CHARLES WOLF JR.
在《中国是如何走向资本主义的》(How China Became Capitalist)一书中，科斯和亚利桑那州立大学(Arizona State University)的全球研究助理教授王宁对促使中国从一个极度贫穷的社会主义国家摇身变为世界第二大经济体的“一连串行动进行了历史性的叙述”。
然而把这本书仅仅描述为“历史性的叙述”有失准确。科斯和王宁解释中国崛起的角度与早已被众人接受的世俗看法明显不同。人们普遍认为中国的突飞猛进得益于共产党的英明领导，而本书的两位作者则认为，中国过去30年令人瞩目的经济增长不是由北京的政党领袖策划的自上而下的过程。相反，中国的崛起是由两位作者所称的“四场边际革命”推动的一个自下而上的过程。
首先是农业领域的“家庭联产承包责任制”。按两位作者的说法，这种制度在1970年代末“在中国农村自发出现”并于1982年在全国范围内实施。该制度允许农民以自由市场价格出售他们的部分农产品。另一场“革命”源于以乡镇企业形式出现的农村产业改革，它推动乡镇企业像实业家那样生产和销售他们的产品。这些企业反过来又产生了实业家和“个体经济”──作者对其的解释是“私有经济的委婉说法”，这样的委婉说法意在掩饰这第三场革命下潜藏的资本主义现实。第四场革命是在深圳、广东和福建的其它几个城市以及上海和其它沿海城市建立“经济特区”。
按两位作者的说法，这四场边际革命催生了“充满活力的非国有行业”，它与“死气沉沉的国有行业”形成了鲜明对比。如两位作者所说，这些发展是在1950年代末的大跃进(the Great Leap Forward)──当时数以百万计的人由于错误的集体化和工业化尝试而被饿死──以及1960年代中期的文化大革命(Cultural Revolution)──“毛泽东为让中国进入社会主义模式而做出的最后也是最可怕的尝试”──之后取得的。
与这些灾难性背景对照来看，私有化取得的成就是非同寻常的，有时甚至有些离奇。两位作者写道，到1980年代初期的时候，“个体户理发师的收入逐渐超过了国有医院里的医生。街头摊贩……比核科学家挣的钱多。做贸易的商人、小商店和私营商店的老板……是当时中国收入最高的群体，”而“个体户企业和独资企业的数量从1978年的14万家增加到了1981年的260万家”。
两位作者指出，在让这一切顺利进行的过程中，共产党扮演的角色主要是为其让路。科斯和王宁得出的结论是：“政府从经济领域的逐渐退出而非政治领导的强大和无所不在……才是成功的原因。”指导原则是务实主义、试验验证和儒家“实事求是”的训诫──或者，就如在后毛泽东时代推进了诸多改革的邓小平的一句名言所说：“实践是检验真理的唯一标准。”
《中国是如何走向资本主义的》一书当中有很多这样的见解。比如，两位作者对支配纵向关系的法制和支配横向关系的法制进行了区分。法制在中国是有明显体现的，从一些腐败案件会遭到何等严厉的惩处（而其他一些则被忽略掉）就可以看出。然而法制又很少是明朗清晰的：共产党无情镇压异见人士，压制可能威胁其统治的个人或团体言论。科斯和王宁对中国缺少“思想领域的自由市场”而感到遗憾，并哀叹这一点给大学和中国经济的创新能力带来了损害。
两位作者还认为，中国经济未来的动力取决于其私有经济领域的持续增长。但是他们不太清楚中国大型国有企业的未来如何，也不清楚中国为将这些企业私有化所做的部分努力会有何前景。
两位作者的论点也偶有可商榷之处。例如，他们认为思想领域的自由市场可以在缺少民主政治的情况下维持。实际上，二者缺其一的情况是很难想象的：毕竟，一些在这个市场上供应的思想很可能会极力主张扩大民主，而这是中国领导人特别忌讳的。虽然作者承认财产权在有效的市场改革中具有中心地位，但是他们回避了这样一个问题：如果不进行规范，行使财产权的时候是否有时会以牺牲人权为代价。
虽然《中国是如何走向资本主义的》一书文笔紧凑，相对而言没有过量的经济学术语，但是这本书读起来并不容易。书中充塞着大量事实、数据和交叉引用的参考文献，还有21页精心标注的尾注。不过读者如有耐心读完此书，则可对现代经济史上最不寻常的经济转型拥有更深入透彻的理解。
（本文作者是美国兰德公司(RAND Corp.)的经济学家，胡佛研究所(Hoover Institution)的高级研究员。）
罗
纳德•科斯(Ronald Coase)是世界最有影响力的经济学家之一，然而他很少成为媒体瞩目的焦点。这是因为他通过别的经济学家来发挥影响，同时又谨慎地与每天备受关注的政策争论保持距离。科斯1991年获得诺贝尔经济学奖，他提出了一些近年来最重要的经济学思想，其中包括用他的名字冠名的科斯定理(Coase Theorem)。该定理指出，强大的、精确定义的财产权能够降低私人交易的社会成本。科斯还是法与经济学领域的先驱者，使用经济学上的见解来阐释法律问题。如今他已102岁高龄，然而他创造的智力成果依然让人赞叹。在《中国是如何走向资本主义的》(How China Became Capitalist)一书中，科斯和亚利桑那州立大学(Arizona State University)的全球研究助理教授王宁对促使中国从一个极度贫穷的社会主义国家摇身变为世界第二大经济体的“一连串行动进行了历史性的叙述”。
