2013年3月20日

先让你注意的,是他浓重的曼彻斯特口音。接下来或许是那件有点皱的西服。事实上吉姆•奥尼尔(Jim O'Neill)就是一个奇异的组合──一位身着银行家正装的教授。然而正是这位知名经济学家、即将卸任的高盛资产管理公司(Goldman Sachs Asset Management)董事长,在10多年前发现了大部分投资者都没有注意到的四个国家的潜力。它们分别是巴西、俄罗斯、印度和中国。奥尼尔称之为“金砖四国”(BRIC),然后这个称号名扬四海,因为它如此巧妙地表达了世界经济实力从发达大国向他处转移的趋势。因为这个缘故,金砖四国还开始更加紧密地合作。现在缩略语先生(当面可别这么叫他)要退休了,不过估计还是会有很大的影响。借此机会,他给出了几条新的预测,粉丝们会希望这些预测同样睿智。以下是经过编辑的对他的访谈内容。

Photography by Jillian Edelstein
奥尼尔因擅长调整数据模型使之更贴切地反映现实而为人所知。他对美国预算赤字的解读十分大胆。
《华尔街日报》:先谈谈你对当前10年全球经济增长的展望吧。

奥尼尔:我的观点会引发争议:由于金砖四国的缘故,2011年到2020年全球GDP总量将强于过去三个10年中的任何一个10年。中国每年创造出一个新的西班牙。仅2011年一年的时间,金砖四国以美元计算的GDP增量就相当于意大利的经济总量。

到2015年,金砖四国GDP总量恐怕将高于美国。所以金砖四国的发展将越来越多地成为全球GDP的真正推动器。

《华尔街日报》:你预计金砖四国将有何表现?

奥尼尔:中国经济增长的放缓几乎是肯定的,它将放缓到每年7%、而非10%的增速。我认为印度有望实现每年10%以上的增长,但对此我没有把握。我预计巴西的增长率为5%,俄罗斯为4%。

《华尔街日报》:这么说来你对印度最乐观了?

奥尼尔:印度在本10年无疑拥有金砖四国当中最大的增长潜力。它拥有惊人的人口条件。其出生率非常高,所以它的人口结构始终在改善,并且非常年轻。接下来20年印度劳动年龄人口的增量,有望达到今天美国劳动年龄人口的总量。这非常之惊人。

但印度要实现这种潜力,肯定也需要进行改革。首先它需要接纳外商直接投资。印度什么时候才会真正对外商直接投资敞开大门呢?这是一个非常重大的问题。我慢慢觉得,对于印度是不可以过于乐观的,因为那里的情况实在是太复杂。

《华尔街日报》:俄罗斯为什么落后于金砖四国中的其他国家?

奥尼尔:俄罗斯人口条件最差,对能源生产的依赖性也是最强。我认为油价已经见顶的可能性很大,大宗商品的超级周期即将落幕。油价自2000年以来基本上都是在上涨,但2008年无疑已经见顶。我这一年一直表示投资者应当看空油价,现在我还是这样认为。

《华尔街日报》:金砖四国的最大增长风险是什么?

奥尼尔:我们刚刚避开了最大的风险,即美国与中国之间打贸易战。我曾害怕米特•罗姆尼(Mitt Romney)赢得总统选举,但现在这种风险已经不复存在,这是好事。另一个风险是中国政府无法控制某种中国式的民主化。我觉得他们有推进政治改革的打算,但速度不会很快。我在中国呆过很长时间,见过很多重要人物。有一件事他们谈得很多,那就是他们希望更加注重创新和创造。这意味着要允许个人变得更有创造力,去承担更多的风险。这就需要给予他们更大的自由。所以,我将非常密切地关注这方面的情况。其过程非常难料,可能会非常、非常困难,如果领导人处置不当,中国可能就会遭遇硬着陆。

《华尔街日报》:中国朝着注重国内消费的方向转型,将对美中关系及全球经济增长产生何种影响?

奥尼尔:我非常紧密地关注着中国零售业销售额的趋势,其中的趋势是非常惊人的。我们已经看到了销售额加速增长的确凿迹象。我认为,习近平主席承继的经济体已经在实现调整。

如果国内消费增加的趋势进一步发力,那么美中关系应该会受到相当大的影响。美国将能够向中国出售越来越多的产品,同时并不希望从中国进口同样多的产品。美国将更多地把中国视为机遇而非威胁。对于向中国消费者销售消费品的美国企业来说,这是一个大好机会。

本10年的实质是美国越来越像中国,中国越来越像美国。这就是我如此看好全球经济增长的原因。我好奇的是,国际货币基金组织(International Monetary Fund)对这种事情居然不是更加乐观。你看2008年的那场危机,它不过就是美国消费过多、中国消费过少,美国贸易逆差过大、中国贸易顺差过大。但两国对这些问题的纠正都已取得明显进展。美国目前的贸易逆差约占GDP的3%,中国贸易顺差约占GDP的2.5%,所以这是非常令人鼓舞的。

《华尔街日报》:你对欧元区有何展望?

奥尼尔:我认为欧洲将回到了无生趣的状态。按欧洲标准衡量,过去两年的起伏实在是太大。欧洲骨子里是一个了无生趣的地方。欧洲本10年的增长潜力在1.5%到2%的样子。欧元区的危机确实是大起大落,但我们终将以这种或那种方式化解危机,问题在于什么时候化解。这也是一个极其重大的问题。

《华尔街日报》:美国是否将迎来增长?

奥尼尔:我预计本10年年均增长率为2.5%。按过去30年的标准来看,这会令人失望,但美国在上个10年平均每年只实现了1.6%的增长。美国存在两种困境,一是它需要增加生产、减少消费,二是它拥有一个巨大的财政问题。

从某些方面来讲,欧洲对财政赤字的处理走在了美国的前面。美国必须收紧财政政策,除此以外别无他法。当然短时间内是要支撑经济,但从更长远来讲,财政赤字问题必须解决。美国今天的财政问题比欧洲任何一个国家都更加严重。据我们的计算,美国经周期性因素调整后的财政赤字占GDP的6.3%左右,高于包括希腊在内的任何一个欧洲国家。经周期性因素调整,就是根据经济体所在经济周期来判断它的表现。

《华尔街日报》:有没有什么新的缩略语说给我们听?

奥尼尔:我不想被称为缩略语先生。有人声称我最近又发明了一个缩略语叫做“迷雾四国”(MIST),即墨西哥、印度尼西亚、韩国和土耳其。

我认为,这四个国家和金砖四国一样,应当区别于其他新兴市场看待,因为它们的GDP都占到了全球总量的1%以上,都是重要经济体。我认为本10年迷雾四国将会有不错的表现,但不会有金砖四国那么好。

《华尔街日报》:你最希望去金砖四国中的哪个国家访问?

奥尼尔:当然是巴西。因为他们喜欢足球,我也喜欢足球。2012年我没去印度,但我去了巴西、俄罗斯和中国。我过去去中国最多。

《华尔街日报》:鲁吉•夏尔马(Ruchir Sharma)的《经济突破型国家》(Breakout Nations)一书引起了一定的关注。对于他对“金砖国家”这个概念的批评,你有何回应?

