三十多岁的多洛蒂(Dorotea)女士是一家位于秘鲁偏远林区的陶瓷厂的老板，她对全球金融危机可谓了然于胸。她或许不太清楚2008年雷曼兄弟(Lehman Brothers)破产时间错综复杂的内幕，也不熟悉随之而来、旨在修补破产银行系统的一系列监管规定。不过，她知道自己十分幸运。如果换成是今天，她想获得1200索尔的贷款、启动几年前买下的一个新窑区，结果可能会让人失望。
几乎和全球所有一家银行一样，她当初选择的小额信贷银行Mibanco也不得不尽力降低自身的风险，目前已不再向多洛蒂那样的穷困商人发放贷款。“我们仍在放贷，”该行当地的一位经理表示，“但我们在寻找风险更低的客户——不能太穷，也不能规模太小。”
80年来最严重的那场金融危机的最糟糕时刻已过去了三年，有一点比任何时候都更为明确：这场许多人认为两年前已经结束的危机仍在延续，并且在某些方面，特别是在美国和整个欧元区，仍在不断加剧。商界人士和政治家都表示，信贷要么是无法获得，要么是成本过高。银行抱怨自己的利润受到了太大的挤压，投资者正弃他们而去。夹在中间的监管当局则想弄明白，他们应对危机的自然反应——起草严厉的新规定——到底是向预期的那样、正构建一个更强大的系统，还是让脆弱不堪的全球经济雪上加霜？
从这一期开始，英国《金融时报》将在未来一周内刊登一系列分析和评论文章、视频采访和多媒体图像，深入地审视一下银行业的未来。
事后想来，有一点十分明确——银行业在2007前那些年的结构，注定了一场事故将无可避免。各机构在追逐丰厚利润的过程中，行为已经变得扭曲。它们持有的股本金微乎其微，根本无法自保。但在许多情况下，它们真正持有的债务却被债务工具放大了50倍之多。它们通过成本低廉的借贷（通常是短期债务）赚取了巨额利润，同时还假定，从国内抵押贷款到复杂衍生品等产品的内在风险可以忽略不计。
如今，上述的盈利能力（股本回报率(ROE)高达25%至30%，是许多蓝筹实业公司的5倍）的基石已不复存在。许多银行目前持有的股本是以往的3倍，是流动性融资的6倍。通常的杠杆倍数降到了20倍，风险得到了重新评估，利润出现了大幅下降。就拿银行最青睐的标准ROE来说，银行目前能够指望的最高水平只有危机前区间的一半。而按照以往的情况，计算ROE时只是把回报与那些微不足道的股本缓冲加以比较，从而夸大了银行的业绩。
美国花旗集团(Citigroup)损失惨重，其资产（贷款、抵押贷款和其它信贷）均大幅缩水。“世界已发生了变化，”花旗欧洲业务联合首席执行官阿尔贝托•沃姆(Alberto Verme)表示，“银行正回归其基本业务——揽储和放贷，并且在以下多个对客户日益重要的方面实施管理——现金管理、贸易融资和外汇业务。”
监管机构进而推行一系列规定，对金融机构应当持有的股本和流动性数量实施管理。尽管大多数规定都出自全球监管机构巴塞尔委员会(Basel committee)的新标准（将在2019年之前逐步到位），分析师和投资者仍向银行施压，要求其尽早实现合规。过去两三年里，他们有一句很简短的口头禅：资本比例——具体地说就是股本对风险加权资产的比例——越高越好。
“有一点相当明确，如今的银行系统比几年前更安全，”安理律师事务所(Allen & Overy)合伙人鲍勃•佩恩(Bob Penn)表示，“但这是监管行动的功劳，还是仅仅是市场对危机的反应？”
不管哪一种情况，金融危机都已死灰复燃。三年前政府纾困破产银行的直接成本，加上银行业危机造成经济放缓和长期过度借贷导致自食其果的间接成本，都已在难以为继的欧美主权债务的负担之中得到体现。而这又反作用于仍然脆弱的银行系统，致使传统上认为安全的银行所持的政府债券投资组合大幅减值。
联邦存款保险公司(FDIC)首席经济学家理查德•布朗(Richard Brown)表示，“在这个调整资产负债表的进程中，眼下在房地产行业和政府层面存在着诸多不确定性。”FDIC为美国的银行存款提供担保，并对银行业进行监管。