然而把这本书仅仅描述为“历史性的叙述”有失准确。科斯和王宁解释中国崛起的角度与早已被众人接受的世俗看法明显不同。人们普遍认为中国的突飞猛进得益于共产党的英明领导，而本书的两位作者则认为，中国过去30年令人瞩目的经济增长不是由北京的政党领袖策划的自上而下的过程。相反，中国的崛起是由两位作者所称的“四场边际革命”推动的一个自下而上的过程。
首先是农业领域的“家庭联产承包责任制”。按两位作者的说法，这种制度在1970年代末“在中国农村自发出现”并于1982年在全国范围内实施。该制度允许农民以自由市场价格出售他们的部分农产品。另一场“革命”源于以乡镇企业形式出现的农村产业改革，它推动乡镇企业像实业家那样生产和销售他们的产品。这些企业反过来又产生了实业家和“个体经济”──作者对其的解释是“私有经济的委婉说法”，这样的委婉说法意在掩饰这第三场革命下潜藏的资本主义现实。第四场革命是在深圳、广东和福建的其它几个城市以及上海和其它沿海城市建立“经济特区”。
按两位作者的说法，这四场边际革命催生了“充满活力的非国有行业”，它与“死气沉沉的国有行业”形成了鲜明对比。如两位作者所说，这些发展是在1950年代末的大跃进(the Great Leap Forward)──当时数以百万计的人由于错误的集体化和工业化尝试而被饿死──以及1960年代中期的文化大革命(Cultural Revolution)──“毛泽东为让中国进入社会主义模式而做出的最后也是最可怕的尝试”──之后取得的。
与这些灾难性背景对照来看，私有化取得的成就是非同寻常的，有时甚至有些离奇。两位作者写道，到1980年代初期的时候，“个体户理发师的收入逐渐超过了国有医院里的医生。街头摊贩……比核科学家挣的钱多。做贸易的商人、小商店和私营商店的老板……是当时中国收入最高的群体，”而“个体户企业和独资企业的数量从1978年的14万家增加到了1981年的260万家”。
两位作者指出，在让这一切顺利进行的过程中，共产党扮演的角色主要是为其让路。科斯和王宁得出的结论是：“政府从经济领域的逐渐退出而非政治领导的强大和无所不在……才是成功的原因。”指导原则是务实主义、试验验证和儒家“实事求是”的训诫──或者，就如在后毛泽东时代推进了诸多改革的邓小平的一句名言所说：“实践是检验真理的唯一标准。”
《中国是如何走向资本主义的》一书当中有很多这样的见解。比如，两位作者对支配纵向关系的法制和支配横向关系的法制进行了区分。法制在中国是有明显体现的，从一些腐败案件会遭到何等严厉的惩处（而其他一些则被忽略掉）就可以看出。然而法制又很少是明朗清晰的：共产党无情镇压异见人士，压制可能威胁其统治的个人或团体言论。科斯和王宁对中国缺少“思想领域的自由市场”而感到遗憾，并哀叹这一点给大学和中国经济的创新能力带来了损害。
两位作者还认为，中国经济未来的动力取决于其私有经济领域的持续增长。但是他们不太清楚中国大型国有企业的未来如何，也不清楚中国为将这些企业私有化所做的部分努力会有何前景。
两位作者的论点也偶有可商榷之处。例如，他们认为思想领域的自由市场可以在缺少民主政治的情况下维持。实际上，二者缺其一的情况是很难想象的：毕竟，一些在这个市场上供应的思想很可能会极力主张扩大民主，而这是中国领导人特别忌讳的。虽然作者承认财产权在有效的市场改革中具有中心地位，但是他们回避了这样一个问题：如果不进行规范，行使财产权的时候是否有时会以牺牲人权为代价。
虽然《中国是如何走向资本主义的》一书文笔紧凑，相对而言没有过量的经济学术语，但是这本书读起来并不容易。书中充塞着大量事实、数据和交叉引用的参考文献，还有21页精心标注的尾注。不过读者如有耐心读完此书，则可对现代经济史上最不寻常的经济转型拥有更深入透彻的理解。
（本文作者是美国兰德公司(RAND Corp.)的经济学家，胡佛研究所(Hoover Institution)的高级研究员。）
CHARLES WOLF JR.
Ronald Coase ranks among the world's most influential economists, yet he rarely appears in the media spotlight. That's because he channels his influence through other economists, while maintaining a prudent distance from the glare of quotidian policy disputes. Mr. Coase, who received the Nobel Prize for economics in 1991, has originated some of the most important economic ideas of recent years. These include the eponymous Coase Theorem, which states that strong, precisely defined property rights can reduce the social costs of private transactions. He has also pioneered the law-and-economics field, using economic insights to illuminate legal problems. He's 102, yet his intellectual output remains dazzling.