奥尼尔:我没有看过此书。我不否认这几个国家各不相同,但那又怎样呢?他们都拥有巨大的人口和巨大的潜力。俄罗斯被认为“最弱”,但它在本10年给全球GDP带来的增量恐怕比整个欧元区还要多。

Min Zeng

(本文版权归道琼斯公司所有,未经许可不得翻译或转载。)


WHAT YOU NOTICE FIRST is his thick Manchester accent. Then maybe the somewhat disheveled suit. Indeed, Jim O'Neill is an unlikely mix of a man--a professor dressed in a banker's suit. But the well-known economist and outgoing chairman of Goldman Sachs Asset Management was the guy who more than a decade ago spotted the potential in four countries that most investors were ignoring: Brazil, Russia, India and China. He dubbed them the 'BRICs,' and the title gained wide notoriety because it so aptly expressed a shift in global economic power away from big developed countries. The four BRIC nations even began working more closely together as a result. Now retiring, but still expected to be influential, Mr. Acronym (don't call him that to his face) offered a few new predictions that his fans will hope are just as smart. His edited remarks follow.

Q: Let's start with your outlook for global growth in the current decade.

A: Controversially, I think world gross-domestic product between 2011 and 2020 will be stronger than each of the past three decades because of the BRICs. China creates another Spain every year. In 2011, just one year, the increase of dollar GDP in the four BRIC countries was equivalent to the size of Italy's entire economy.

By 2015, the aggregate GDP for the four BRIC countries will probably be bigger than the U.S. So what's going on in BRIC countries will be increasingly the real driver of global GDP.

Q: How do you expect the four BRIC nations to perform?

A: China's growth is almost definitely going to slow--to 7 percent annually instead of 10 percent. I think India could grow by more than 10 percent per year, but I am not sure. I am assuming Brazil will grow by 5 percent, and Russia by 4 percent.

Q: So you are most optimistic about India?

A: India definitely has the biggest potential for growth among BRIC countries this decade. India has incredible demographics. It has a very strong birth rate, which means the demographic profile is improving all the time and it is very young. During the next 20 years, the increase in the size of the working population in India could be as large as the total number of people working in the U.S. today. It is absolutely incredible.

But of course India needs to carry out reform for this to happen. It needs to embrace foreign direct investment for a start. When will India really open the door to foreign direct investments? That is the billion-rupee question. I have learned that with India, you can't be overly hopeful because the situation there is so complex.

Q: Why is Russia a laggard among the BRICs?

A: Russia has the weakest demographics. It is also the most dependent on energy production. I think it is quite possible oil prices have peaked and that the commodity super cycle is coming to an end. Since 2000, oil prices have basically risen, though the absolute peak was in 2008. I have been saying all year that investors should be bearish on oil, and I continue to think so.

Q: What's the biggest risk to the growth of the BRICs?

A: We just missed the biggest risk--a U.S. trade war with China. I was nervous about Mitt Romney winning the presidential election, but now that risk is gone and that's a good thing. Another risk is that the Chinese government will not be able to control a Chinese-style shift to democracy. I think they plan to advance political reform, but it will happen slowly. I've spent a lot of time in China and I've met a lot of important people. One of the things they talk about a lot is that they want to give more attention to innovation and creativity. That means allowing individuals to be more creative and to take more risks. You have to provide more freedom. So I am going to be watching this very closely. The process is very unpredictable. It could be very, very difficult. If the country's leaders mishandle it, China could suffer a hard landing.

Q: How will China's shift to focusing on domestic consumption impact U.S.-China relations and global growth?

A: I monitor the trend of real retail sales in China very closely, and it has been fantastic. We have seen strong signs of acceleration. I think President Xi Jinping inherited an economy that is already adjusting.

If the trend toward increased domestic consumption gathers steam, it should improve U.S.-China relations dramatically. The U.S. will be able to sell more and more to China and will not want to import as much from China. The U.S. will see China less as a threat and more as an opportunity. It is a fantastic opportunity for U.S. companies that sell consumer products to Chinese consumers.

What this decade is all about is the U.S. becoming more and more like China, and China becoming more like the U.S. This is why I am so bullish on the global growth. I am amazed that the International Monetary Fund is not more optimistic about this kind of thing. You look at the 2008 crisis, and it was all about the U.S. consuming too much, and China consuming too little. The U.S. has too big of a trade deficit, and China has too big of a trade surplus. But both countries are making significant progress in the other direction. The U.S. trade deficit is now about 3 percent of GDP, and China's trade surplus is about 2.5 percent, so it is really encouraging.

Q: What is the outlook for the euro zone?

A: I suspect Europe will go back to being boring. By European standards, the past two years have been far too exciting. At the core of it, Europe is a dull place. European growth potential is about 1.5 to 2 percent for this decade. Yes, the crisis in the euro zone is dramatic, but we will eventually resolve the crisis one way or the other. The question is, when? And that is still a one-trillion-euro question.

Q: Is the U.S. poised for growth?

A: I see 2.5 percent annual growth for this decade. By the standard of the past 30 years, this would be disappointing. But the U.S. only grew an average of 1.6 percent annually in the past decade. The U.S. has two dilemmas. First, it has to produce more and consume less. And second, the U.S. has a big fiscal problem.

In some ways, Europe is ahead of the U.S. in addressing fiscal deficits. The U.S. has to tighten its fiscal policy. It has no choice. Of course, in the short term you need to support the economy, but in the longer term the fiscal deficit must be addressed. If you look at the U.S. fiscal situation today, it is worse than that of every European country. According to our calculations, the cyclically adjusted fiscal deficit in the U.S. is about 6.3 percent of GDP. That is higher than every European country, including Greece. Cyclically adjusted is a way of looking at how an economy is doing based on where it is in its business cycle.

Q: Any new acronyms for us?

A: I don't want to be known as Mr. Acronym. People claimed I recently created another one: MIST, or Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea and Turkey.

What I believe is that these four nations, along with the BRICs, should be regarded as distinctive from the rest of the emerging world because they all account for more than 1 percent of global GDP. They are the big guys. I think MIST countries will do well but not as well as the BRICs this decade.

Q: What's your favorite BRIC country to visit?

A: Brazil, easily. Because they love football, and so do I. I didn't go to India in 2012, but I went to Brazil, Russia and China. I used to travel to China the most.

Q: Ruchir Sharma's book 'Breakout Nations' got some attention. What is your response to his criticism of BRICs as a concept?

A: I didn't read it. I don't disagree with the fact they are different, but so what? They share large populations and huge potential. Russia, the supposed 'weakest,' is probably going to add more to global GDP this decade than the entire euro zone.