有些人认为，根本问题在于改革力度不够。斯坦福大学(Stanford)教授阿纳特•阿德马蒂（Anat Admati)表示，“我们所引入和设计的结构性变革，将无法使金融体系变得足够安全。”
举例来说，市场看跌情绪的最新目标当属法国的银行。这些银行在法国监管机构的支持下，拒绝效仿瑞士、瑞典和英国同行发起的旨在提高资本金水平的行动。与此同时，法国巴黎银行(BNP Paribas)、兴业银行(Société Générale)和农业信贷银行(Credit Agricole)的风险敞口都已高于希腊。
政策制定者正竭力在不损耗银行资本缓冲的前提下，对欧元区经济体存在缺陷的基本面进行修复。但同时，随着恐慌情绪再度泛起，整个欧洲范围内许多机构的短期流动性融资供应正逐渐枯竭——正是这种恐慌情绪，导致了2007-2008年英国北岩银行(Northern Rock)和美国雷曼兄弟(Lehman)的倒闭。
“随着时间的推移，欧元区的基本面问题只是在不断恶化，”瑞典企业Handelsbanken的财务总监乌尔夫•里斯(Ulf Riese)表示。该公司的低风险业务模式，使之成为欧洲同类公司中一个不可多得的“安全港”。“许多银行的流动性要么期限变得更短，要么就是依赖政府的措施。”
周五是希腊主权债券的私人部门持有者签署自愿性协议、将债券延期至最多10年的最后期限，这可能在整个欧元区引发新一轮市场看空情绪。银行家预计，私人部门持有者的参与率将不会达到90%的目标，如果政治家们认为债务负担分配不公，有可能危及向希腊提供的下一笔纾困资金。市场的脆弱态势，使得一些通常态度强硬的改革者怀疑采取一种毫不妥协的方法能否奏效。上月，英国央行(BoE)负责金融稳定的执行董事安德鲁•霍尔丹(Andrew Haldane)称赞了上世纪30年代美国总统富兰克林•罗斯福(Franklin Roosevelt)在银行监管上的应对之策——具体说来，罗斯福在大萧条(Great Depression)时期放松了一些规则，以增加贷款的发放，而他的努力取得了成功。
银行家们赞同霍尔丹的看法，这毫不奇怪。例如，他们指出，既然这么多家银行被评级机构调降了信用等级，从经济角度讲，银行作为资本市场和借款公司中间人的传统角色可能已经失效。“现如今，很多银行的筹资成本高于企业，这使得银行很难再向企业放贷，”里斯表示。
至于蓝筹客户，由于它们能轻而易举地直接到资本市场上筹资，上述问题可能只是银行才面临的问题。贷款传统上是一种赔本赚吆喝的产品，银行籍此与客户建立起关系，并在此基础上向客户交叉销售利润更高的产品与服务。
但就中小企业(SME)而言，银行资金不足在政治和经济两方面都构成了一个真正的问题。须满足更高监管资本要求的中小企业贷款，在欧洲尤为敏感，因为这些企业为欧洲提供了绝大多数的就业岗位。
有些改革者认为，监管当局必须维持压力不变——比如说，强制银行只有在通过留存利润提高资本水平之后，才能向股东支付红利。
“我们只有保证金融系统的健康，才有可能实现长远的繁荣，”英国央行副行长保罗•塔克(Paul Tucker)表示。“如果监管当局当初没有强制银行系统持有更多的资本，我们目前的境况可能更糟。”
然而，在全球范围代表金融业界的国际金融协会(Institute of International Finance)日前估计，执行新规将迫使金融企业追加1.3万亿美元的额外股本。该协会预测，累计效果可能相当于在未来5年里将贷款利率提高3.6%，并且到2015年前将全球国内生产总值(GDP)拉低3.2%。
那些支持采取更实用改革方法的人还有更大的抱怨：即上述方法可能导致一系列全新的扭曲现象——或许与引发2008年危机的种种扭曲同样危险。
