世
界上没有不需要成本的经济刺激政策。乍一看，中国应对金融危机的成本似乎很低。2009年财政赤字总额占GDP的3.1%，2010年为2.6%，相比之下，美国这两个年份分别为12.7%和10.6%。但真实情况是，中国付出的代价远高于此。
中国应对危机主要是利用银行贷款，而不是中央政府债务。在其中许多贷款都很有可能变为坏账的情况下，到头来的成本可能还是会出现在政府的资产负债表上。
症结在于地方政府融资平台在巨额投资基础设施的两年期间所欠下的债务。目前有关其欠债规模的最佳数据来自中国银行业监督管理委员会和中国人民银行。银监会估计，截至2010年年底这些平台的借款总额是1.4万亿美元，央行曾经暗示这个数字最高可能达到2.2万亿美元。
这些数字很大，但也不是特别大。首先，并非全部贷款都会沦为坏账。据银监会2010年夏季的另一篇研究报告，地方政府融资平台所借贷款中有26%存在严重问题。将这个比例乘以央行估计的更高贷款余额数字，则可以粗略估计出不良贷款总额为5,720亿美元。
大胆假设这些不良贷款全部打了水漂，5,720亿美元也仅相当于中国2010年GDP的9.7%，仍旧低于美国的比例。考虑到中国中央政府债务水平低（2010年年底占GDP的17.7%）、经济增长速度高，以及资产负债表上还有大量资产，这些成本看上去是处于可控范围。
在不太可能发生债务危机的情况下，真正要问的问题是谁来买单。由于地方预算已然紧张，面临更高偿债成本的地方政府将不得不挤压公共服务方面的开支。第二个选项是政府所控制的银行业。中央政府不会任由银行陷入风雨飘摇的境地。只要政府设定的存贷款利率继续维持高息差，那么银行应该就能得到足够的缓冲应付过去。
基本可以肯定，长期以来承受重压的中国家庭将以某种形式为大多数成本买单。实际负利率给中国家庭储蓄造成的隐性税负眼下还没有告终的迹象。这是让中国经济朝着国内消费实现再平衡的又一障碍。在受到政府和银行双重挤压的情况下，就不用指望中国家庭会购物消费了。
Tom Orlik
There is no such thing as a free stimulus.
At first sight, China's response to the financial crisis looked cheap. A fiscal deficit totaling 3.1% of GDP in 2009 and 2.6% in 2010 compares with 12.7% and 10.6% in the U.S. The reality is that it was considerably more expensive than that.
China's response to the crisis came mainly from bank loans rather than central government debt. With many of those loans threatening to turn bad, the cost may still end up on the government's balance sheet.
The heart of the problem is debt taken on by local government financing vehicles over two years of huge infrastructure investment. The best numbers currently available on how much debt they have come from the China Banking Regulatory Commission, which puts total borrowing at $1.4 trillion at the end of 2010, and People's Bank of China, which has hinted it could be up to $2.2 trillion.
Those numbers are big, but not that big. First, not all of the loans will go bad. According to a separate CBRC study in summer 2010, 26% of loans to local government vehicles have serious deficiencies. Putting that together with the PBOC's higher figure for the loans outstanding suggests $572 billion as a back-of-the-envelope estimate of bad debts.
Using the aggressive assumption that nothing is recovered on those bad loans, $572 billion is equal to 9.7% of 2010 GDP, still low versus the U.S. In the context of China's low central government debt (17.7% of GDP at the end of 2010), a high rate of growth and substantial assets on the other side of the balance sheet, the cost looks manageable.
With the chances of a debt crisis small, the real question is who will pick up the tab. With local budgets already strained, town halls that face higher costs for servicing debt will need to squeeze spending on public services. The government won't leave the second option, the banks -- which it controls -- to swing in the wind. A continued wide spread between government-set interest rates for deposits and lending should provide them with enough of a cushion to muddle through.
There is little doubt that China's long-suffering households -- with no end in sight to the implicit tax on their savings deposits from negative real interest rates -- will pick up most of the bill in some form. That is another impediment to rebalancing the economy toward domestic consumption. Households can hardly be expected to hit the shops at the same time they are squeezed by the government and the banks.
Tom Orlik
At first sight, China's response to the financial crisis looked cheap. A fiscal deficit totaling 3.1% of GDP in 2009 and 2.6% in 2010 compares with 12.7% and 10.6% in the U.S. The reality is that it was considerably more expensive than that.
China's response to the crisis came mainly from bank loans rather than central government debt. With many of those loans threatening to turn bad, the cost may still end up on the government's balance sheet.
The heart of the problem is debt taken on by local government financing vehicles over two years of huge infrastructure investment. The best numbers currently available on how much debt they have come from the China Banking Regulatory Commission, which puts total borrowing at $1.4 trillion at the end of 2010, and People's Bank of China, which has hinted it could be up to $2.2 trillion.
Those numbers are big, but not that big. First, not all of the loans will go bad. According to a separate CBRC study in summer 2010, 26% of loans to local government vehicles have serious deficiencies. Putting that together with the PBOC's higher figure for the loans outstanding suggests $572 billion as a back-of-the-envelope estimate of bad debts.
Using the aggressive assumption that nothing is recovered on those bad loans, $572 billion is equal to 9.7% of 2010 GDP, still low versus the U.S. In the context of China's low central government debt (17.7% of GDP at the end of 2010), a high rate of growth and substantial assets on the other side of the balance sheet, the cost looks manageable.
With the chances of a debt crisis small, the real question is who will pick up the tab. With local budgets already strained, town halls that face higher costs for servicing debt will need to squeeze spending on public services. The government won't leave the second option, the banks -- which it controls -- to swing in the wind. A continued wide spread between government-set interest rates for deposits and lending should provide them with enough of a cushion to muddle through.
There is little doubt that China's long-suffering households -- with no end in sight to the implicit tax on their savings deposits from negative real interest rates -- will pick up most of the bill in some form. That is another impediment to rebalancing the economy toward domestic consumption. Households can hardly be expected to hit the shops at the same time they are squeezed by the government and the banks.
Tom Orlik
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