In 'How China Became Capitalist,' Mr. Coase and Ning Wang, an assistant professor of global studies at Arizona State University, offer a 'historical narrative of the chain of actions' that brought about China's remarkable transformation from a deeply impoverished socialist country to the world's second-largest economy.
Yet to describe the book simply as 'historical narrative' would be a misstatement. Messrs. Coase and Wang interpret China's rise in terms that are distinctly different from what has been accepted as conventional wisdom, which holds that China's dramatic rise has resulted from astute guidance by its Communist Party leadership. But as the authors demonstrate, China's dramatic economic growth over the past three decades hasn't been a top-down process engineered by party leaders in Beijing. Instead, China's rise has been a bottom-up process driven by what the authors call the 'four marginal revolutions.'
First came the 'household responsibility system' in agriculture that, the authors say, 'emerged spontaneously in rural China' in the late 1970s and was implemented nationwide in 1982. This system allowed farmers to sell some of their output at free-market prices. The next 'revolution' resulted from rural industry reform in the form of township and village enterprises, which impelled townships to behave like entrepreneurs in producing and marketing their products. These enterprises in turn led to the emergence of entrepreneurs and the 'individual economy'─'a euphemism for private economy,' the authors explain, that was intended to disguise the underlying capitalist reality of this third revolution. The fourth revolution was the establishment of the 'special economic zones' in Shenzhen and several other towns in Guangdong and Fujian provinces, as well as in Shanghai and other coastal cities.
