瑞银证券：益佰制药 品种稀缺时代的"小天士力"_财经_腾讯网 http://finance.qq.com/a/20130613/019356.htm (UC浏览器)
2013年6月21日
2013年6月19日
中道巴菲特俱乐部的博客：【转载】盖茨写文说，我从巴菲特身上学到这三件事
中道巴菲特俱乐部的博客：【转载】盖茨写文说，我从巴菲特身上学到这三件事. (http://goo.gl/mag/yNg7d4z)
张东伟（福尔莫斯）博客：快乐的事业――徐星公司10周年暨《价值评估V13》（上）讲座会上的致词
张东伟（福尔莫斯）博客：快乐的事业――徐星公司10周年暨《价值评估V13》（上）讲座会上的致词. (http://goo.gl/mag/TYjATWd)
思考投资―李剑的博客：[转载]巴菲特给基金经理的三个忠告: 如何成为投资冠军
思考投资―李剑的博客：[转载]巴菲特给基金经理的三个忠告: 如何成为投资冠军. (http://goo.gl/mag/ZCZKbwi)
穿过记忆的河流：一生取决于几次重要的投资决策，一个最重要的决定决定了一生的路
穿过记忆的河流：一生取决于几次重要的投资决策，一个最重要的决定决定了一生的路. (http://goo.gl/mag/GNIr2Tn)
2013年6月8日
五问段永平：如何练就中国巴菲特
2013-05-17 10:06 | 段永平来源：中欧商业评论 段永平
1989年，硕士毕业的段永平来到广东一家亏损200万元的家用电视游戏机小厂做厂长，从此踏上商途。此后，在他的手中接连诞生了小霸王、步步高、OPPO等一系列知名品牌。与此同时，这位创业大佬还拥有“中国巴菲特”的美誉，包括2001年以1美元左右的低价大量买入网易股票在内的成功投资，令他早早赚够了这辈子所需的钱，开始以“处理麻烦”的姿态将多余的钱投向公益事业。
称自己“胸无大志”的段永平懂得放权，拒绝功利，因此过得怡然自得，说起什么都透着一股子超然。
一问：关于创业有何心得
“从本分出发，做不好会有愧于人，做好企业的原始状态就这么简单。”
最初为什么要去做生意？很简单，想要多挣点钱，生活好一点，没有什么“伟大的目标”。扎克伯格一开始也并没想改变世界，他本人内心深处有强烈的社交欲望，但个性上又是一个反社交（anti-social）的人，所以就建了这么一个社交平台，结果发现很多人跟他有一样的需求。所有最后成功的企业，都是从一点一滴做起来的。当年南下广东，我曾经开玩笑说如果不成功，自己就去当个老师，教人家怎么考大学。如果我当年不成功，可能就成俞敏洪了。
我们最早做游戏机是买来台湾人的机器，组装后就卖出去，没什么品牌。当时的客户不允许我们将地址、电话号码打在纸箱上，怕下家直接来找我们。但我们的顾虑是，因为没有办法保证每一台机器卖出去都不出问题，万一坏掉怎么办？于是我们在机器里面贴上了标有地址电话的纸条，意思是如果需要维修可以联系我们，后来很多客户正是通过这个渠道找来的。但我们最早做这件事情并没有任何做生意的想法。从本分出发，做不好会有愧于人，做好企业的原始状态就这么简单。
创业者的特质，在我看来，首先应当可靠，不以捞一笔快钱为目的。第二要有热情，我当时做小霸王就是因为喜欢玩游戏，直到今天依然非常喜欢。如果你喜欢一件事情，你就会有很多感觉。如果让我去卖浴缸，那我完全没有感觉，绝不可能卖得好。另外，创业的过程中艰难的时刻很多，我们那时候好像每年都有感觉过不去的坎儿，最后又都过去了。当然，最重要的还是信念，只要能够坚持到最后，不做坏事，困难终究会过去。
最后，做企业不要快，有时候欲速则不达。步步高就发了三四成的力，但很健康，慢一点就慢一点。20年前很多人说我们这样做企业很怪异，从来都不发全力，但20年后它们都不见了。有时候全力以赴可能是很短视的表现，就像你把长跑当短跑来跑。短跑你才需要全力以赴，长跑还全力以赴，那就是脑袋坏掉了。
二问：如何培养授权文化
“从指示、指导到协商、授权、放权，逐步推进，这样企业就不会失控。”
前段时间马云辞任CEO，我很赞成，其实我早就干过这个事情。退下来比待在那个位子上可能作用更大。步步高的小日子过得不错，手机、电子教育盈利都不错，但并不意味着需要我去控制，我只担任董事长。在中国企业里，大家不太愿意跟老板提意见，得有一个人跟老板提意见时不会有顾忌，这个人就是董事长。
我现在常年在美国，连公司具体卖什么产品都不太清楚，有人说我是“影子老板”。我对授权的体会是，从指示、指导到协商、授权、放权，逐步推进，这样企业就不会失控。当年因为老板食言，我在小霸王发展最好的时候决定离开，仅仅用了15分钟就完成了全部交接，充分授权是我一直以来的作风。做企业关键就是“做对的事情”和“把事情做对”，董事长的工作不是去控制细节，而是关注企业是否在做对的事情。任何人在做对的事情的过程中都可能犯错，那是技术上的问题，很正常。但类似质量有问题的产品还出厂这样的事，我就要让它立刻停止，不管多大的代价都是最小的代价。
在一些企业里，如果是老板自己的原因导致赔钱，他会觉得正常；但如果是下属导致的亏损，他往往会很心疼。我是可以把别人亏的钱和自己亏的钱等同起来的人，这种容忍对于建立健康的企业文化来说十分重要。我们曾经想做彩电，在研发上投入了一个多亿。一天我跟这个项目的负责人聊到彩电的未来，得出结论：5年以后我们就会沦为彩电的搬运工，因为产品很难做到差异化。几天后，有人打电话问我：“听说你们的彩电项目取消了？”其实并不是我下令让那位负责人停止的，是他自己感觉事情不对后，做出了正确的决定。可见，文化一旦建立起来，它比你想象的要强大得多，会帮你纠正非常多的错误。
三问：如何打造优秀的企业团队
“保健因素如果不能满足，人肯定会走。保健的关键在于公平。”
企业首先要确立自己的核心价值观，招的人必须符合这个核心价值观。评价一个员工，可以从“合格性”与“合适性”两个方面来看。大部分企业找的都是合格的人，比如技术好、会销售、懂设计，但如果没有办法跟他合作，这种人我不要。很简单，因为合格性是可以培养的，但合适性的培养非常困难。所以，首先必须要找到“对胃口”、可以信任的人，才能把公司交给他打理。
从“保健－激励”双因素模型来看，保健因素如果不能满足，人肯定会走。保健的关键在于公平。1989年，我在工厂账上只有3000元、负债200万元的情况下接手，到1995年赚了好几亿。最早老板让我接手的时候说按七三分账，后来给我们的分成变成两成、一成，不断食言。如果当初他兑现承诺，我是不会离开的。保健因素是基础。
金钱激励并非永远有效。如果一个人已经很努力，100%投入，即便你将他的报酬从100万元涨到1000万元，他也不会更努力。一个企业要想永续发展，你不会希望员工花费120%的精力工作。我很反对员工无缘无故地加班。其实，当保健因素满足以后，人们追求的往往是钱以外的事情。在步步高，没有人把企业当成是我的企业来做，而是当成他们自己的企业来做，年薪100万元的人，别的公司给200万元都挖不走，因为他喜欢这里的文化。
文化是需要花费很大的功夫去培养的。我非常推崇马云，他对企业文化的细节非常注意，手段也非常高明。比如，他有花名，风清扬。在步步高，所有人都可以叫我“阿段”。但大多数公司呢？都是王总、张总，员工这么叫你，人马上就矮了一点，不平等，也没有感情，这样就很难实现充分的沟通。
四问：成功投资最重要的是什么
“投资其实很简单，就像是为自己买一件需要的东西，觉得足够便宜就会买下来。”
我投资最重要的原则是不懂不碰，不懂的股票，涨了跟我没关系，根本不去想它。我不是投某一个产品、某一件事情、某一个时期，而是对一家公司的整个生命周期进行投资，买时就会有持股20年的打算。
投资其实很简单，就像是为自己买一件需要的东西，觉得足够便宜就会买下来。就好像买一套房子，你喜欢这一套，就买来住，隔壁有套房子涨了，对你来说没有意义。我不认为有其他投资的方法，其他方法是投机。
2006年，我在网上拍得与巴菲特共进午餐的机会。那时虽然我也认为自己还蛮懂投资的，但不太清楚哪些东西是最重要的，就在吃饭时问他，第一眼要看一个公司的哪个方面？他的回答是“商业模式”，另外就是“不懂不做”。有时候他只是简单说一句话，比如“我不知道我不知道什么”，你会发现很精辟，关键是你要能听得懂，三年之后想起来还会觉得有用。
很多人好奇，其实巴菲特说的很多东西都是我知道的，为什么还要花这么多钱去跟他聊天？这件事情就像很多人每个礼拜都会去教堂，很多东西他们早就知道，为什么还要去呢？这里面有些东西可以去琢磨。一个人如果做投资的话，拿出身家的百分之几去跟巴菲特这样的人聊聊天是很值得的。巴菲特在股东大会上的历次演讲都非常值得一看，他对投资的理解已经深入骨髓。
五问：为什么热衷公益事业
“我做公益是在解决自己的麻烦，解决麻烦的同时还能帮到别人，这是天底下难得的好事。”
我做公益的想法很简单。无论你做多大的生意，自己用的钱总归是很有限的。我不希望留太多钱给孩子，那会让他们的生活变得无趣。赚钱的过程需要应对挑战、克服挑战，会令人非常有成就感。我们可以为孩子设一个保护基金，每隔5年他们可以从中拿一笔钱，以防生活万一不如意，还可以过一个普通人的生活。剩下的钱自然就是累赘。如何解决呢？做公益。
我很忌讳说“慈善”，我从来不觉得自己是一个慈善的人。“慈善”给人一种居高临下的感觉，而我们都是平等的。我只是在解决自己的需求——把钱捐出去，找到能够把钱用好的人。但我发现捐钱比赚钱难多了，因为赚钱的时候你是待在你熟悉的地方，但做公益捐钱需要碰到一个又一个新的项目，必须去摸索。
做公益的过程中肯定会碰到很多不愉快的事情，比如钱花得可能不是地方，但我不会特别在意，因为我很清楚，自己做公益是在解决自己的麻烦，解决麻烦的同时还能帮到别人，这是天底下难得的好事，所以会坚持做下去。
［本文由本刊编辑邓中华、罗真根据段永平在中欧创业营硅谷模块的演讲整理而成，未经本人确认。］
关于段永平
