强悍的新加坡政府投资公司（Government Investment Corporation of Singapore，简称GIC）并不常成为异端思想的滋生地。不过，最近在GIC沸沸扬扬的一场辩论，其深层意义却吸引了世界各地投资者的关注。
辩论的中心议题，是围绕所谓的哈佛(Harvard)或耶鲁(Yale)投资模式展开的。从其近期历史来看，一如全球其它众多的主权财富基金，大部分时间GIC都对资产庞大的大学捐赠基金充满嫉妒与艳羡。原因是，对于任何希望摆脱呆滞守旧养老基金状态的长期投资集团，哈佛或耶鲁模式似乎提供了一幅令人兴奋的远景。毕竟，20年来，耶鲁等高校通过开拓一种独特的投资风格赚取了丰厚的回报。这在本质上讲是在支持一种多样投资理念，即在投资主流证券的同时，也将资产分散到非流动性资产及另类资产类别（诸如私人股本）。
然而，同众多美国金融品牌一样，哈佛和耶鲁的名字如今在亚洲等地似乎已失去了往日的光芒。或许正如GIC副主席陈庆炎(Tony Tan)解释的那样：“整个‘捐赠模式'的概念（曾经）非常具有影响力。但是，（如今）任何理性的投资者都会对此重新审视一番。”或者，更具体地说，重新思考是否要照搬。
数据是导致这种结果的部分原因。截至2009年6月的一年里，哈佛和耶鲁捐赠基金所持有的资产价值缩水25%。同期，全美所有高校的平均损失为23%（与GIC模式类似，截至2009年3月，GIC的年度损失也达到了20%）。
哈佛模式的支持者坚持表示，未来几年这种衰退局面有可能在一定程度上得到扭转。此外，正是由于亏损如此普遍，一些投资经理对此满不在乎，认为这是一种自然的力量。
但事实上，并非所有人都遭遇了同样的损失。例如，在截至2009年6月的一年里，牛津大学(Oxford University)捐赠基金“仅仅”损失了10%。而且，据牛津大学基金主管桑德拉•罗伯逊(Sandra Robertson)表示，那正是因为几年前牛津大学在经过深思熟虑后决定不效仿哈佛模式。
不过，这种失去光芒——抑或不安——的感觉，，不只是损失所带来的。近期，对业绩数据进行仔细核查后，一些GIC的高管开始得出结论：自己公司内部经理近些年的业绩，就算不是更好，也和外聘投资经理不相上下。由此，他们不禁要提出一个在过去看来有些离经叛道的问题，即：为什么会有人自找麻烦，向对冲基金或私人股本等机构支付高额的费用呢？
流动性风险依然是更为重要的问题。直到2007年，GIC还一直认为自己永远不会被迫贱卖资产，或者以不体面的方式退出投资。毕竟，主权财富基金（或捐赠基金）的全部意义就在于它应具有长远眼光，且这种眼光应当能助其安然度过任何短暂的风暴。
然而，在过去两年里，主权基金发现，这种“长期福咒”所能提供的保护远比之前想象的要少。因为在投资私人股本和对冲基金之后，GIC（和其他主权基金）最终往往会受制于共同投资者的变幻莫测——而这些共同投资者有一些目光短浅，或者实行逐日盯市制度。因此，会给GIC等集团造成伤害的，不仅有资产相关性问题，还有投资风格的延续。
这对于GIC（和其他基金）应当如何运作，提出了一些重要的问题。未来他们是否只应该与类似的投资机构共同投资呢？他们现在可以要求共同投资者提供详细资产目录吗（即便他们自己并不愿意提供这些数据）？他们能够因为预想中的非流动性风险而要求赔偿吗？或者，他们是不是应该辞掉所有的外聘经理，完全通过“内部力量”来完成投资？
坦率的讲，这场辩论的结局还不甚明朗，因为在像GIC这样的集团里，论战还处于初期阶段。此外，正如陈庆炎所承认的那样，他们以前几乎没有就流动性问题进行过任何思考，且大多数亚洲基金在努力打造一片全新天地方面都经验有限。相反，近几十年来，在某种程度上他们都普遍在试图追随美国模式（最突出的原因是许多亚洲国家的投资官员都拥有……呃……哈佛或者耶鲁的学位）。
但是，随着全球更多财富从美国流出，向新兴市场国家转移，未来投资业的才智领袖将出现在哪里，这个问题越来越引人注目。投资者应当继续关注GIC下一步的动向，更不用说其他新兴市场国家——例如中国——更为低调的主权基金了。
译者/汇栋
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001032224
The doughty Government Investment Corporation of Singapore is not often a hotbed of heretical thought. Recently, however, a debate has been bubbling at the GIC that has fascinating implications for investors around the world.