Min Zeng

重新逐步买入茅台

http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_4c5a73c90102e06v.html

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卖出与买入茅台的逻辑

http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_4c5a73c90102e026.html

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2013年3月14日

习近平当选中国国家主席 Xi Jinping Named China's President

四,中国正式任命中共中央总书记习近平为国家主席,并任命一位从过往记录看属温和改革派的官员为国家副主席。这标志着中国10年一次的高层领导换届就要进入尾声。

中国全国人民代表大会表决通过了对习近平的任命。中国全国人大是一个类似橡皮图章的议会机构,总是支持中共做出的各项决策。此举仅仅是一个形式。去年11月习近平已经被任命为中共中央总书记,这令他成为紧紧控制中国政治权力的中共最高领导人。

中国全国人大同时任命李源潮为中国国家副主席。李源潮曾任权力很大的中组部部长。中组部控制着中共党内人事变动。近年来在东部省份江苏担任省委书记期间,李源潮主张进行渐进式的治理改革。

中国国家副主席通常也会担任中共中央政治局常委。中央政治局常务委员会是中国最高决策机构。李源潮此次被任命为国家副主席令他在2017年成为政治局常委的可能性大大增加。

中国全国人大同时选举产生张德江为人大常委会委员长。张德江目前是中共中央政治局常委。

中国预计将在周五任命新一任国务院总理。普遍预计目前担任国务院副总理的李克强将成为新一任总理。

习近平当选国家主席之际,中国正在努力应对一系列问题。这些问题包括经济不平衡、贫富差距过大以及伴随中国崛起为经济和政治强国而出现的无处不在的官员腐败、食品和环境问题等。未来几天,中国还将任命各部级单位和监管机构负责人,届时可能会为外界了解中国新领导人的改革决心提供更多线索。经济学家和中国国内外人士都说,中国只有改革才能维持经济增长。

自从去年11月接任中共中央总书记以来,习近平发表了一系列强有力的反腐言论,民众因此期望能出台彻底的改革举措。但鉴于中国领导人倾向于达成共识,且既得利益者愿维持现状,目前不清楚他推进改革的力度有多大,也不知这些举措是否会有效。

习近平的父亲是知名革命领袖。去年11月以来,习近平迅速行动,以巩固他在军队中获得的支持。他在参观军事单位时,强调部队要做好战斗准备,并直接过问中日岛屿之争中军事和民事行动的升级。该岛屿地处东中国海(East China Sea,中国称东海),为日本所控制。

中共党内人士和分析人士认为,习近平属于中国高层领导人中改革愿望比较强烈的,并且被认为与刚刚卸任的国家主席胡锦涛关系密切。中国新一届中共中央政治局常委会的委员主要是另一位中国前领导人江泽民的门生和支持者。分析人士说,维持派系力量的平衡是中共维稳的关键。

香港城市大学(City University of Hong Kong.)政治学教授郑宇硕(Joseph Cheng)说,这在很大程度上是平衡派系利益的一种象征性姿态,是对年轻领导人和所谓改革派的一个安慰。

习近平在全国人大会议上以2,952票赞成、1票反对、3票弃权当选国家主席。

Carlos Tejada / Brian Spegele

(更新完成)

(本文版权归道琼斯公司所有,未经许可不得翻译或转载。)


China formally appointed Communist Party chief Xi Jinping as the nation's president on Thursday, and an official with a track record of moderate reform as vice president, marking the beginning of the end of China's once-a-decade leadership change.

Mr. Xi was approved in a vote by China's National People's Congress, a rubber-stamp legislature that endorses decisions made by the Communist party. The move was a formality--Mr. Xi in November was named general-secretary of the Communist Party, making him the top official in the organization that keeps a tight grip on China's political power.

The congress also appointed Li Yuanchao, formerly the chief of the party's powerful Organization Department, as vice president. The Organization Department controls party personnel matters. He advocated incremental governance reforms while serving as party chief in recent years in the eastern province of Jiangsu.

The vice president normally holds a seat on the party's Politburo Standing Committee, its top decision-making body, and Mr. Li's appointment makes him a front-runner for elevation to the top governing body in 2017.

The congress also elected Zhang Dejiang, a member of the Communist Party's ruling Politburo Standing Committee, as its chairman.

China on Friday is expected name its new premier, a move widely expected to result in the elevation of Vice Premier Li Keqiang.

Mr. Xi comes into office as China grapples with problems ranging from economic imbalances, a wide wealth gap, pervasive official corruption and food and environmental issues that have accompanied its rise as an economic and political power. Appointments in coming days to China's top ministries and regulatory agencies could provide additional clues into how strongly the nation's new leadership will commit to reforms that economists and others both inside and outside the country say are needed to sustain growth.

Through a series of strong statements on corruption and waste since his November appointment, Mr. Xi has raised public expectations of overhauls. But it isn't clear how strongly he will pursue reform or how effective such efforts would be, given China's consensus-driven leadership and entrenched interests protecting the status quo.

Mr. Xi, whose father was a famous revolutionary leader, has moved quickly since November to consolidate his support among the armed forces, stressing combat readiness on visits to military units and taking direct charge of an escalation of military and civilian operations over disputed islands controlled by Japan in the East China Sea.

Mr. Li is viewed by party insiders and analysts as being among the more reform-minded of China's top leadership, and is believed to have close ties to the outgoing president, Hu Jintao. China's new standing committee is largely dominated by proteges and supporters of another former Chinese leader, Jiang Zemin. Analysts say balancing the power of factions is key to the party maintaining stability.

'This is a very symbolic gesture of balancing factional interests,' said Joseph Cheng, a political science professor at City University of Hong Kong. 'It's a reassurance to the younger leaders and so-called reformers.'

At the congress, Mr. Xi received 2,952 votes in favor, with one against and three abstentions.

Carlos Tejada / Brian Spegele

2013年3月3日

中国全国人大会议将揭示高层改革决心 Leadership Shift In China Hints At Path

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周日,中共中央总书记习近平、中国国家主席胡锦涛、中国总理温家宝和副总理李克强在参加完政协开幕式后准备离场。

国的全国人大会议将于本周召开,会议将揭晓10年一次的领导层换届的最终人事变动,并让人们对于新一届政府解决日益严重的社会、经济和环境问题的决心有所了解。许多中共内部人士担心,上述问题正在损害中共的执政地位。

习近平将在人大会议上就任基本上只具有仪式性的中国国家主席一职。这将是他的第三个职位。他已经在去年11月领导层换届开始时接替胡锦涛担任中共中央总书记和中央军委主席。全国人民代表大会将于周二开始,预计将持续10天左右。

中共新领导班子中的二号人物李克强将接替温家宝担任总理,成为世界第二大经济体的掌舵者,并将在人大会议结束时举行记者招待会,接受中外记者的提问。

据分析人士和外交人士说,橡皮图章式的全国人大预计将表决通过一些部委的合并、2013年7.5%的GDP增长目标、军事预算的大幅扩张,以及数十个国家和政府高层职位的任命。全国人大共有约3,000名代表。

据一名直接了解情况的中共内部人士说,主要的人事变动包括,中共最高决策机构中央政治局的七名常委之一张高丽预计将成为副总理,在新的经济领导团队中扮演有影响力的角色。

这名人士还说,李源潮将接替习近平担任国家副主席的职位,李源潮目前是拥有较大权力的中共组织部部长,曾在党内实施过有限的政治改革,但是他没有进入新一届中共中央政治局常委会。李源潮晋升至一个通常在常委会中有一席之地的职位将提高他在国际上的知名度,使其在2017年拥有晋升最高领导机构的优势。

另一名曾经实施过相对自由的经济和政治改革的领导人汪洋预计将作为副总理加入经济团队。汪洋去年也未能当选中共中央政治局常委。这名党内人士说,不过目前还不清楚他将主管金融、工业还是农业。

全国人大是判断新一届领导人是否将实施大范围经济改革的早期风向标。胡锦涛和温家宝多年以来一直在谈经济改革,但是在这方面毫无成效。经济改革意味着更加依赖内需,减少对国内资本密集型产业投资以及中国出口需求的依赖。