1989年3月，到中山市怡华集团下属一家亏损200万元的小厂当厂长，决定做电子游戏机。1991年，小霸王电子工业公司成立。三年后，其产值已达10亿元，并正式命名为中山霸王电子工业公司。
1995年9月18日，到东莞成立步步高电子有限公司。1999年、2000年，步步高两夺央视广告标王。2001年之后，段永平退居幕后。
2001年底开始，以1美元左右的价格购买网易股票，2003年10月14日，网易股价飙升到70美元；2006年，以62.01万美元拍得与巴菲特共进午餐的机会。
2006年开始，数次向母校浙江大学、中国人民大学捐款；在2011年1月发布的“2011大学校友捐赠排行榜”上，段永平以浙江大学、中国人民大学“双料校友”的身份，以4.47亿元的捐赠额问鼎榜首。
2013年6月5日
书评：一场真正的大跃进 A Truly Great Leap Forward
CHARLES WOLF JR.
在《中国是如何走向资本主义的》(How China Became Capitalist)一书中，科斯和亚利桑那州立大学(Arizona State University)的全球研究助理教授王宁对促使中国从一个极度贫穷的社会主义国家摇身变为世界第二大经济体的“一连串行动进行了历史性的叙述”。
然而把这本书仅仅描述为“历史性的叙述”有失准确。科斯和王宁解释中国崛起的角度与早已被众人接受的世俗看法明显不同。人们普遍认为中国的突飞猛进得益于共产党的英明领导，而本书的两位作者则认为，中国过去30年令人瞩目的经济增长不是由北京的政党领袖策划的自上而下的过程。相反，中国的崛起是由两位作者所称的“四场边际革命”推动的一个自下而上的过程。
首先是农业领域的“家庭联产承包责任制”。按两位作者的说法，这种制度在1970年代末“在中国农村自发出现”并于1982年在全国范围内实施。该制度允许农民以自由市场价格出售他们的部分农产品。另一场“革命”源于以乡镇企业形式出现的农村产业改革，它推动乡镇企业像实业家那样生产和销售他们的产品。这些企业反过来又产生了实业家和“个体经济”──作者对其的解释是“私有经济的委婉说法”，这样的委婉说法意在掩饰这第三场革命下潜藏的资本主义现实。第四场革命是在深圳、广东和福建的其它几个城市以及上海和其它沿海城市建立“经济特区”。
按两位作者的说法，这四场边际革命催生了“充满活力的非国有行业”，它与“死气沉沉的国有行业”形成了鲜明对比。如两位作者所说，这些发展是在1950年代末的大跃进(the Great Leap Forward)──当时数以百万计的人由于错误的集体化和工业化尝试而被饿死──以及1960年代中期的文化大革命(Cultural Revolution)──“毛泽东为让中国进入社会主义模式而做出的最后也是最可怕的尝试”──之后取得的。
与这些灾难性背景对照来看，私有化取得的成就是非同寻常的，有时甚至有些离奇。两位作者写道，到1980年代初期的时候，“个体户理发师的收入逐渐超过了国有医院里的医生。街头摊贩……比核科学家挣的钱多。做贸易的商人、小商店和私营商店的老板……是当时中国收入最高的群体，”而“个体户企业和独资企业的数量从1978年的14万家增加到了1981年的260万家”。
两位作者指出，在让这一切顺利进行的过程中，共产党扮演的角色主要是为其让路。科斯和王宁得出的结论是：“政府从经济领域的逐渐退出而非政治领导的强大和无所不在……才是成功的原因。”指导原则是务实主义、试验验证和儒家“实事求是”的训诫──或者，就如在后毛泽东时代推进了诸多改革的邓小平的一句名言所说：“实践是检验真理的唯一标准。”
《中国是如何走向资本主义的》一书当中有很多这样的见解。比如，两位作者对支配纵向关系的法制和支配横向关系的法制进行了区分。法制在中国是有明显体现的，从一些腐败案件会遭到何等严厉的惩处（而其他一些则被忽略掉）就可以看出。然而法制又很少是明朗清晰的：共产党无情镇压异见人士，压制可能威胁其统治的个人或团体言论。科斯和王宁对中国缺少“思想领域的自由市场”而感到遗憾，并哀叹这一点给大学和中国经济的创新能力带来了损害。
两位作者还认为，中国经济未来的动力取决于其私有经济领域的持续增长。但是他们不太清楚中国大型国有企业的未来如何，也不清楚中国为将这些企业私有化所做的部分努力会有何前景。
两位作者的论点也偶有可商榷之处。例如，他们认为思想领域的自由市场可以在缺少民主政治的情况下维持。实际上，二者缺其一的情况是很难想象的：毕竟，一些在这个市场上供应的思想很可能会极力主张扩大民主，而这是中国领导人特别忌讳的。虽然作者承认财产权在有效的市场改革中具有中心地位，但是他们回避了这样一个问题：如果不进行规范，行使财产权的时候是否有时会以牺牲人权为代价。
虽然《中国是如何走向资本主义的》一书文笔紧凑，相对而言没有过量的经济学术语，但是这本书读起来并不容易。书中充塞着大量事实、数据和交叉引用的参考文献，还有21页精心标注的尾注。不过读者如有耐心读完此书，则可对现代经济史上最不寻常的经济转型拥有更深入透彻的理解。
（本文作者是美国兰德公司(RAND Corp.)的经济学家，胡佛研究所(Hoover Institution)的高级研究员。）
罗
纳德•科斯(Ronald Coase)是世界最有影响力的经济学家之一，然而他很少成为媒体瞩目的焦点。这是因为他通过别的经济学家来发挥影响，同时又谨慎地与每天备受关注的政策争论保持距离。科斯1991年获得诺贝尔经济学奖，他提出了一些近年来最重要的经济学思想，其中包括用他的名字冠名的科斯定理(Coase Theorem)。该定理指出，强大的、精确定义的财产权能够降低私人交易的社会成本。科斯还是法与经济学领域的先驱者，使用经济学上的见解来阐释法律问题。如今他已102岁高龄，然而他创造的智力成果依然让人赞叹。在《中国是如何走向资本主义的》(How China Became Capitalist)一书中，科斯和亚利桑那州立大学(Arizona State University)的全球研究助理教授王宁对促使中国从一个极度贫穷的社会主义国家摇身变为世界第二大经济体的“一连串行动进行了历史性的叙述”。
然而把这本书仅仅描述为“历史性的叙述”有失准确。科斯和王宁解释中国崛起的角度与早已被众人接受的世俗看法明显不同。人们普遍认为中国的突飞猛进得益于共产党的英明领导，而本书的两位作者则认为，中国过去30年令人瞩目的经济增长不是由北京的政党领袖策划的自上而下的过程。相反，中国的崛起是由两位作者所称的“四场边际革命”推动的一个自下而上的过程。
首先是农业领域的“家庭联产承包责任制”。按两位作者的说法，这种制度在1970年代末“在中国农村自发出现”并于1982年在全国范围内实施。该制度允许农民以自由市场价格出售他们的部分农产品。另一场“革命”源于以乡镇企业形式出现的农村产业改革，它推动乡镇企业像实业家那样生产和销售他们的产品。这些企业反过来又产生了实业家和“个体经济”──作者对其的解释是“私有经济的委婉说法”，这样的委婉说法意在掩饰这第三场革命下潜藏的资本主义现实。第四场革命是在深圳、广东和福建的其它几个城市以及上海和其它沿海城市建立“经济特区”。
按两位作者的说法，这四场边际革命催生了“充满活力的非国有行业”，它与“死气沉沉的国有行业”形成了鲜明对比。如两位作者所说，这些发展是在1950年代末的大跃进(the Great Leap Forward)──当时数以百万计的人由于错误的集体化和工业化尝试而被饿死──以及1960年代中期的文化大革命(Cultural Revolution)──“毛泽东为让中国进入社会主义模式而做出的最后也是最可怕的尝试”──之后取得的。
与这些灾难性背景对照来看，私有化取得的成就是非同寻常的，有时甚至有些离奇。两位作者写道，到1980年代初期的时候，“个体户理发师的收入逐渐超过了国有医院里的医生。街头摊贩……比核科学家挣的钱多。做贸易的商人、小商店和私营商店的老板……是当时中国收入最高的群体，”而“个体户企业和独资企业的数量从1978年的14万家增加到了1981年的260万家”。
两位作者指出，在让这一切顺利进行的过程中，共产党扮演的角色主要是为其让路。科斯和王宁得出的结论是：“政府从经济领域的逐渐退出而非政治领导的强大和无所不在……才是成功的原因。”指导原则是务实主义、试验验证和儒家“实事求是”的训诫──或者，就如在后毛泽东时代推进了诸多改革的邓小平的一句名言所说：“实践是检验真理的唯一标准。”
《中国是如何走向资本主义的》一书当中有很多这样的见解。比如，两位作者对支配纵向关系的法制和支配横向关系的法制进行了区分。法制在中国是有明显体现的，从一些腐败案件会遭到何等严厉的惩处（而其他一些则被忽略掉）就可以看出。然而法制又很少是明朗清晰的：共产党无情镇压异见人士，压制可能威胁其统治的个人或团体言论。科斯和王宁对中国缺少“思想领域的自由市场”而感到遗憾，并哀叹这一点给大学和中国经济的创新能力带来了损害。
两位作者还认为，中国经济未来的动力取决于其私有经济领域的持续增长。但是他们不太清楚中国大型国有企业的未来如何，也不清楚中国为将这些企业私有化所做的部分努力会有何前景。
两位作者的论点也偶有可商榷之处。例如，他们认为思想领域的自由市场可以在缺少民主政治的情况下维持。实际上，二者缺其一的情况是很难想象的：毕竟，一些在这个市场上供应的思想很可能会极力主张扩大民主，而这是中国领导人特别忌讳的。虽然作者承认财产权在有效的市场改革中具有中心地位，但是他们回避了这样一个问题：如果不进行规范，行使财产权的时候是否有时会以牺牲人权为代价。
虽然《中国是如何走向资本主义的》一书文笔紧凑，相对而言没有过量的经济学术语，但是这本书读起来并不容易。书中充塞着大量事实、数据和交叉引用的参考文献，还有21页精心标注的尾注。不过读者如有耐心读完此书，则可对现代经济史上最不寻常的经济转型拥有更深入透彻的理解。
（本文作者是美国兰德公司(RAND Corp.)的经济学家，胡佛研究所(Hoover Institution)的高级研究员。）