The issue at stake revolves around the so-called Harvard or Yale investment model. During most of its recent history, the GIC – like many other sovereign wealth funds around the world – has looked at these huge university endowment funds with envy and admiration. For the Harvard or Yale model seemed to offer an exciting vision for any long-term investment group that wanted to do more than act like a stodgy, old-fashioned pension fund. After all, for 20 years, groups such as Yale earned solid returns, by pioneering a distinctive investment style. This essentially championed the idea of diversifying into illiquid and alternative asset classes, such as private equity, alongside mainstream securities.
But these days, the names of Harvard and Yale – like so many American financial brands – are looking somewhat tarnished in places such as Asia. Or as Tony Tan, deputy chairman of the GIC, explains: “The whole idea of the endowment model has been very influential [before]. But any reasonable investor would [now] want to take another look at this.” Or, more specifically, about whether to copy it.
That is partly down to the numbers. In the year to June 2009, the value of the assets held in the Harvard and Yale endowment funds fell by over 25 per cent. Meanwhile, across all US colleges, the average loss was 23 per cent (a pattern similar to the GIC, which saw losses of 20 per cent in the year to March 2009).
Supporters of the Harvard approach insist that these declines are likely to be partly reversed in the coming years. Moreover, precisely because the losses were so widespread, some investment managers are apt to shrug them off, as a force of nature.
But the fact is that not everybody suffered quite the same way; at the Oxford University endowment fund, for example, losses in the year to June 2009 were “only” 10 per cent. And that, according to Sandra Robertson, head of this fund, is because Oxford deliberately decided a few years ago that it would not try to emulate Harvard.
But the sense of tarnish – or unease – goes beyond the losses. After recently scrutinising their performance data, some GIC executives are starting to conclude that their own in-house managers have performed as well, if not better, than external managers in recent years. That leaves them asking a question that used to seem heretical: namely why does anyone ever bother to pay such hefty fees to, say, hedge funds or private equity?
More important still is the issue of liquidity risk. Until 2007, the GIC tended to assume that it would never need to engage in asset firesales or unseemly investment exits. After all, the whole point of a sovereign wealth fund (or endowment fund) is that it is supposed to take a long-term perspective, which should enable it to ride out any temporary storms.
However, in the past two years, sovereign funds discovered that the long-term mantra provides far less protection than previously thought. For by investing in private equity and hedge funds, the GIC (and others) ended up being exposed to the vagaries of their co-investors – and some of those had short-term horizons, or mark-to-market triggers. Thus what hurt groups such as the GIC was not just the issue of asset correlation, but a contagion of investor style as well.
That raises some big questions about how the GIC (and others) should conduct themselves. Should they only co-invest with similar investors in the future? Could they now demand detailed lists of their co-investors (even if they hate providing such data themselves)? Could they ask to be paid for assuming illiquidity risk? Or should they dump external managers altogether, and bring that activity “in-house”?
Frankly, it is still unclear where this debate will end since, at groups such as the GIC, it is still at an early stage. Moreover, as Mr Tam admits, there has been little intellectual work done on this liquidity issue before, and most Asian funds have limited experience in trying to forge radical new ground. Instead, they have generally spent recent decades trying to follow a US model, to some degree (not least because many Asian investment officials have degrees from . . . er . . . Harvard or Yale).
But in a world where more wealth is moving to the emerging markets – and away from America – the question of where the future intellectual leadership for the investment business will be found is becoming ever more fascinating. Investors should keep watching what the GIC does next, not to mention its other – less vocal – brethren in places such as China.
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