去年11月以来,习近平就反腐和反对公款浪费发表了一系列措辞严厉的讲话,他的首次正式考察去了南方城市深圳,引发了公众对改革的热切期望。众所周知,在1989年的政治动乱后,1992年前领导人邓小平在"南巡"中再次推出了市场化改革。

作为习近平提出的厉行勤俭节约的一部分,全国人大代表和政协委员被告知应避免举办宴会、欢迎仪式和长篇讲话,而警方接到的命令是尽量减少首都北京的交通管制。

但新的领导层目前为止一直未公布经济改革日程的细节,也未说明计划如何应对公众日益感到不满的其他问题──特别是严重的空气、土壤和水污染,以及党内普遍存在的滥用职权的问题。去年围绕中共高官薄熙来的丑闻凸显出了这一问题。

预计人大将批准的一项重要改革是国务院机构调整计划,其中的一条是将铁道部并入交通部。很多分析人士认为,此举与2011年高速铁路撞车事故及同年铁道部部长刘志军因腐败指控被解职有关。

据了解计划的中国学术人士说,食品安全监管部门也可能出现归并,国家海洋局的权力将扩大。近年来中国曝出了一连串的食品安全丑闻,食品安全是又一个令公众非常不满的问题。国家海洋局负责南中国海(South China Sea,中国称南海)和东中国海(East China Sea,中国称东海)争议岛屿周边地区的海上巡逻工作。

中国专家说,机构调整意在减少官僚程序,增强部门间的协作,打破体制内的既得利益集团。但很多分析人士对此表示怀疑,他们说需要从根本上进行更多的改革,比如迫使所有的官员公开财产,增强政府的透明度和问责制。

预计机构调整的力度也将比早些时候的一项计划要弱,此前的计划可能还会影响经济规划、能源和信息技术部门。无党派智库鲍尔森学院(Paulson Institute)中国问题专家Damien Ma说,很有可能不会出现几个月前一些人提出的那样力度非常大的改革。

在经济问题上,分析人士预计人大会议上将提出可能会提高普通中国人收入的具体提案。居民收入是使中国经济实现再平衡的一个重要组成元素。

这类提案可能包括放宽对外来务工人员的限制,提高国有企业上缴红利比例,将其用于社会福利项目,调整财政政策,减少地方政府对征收销售农民土地所得的收入的依赖。现有的限制使外来务工人员的养老和女子教育都有困难。

一位花旗(Citigroup)的分析师说,新一届政府将可能决定目前的增长模式是否能够持续长久。

从很大程度上讲,十二五规划已经设定了中国的政策方向。十二五规划涉及的时间是2011年至2015年,规划广泛支持中国经济实现再平衡的目标。习近平和李克强曾是批准十二五规划的那一届中共中央政治局常委会的委员。中共经济学家刘鹤曾参与十二五规划的编制,预计他将是习近平的高级经济顾问。刘鹤写道,十二五规划的思路是在出口需求下滑之际扩大内需──这样的转型规划起来很难。

2013年GDP增长7.5%的目标并不是种预测。至少过去18年中,中国经济增速一直在这个目标之上,并且是远在其之上。相反,这个目标意在向省级领导人发出这样的信号,两位数的经济增长时代已经成为过去,他们需要减少对大型投资项目的依赖。

地方领导人是否真正领会了这一信号,目前显现出的迹象有好有坏。一方面,据野村(Nomura)的一项分析说,地方政府将2013年经济增长目标较2012年平均下调了0.5个百分点。另一方面,地方政府继续依靠基础设施支出来推动经济增长,而不是采取减税等措施来扩大消费支出。

香港智库经纶国际经济研究院(Fung Global Institute)院长沈联涛(Andrew Sheng)说,7.5%的增速算是合理的,可以给经济一定的调整空间。去年,中国GDP增长了7.8%,外界普遍认为今年的增速将有所提高。

另外一个可能会有更明确答案的问题是,李克强提出的推进"城镇化"步伐到底是什么意思。李克强在很多讲话中都使用了这个词。中国目前约有一半人口居住在城市,城镇居民收入比农村要高得多。城镇人口的进一步扩大可能使更多的钱流入外来务工人员口袋,他们可以用来买车、电视机、电器、房地产,以及中产阶级生活的其他"装备"。

研究中国问题的经济学家说,为鼓励农村人口进一步迁移到城镇,中国需要改变对外来务工人员的限制,包括向他们发放工作城市的居住证。只有这样,外来务工人员才能享受养老、医疗和子女公共教育等权利,才能更加没有顾虑地把钱用于消费。但几乎没有哪个中国城市愿意承担由此产生的额外社会支出。

苏格兰皇家银行(RBS)经济学家、前世界银行(World Bank)中国问题专家高路易(Louis Kuijs)说,在扩大外来务工人员公共服务和保障房项目、实现更加平衡的城镇化过程所需的政策方面,可能会公布比过去更具体的方案。

但李克强的城镇化讲话可能已经加深了其他经济问题,包括随着开发商和购房者为城镇人口大幅增加做准备,房地产泡沫有死灰复燃的危险。

上海房价继去年12月同比上涨36%后,今年1月再涨35%。上周五,中国政府公布了若干限制房价上涨的政策,包括向个人出售住房征收20%资本所得税。

全国人大会议上公布的计划是新一届领导人推进经济政策过程的一部分。预计10月召开的中共会议将有更详细的提案。

Jeremy Page / Bob Davis / Lingling Wei

(更新完成)

(本文版权归道琼斯公司所有,未经许可不得翻译或转载。)


China begins a Parliament meeting this week that will unveil the final personnel changes of a once-a-decade leadership transition and provide some clues about the new administration's commitment to address mounting social, economic and environmental problems that many Communist Party insiders fear are eroding its grip on power.

Xi Jinping, who replaced Hu Jintao as Communist Party leader and military chief at the start of the succession process in November, will assume his third, largely ceremonial post as state president during the meeting of the National People's Congress, or NPC, which begins on Tuesday and is expected to last about 10 days.

Li Keqiang, who ranks number two in the new Party hierarchy, is due to replace Wen Jiabao as premier and chief steward of the world's second-largest economy, and will face questions from local and foreign reporters for the first time in that role during a news conference at the end of the Parliament meeting.

The roughly 3,000 deputies to the rubber-stamp Parliament are also expected to approve the merger of some ministries, a GDP growth target of 7.5% for 2013, a substantial expansion of the military budget and appointments to dozens of top state and government posts, according to analysts and diplomats.

Among the key personnel changes, Zhang Gaoli, another member of the Party's seven-man Politburo Standing Committee─its top decision-making body─is expected to become executive vice premier and an influential figure on the new economic team, according to one party insider with direct knowledge of the matter.

That person also said that Mr. Xi's successor as vice president was expected to be Li Yuanchao, the current head of the Party's powerful Organization Department who has overseen experiments with limited political reform within the party, but who missed out on a place on the new Politburo Standing Committee. Mr. Li's promotion to a position that normally commands a seat in the Standing Committee will raise his international profile and make him a front-runner for elevation to the top governing body in 2017.

Wang Yang, another person with a track record of relatively liberal economic and political reform who missed out on a Standing Committee slot last year, is expected to join the economic team as a vice premier, although it remains unclear if he will be in charge of finance, industry or agriculture, according to the party insider.