CHARLES WOLF JR.
Ronald Coase ranks among the world's most influential economists, yet he rarely appears in the media spotlight. That's because he channels his influence through other economists, while maintaining a prudent distance from the glare of quotidian policy disputes. Mr. Coase, who received the Nobel Prize for economics in 1991, has originated some of the most important economic ideas of recent years. These include the eponymous Coase Theorem, which states that strong, precisely defined property rights can reduce the social costs of private transactions. He has also pioneered the law-and-economics field, using economic insights to illuminate legal problems. He's 102, yet his intellectual output remains dazzling.
In 'How China Became Capitalist,' Mr. Coase and Ning Wang, an assistant professor of global studies at Arizona State University, offer a 'historical narrative of the chain of actions' that brought about China's remarkable transformation from a deeply impoverished socialist country to the world's second-largest economy.
Yet to describe the book simply as 'historical narrative' would be a misstatement. Messrs. Coase and Wang interpret China's rise in terms that are distinctly different from what has been accepted as conventional wisdom, which holds that China's dramatic rise has resulted from astute guidance by its Communist Party leadership. But as the authors demonstrate, China's dramatic economic growth over the past three decades hasn't been a top-down process engineered by party leaders in Beijing. Instead, China's rise has been a bottom-up process driven by what the authors call the 'four marginal revolutions.'
First came the 'household responsibility system' in agriculture that, the authors say, 'emerged spontaneously in rural China' in the late 1970s and was implemented nationwide in 1982. This system allowed farmers to sell some of their output at free-market prices. The next 'revolution' resulted from rural industry reform in the form of township and village enterprises, which impelled townships to behave like entrepreneurs in producing and marketing their products. These enterprises in turn led to the emergence of entrepreneurs and the 'individual economy'─'a euphemism for private economy,' the authors explain, that was intended to disguise the underlying capitalist reality of this third revolution. The fourth revolution was the establishment of the 'special economic zones' in Shenzhen and several other towns in Guangdong and Fujian provinces, as well as in Shanghai and other coastal cities.
According to the authors, the four marginal revolutions gave birth to 'a vibrant non-state sector' that contrasted sharply with 'a stagnant state sector.' These developments followed the Great Leap Forward in the late 1950s─when millions starved as a result of misguided collectivization and industrialization efforts─and the Cultural Revolution in the mid-1960s, 'Mao's last and most horrendous effort to mold China into socialism,' as the authors put it.
Viewed against the backdrop of these catastrophes, the achievements of this private were extraordinary and sometimes bizarre. By the early 1980s, the authors write, 'self-employed barbers came to earn higher incomes than surgeons in state hospitals. Street vendors . . . earned more than nuclear scientists. Traders, small-shop and private restaurant owners . . . were among the highest income groups in China.' And 'the number of self-employed household businesses and single proprietorships increased from 140,000 in 1978 to 2.6 million in 1981.'
The Communist Party's role in bringing this to pass, the authors say, consisted mainly in getting out of the way. Messrs. Coase and Wang conclude that 'the gradual withdrawal of government from the economy, rather than the strength or omnipresence of the political leadership . . . explains the success.' The guiding principles have been pragmatism, experimentation and the Confucian injunction 'to seek truth from facts'─or, as Deng Xiaoping, who pushed through many of the post-Mao reforms, put it in a famous dictum: 'Practice is the sole criterion for testing truth.'
