中国总理温家宝的又一次“慈善之旅”即将结束之际，欧洲政商两界领袖正使出浑身解数，百般讨好“财大气粗”的中国。然而，指望这个新兴大国帮助欧洲摆脱经济困境的想法，实际上反而有可能破坏双方之间本已十分复杂的关系。
欧洲早有心构建一条新的“丝绸之路”，连通繁荣兴旺的中国市场，而最近的金融危机更是起到了推波助澜的作用。相关各方已向中国发出信号，恳请其购买希腊、葡萄牙和西班牙的国债，以帮助它们脱困。而由于国内市场萎靡不振，欧洲各国也正争相服务于蓬勃发展的中国消费市场。到访的投资者照例会受到红地毯的待遇，被当作财力雄厚的新商队派出的先头部队。
这显然不是一件区区小事。政府数据显示，中国在欧盟地区的年直接投资额已增加到60亿美元。同时，中国政府承诺，将再拿出数十亿美元资金，购买欧元区外围国家的债券。不过，我们也必须全面地看待这些成就。在欧盟的外来投资中，中国所占的比例仍相对较低；与其对美国国债上万亿美元的投资相比，中国对欧洲债券的购买额仍然极小。
然而，此类数据掩盖了问题的症结。欧洲经济如今已是千疮百孔，仅凭中国一己之力，绝不可能帮助欧洲复苏。坦白地说，当我们自己的企业在高工资和高税收的重负下摇摇欲坠之时，我们难道能指望中国企业来欧洲创造就业？当众多欧洲行业倾向于在中国生产产品之时，我们难道还能指望出口增长？
摆在欧洲面前的任务，是维持当前的发展水平，即使缺乏完成这一任务所需的“生产设备”。这是谋求追赶北欧繁荣水平的南欧国家长期以来所面临的挑战。金融危机不过突显出：北欧的高福利水平原来也是建立在摇摇晃晃的基础之上。
欧洲政界人士并不热衷于出台更多紧缩措施，所以他们正（再度）呼吁实施改革，以提高欧洲服务业效率和总体创新能力。然而，即使这类做法行之有效，也无助于降低欧洲持续膨胀的经常账户赤字——尤其是对华贸易逆差。2010年，欧洲对华的服务贸易顺差为40亿欧元，与2030亿美元的对华商品贸易逆差相比可谓小巫见大巫——这正是欧洲经常账户赤字高达1900亿美元的原因所在。
欧洲只有扩大工业产能，才能维持现有的生活水平。而在这方面，中国又站上了风口浪尖——只不过是作为挑战者，而非潜在的救星。欧洲平均工资水平仍比中国高5-10倍；中国的基础设施和教育水平均有所提升；中国的研发预算数额庞大；最重要的是，中国建设世界级工业的雄心似乎永不停息。当中国企业真正在欧洲投资时，他们想获得的是技术诀窍以及出口渠道。
中国想把本国工人放在第一位无可厚非。然而，当新一代欧洲政治家开始审视扩大经济合作的利与弊时，他们很快就能找到充足的理由，来阻止中国企业占领或高价收购他们仅存的一些工业“堡垒”。中国正在践行日益成熟的“经济国家主义”，与此同时，中欧有关相互开放市场的互惠机制存在明显缺陷。欧洲将不难找到理由保卫本地区工业，即使这意味着欧盟委员会的审慎政策将画上句号。
因此，从长远来看，我们可以预计这条丝绸之路将出现可怕的转向，这个转向极有可能导致欧亚大陆的两极难以保持稳定关系。不过，这样的转向首先将是欧洲自身不能适应新经济现实的征兆。欧洲上层官僚或许早已流于习俗，认为自由贸易大有好处。然而，欧洲未来的政治领导人将需面对与社会信心变化相呼应的新现实——社会信心的变化，归根结底是反映全球力量格局的变化。届时，温家宝的继任者们将会发现，欧洲对他们的欢迎远不如以往那么热情。
注：本文作者是布鲁塞尔当代中国研究所(Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies)研究员。
译者/何黎
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001039331
With Premier Wen Jiabao winding up another charity trip, European political and business leaders are going all-out to curry favour with the cash-laden Chinese juggernaut. Yet hopes that Mr Wen’s rising power will drag their region out of its economic malaise actually threaten to wreck an already complicated relationship.
Europe’s interest in building a new “silk road” to the thriving Chinese market is not new, but the recent financial crisis added new impetus. Appeals have been made to China, to help bail out Greece, Portugal and Spain by purchasing their debt. With home markets subdued, European states are also scrambling to serve the burgeoning Chinese consumer market. Visiting investors are routinely given the red-carpet treatment, as if the vanguard of a new caravan of capital bearers.
This is obviously not a trivial matter. Chinese direct investment in the European Union has now expanded to $6bn a year, according to government figures, while Beijing has pledged many billions more to the treasuries of peripheral nations. Yet these achievements must also be put in perspective. China’s share of EU investment inflows remains relatively modest, and compared to its $1,000bn in US Treasury bond holdings, Chinese purchases of European debt are still tiny.
Such figures, however, hide the crux of the problem. Europe’s economy is now sufficiently damaged that China alone can never do enough to help it recover. To put it bluntly, why should we expect Chinese companies to create jobs in Europe when our own ones stumble under the weight of high wages and taxes? And why should we expect our exports to grow when so many European industries prefer to build products in China?
Europe’s task is to maintain its current level of development, even while it lacks the productive machinery needed for that task. This has long been a challenge for those southern European member states seeking to emulate the prosperity of the north. The financial crisis high-lighted only that the high welfare standards of the north were also built on shaky fundamentals too.
European politicians are not keen on further austerity measures, so they are now calling (once again) for reforms to help boost the efficiency of the continent’s services sector and its overall innovation capacity. Yet even if this works, such things will scarcely reduce Europe’s growing current account deficit, especially with China. In 2010 Europe’s $4bn services surplus with China was dwarfed by a $203bn deficit in goods – the explanation for its current account deficit of $190bn.
Only greater industrial capacity can maintain current living standards. And it is here that China comes again to the forefront – but as a challenger, not a potential saviour. China boasts wages still 5 to 10 times below the European average, improving infrastructure and education, vast budgets for research, and, above all, a seemingly endless ambition to build world-class industries. When Chinese companies do invest in Europe, they are seeking knowhow, and export channels.
China’s desire to put its workers first is not an offence. Yet when a new generation of European politicians begins to scrutinise the balance sheet of greater economic co-operation, they will soon find ample arguments to stop Chinese companies taking over or outbidding their last few industrial strongholds. China is practising an increasingly sophisticated form of economic nationalism, while there are obvious flaws of reciprocity in the access China and Europe provide to each other’s market. It would not be difficult for Europe to find reasons to defend its industries, even if this meant an end to prudent policies at the European Commission.
In the long term, we should, therefore, expect the silk road to take a nasty turn, one that could well make it impossible to maintain stable relations between the two poles of the Eurasian continent. Yet such a turn would, in the first place, be symptomatic for Europe’s own failure to adjust to changing economic realities. Europe’s bureaucratic elites might be long-socialised to believe the benefits of free trade, but its future political leaders will need to confront new realities that respond to the changing confidence of their societies – a confidence that ultimately reflects shifts in the global balance of power. When this happens, Mr Wen’s successors will find Europe’s welcome to be far less warm.
The writer is research fellow of the Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies
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