The Parliament meeting will be an early gauge of the new leaders' commitment to carrying out broad changes in China's economy that Messrs. Hu and Wen talked about for years, but did little to accomplish─remaking the economy so it relies more on domestic demand and less on investment in capital-intensive industries at home and demand for Chinese exports abroad.

Mr. Xi has raised public expectations of reform since November with a series of strong statements on corruption and government waste, and by using his first official trip to go to the southern city of Shenzhen, where former paramount leader Deng Xiaoping famously relaunched market reforms in 1992 following the political turmoil of 1989.

As part of an austerity and efficiency drive launched by Mr. Xi, delegates to the NPC─and a parallel meeting of a consultative body to Parliament─have been instructed to eschew banquets, welcoming ceremonies and wordy speeches, while police have been ordered to minimize traffic controls in the capital.

But the new leadership has so far given few details of its economic reform agenda, or how it plans to address other issues of growing public concern─especially severe air, soil and water pollution and rampant abuse of power within the party, which was highlighted last year by the scandal surrounding former Party highflier Bo Xilai.

One substantial change that Parliament is expected to approve is a plan to streamline the State Council─or cabinet─by, among other things, merging the Railways Ministry into the Ministry of Transport, a move that many analysts believe is linked to the crash of a high-speed train in 2011, and the dismissal the same year of the railways minister, Liu Zhijun, on corruption charges.

Agencies monitoring food safety─another issue of huge public concern following a string of scandals in recent years─may also be merged, and greater powers given to the State Oceanic Administration, the agency responsible for maritime patrols around disputed islands in the South China Sea and East China Sea, according to Chinese academics familiar with the plans.

Chinese experts say the restructuring is designed to cut down red tape, enhance interdepartmental coordination and break apart vested interests in the bureaucracy. But many analysts are skeptical, arguing that more fundamental changes are needed, such as forcing all officials to declare their financial assets publicly, to enhance government transparency and accountability.

The restructuring is also expected to be less aggressive than an earlier plan that could have affected the economic planning, energy and information technology bureaucracies as well. 'It is most likely not going to be the supercharged overhaul that some were floating a few months back,' said Damien Ma, a China expert at the Paulson Institute, a nonpartisan thank tank.

On the economic front, analysts are looking for specific proposals that could lift the incomes of ordinary Chinese, an essential ingredient in rebalancing the economy.

Such proposals could include easing restrictions on migrants that make it tough for them to get pensions and children's education, raising dividend payments by state-owned enterprises and using the money for social-welfare payments, and changing fiscal policy so localities rely less on income from the sale of land seized from farmers.

'The new administration will likely decide whether the current growth model can last for long,' said a Citigroup C +0.33% analysis.

In many ways, the policy direction is already set by China's current five-year plan which covers 2011 to 2015 and broadly endorses the rebalancing goal. Messrs Xi and Li were members of the previous Politburo Standing committee that approved the document. Liu He, a Party economist who helped write the plan and is expected to be a senior economic adviser to Mr. Xi, wrote that the 'logic' of the plan involves boosting domestic demand as export demand wanes─a transformation that is difficult to choreograph.

The 2013 GDP growth target of 7.5% isn't a forecast. China has grown faster than the target for the past 18 years at least─and often by a wide margin. Rather the target is meant to signal provincial leaders that the era of double-digit economic growth has passed and that they need to depend less on big investment projects.

There is mixed evidence about whether the message is getting through. On the one hand, local governments have reduced their 2013 growth targets by an average of 0.5 percentage points from 2012, according to a Nomura analysis. On the other hand, the governments continue to rely on infrastructure spending to boost growth, rather than taking steps to boost consumer spending, such as cutting taxes.

A 7.5% growth rate 'is not a bad rate to give the economy room to make adjustments,' said Andrew Sheng, president of the Fung Global Institute, a Hong Kong think tank. Last year, China's GDP grew 7.8% and is widely expected to grow somewhat faster this year.

Another question that may get a clearer answer is what Mr. Li means when he advocates further 'urbanization'─a catchall phrase that he uses in many of speeches. About half of China's population now lives in cities, where incomes are much higher than in rural areas. A further increase in the urban population could put more money in the pockets of China's migrants to spend on cars, televisions, appliances, real estate and the other accouterments of middle-class life.

To encourage further urban settlement, China needs to change restrictions on migrants, say China economists, including issuing them residence permits to live in the cities where they work. Only then are the migrants entitled to the pensions, health care and public education for their children that encourages them to spend more freely. But few Chinese cities are ready to pay for additional social spending.

'There may be more concrete announcements than before on policies needed to ensure more balanced urbanization by expanding the provision of public services and affordable housing to migrants,' said RBS economist Louis Kuijs, a former World Bank China expert.

But Mr. Li's talk of urbanization may have deepened other economic problems, including risking a re-emergence of a real-estate bubble as developers and buyers prepare for a big increase in the urban population.

In January, prices of apartments in Shanghai increased 35%, compared with the year earlier period, following a 36% increase in December, year-to-year. On Friday, China's government announced a number of policies to curb real-estate-price increases, including stricter enforcement of a 20% capital-gains tax on apartment sales.

The plans released at the NPC are part of a process in which the new leadership develops its economic policies. More detailed proposals are expected by an October Communist Party gathering.

Jeremy Page / Bob Davis / Lingling Wei

低生育率才是美国经济不振之源? America's Baby Bust


Jonathan V. Last

十多年来,中国的女性一直受到自己国家独生子女政策的粗暴对待。那些试图生一个孩子以上的女性遭到罚款并被强制堕胎,她们的房子被拆毁,她们的丈夫也被开除职位。因此,如今中国女性的生育率仅为1.54。在美国,作为中产阶级的典型代表,受过高等教育的白人女性的生育率为1.6。如此看来,美国也有它自己的独生子女政策,只不过这是我们自己选择的。


忘掉什么债务上限吧,忘掉财政悬崖,忘掉所谓的封存悬崖以及福利悬崖吧。这些都只是表象而已,美国真正面临的问题是人口悬崖──我们大多数问题的根源是我们的生育率在逐渐下降。

生育率指一个群体中平均每个女性在其一生当中所生育的子女数量,更替水平生育率为2.1。如果一个群体中平均每个女性生育孩子的数量超过了2.1,那么人口就会增长。如果所生育孩子的数量不及2.1,人口数量就会缩减。美国疾病控制与预防中心(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention)的最新数据显示,美国当前的总和生育率为1.93;该数据自上世纪70年代初以来便始终未超过生育更替水平。

生育率的下降是目前我们面临的许多最艰难的问题的起因。一旦一个国家的生育率持续降至低于生育更替水平,其年龄状况就会开始转变,老年人的数量会超过年轻人。最终,随着数量庞大的老年人逐渐离世,人口数量开始缩减。这个双重问题──老年人所占比例过高以及人口总数缩减──具有巨大的经济、政治和文化影响。

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全球97%的人口所在的国家生育率都在下降。
两代人以来,我们一直听到的教导是人口过多有什么危险。然而,这个传统观念其实是错的,而且是两个层面。首先,全球人口增长放缓到了停滞的地步,将在60年内开始缩减;其次,如经济学家埃斯特•博塞鲁普(Esther Boserup)和朱利安•西蒙(Julian Simon)的著作所表明,人口增长会促成更多创新和传承。想想看,自1970年以来,商品价格持续下跌,美国的环境变得更加洁净、更加可持续,尽管其人口增加了逾50%。事实证明,人类的独创性是最为珍贵的资源。