'How China Became Capitalist' abounds with such insights. For example, the authors distinguish between, on one hand, rule by law governing hierarchical relations and, on the other, rule of law governing horizontal relations. Rule by law is plainly manifest in China, in how severe punishment is applied in some instances of corruption (while others are ignored). But rule of law is rarely evident: The Communist Party brutally suppresses political dissent as well as expressions of individual or group identity that might threaten its rule. Messrs. Coase and Wang deplore China's lack of a 'free market for ideas' and the damage that this has wrought on universities and on the Chinese economy's capacity to innovate.
The authors also insist that the future dynamism of China's economy depends on the continued growth of its private sector. But they are much less clear on the future of China's huge state-owned enterprises and of China's partial efforts to privatize them.
Occasionally the authors' contentions are problematic. For example, they opine that a free market for ideas can be sustained without political democracy. Actually, it's hard to imagine one without the other: Some of the ideas on offer, after all, might strongly advocate expanded democracy, which is anathema to China's leaders. And although the authors acknowledge the centrality of property rights in effective market reform, they avoid the question of whether property rights, if not regulated, may sometimes be exercised at the expense of human rights.
And while 'How China Became Capitalist' is tightly written and swept relatively clear of excessive economic jargon, it isn't easy reading. The book is crammed with facts, data, cross-references and 21 pages of carefully crafted endnotes. Yet patient readers will be rewarded with a better and deeper understanding of the most extraordinary transformation in modern economic history.
(Mr. Wolf is an economist at the RAND Corp. and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution.)
Ronald Coase ranks among the world's most influential economists, yet he rarely appears in the media spotlight. That's because he channels his influence through other economists, while maintaining a prudent distance from the glare of quotidian policy disputes. Mr. Coase, who received the Nobel Prize for economics in 1991, has originated some of the most important economic ideas of recent years. These include the eponymous Coase Theorem, which states that strong, precisely defined property rights can reduce the social costs of private transactions. He has also pioneered the law-and-economics field, using economic insights to illuminate legal problems. He's 102, yet his intellectual output remains dazzling.
In 'How China Became Capitalist,' Mr. Coase and Ning Wang, an assistant professor of global studies at Arizona State University, offer a 'historical narrative of the chain of actions' that brought about China's remarkable transformation from a deeply impoverished socialist country to the world's second-largest economy.
Yet to describe the book simply as 'historical narrative' would be a misstatement. Messrs. Coase and Wang interpret China's rise in terms that are distinctly different from what has been accepted as conventional wisdom, which holds that China's dramatic rise has resulted from astute guidance by its Communist Party leadership. But as the authors demonstrate, China's dramatic economic growth over the past three decades hasn't been a top-down process engineered by party leaders in Beijing. Instead, China's rise has been a bottom-up process driven by what the authors call the 'four marginal revolutions.'
First came the 'household responsibility system' in agriculture that, the authors say, 'emerged spontaneously in rural China' in the late 1970s and was implemented nationwide in 1982. This system allowed farmers to sell some of their output at free-market prices. The next 'revolution' resulted from rural industry reform in the form of township and village enterprises, which impelled townships to behave like entrepreneurs in producing and marketing their products. These enterprises in turn led to the emergence of entrepreneurs and the 'individual economy'─'a euphemism for private economy,' the authors explain, that was intended to disguise the underlying capitalist reality of this third revolution. The fourth revolution was the establishment of the 'special economic zones' in Shenzhen and several other towns in Guangdong and Fujian provinces, as well as in Shanghai and other coastal cities.
According to the authors, the four marginal revolutions gave birth to 'a vibrant non-state sector' that contrasted sharply with 'a stagnant state sector.' These developments followed the Great Leap Forward in the late 1950s─when millions starved as a result of misguided collectivization and industrialization efforts─and the Cultural Revolution in the mid-1960s, 'Mao's last and most horrendous effort to mold China into socialism,' as the authors put it.
Viewed against the backdrop of these catastrophes, the achievements of this private were extraordinary and sometimes bizarre. By the early 1980s, the authors write, 'self-employed barbers came to earn higher incomes than surgeons in state hospitals. Street vendors . . . earned more than nuclear scientists. Traders, small-shop and private restaurant owners . . . were among the highest income groups in China.' And 'the number of self-employed household businesses and single proprietorships increased from 140,000 in 1978 to 2.6 million in 1981.'
The Communist Party's role in bringing this to pass, the authors say, consisted mainly in getting out of the way. Messrs. Coase and Wang conclude that 'the gradual withdrawal of government from the economy, rather than the strength or omnipresence of the political leadership . . . explains the success.' The guiding principles have been pragmatism, experimentation and the Confucian injunction 'to seek truth from facts'─or, as Deng Xiaoping, who pushed through many of the post-Mao reforms, put it in a famous dictum: 'Practice is the sole criterion for testing truth.'
'How China Became Capitalist' abounds with such insights. For example, the authors distinguish between, on one hand, rule by law governing hierarchical relations and, on the other, rule of law governing horizontal relations. Rule by law is plainly manifest in China, in how severe punishment is applied in some instances of corruption (while others are ignored). But rule of law is rarely evident: The Communist Party brutally suppresses political dissent as well as expressions of individual or group identity that might threaten its rule. Messrs. Coase and Wang deplore China's lack of a 'free market for ideas' and the damage that this has wrought on universities and on the Chinese economy's capacity to innovate.
The authors also insist that the future dynamism of China's economy depends on the continued growth of its private sector. But they are much less clear on the future of China's huge state-owned enterprises and of China's partial efforts to privatize them.
Occasionally the authors' contentions are problematic. For example, they opine that a free market for ideas can be sustained without political democracy. Actually, it's hard to imagine one without the other: Some of the ideas on offer, after all, might strongly advocate expanded democracy, which is anathema to China's leaders. And although the authors acknowledge the centrality of property rights in effective market reform, they avoid the question of whether property rights, if not regulated, may sometimes be exercised at the expense of human rights.
And while 'How China Became Capitalist' is tightly written and swept relatively clear of excessive economic jargon, it isn't easy reading. The book is crammed with facts, data, cross-references and 21 pages of carefully crafted endnotes. Yet patient readers will be rewarded with a better and deeper understanding of the most extraordinary transformation in modern economic history.
(Mr. Wolf is an economist at the RAND Corp. and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution.)