According to the authors, the four marginal revolutions gave birth to 'a vibrant non-state sector' that contrasted sharply with 'a stagnant state sector.' These developments followed the Great Leap Forward in the late 1950s─when millions starved as a result of misguided collectivization and industrialization efforts─and the Cultural Revolution in the mid-1960s, 'Mao's last and most horrendous effort to mold China into socialism,' as the authors put it.
Viewed against the backdrop of these catastrophes, the achievements of this private were extraordinary and sometimes bizarre. By the early 1980s, the authors write, 'self-employed barbers came to earn higher incomes than surgeons in state hospitals. Street vendors . . . earned more than nuclear scientists. Traders, small-shop and private restaurant owners . . . were among the highest income groups in China.' And 'the number of self-employed household businesses and single proprietorships increased from 140,000 in 1978 to 2.6 million in 1981.'
The Communist Party's role in bringing this to pass, the authors say, consisted mainly in getting out of the way. Messrs. Coase and Wang conclude that 'the gradual withdrawal of government from the economy, rather than the strength or omnipresence of the political leadership . . . explains the success.' The guiding principles have been pragmatism, experimentation and the Confucian injunction 'to seek truth from facts'─or, as Deng Xiaoping, who pushed through many of the post-Mao reforms, put it in a famous dictum: 'Practice is the sole criterion for testing truth.'
'How China Became Capitalist' abounds with such insights. For example, the authors distinguish between, on one hand, rule by law governing hierarchical relations and, on the other, rule of law governing horizontal relations. Rule by law is plainly manifest in China, in how severe punishment is applied in some instances of corruption (while others are ignored). But rule of law is rarely evident: The Communist Party brutally suppresses political dissent as well as expressions of individual or group identity that might threaten its rule. Messrs. Coase and Wang deplore China's lack of a 'free market for ideas' and the damage that this has wrought on universities and on the Chinese economy's capacity to innovate.
The authors also insist that the future dynamism of China's economy depends on the continued growth of its private sector. But they are much less clear on the future of China's huge state-owned enterprises and of China's partial efforts to privatize them.
Occasionally the authors' contentions are problematic. For example, they opine that a free market for ideas can be sustained without political democracy. Actually, it's hard to imagine one without the other: Some of the ideas on offer, after all, might strongly advocate expanded democracy, which is anathema to China's leaders. And although the authors acknowledge the centrality of property rights in effective market reform, they avoid the question of whether property rights, if not regulated, may sometimes be exercised at the expense of human rights.
And while 'How China Became Capitalist' is tightly written and swept relatively clear of excessive economic jargon, it isn't easy reading. The book is crammed with facts, data, cross-references and 21 pages of carefully crafted endnotes. Yet patient readers will be rewarded with a better and deeper understanding of the most extraordinary transformation in modern economic history.
(Mr. Wolf is an economist at the RAND Corp. and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution.)
Ronald Coase ranks among the world's most influential economists, yet he rarely appears in the media spotlight. That's because he channels his influence through other economists, while maintaining a prudent distance from the glare of quotidian policy disputes. Mr. Coase, who received the Nobel Prize for economics in 1991, has originated some of the most important economic ideas of recent years. These include the eponymous Coase Theorem, which states that strong, precisely defined property rights can reduce the social costs of private transactions. He has also pioneered the law-and-economics field, using economic insights to illuminate legal problems. He's 102, yet his intellectual output remains dazzling.
In 'How China Became Capitalist,' Mr. Coase and Ning Wang, an assistant professor of global studies at Arizona State University, offer a 'historical narrative of the chain of actions' that brought about China's remarkable transformation from a deeply impoverished socialist country to the world's second-largest economy.