生育率低的社会不会创新,因为他们的消费动机基本上倾向于医疗保健。他们不会大力投资,因为随着平均年龄偏高,资本流向维持和延长寿命,然后开始耗尽。这样的社会无法维持社会保障计划,因为他们没有足够的劳动力为退休者付退休金;他们也不能部署武力,因为他们缺乏国防资金和可在军队服役的青壮年兵力。

在近几年,关于曾被人视为高居山巅的耀眼国家的美国是否正在衰退的政治讨论有很多。但是,美国的衰落与是民主党还是共和党掌权无关,也与政治意识形态毫无关联。从根本上说,它与人力资本的可持续性有关。无论在上个月宣誓就职的是巴拉克•奥巴马(Barack Obama)还是米特•罗姆尼(Mitt Romney),美国依然会在最重要的方面──人口问题──衰退。它是引发其他所有事情的原因所在。

如果我们国家的生育率更高些,比如说达到2.5,即便是2.2,我们的许多问题都可能要可控得多,可是我们的生育率不会很快上升。实际上,它很可能还会往下降,降到比现在低得多的水平。

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如今,整个美国的生育率为1.93,低于2.1的更替水平生育率。
美国的生育率在建国之初便几乎立即开始下降。在1800年,平均每个美国白人妇女生育七个孩子。(黑人妇女生育率最早的可靠数据始于19世纪50年代。)自那以后,我们的生育率就持续往下降,只有一个重大时期人口有增长,那就是“婴儿潮”时期。在1940年,美国的生育率就已经处于生育更替水平的边缘,但在二战后又开始大增,这个增长势头维持了一代人。接下来,从1970年开始,它又开始像跌落的石头一样飞速下降。

生育率下降的原因有许许多多,比如说中产阶级的工资开始长时期地停滞。大学教育成为大多数美国人的普遍经历,这不仅使人们结婚更晚,也使养育孩子的成本更高。女性上大学的人数赶上男性,在后来还超过了男性。更重要的是,女性开始从事教师和护士以外的职业。此外,避孕药以及同居的增长共同打破了性、婚姻以及生儿育女这个铁三角。

这只是列出了部分原因,其中许多发展趋势显然是积极的。但是,即便是属于纯粹好处的社会发展也可能带来严重后果。

到1973年,美国的生育率已经低于生育更替水平,几乎其他每个西方国家也都是如此。自此之后,生育率大降的现象在全球范围蔓延开来,全球97%的人口如今都生活在生育率正在下降的国家中。

Corbis; Photo Illustration by Keith A. Webb/The Wall Street Journal
移民帮助弥补了美国不断下滑的出生率的影响。
如果你想看看一个国家把自己拉下人口悬崖后会产生什么后果的话,看看生育率为1.3的日本就可以了。在上世纪80年代,每个人都以为日本正走在迈向主掌全球地位的道路上。然而,该国强劲的经济表象背后却隐藏着摇摇欲坠的人口结构。

日本的生育率在1960年开始降到低于更替率的水平,其中有大量复杂的原因(包括西方在战后推动降低日本的生育率、养育孩子的成本飙升以及结婚率总体下降等)。到了80年代,日本的人口数量最终将缩减的趋势已然显而易见。1984年,人口学家小川直宏(Naohiro Ogawa)曾警告称:“由于劳动力增长率的降低……日本经济可能将放缓。”他预计日本经济的年增长率在21世纪初的头两三年将降至1%甚至是0%。

从1950年到1973年,日本的全要素生产率──一个很好的衡量经济动力的指标──每年平均增长5.4%。从1990年到2006年,它每年只增长了0.63%。自1991年以来,日本的GDP增长率仅在四年中超过了2.5%,其年增长率平均为1.03%。

由于生育率低迷,日本的人口在2008年达到顶峰,自那以后其人口数量已经减少了100万。在去年,日本成人纸尿裤的购买量首次超过了婴儿纸尿裤的购买量,该国超过一半的土地被划归为“人口稀少的边际土地”。按照当前这个生育率发展下去,到2100年日本的人口数量将不到现在的一半。

我们能够阻止美国重蹈日本的覆辙吗?我们拥有一些日本所不具备的优势,首先是我们对移民持欢迎态度,宗教信仰也活跃,这两点都有助于提振生育率。但是,从长期来看,答案是大概不能够。

保守派会觉得只要我们能够提供适当的鼓励生育的税收激励政策,那么美国人或许会像40年前那样重新多生孩子。自由派会觉得只要我们能像法国那样提供国营托儿所及其他政策,那么女性就不必在工作和生育之间进行抉择──它能解决问题。但是,证据显示这两条路所带来的充其量只是微薄的效应。以法国为例,尽管它花费资金开办托儿所,其生育率也没能维持在生育更替水平。

这使我们将提高生育率的任务转向国外。我们从上世纪70年代末以来接收了一大批来自国境线以南的移民进入美国。移民人口阻止了美国向人口悬崖倾斜,如今美国大约有3800万人是在美国境外出生的。(其中三分之二的人为合法移民。)若要理解这一点,想想美国每年仅有400万婴儿出生这一事实吧。

假如把这些移民及其相对较高的生育率从我们的人口结构剥离的话,美国会突然看起来就像欧洲大陆那样糟糕的地方,后者的生育率即便还没有日本那么严重,也是只有区区的1.5。

依赖移民人口来支撑我们的生育率也会带来一些问题,其中最重要的是它不大可能持续。在历史上,生育率低于更替生育水平的国家会开始面临劳工短缺的问题,因此会减少人口的输出。在拉丁美洲,生育率下降的情况甚至比美国还要极端。南美许多国家的生育率已经低于生育更替率,它们输往我们这儿的移民人数也非常少。此外,南美和中美洲其他国家的生育率也是急速下降,也许很快便会降至更替率的水平。

这正是墨西哥的状况。该国在1970年的生育率达6.72,如今则仅为更替率的水平,在40年中下降了72%。过去墨西哥每年都有数十万移民来到我们国家。然而,过去三年来,从墨西哥迁入美国的净人口数为零。移民的减少在部分程度上大概与近期的经济衰退有关,但是大部分原因可能源于人口结构的转变。

至于已经在美国的拉丁裔移民,我们无法指望他们永远都能在人口问题上有所帮助。长期以来他们一直承担着这个重任,整个美国的生育率为1.93,而拉丁裔美国人的生育率达到2.35。皮尤研究中心(Pew Center)最近的数据表明,拉丁裔移民的生育率正以惊人的速度下降。仅举一个例子,在2007年至2010年这三年间,出生于墨西哥的美国人的生育率下降了惊人的23%。

面临这种人口减少的状况,能够维持美国在世界上的地位的唯一方法是所有美国人──民主党人、共和党人、拉丁裔美国人、黑人、白人、犹太人、基督教徒以及无神论者──都决定生更多孩子。

问题是,虽然造人很有趣,但抚养孩子可不是这样。大量研究显示,如果将两个各方面情况都一模一样、只有生育状况不同的人进行比较,有孩子的人比没孩子的人的“非常快乐”的程度平均要低六个百分点左右。(这还只是有一个孩子的情况,每多一个孩子,快乐程度就要额外再降低两个百分点。)