王沪宁：学者出身的中共高级幕僚
今
年3月，中国新任国家主席习近平首次出访海外，在同俄罗斯和非洲国家领导人会晤期间，每一次我们都能看到习近平身后坐着一个戴着眼镜、书生气十足的人物。此人在一旁专心致志地倾听，不时记着笔记。本周五，习近平同美国总统奥巴马(Barack Obama)在加州兰乔米拉日(Rancho Mirage)举行峰会期间，预计我们还将看到此人。王沪宁说
王沪宁作品摘选如何实现中国经济现代化的最关键问题是：是否能在公有制制度下完成经济现代化进程？《美国反对美国》，1991年
在美国资本主义体制下，不能忽视私有产权对政治民主的限制……美国重大经济决策权主要掌握在私人财团的手里。《美国反对美国》，1991年
从目前国际力量的对比来说，坚持独立自主是最为关键的战略，没有独立自主的外交政策，中国就不能屹立于世界民族之林。《文化扩张与文化主权：对主权观念的挑战》，1994年
中央集权是所有国家建立的前提和先决条件……强调中央集权不是抵制市场经济，相反是促进市场经济。《探索与争鸣》杂志访谈，1995年
然而，中共党内人士和研究中国政治的专家认为，王沪宁是当今中国最有影响力的人物之一，是过去10年来中国国内和外交政策的一位重要设计师，现为习近平标志性的“中国梦”运动的策划者。习近平的“中国梦”意在唤醒一个军事和经济上强大的中国，令中国重新争取在世界上的重要地位。
曾短暂在美学习的王沪宁自2002年以来一直担任中央政策研究室主任。作为唯一一位在担任政府首席政策顾问的同时为接连三任国家主席撰写演讲稿的人，王沪宁在中共党内享有独特地位。这三任国家主席分别是：江泽民，其继任者胡锦涛，以及习近平。
王沪宁的影响力部分源自他作为中国新保守主义教父的身份。自1989年以来，这一派力量为中国领导人提供了思想支柱。他们反对西方式的民主，青睐威权政府和国家支持的民族主义。现年57岁的王沪宁也是中共中央政治局委员中唯一一位美国政治专家。中共中央政治局共有25名委员。
这意味着王沪宁在本周举行的中美领导人非正式峰会上可能扮演着必不可少的角色。此次峰会的目的是让习近平和奥巴马能够避开正式会晤的礼仪礼节，进行广泛的、非照本宣科式的会谈。对中国领导人来说，这种会晤形式尚属陌生。从中国官方电视台播出的电视画面中可以看到，在过去几天习近平访问加勒比和中美洲国家时，王沪宁就坐在他的身旁。
一位资深外国外交官称王沪宁将“卡尔•罗夫(Karl Rove)和亨利•基辛格(Henry Kissinger)集于一身”，因为王沪宁在国内和外交政策上具有重要影响力。其他观察人士则更多地将他比作将一生献给皇帝的传统儒家士大夫。
王沪宁在决策过程中扮演的具体角色目前还不清楚。中央政策研究室没有网站，也不设发言人，甚至没有公开电话号码。记者试图直接联系王沪宁置评，但未成功。
Getty Images
王沪宁是三任国家主席的顾问。图为3月，王沪宁（中）和中国国家主席习近平（左）在一起。
由于王沪宁有担任过上海复旦大学教授这一背景，许多观察人士曾预计他在今年3月的“两会”后将取代戴秉国成为中国负责外交政策的最高官员。王沪宁曾担任复旦大学国际政治系主任和法学院院长。
但实际情况却是，尽管中国进行了10年来规模最大的领导层改组，但王沪宁依然留任中共中央政策研究室主任。据王沪宁的几位朋友说，他拒绝获得提拔，喜欢在幕后工作。
虽然如此，外界依然预计王沪宁在中国的外交政策方面会扮演更加重要的角色。一些西方官员和分析人士希望，王沪宁能对鹰派军事官员和其他利益集团起到制衡作用，后者希望中国采取更具对抗性的外交政策。
但王沪宁的几位朋友和前同事说，这种希望可能找错了寄托对象。他们说，王沪宁的学术专长是比较政治学，即研究不同国家的政治体系，而不是国际关系，他预计会赞同中国领导人在国内老百姓面前树立强有力的个人形象。
新加坡国立大学(National University of Singapore)教授、中国政治问题专家黄靖是与王沪宁同时入读复旦大学的，他说，王沪宁现在有了更大权力，他将对中国的外交政策发挥更大影响力。黄靖说，这对中国是个好消息，但对其他国家却并不是个非常好的消息。
Color China Photos/Zuma Press
2007年，王沪宁坐在前中国国家主席江泽民的身后。
这名学者说，当共产主义破产时，他们需要某种其他东西来取代它，王沪宁给出的建议是爱国主义和新保守主义；但他关心的是如何让共产党保住权力，而不是如何让中国强大。
但王沪宁对习近平的政治见解绝没有垄断性影响力。中国其他的政治局委员、已退休的前领导人、家庭朋友、知名知识分子和商界要人们也在竞相获得习近平的关注。
但就像在美国政治体系中一样，中国领导人也往往会依赖一个小的顾问圈子，他们认为这一圈子里的人与其有共同的观点。据王沪宁的朋友们和中共内部人士说，与习近平一样，王沪宁也钦佩美国，也想学习美国的长处，但他认为共产党应该维持对国内权力的垄断，同时在国内进行有限的改革。
王沪宁在复旦大学的另一位同龄人及友人说，我认为习近平信任他；王沪宁依然相信马克思主义，他依然相信共产党将作出正确的选择；他不认为中国应该实行多党制或分权制。
王沪宁的影响力一定程度上源于他每天都有机会接触到习近平。他已在连续三任国家主席的手下工作过，过去10年里他们几乎每次国内视察和出国访问都有王沪宁陪同。
除王沪宁之外，能这样经常接触到中国领导人的就只有中共中央办公厅主任栗战书了。中共中央办公厅负责管理国家主席的日程安排、生活起居和文件流通。但是据外交人士和政治分析人士说，由于栗战书去年11月才被任命，他在政策方面几乎没有影响力。
过去11年，作为中央政策研究室主任，王沪宁管理着最高领导层的“智囊团”，提供政策建议，实施调研，起草演讲稿和官方报告。
清华大学(Tsinghua University)教授朱旭峰研究过智库在中国体制中的角色。他说，王沪宁是中国共产党最重要的内部智囊。朱旭峰说，作为演讲稿起草者，对王沪宁的评价取决于他起草的演讲稿需要多少改动。如果几乎不需要领导修改，那就是好的演讲稿──这意味着你了解领导在想什么。
在组织中央政治局的集体学习会议方面，中央政策研究室也扮演着关键角色。中央政治局大约每个月举行一次集体学习。据研究过这一程序的分析人士说，中央政策研究室与中共中央办公厅一道负责为学习会议确定主题，并审查讲座的专家以及他们的演讲文本。
王沪宁的友人和一些分析人士说，王沪宁是一个工作狂和失眠症患者，处事非常谨慎，几乎偏执地低调。几个友人说，王沪宁自从担任中央政策研究室主任以来，基本上与他们切断了联系。
美国的一名前官员说，他第一次见到王沪宁是在1989年，当时王沪宁正在美国进行短暂的学习。这位前官员回忆自己在华盛顿的一个正式双边会议上曾穿过房间与王沪宁打招呼。这名美国官员说：他转身走开了，完全没有理睬我。显然他不打算与美国人扯上任何关系。
王沪宁的经历与大多数同辈人不同，在文革中，他没有被迫辍学下乡。认识他的人说，因为童年时患有疾病，而且家中有关系，王沪宁进入了上海的一所精英外语学校，学习法语。
王沪宁1978年进入复旦大学(Fudan University)学习国际政治，成为第一批接触西方民主和法律概念的中国学生。他的许多同龄人成为了支持民主的活动人士。他的一些早期文章曾流露出自由派的倾向，比如，他在1986年撰写的一篇论文认为，文革的爆发要归咎于党内缺乏民主。
但即使是在1989年中共动用军队镇压民主抗议活动之前，王沪宁也是公开质疑西方政治价值与中国社会相关性的一批知识分子之一。他批评美国政治制度的著作《美国反对美国》于1991年出版。
1993年，王沪宁的知名度进一步增强。当时，他率领复旦大学的一个团队在新加坡举行的国际辩论赛上获胜。他还把这段经历写进了一本与他人合著的书中。
辩论队成员张谦回忆说，王沪宁最关心的问题是如何管理中国。张谦现在是新加坡管理大学(Singapore Management University)社会学副教授。他说，王沪宁当时表示，把社会凝聚起来需要一个强有力的中央集权国家，他每天晚上都泡在办公室，哪也不去。
1995年是王沪宁政治上的转折点，时任国家主席的江泽民召他进入中央政研室。上世纪80年代，江泽民任上海市委书记时就认识王沪宁。天安门事件后，江泽民十分赞同王沪宁的新保守主义观点。
此后，王沪宁在中国几乎所有重大政治倡议中都发挥了一定作用。他就“软实力”问题写了中国首份学术论文。软实力指的是一国的全球影响力不仅来自其军事实力，也来自其理念和文化价值观。过去10年，中国在海外宣传本国文化方面做了大量投入，王沪宁被认为是幕后的推动力量。
中共内部人士说，王沪宁是江泽民“三个代表”理论设计团队中的一员。该理论使得中共党章2002年被修改，首次允许民营企业家入党。中国政治分析人士表示，他还帮助制定了胡锦涛提出的推动“和谐社会”和“科学发展观”思想。此外，据中共党内人士透露，胡锦涛在去年中共18大上所作报告终稿也由王沪宁领导的团体撰写。
这些人说，如今王沪宁负责习近平“中国梦”运动的监督工作，这项运动的目的是以一个简单的流行词汇重获民众对中共的支持，并且树立习近平强大、有魅力的领导人形象。
新加坡国立大学的黄靖说，王沪宁非常善于解释领导人的理念。他说，领导人常会提出一些大的理念，但不知如何将其转化为具体政策，王沪宁知道他们的想法。
JEREMY PAGE
（更新完成）
（本文版权归道琼斯公司所有，未经许可不得翻译或转载。）
2013年6月4日
看完这个，地方政府债有多大！各位就清楚了。
地方政府债的债主是谁？（转载）
银行呗。因为没有听说过地方政府债券，也没有人买过。……老百姓只买过国债券。的确，中国的地方政府没有发行债券的权利，因为中央知道地方政府一定会胡来，管不住。所以你也没见过没听过有地方政府债券。中央以前有过代理发行，因为没人买，地方政府就另谋出路了……。
