents a concrete step toward interest rate liberalization.
Banks will now be allowed to lend at a discount 20% below the benchmark loan rate (prior to the change the maximum discount was 10%). On deposits, banks will be allowed to offer savers a 10% premium to the benchmark deposit rate. The big four banks have already announced that they will offer savers a 3.5% return on their 1-year deposits, a quarter percent above the 3.25% benchmark.
The impact will be to narrow the net interest margin. Prior to the change, the spread between the ceiling on 1-year deposits and the floor on 1-year loans was 2.4 percentage points. Now it is 1.5 percentage points.
It's not all bad news for the banks. Lower interest rates will help spur more lending -- so higher volume will help offset lower margins.
But it is mainly bad news. A tighter interest margin will hit profits. For ICBC, China's largest bank by assets, a tenth of a percent increase on interest paid on deposits would have eaten away 6% of 2011 profits.
Even before Thursday's move, banks' traditional loan deposit business was already under threat from multiple channels.
On the deposit side, the main risk comes from wealth management products -- short-term investments that offer savers some of the security of a deposit but substantially higher returns. Products launched in the last few weeks by China's banks offer annualized returns of around 5%, compared to 3.25% for a 1-year deposit according to data from Chinese data provider Wind.
The exact size of China's wealth management sector is not known, but everyone agrees it is growing fast. Simon Ho, China bank expert at Citigroup, estimates that assets in wealth management products have risen to 5.5 trillion yuan, the equivalent of 7% of deposits, at the end of 2011, up from less than 4% at the end of 2010. Charlene Chu at Fitch puts the total at 10% in September last year.
Some banks will benefit in the short term by grabbing a bigger share of the wealth management business. But ultimately all the banks lose as the interest spread on wealth management products is much tighter than on traditional loan and deposit business -- around 1% according to Citigroup's estimates.
On the lending side, banks are also no longer the only show in town. In 2002, 93% of finance was bank loans. In the first quarter of 2012, that number was just 63%.
A growing corporate bond market gives businesses an alternative source of finance. Yields in the bond market are not set by the government and are currently lower than the benchmark lending rate. The 1-year yield on the highest AAA-rated corporate bonds is currently about 3.1%, compared to a benchmark lending rate of 6.3%.
China's shadow banking system, comprising everything from the informal lenders of entrepreneurial Wenzhou to pawn shops and loan guarantee companies, is also offering borrowers access to credit outside of the traditional banking system. A report by the People's Bank of China's Wenzhou branch estimates that informal finance equaled 20% of bank loans for the city.
In other words, savers have a growing range of options for where to put their money, and borrowers have more choices on where to get credit. The result is that even before Thursday's policy shift, China's banks were seeing slower growth and lower margins in the loan and deposit business that has always been the mainstay of their profitability.
Lower profitability will make it more difficult for the banks to process large volumes of problem loans made during the 2009 stimulus. Loans to local government financing vehicles are seen as especially risky. The most comprehensive review put local government debt at 10.7 trillion yuan at the end of 2010 -- equivalent to around 19.5% of banks' loan book.
Michael Werner, China bank analyst at Bernstein Research, calculates that policy banks like China Development Bank, and small city commercial and rural banks, have the biggest share of their loan book exposed to the problem.
Lower profits also make it more difficult for banks to replenish their capital base. Under new rules, banks will be required to hold core capital equivalent to at least 9.5% of their risk-weighted assets -- intended to prevent them from going bust if loans start to go bad.
At present, China's banks capital adequacy ratios look solid. For the sector as a whole, the core capital ratio at the end of the first quarter was 10.3%. But expanding the loan book, and paying down bad loans, means banks are always hungry for more capital. With profits set to fall they have less capacity to raise it themselves, and a less appealing pitch to outside investors.
In the longer term, narrower margins should encourage banks to innovate. One way to preserve profitability would be to raise the share of loans to small businesses. With high growth private business willing to pay a premium above the benchmark for access to credit that would boost bank income, and help drive China's growth by improving access to finance for entrepreneurs.
But that won't happen overnight. In the immediate future, lower margins mean lower profits, and the markets have already decided that is bad news for the banks. The share price of China's big four banks plunged on Friday, with ICBC and China Construction Bank down 4.9% and 4% respectively, compared to a 0.9% fall in the Hang Seng Index.
Tom Orlik
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