不过,养育子女应该从来都不是轻松惬意的事。美国人的生活在过去40年间所经历的众多变化推动了生育率下降。高居前列的生活理念是“快乐”是美好生活的目标。如果我们要扭转这种下降趋势,就需要将“人类的繁荣比衡量纯粹的快乐有着更广泛更深远影响”这一理念重新引入美国社会。

我们还需要制订巧妙的鼓励生育的政策。美国政府无法说服民众去生育不想要的孩子,但是可以帮助他们生育想要的孩子。以下为三个起点:

-- 社会保障。在美国,社会保障体系承担着赡养老年人的大部分重担,而传统上这个责任都是落在成年子女身上的。让政府介入养老事务的反作用是它首先降低了人们生育孩子的动力。美国兰德公司(RAND)的一项研究表明,社会保障体系将美国的生育率压低了高达0.5个点。

为了清除这个障碍,一些分析家提出将税则精简至两个级别,大幅提高子女税收优惠幅度。其他一些分析家则建议免除家长在抚养孩子期间的社会保障和医疗部分的工资税──比如说生第一个孩子时减免三分之一,第二个孩子减免三分之二,生第三个孩子时则全部免除。(一旦孩子长到18岁,家长则要重新开始全额纳税。)

不论细则如何,它们的基本理论都是一样的──减轻承担着缔造新纳税人(也就是孩子)的成本的人的税收负担。

-- 高等教育。高等教育从各个方面抑制了生育率。它使结婚年龄推迟,引发债务,提高了生育的机会成本并且大幅增加了抚养孩子的费用。如果你疑虑高校系统的经济状况不佳,可以想想这一点:从1960年以来,美国民众生活中几乎其他每个行业的商品的实际成本都有所下降,与此同时读大学的实际成本却上涨了逾1,000%。

如果将大学也视作一个产业的话,每个人都会呼吁发起改革。但目前的现状却是,政治家们在尽力说服每个美国孩子入读目前成本过高的大学体系。我们如何能控制住大学教育的成本?首先,我们可以从消除大学作为文凭制造者的作用这一点开始,允许雇主自己举行测试来考核意向员工。或者,我们也可以鼓励各高校要更顺应市场的力量,设立精简的可授予联邦学位的机构为通过某项课程考试的学生颁发文凭。

--地价差距。建立家庭的一个重要因素是土地成本,它不仅决定住房成本,还决定了交通、娱乐、照顾孩子、孩子入学以及其他相当一部分事务的成本。虽然人口密集的都市,比如洛杉矶、纽约、华盛顿和芝加哥等,集中了最多的工作机会,但它们的土地成本也很高。改善公路交通系统和增加远程办公的机会将对帮助各家庭在生活成本低的地区生活起到很大作用。

上述这些想法只是一个起点,我们当然还需要其他措施来避免美国出现人口灾难。如果我们想继续引导世界,我们就必须找出一个增加人口的方法。

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国内生产总值位列世界前十的国家的总生育率*:

1. 美国:2.07

2. 中国:1.64

3. 日本:1.32

4. 德国:1.36

5. 法国:1.97

6. 巴西:1.9

7. 英国:1.83

8. 意大利:1.38

9. 俄罗斯联邦:1.44

10. 印度:2.73

*2005年至2010年的平均数据。

数据来源:联合国。

(本文作者乔纳森•拉斯特(Jonathan V. Last)为《旗帜周刊》(Weekly Standard)的资深作者。他也是由Encounter图书公司出版的《当无人生育时还能期盼什么:美国即将来临的人口灾难》(What to Expect When No One's Expecting: American's Coming Demographic Disaster)一书的作者,本文即节选自该书。)

(本文版权归道琼斯公司所有,未经许可不得翻译或转载。)


For more than three decades, Chinese women have been subjected to their country's brutal one-child policy. Those who try to have more children have been subjected to fines and forced abortions. Their houses have been razed and their husbands fired from their jobs. As a result, Chinese women have a fertility rate of 1.54. Here in America, white, college-educated women -- a good proxy for the middle class -- have a fertility rate of 1.6. America has its very own one-child policy. And we have chosen it for ourselves.

Forget the debt ceiling. Forget the fiscal cliff, the sequestration cliff and the entitlement cliff. Those are all just symptoms. What America really faces is a demographic cliff: The root cause of most of our problems is our declining fertility rate.

The fertility rate is the number of children an average woman bears over the course of her life. The replacement rate is 2.1. If the average woman has more children than that, population grows. Fewer, and it contracts. Today, America's total fertility rate is 1.93, according to the latest figures from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; it hasn't been above the replacement rate in a sustained way since the early 1970s.

The nation's falling fertility rate underlies many of our most difficult problems. Once a country's fertility rate falls consistently below replacement, its age profile begins to shift. You get more old people than young people. And eventually, as the bloated cohort of old people dies off, population begins to contract. This dual problem -- a population that is disproportionately old and shrinking overall -- has enormous economic, political and cultural consequences.

For two generations we've been lectured about the dangers of overpopulation. But the conventional wisdom on this issue is wrong, twice. First, global population growth is slowing to a halt and will begin to shrink within 60 years. Second, as the work of economists Esther Boserups and Julian Simon demonstrated, growing populations lead to increased innovation and conservation. Think about it: Since 1970, commodity prices have continued to fall and America's environment has become much cleaner and more sustainable -- even though our population has increased by more than 50%. Human ingenuity, it turns out, is the most precious resource.

Low-fertility societies don't innovate because their incentives for consumption tilt overwhelmingly toward health care. They don't invest aggressively because, with the average age skewing higher, capital shifts to preserving and extending life and then begins drawing down. They cannot sustain social-security programs because they don't have enough workers to pay for the retirees. They cannot project power because they lack the money to pay for defense and the military-age manpower to serve in their armed forces.

There has been a great deal of political talk in recent years about whether America, once regarded as the shining city on a hill, is in decline. But decline isn't about whether Democrats or Republicans hold power; it isn't about political ideology at all. At its most basic, it's about the sustainability of human capital. Whether Barack Obama or Mitt Romney took the oath of office last month, we would still be declining in the most important sense -- demographically. It is what drives everything else.

If our fertility rate were higher -- say 2.5, or even 2.2 -- many of our problems would be a lot more manageable. But our fertility rate isn't going up any time soon. In fact, it's probably heading lower. Much lower.

America's fertility rate began falling almost as soon as the nation was founded. In 1800, the average white American woman had seven children. (The first reliable data on black fertility begin in the 1850s.) Since then, our fertility rate has floated consistently downward, with only one major moment of increase -- the baby boom. In 1940, America's fertility rate was already skirting the replacement level, but after the war it jumped and remained elevated for a generation. Then, beginning in 1970, it began to sink like a stone.

There's a constellation of reasons for this decline: Middle-class wages began a long period of stagnation. College became a universal experience for most Americans, which not only pushed people into marrying later but made having children more expensive. Women began attending college in equal (and then greater) numbers than men. More important, women began branching out into careers beyond teaching and nursing. And the combination of the birth-control pill and the rise of cohabitation broke the iron triangle linking sex, marriage and childbearing.

This is only a partial list, and many of these developments are clearly positive. But even a social development that represents a net good can carry a serious cost.

By 1973, the U.S. was below the replacement rate, as was nearly every other Western country. Since then, the phenomenon of fertility collapse has spread around the globe: 97% of the world's population now lives in countries where the fertility rate is falling.