怎么个另谋出路？路径是这样：
1，各地方政府主导注册了一些投资公司，这些投资公司政府把它叫做：融资平台。其名称可以是某城建开发公司、城建资产经营公司等。
2，地方政府立项，比如：建高速，建机场，盖政府大楼……等等。
3，融资平台的这些公司拿着政府的项目去银行融资，因为是政府背景的公司，又是政府项目，所以融资是审批 金额是多少给多少。
4，银行当然知道地方政府是个什么东西，此钱大半是有去无回，风险很大。所以银行就把此债权转卖给信托公司，比如10亿的融资，银行说我留下2%的利息，剩下的你接手，签的是5% 的利息，你还有3%可赚。虽然信托公司也知道政府是个什么东西，但是这么大的生意总不能不要，怎么办？ 只要再转卖出去不就行了？利息写得高一点肯定好卖。反正只要卖出去，信托公司就即没风险也没责任了。于是，信托公司就把这些个债权做成一个一个项目投资产品，比如：城建公司修高速项目……等等。 各种各样，总称"理财产品"。
5，信托公司把"理财产品"拿到银行，让银行代理销售，还有回扣。
6，银行就印些广告，再开一间"理财室"，配个理财经理，看着储户的存款额，给储户打电话推销。把有钱人称作"VIP客户"，请上上坐。
至此，债权人是谁？明白了？……谁买了理财产品，谁就是地方政府债的债主。
如果出了问题，也就是不兑现。（去年华夏银行已经出现血本无归，而且好像是起步50万一份的VIP产品。）你去找银行。以华夏为例，银行说：签约的合同上任何地方没有银行的章子。银行只是代售。（华夏银行更甚，说是理财经理自己私人代理的，银行不知此事）
你看看合同上的章子去找信托公司，信托公司说：这是城建公司的项目，我们只是理财的信托公司。就好比你买了中石油的股票赔了，你不能找你开户的证券公司吧。
你去找城建公司，城建公司说：我们是跟银行签的约融的资，你是谁？
你去找银行，银行说：我们是融资给城建公司的，跟你有什么关系？
你再去找城建公司，城建公司说：谁卖给你的你找谁去！……
你再拐回来找银行，银行说：你跟谁签的约，你找谁去！
你再去找信托公司，信托公司说：投资有风险，你没看合同条款细则吗？
你说：明明写着保本的！
信托公司说：这是政府项目，政府不光说保本，还说有补贴呢，不信你去问政府！
你去问政府，政府说：我们只是立项，审批项目。是行政机构，这连你都不知道吗？
……你说算了，我也不找了，直接告吧。打官司！
我是VIP客户，还没被骗光，还有财力，物力，人力，写诉状！
诉状第一栏，被告人：…… ？？？该填谁？
这时候你才发现，打官司，要在被告人所在地法院打。银行在本地，信托公司在上海，城建公司在北京……。被告栏都填不出，根本没法打。
政府怎么这么聪明？……其实政府也是让美国涮过，学来的。美国的"次级债"就是这样的结构。区别在于：美国是信托公司把它卖给全世界了；中国是各地方政府卖给全国老百姓了。好了，各位看官，别在这看雪球了，赶快回去问问你家金砖老婆买没买理财产品？
银行呗。因为没有听说过地方政府债券，也没有人买过。……老百姓只买过国债券。的确，中国的地方政府没有发行债券的权利，因为中央知道地方政府一定会胡来，管不住。所以你也没见过没听过有地方政府债券。中央以前有过代理发行，因为没人买，地方政府就另谋出路了……。
怎么个另谋出路？路径是这样：
1，各地方政府主导注册了一些投资公司，这些投资公司政府把它叫做：融资平台。其名称可以是某城建开发公司、城建资产经营公司等。
2，地方政府立项，比如：建高速，建机场，盖政府大楼……等等。
3，融资平台的这些公司拿着政府的项目去银行融资，因为是政府背景的公司，又是政府项目，所以融资是审批 金额是多少给多少。
4，银行当然知道地方政府是个什么东西，此钱大半是有去无回，风险很大。所以银行就把此债权转卖给信托公司，比如10亿的融资，银行说我留下2%的利息，剩下的你接手，签的是5% 的利息，你还有3%可赚。虽然信托公司也知道政府是个什么东西，但是这么大的生意总不能不要，怎么办？ 只要再转卖出去不就行了？利息写得高一点肯定好卖。反正只要卖出去，信托公司就即没风险也没责任了。于是，信托公司就把这些个债权做成一个一个项目投资产品，比如：城建公司修高速项目……等等。 各种各样，总称"理财产品"。
5，信托公司把"理财产品"拿到银行，让银行代理销售，还有回扣。
6，银行就印些广告，再开一间"理财室"，配个理财经理，看着储户的存款额，给储户打电话推销。把有钱人称作"VIP客户"，请上上坐。
至此，债权人是谁？明白了？……谁买了理财产品，谁就是地方政府债的债主。
如果出了问题，也就是不兑现。（去年华夏银行已经出现血本无归，而且好像是起步50万一份的VIP产品。）你去找银行。以华夏为例，银行说：签约的合同上任何地方没有银行的章子。银行只是代售。（华夏银行更甚，说是理财经理自己私人代理的，银行不知此事）
你看看合同上的章子去找信托公司，信托公司说：这是城建公司的项目，我们只是理财的信托公司。就好比你买了中石油的股票赔了，你不能找你开户的证券公司吧。
你去找城建公司，城建公司说：我们是跟银行签的约融的资，你是谁？
你去找银行，银行说：我们是融资给城建公司的，跟你有什么关系？
你再去找城建公司，城建公司说：谁卖给你的你找谁去！……
你再拐回来找银行，银行说：你跟谁签的约，你找谁去！
你再去找信托公司，信托公司说：投资有风险，你没看合同条款细则吗？
你说：明明写着保本的！
信托公司说：这是政府项目，政府不光说保本，还说有补贴呢，不信你去问政府！
你去问政府，政府说：我们只是立项，审批项目。是行政机构，这连你都不知道吗？
……你说算了，我也不找了，直接告吧。打官司！
我是VIP客户，还没被骗光，还有财力，物力，人力，写诉状！
诉状第一栏，被告人：…… ？？？该填谁？
这时候你才发现，打官司，要在被告人所在地法院打。银行在本地，信托公司在上海，城建公司在北京……。被告栏都填不出，根本没法打。
政府怎么这么聪明？……其实政府也是让美国涮过，学来的。美国的"次级债"就是这样的结构。区别在于：美国是信托公司把它卖给全世界了；中国是各地方政府卖给全国老百姓了。好了，各位看官，别在这看雪球了，赶快回去问问你家金砖老婆买没买理财产品？
2013年6月3日
处理婆媳关系的关键：儿子/丈夫 A Mother, A Son And A Wife
母
亲还未问完这个问题，吉姆•布朗(Jim Brown)就知道自己麻烦来了。“我的厨艺是不是比你妻子的更好？”母亲在厨房里一边平静地搅拌着炉灶上锅里的食物，一边问道。吉姆支支吾吾不愿回答，因为当时妻子乔伊(Joy)就站在旁边。他说当时自己祈祷着“地上能出现一道缝”。最终，他做了当时他能想到的唯一一件事：实话实说。他说：“我当时答道妻子的厨艺更好。”现年50岁的吉姆是得克萨斯州邓肯维尔(Duncanville)一家汽修店的老板。
研究表明，男方母亲比女方母亲更容易与孩子的配偶产生矛盾，而婆媳不合可能导致新婚夫妇关系紧张。专家说化解婆媳关系不合的关键在于儿子/丈夫的态度，他不能袖手旁观，并且学会在传话时把妻子的意见说成是自己的。
可悲的是，这种场景对当时结婚七年的布朗夫妇来说并不新鲜。妻子和母亲之间的紧张关系──还有他夹在中间的左右为难──已经对三人间的关系产生了负面影响。他母亲批评他妻子抚育孩子的方式，并且不满她赋闲在家。妻子就向他哭诉和抱怨。面对这两个女人，他选择了逃避。
他说：“我是个男人，直觉也不那么灵敏。这两个女人，我简直一个都搞不懂。遇到这种事情，我就想出去割草。”接下来的两年，布朗夫妇一直竭力维持着这个三角关系──直到冲突触及危机点，并来了个意料之外的转折。
很少有家庭关系比婆婆、媳妇以及被夹在中间的男人之间的关系更令人头疼了。虽然它一直是喜剧类电影和电视剧永恒的题材，但似乎每一代人都不得不自己学习如何让这种三角关系维持下去。
根据威斯康辛大学史蒂文斯波恩特分校(University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point)传播学助理教授西尔维娅•米库茨基-埃尼亚特(Sylvia L. Mikucki-Enyart)一项尚未发表论文的研究，娶儿媳比嫁女儿更让母亲担心。她询问了89名婆婆和岳母，孩子结婚她们最担心什么。这些人绝大多数都表示,如果是儿子结婚，她们会感到更加不确定、不安心。这种不安集中在儿子与父母以及自己小家庭的关系上。他会比以前少来看望我们或者少打电话吗？他会和家人一起共度假期吗？
母亲们还称，她们担心儿子的幸福，以及婚姻和妻子是否会改变他。一些具体的担心包括：“因为妻子干涉，他变得不再可信赖。”“他的兴趣爱好发生了戏剧性的改变。”“他吃饱了吗？我儿媳可不是个好厨子。”“他快乐吗？”
Gary William Musgrave
婆婆和儿媳常常对她们之间的关系不太确定，因此二者就会保持距离。专家们称，打破这种矛盾格局的一个方法是夫妻二人要站在同一战线上。
米库茨基-埃尼亚特博士说：“很可能儿媳会不怎么喜欢婆婆，并且觉得她会多管闲事。”结果，这两个女人可能一开始相处就小心翼翼，采取防御姿态，最终渐行渐远。她说：“这已经变成了一种自证预言。”
从某种方式上来说，母亲和妻子都在争着养育这个男人。让这种关系雪上加霜的是被研究人员称作“家庭关系维护者”的女性传统角色，该角色负责管理家庭社交日程，维护家庭关系和传统。
两边都存在不确定性。婆婆和媳妇虽说理应是一家人，但双方并不怎么熟悉。如何称呼对方？应该与对方分享多少？都没有脚本。
这种不确定本身就可能导致嫉妒、愤怒或伤心。不确定性越强，两个女人越可能相互保持距离。而这可能会破坏婚姻的稳定：当母亲和妻子开战，男人自我保护的本能会告诉他能躲多远是多远。