Yet to describe the book simply as 'historical narrative' would be a misstatement. Messrs. Coase and Wang interpret China's rise in terms that are distinctly different from what has been accepted as conventional wisdom, which holds that China's dramatic rise has resulted from astute guidance by its Communist Party leadership. But as the authors demonstrate, China's dramatic economic growth over the past three decades hasn't been a top-down process engineered by party leaders in Beijing. Instead, China's rise has been a bottom-up process driven by what the authors call the 'four marginal revolutions.'
First came the 'household responsibility system' in agriculture that, the authors say, 'emerged spontaneously in rural China' in the late 1970s and was implemented nationwide in 1982. This system allowed farmers to sell some of their output at free-market prices. The next 'revolution' resulted from rural industry reform in the form of township and village enterprises, which impelled townships to behave like entrepreneurs in producing and marketing their products. These enterprises in turn led to the emergence of entrepreneurs and the 'individual economy'─'a euphemism for private economy,' the authors explain, that was intended to disguise the underlying capitalist reality of this third revolution. The fourth revolution was the establishment of the 'special economic zones' in Shenzhen and several other towns in Guangdong and Fujian provinces, as well as in Shanghai and other coastal cities.
According to the authors, the four marginal revolutions gave birth to 'a vibrant non-state sector' that contrasted sharply with 'a stagnant state sector.' These developments followed the Great Leap Forward in the late 1950s─when millions starved as a result of misguided collectivization and industrialization efforts─and the Cultural Revolution in the mid-1960s, 'Mao's last and most horrendous effort to mold China into socialism,' as the authors put it.
Viewed against the backdrop of these catastrophes, the achievements of this private were extraordinary and sometimes bizarre. By the early 1980s, the authors write, 'self-employed barbers came to earn higher incomes than surgeons in state hospitals. Street vendors . . . earned more than nuclear scientists. Traders, small-shop and private restaurant owners . . . were among the highest income groups in China.' And 'the number of self-employed household businesses and single proprietorships increased from 140,000 in 1978 to 2.6 million in 1981.'
The Communist Party's role in bringing this to pass, the authors say, consisted mainly in getting out of the way. Messrs. Coase and Wang conclude that 'the gradual withdrawal of government from the economy, rather than the strength or omnipresence of the political leadership . . . explains the success.' The guiding principles have been pragmatism, experimentation and the Confucian injunction 'to seek truth from facts'─or, as Deng Xiaoping, who pushed through many of the post-Mao reforms, put it in a famous dictum: 'Practice is the sole criterion for testing truth.'
'How China Became Capitalist' abounds with such insights. For example, the authors distinguish between, on one hand, rule by law governing hierarchical relations and, on the other, rule of law governing horizontal relations. Rule by law is plainly manifest in China, in how severe punishment is applied in some instances of corruption (while others are ignored). But rule of law is rarely evident: The Communist Party brutally suppresses political dissent as well as expressions of individual or group identity that might threaten its rule. Messrs. Coase and Wang deplore China's lack of a 'free market for ideas' and the damage that this has wrought on universities and on the Chinese economy's capacity to innovate.
The authors also insist that the future dynamism of China's economy depends on the continued growth of its private sector. But they are much less clear on the future of China's huge state-owned enterprises and of China's partial efforts to privatize them.
Occasionally the authors' contentions are problematic. For example, they opine that a free market for ideas can be sustained without political democracy. Actually, it's hard to imagine one without the other: Some of the ideas on offer, after all, might strongly advocate expanded democracy, which is anathema to China's leaders. And although the authors acknowledge the centrality of property rights in effective market reform, they avoid the question of whether property rights, if not regulated, may sometimes be exercised at the expense of human rights.
And while 'How China Became Capitalist' is tightly written and swept relatively clear of excessive economic jargon, it isn't easy reading. The book is crammed with facts, data, cross-references and 21 pages of carefully crafted endnotes. Yet patient readers will be rewarded with a better and deeper understanding of the most extraordinary transformation in modern economic history.
(Mr. Wolf is an economist at the RAND Corp. and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution.)
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