If you want to see what happens to a country once it hurls itself off the demographic cliff, look at Japan, with a fertility rate of 1.3. In the 1980s, everyone assumed the Japanese were on a path to owning the world. But the country's robust economic facade concealed a crumbling demographic structure.

The Japanese fertility rate began dipping beneath the replacement rate in 1960 for a number of complicated reasons (including a postwar push by the West to lower Japan's fertility rate, the soaring cost of having children and an overall decline in the marriage rate). By the 1980s, it was already clear that the country would eventually undergo a population contraction. In 1984, demographer Naohiro Ogawa warned that, 'Owing to a decrease in the growth rate of the labor force . . . Japan's economy is likely to slow down.' He predicted annual growth rates of 1% or even 0% in the first quarter of the 2000s.

From 1950 to 1973, Japan's total-factor productivity -- a good measure of economic dynamism -- increased by an average of 5.4% per year. From 1990 to 2006, it increased by just 0.63% per year. Since 1991, Japan's rate of GDP growth has exceeded 2.5% in only four years; its annual rate of growth has averaged 1.03%.

Because of its dismal fertility rate, Japan's population peaked in 2008; it has already shrunk by a million since then. Last year, for the first time, the Japanese bought more adult diapers than diapers for babies, and more than half the country was categorized as 'depopulated marginal land.' At the current fertility rate, by 2100 Japan's population will be less than half what it is now.

Can we keep the U.S. from becoming Japan? We have some advantages that the Japanese lack, beginning with a welcoming attitude toward immigration and robust religious faith, both of which buoy fertility. But in the long run, the answer is, probably not.

Conservatives like to think that if we could just provide the right tax incentives for childbearing, then Americans might go back to having children the way they did 40 years ago. Liberals like to think that if we would just be more like France -- offer state-run day care and other programs so women wouldn't have to choose between working and motherhood -- it would solve the problem. But the evidence suggests that neither path offers more than marginal gains. France, for example, hasn't been able to stay at the replacement rate, even with all its day-care spending.

Which leaves us with outsourcing our fertility. We've received a massive influx of immigrants from south of the border since the late 1970s. Immigration has kept America from careening over the demographic cliff. Today, there are roughly 38 million people in the U.S. who were born elsewhere. (Two-thirds of them are here legally.) To put that in perspective, consider that just four million babies are born annually in the U.S.

If you strip these immigrants -- and their relatively high fertility rates -- from our population profile, America suddenly looks an awful lot like continental Europe, which has a fertility rate of 1.5., if not quite as demographically terminal as Japan.

Relying on immigration to prop up our fertility rate also presents several problems, the most important of which is that it's unlikely to last. Historically, countries with fertility rates below replacement level start to face their own labor shortages, and they send fewer people abroad. In Latin America, the rates of fertility decline are even more extreme than in the U.S. Many countries in South America are already below replacement level, and they send very few immigrants our way. And every other country in Central and South America is on a steep dive toward the replacement line.

That is what's happened in Mexico. In 1970, the Mexican fertility rate was 6.72. Today, it's just at replacement, a drop of 72% in 40 years. Mexico used to send us several hundred thousand immigrants a year. For the last three years, there has been a net immigration of zero. Some of this decrease is probably related to the recent recession, but much of it is likely the result of a structural shift.

As for the Hispanic immigrants who are already here, we can't count on their demographic help forever. They've been doing the heavy lifting for a long time: While the nation as a whole has a fertility rate of 1.93, the Hispanic-American fertility rate is 2.35. But recent data from the Pew Center suggest that the fertility rate for Hispanic immigrants is falling at an incredible rate. To take just one example, in the three years between 2007 and 2010, the birthrate for Mexican-born Americans dropped by an astonishing 23%.

In the face of this decline, the only thing that will preserve America's place in the world is if all Americans -- Democrats, Republicans, Hispanics, blacks, whites, Jews, Christians and atheists -- decide to have more babies.

The problem is that, while making babies is fun, raising them isn't. A raft of research shows that if you take two people who are identical in every way except for childbearing status, the parent will be on average about six percentage points less likely to be 'very happy' than the nonparent. (That's just for one child. Knock off two more points for each additional bundle of joy.)

But then, parenting has probably never been a barrel of laughs. There have been lots of changes in American life over the last 40 years that have nudged our fertility rate downward. High on the list is the idea that 'happiness' is the lodestar of a life well-lived. If we're going to reverse this decline, we'll need to reintroduce into American culture the notion that human flourishing ranges wider and deeper than calculations of mere happiness.

We'll need smart pronatalist policies, too. The government cannot persuade Americans to have children they do not want, but it can help them to have the children they do want. Here are three starting points:

-- Social Security. In the U.S., the Social Security system has taken on most of the burden for caring for elderly adults, a duty that traditionally fell to grown-up children. A perverse effect of putting government in the business of eldercare has been to reduce the incentives to have children in the first place. One RAND study suggested that Social Security depresses the American fertility rate by as much as 0.5.

Looking to dismantle this roadblock, some analysts have suggested flattening the tax code to just two brackets and significantly raising the child tax credit. Others suggest exempting parents from payroll taxes for Social Security and Medicare while they are raising children -- perhaps by a third for their first child, two-thirds for the second, and then completely for a third child. (Once the children turn 18, the parents would go back to paying their full share.)

Regardless of the particulars, the underlying theory is the same: To reduce the tax burden for people who take on the costs of creating new taxpayers (otherwise known as children).

-- College. Higher education dampens fertility in all sorts of ways. It delays marriage, incurs debt, increases the opportunity costs of childbearing and significantly increases the expense of raising a child. If you doubt that the economics of the university system are broken, consider this: Since 1960, the real cost of goods in nearly every other sector of American life has dropped. Meanwhile, the real cost of college has increased by more than 1,000%.

If college were another industry, everyone would be campaigning for reform. Instead, politicians are trying to push every kid in America into the current exorbitantly expensive system. How could we get college costs under control? For one, we could begin to eliminate college's role as a credentialing machine by allowing employers to give their own tests to prospective workers. Alternately, we could encourage the university system to be more responsive to market forces by creating a no-frills, federal degree-granting body that awards certificates to students who pass exams in a given subject.

--The Dirt Gap. A big factor in family formation is the cost of land: It determines not just housing expenses but also the costs of transportation, entertainment, baby sitting, school and pretty much everything else. And while intensely urban areas -- Los Angeles, New York, Washington, Chicago -- have the highest concentrations of jobs, they come with high land costs. Improving the highway system and boosting opportunities for telecommuting would go a long way in helping families to live in lower-cost areas.

These ideas are just a start; other measures certainly will be needed to avert a demographic disaster in the U.S. If we want to continue leading the world, we simply must figure out a way to have more babies.

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Total fertility rate* of the top 10 countries by gross domestic product

1. U.S. 2.07
2. China 1.64
3. Japan 1.32
4. Germany 1.36
5. France 1.97
6. Brazil 1.9
7. U.K. 1.83
8. Italy 1.38
9. Russian Federation 1.44
10. India 2.73
*Average from 2005-10.

Source: United Nations

(Mr. Last is a senior writer at the Weekly Standard and author of 'What to Expect When No One's Expecting: American's Coming Demographic Disaster' (Encounter), from which this essay is adapted. )