如何才能打破这一模式？米库茨基-埃尼亚特博士说，关键在丈夫/儿子身上。她说：“他必须出面。他必须把妻子放在首位，并且让大家知道这一点。”
如果他的母亲经常出其不意地造访，让妻子感到困扰，做丈夫的需要和母亲说，来之前请先打电话。他不需要告诉母亲说这件事困扰到了他妻子。
米库茨基-埃尼亚特博士说：“母亲更容易对儿子而不是儿媳的要求做出回应。”
媳妇也可以发挥她们的作用，让婆婆参与到家庭中来。邀请她们一起吃晚餐。给她们发送孩子们的照片。有些事情学会睁一只眼闭一只眼。
米库茨基-埃尼亚特博士说：“别让它成为一种竞争。你们都爱这个男人，只是采取的方式不同。”
她说，夫妇必须永远站在同一战线上。记住，你们是一个团队。别把对方往火坑里推。她说，父母对你们会共同进退这一点是有心理准备的，尽管一开始他们可能会有些难以接受。
布朗夫妇结婚一年左右的时候，婆媳之间的关系就开始变得紧张。当时乔伊怀孕了，而她婆婆似乎突然变得无所不知。乔伊试着礼貌地对她视而不见，但偶尔会对老太太说她错了。婆婆会大哭并气冲冲地离开，最后乔伊不得不道歉了事。
乔伊说：“我感觉这是两败俱伤，好像我们是在跳一场疯狂的舞蹈。”现年45岁的乔伊是一名五年级的老师。
于是，大部分时候乔伊只好向丈夫抱怨。但，大部分时候，他什么也不做。他说：“我从来没有想过要去驳斥我母亲。”
更糟糕的是：吉姆有时会和他母亲讨论他婚姻中的问题。他说：“她会表示同情，我想，这让她感觉离我更近。这更让我觉得自己受到了妻子的怠慢。”
吉姆借工作逃避。他和妻子开始过着平行线般的生活，最终他提出了离婚。但在他们将这一决定告诉母亲后，她似乎让步了。现年72岁的贝蒂•韦德(Betty Wade)说，她不记得自己曾经和儿媳关系紧张，也不觉得这是导致夫妇俩商讨离婚的因素之一。她说：“虽然他结了婚，但依然是我的儿子；不过我也知道，他必须要去关心另外那位女士。”
贝蒂的让步为夫妇俩改善彼此的关系提供了一个机会。他们向所在教区的顾问寻求建议，并且去求助了婚姻咨询师。他们阅读自助书籍，还一起祈祷。他们的婚姻也得以维系了下来。
吉姆说：“这就是一部血泪史。但我学会了要牢牢记住一点，就是必须把妻子摆在首位。”
Elizabeth Bernstein
（本文版权归道琼斯公司所有，未经许可不得翻译或转载。）
Jim Brown knew he was in trouble before his mother finished asking the question. 'Am I a better cook than your wife?' she asked, calmly stirring a pot on the stove in her kitchen.
With his wife, Joy, standing next to him, Mr. Brown stammered and stuttered. He prayed -- 'for a trap door to appear,' he says. Finally, he did the only thing he could think to do: Tell the truth. 'I said that my wife is a better cook,' the 50-year-old owner of a Duncanville, Texas, auto-repair shop says.
The fallout? 'Biblical,' he says. 'There was wailing. Gnashing of teeth.' Even his wife got mad -- telling him that he had been insensitive to his mother.
Sadly, the scene wasn't new to the Browns, who had been married seven years. The strain between his wife and his mother -- and his position, stuck in the middle -- was taking a toll on all three relationships. His mom criticized his wife for her parenting style and for not getting a job. His wife cried and complained to him. He retreated from both women.
'I am a guy and not that intuitive, and I didn't really understand either one,' he says. 'My inclination was to go mow the grass.' Over the next couple years, the Browns kept trying to make the triangle work -- until the conflict reached a crisis point and then took an unexpected turn.
Few family relationships are more fraught than the ones between a mother-in-law and her daughter-in-law, and the man caught between them. It has been fodder for comedy in movies and on TV forever, yet each generation seems to have to learn for itself how to make this triangle work.
Mothers really do worry more when sons marry than when daughters marry, according to unpublished research conducted by Sylvia L. Mikucki-Enyart, assistant professor of communication at the University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point. She asked 89 mothers-in-law what they worried about most when a child married. Overwhelmingly, when a son married these women reported more uncertainty and insecurity. The insecurity centered on the son's relationship with his parents and nuclear family. Will he visit or call less often? Will he spend holidays with the family?
The mothers also reported worrying about their son's well-being and whether marriage and his wife would change him. Some of their specific concerns: 'He's no longer reliable, due to his wife's interference.' 'His interests have changed dramatically.' 'Is he eating enough? My daughter-in-law is a bad cook.' 'Is he happy?'
Dr. Mikucki-Enyart also studied 133 daughters-in-law, eliciting their concerns about the women who raised their husbands. 'Is my mother-in-law getting too involved in my life?' 'What is her ability to take financial care of herself?' 'What does she say about me when I am not around?'
'We expect a daughter-in-law not to like a mother-in-law and to expect her to be meddlesome,' says Dr. Mikucki-Enyart. As a result, the two women may tread carefully around each other from the start, reacting defensively and eventually becoming distant. 'It becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy,' she says.
In a way, both mother and wife are competing to nurture the man. Loading the relationship even more is women's traditional role as what researchers call 'kin keepers' who maintain the family social calendar, relationships and traditions.
There is uncertainty on both sides. Mothers- and daughters-in-law are supposed to be family, yet they don't know each other well. What to call each other? How much to share? There is no script.
The uncertainty itself can lead to jealousy, anger or sadness. The more uncertainty there is, the more each woman is likely to keep the other at arm's length. This can destabilize the marriage: When his mother and his wife are battling, a man's self-preservation instinct tells him to hide.
How can families break the pattern? It's really up to the husband/son, Dr. Mikucki-Enyart says. 'He needs to step up to the plate,' she says. 'He has to make his wife his priority and let that be known.'
If his mother often drops by unannounced and this bothers his wife, the husband needs to ask his mother to call first. He doesn't need to tell her that it upsets his wife.
'A mother is more likely to respond to her son's request than her daughter-in-law's,' says Dr. Mikucki-Enyart.
Daughters-in-law can do their part by keeping their mother-in-law involved in the family. Invite them to dinner. Send photos of the children. And pick your battles.
'Don't make it a competition,' says Dr. Mikucki-Enyart. 'You both love this man in completely different ways.'
The couple should always present a united front, she says. Remember that you are a team. Don't throw each other under the bus. Parents expect that united front, she says, even though it may be a little hard for them to get used to at first.
The tension between mother- and daughter-in-law started about a year into the Browns' marriage, when Ms. Brown got pregnant and her mother-in-law suddenly seemed to know everything. Ms. Brown tried to politely ignore her mother-in-law, but every once in a while she would tell the older woman she was wrong. Her mother-in-law would cry and storm off, and Ms. Brown would end up apologizing.
'I felt like there was no winning, like we were in a crazy dance,' says Ms. Brown, now 45 and a fifth-grade teacher.
So, mostly, Ms. Brown complained to her husband -- and, mostly, he did nothing. 'It didn't occur to me to contradict my mom,' he says.
Making matters worse: Mr. Brown sometimes sometimes discussed problems in his marriage with his mom. 'She would commiserate, I think, to feel close to me,' he says. 'And it increased my feelings of being slighted by my wife.'
Mr. Brown retreated into work. He and his wife began living parallel lives, and eventually he asked for a divorce. But after they told his mother the news, she seemed to back off. Betty Wade, now 72, says she doesn't remember that her relationship with her daughter-in-law was tense or a factor in the couple's divorce discussion. 'Just because he got married didn't make him less my son, but I knew he had to spend his attention on the other lady,' she says.
The space gave the couple a chance to work on their relationship. They sought advice from counselors at their church and went to a marriage therapist. They read self-help books and prayed together. And they stayed married.
'It was a lot of blood, sweat and tears,' Mr. Brown says. 'But I had learned to come to grips with the idea that I had to place my priorities with my wife first.'
Elizabeth Bernstein
With his wife, Joy, standing next to him, Mr. Brown stammered and stuttered. He prayed -- 'for a trap door to appear,' he says. Finally, he did the only thing he could think to do: Tell the truth. 'I said that my wife is a better cook,' the 50-year-old owner of a Duncanville, Texas, auto-repair shop says.
The fallout? 'Biblical,' he says. 'There was wailing. Gnashing of teeth.' Even his wife got mad -- telling him that he had been insensitive to his mother.
Sadly, the scene wasn't new to the Browns, who had been married seven years. The strain between his wife and his mother -- and his position, stuck in the middle -- was taking a toll on all three relationships. His mom criticized his wife for her parenting style and for not getting a job. His wife cried and complained to him. He retreated from both women.
'I am a guy and not that intuitive, and I didn't really understand either one,' he says. 'My inclination was to go mow the grass.' Over the next couple years, the Browns kept trying to make the triangle work -- until the conflict reached a crisis point and then took an unexpected turn.
Few family relationships are more fraught than the ones between a mother-in-law and her daughter-in-law, and the man caught between them. It has been fodder for comedy in movies and on TV forever, yet each generation seems to have to learn for itself how to make this triangle work.
Mothers really do worry more when sons marry than when daughters marry, according to unpublished research conducted by Sylvia L. Mikucki-Enyart, assistant professor of communication at the University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point. She asked 89 mothers-in-law what they worried about most when a child married. Overwhelmingly, when a son married these women reported more uncertainty and insecurity. The insecurity centered on the son's relationship with his parents and nuclear family. Will he visit or call less often? Will he spend holidays with the family?
The mothers also reported worrying about their son's well-being and whether marriage and his wife would change him. Some of their specific concerns: 'He's no longer reliable, due to his wife's interference.' 'His interests have changed dramatically.' 'Is he eating enough? My daughter-in-law is a bad cook.' 'Is he happy?'
Dr. Mikucki-Enyart also studied 133 daughters-in-law, eliciting their concerns about the women who raised their husbands. 'Is my mother-in-law getting too involved in my life?' 'What is her ability to take financial care of herself?' 'What does she say about me when I am not around?'
'We expect a daughter-in-law not to like a mother-in-law and to expect her to be meddlesome,' says Dr. Mikucki-Enyart. As a result, the two women may tread carefully around each other from the start, reacting defensively and eventually becoming distant. 'It becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy,' she says.
In a way, both mother and wife are competing to nurture the man. Loading the relationship even more is women's traditional role as what researchers call 'kin keepers' who maintain the family social calendar, relationships and traditions.
There is uncertainty on both sides. Mothers- and daughters-in-law are supposed to be family, yet they don't know each other well. What to call each other? How much to share? There is no script.
The uncertainty itself can lead to jealousy, anger or sadness. The more uncertainty there is, the more each woman is likely to keep the other at arm's length. This can destabilize the marriage: When his mother and his wife are battling, a man's self-preservation instinct tells him to hide.
How can families break the pattern? It's really up to the husband/son, Dr. Mikucki-Enyart says. 'He needs to step up to the plate,' she says. 'He has to make his wife his priority and let that be known.'
If his mother often drops by unannounced and this bothers his wife, the husband needs to ask his mother to call first. He doesn't need to tell her that it upsets his wife.
'A mother is more likely to respond to her son's request than her daughter-in-law's,' says Dr. Mikucki-Enyart.
Daughters-in-law can do their part by keeping their mother-in-law involved in the family. Invite them to dinner. Send photos of the children. And pick your battles.
'Don't make it a competition,' says Dr. Mikucki-Enyart. 'You both love this man in completely different ways.'
The couple should always present a united front, she says. Remember that you are a team. Don't throw each other under the bus. Parents expect that united front, she says, even though it may be a little hard for them to get used to at first.
The tension between mother- and daughter-in-law started about a year into the Browns' marriage, when Ms. Brown got pregnant and her mother-in-law suddenly seemed to know everything. Ms. Brown tried to politely ignore her mother-in-law, but every once in a while she would tell the older woman she was wrong. Her mother-in-law would cry and storm off, and Ms. Brown would end up apologizing.
'I felt like there was no winning, like we were in a crazy dance,' says Ms. Brown, now 45 and a fifth-grade teacher.
So, mostly, Ms. Brown complained to her husband -- and, mostly, he did nothing. 'It didn't occur to me to contradict my mom,' he says.
Making matters worse: Mr. Brown sometimes sometimes discussed problems in his marriage with his mom. 'She would commiserate, I think, to feel close to me,' he says. 'And it increased my feelings of being slighted by my wife.'
Mr. Brown retreated into work. He and his wife began living parallel lives, and eventually he asked for a divorce. But after they told his mother the news, she seemed to back off. Betty Wade, now 72, says she doesn't remember that her relationship with her daughter-in-law was tense or a factor in the couple's divorce discussion. 'Just because he got married didn't make him less my son, but I knew he had to spend his attention on the other lady,' she says.
The space gave the couple a chance to work on their relationship. They sought advice from counselors at their church and went to a marriage therapist. They read self-help books and prayed together. And they stayed married.
'It was a lot of blood, sweat and tears,' Mr. Brown says. 'But I had learned to come to grips with the idea that I had to place my priorities with my wife first.'
Elizabeth Bernstein
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