荷兰银行荷兰国际集团(ING)首席执行官简•霍蒙(Jan Hommen)表示，重拳整治银行会推动风险转移至“影子”机构，从对冲基金到扩展至放贷业务的实业公司。他表示：“我很担心，受监管的金融市场——本质上作为整个经济的润滑剂——现在被管得太严了。监管机构实质上是在说：‘去那儿吧，那儿更便宜。’但没有人监管那些新的风险。”规则制定者虽然承诺将对影子市场进行调研，但迄今为止，尚未拿出任何有关这些风险的评估报告。
同时，人们对于形形色色缺乏协调的改革的副效应也颇有微辞。这些改革包括：全球层面上，《巴塞尔协议III》(Basel III)资本要求新规；在欧洲，《资本要求指令IV》( Capital Requirements Directive IV)；在美国，多德-弗兰克法案(Dodd-Frank Act)；在英国，即将发布的维克斯委员会(Vickers Commission)报告；在欧洲保险业，《偿付能力监管标准II》 (Solvency II) 规定。“如果政府官员与监管部门都不能统一他们的想法，我们还能指望出现明智的结局吗？”安理律师事务所(Allen & Overy)的佩恩反问道。
纳税人对2008年救助行动的不满，也限制了应对未来危机的选择。例如，美联储就不能直接向某一家机构发放应急贷款。
谈到美联储面临的限制，国际金融协会(IIF)首席经济学家菲尔•萨特尔(Phil Suttle)表示：“我担心，挤兑风险仍明显存在。如果我是一个未获得担保、期限较短的存款者，而银行业体系也没有得到明确的保障，在此刻我的担忧可能会更多、而非更少。”
一个更大的担忧则是，对西方银行的重拳整治可能会造成仅存的几个增长性市场（最引人注目的是亚洲）产生扭曲。一家银行的亚洲专家表示：“就宏观层面而言，中国在增长这条道路上还有很长的一段路要走。但这并不意味着沿途不会出现颠簸。”亚洲避开了西方的许多监管改革，所以欧美的银行正将巨额投资转向该地区（从放贷业务到建立新交易场所），从而帮助吹大了现有的泡沫。
但当前最大的问题仍是基本的贷款能力问题。只有当整个经济对于信贷的疲弱需求最终增强，对银行在新资本金与流动性限制下放贷的能力进行了考验，世界才会真正知道银行业的未来是否会变得更美好。
译者/何黎
刘明康：鱼都是从头臭起的
英国《金融时报》欧阳德报道
中国银监会(CBRC)主席刘明康在解释自己的工作时会用一种通俗易懂的方式。“鱼都是从头臭起的”，是他喜欢用的一句话。
刘明康相信，监管必须牢牢看紧各家银行的总行。这一看法在中国积极落实《巴塞尔协议III》(Basel III)规定的举动中得以体现。在欧美讨论放松流动性规则之际，中国银监会在加紧推行一套在定义上比国际标准还要严格的规定。
《巴塞尔协议III》规定，银行一级普通股本的最低资本充足率达4.5%；中国则将这一比例定为5%。在杠杆比率方面，《巴塞尔协议III》要求，风险权重失效情况下安全保障最低应为银行总资产的3%，而中国的对应规定是4%。
中国落实《巴塞尔协议III》规定的速度甚至更令人吃惊。中国银监会已向几家大银行下达命令，须在2013年满足上述资本充足率要求，而发达国家银行执行新规的截止时间是2015年。
中国银行家在执行新规上的反应可谓迅速。中国与欧美之间的区别很好解释。在中国，银行最高层高管都由共产党任命，他们向政府负责。
截至6月底，中国银行业的资本充足率为12.2%，远高于《巴塞尔协议III》的要求。亚洲地区银行的情况也大抵如此，尽管该地区认为资本充足率主要是西方银行的问题。
然而，日本是个例外，该国的监管当局想方设法为银行提供庇护，使其不必在增加资本存量方面走得太快。
但是，中国银行家没有抱怨，并不意味着新的监管规定不会造成痛苦。前央行副行长吴晓灵在这个问题上格外坦率，她警告称，未来五年，被认定具有系统重要性的银行可能面临很大的资金缺口。市场担心中国各银行将被迫借助股市来满足资本要求，而这正是过去一年银行股价低迷的原因之一。
严格的规定无疑体现了审慎态度，但也掩盖了中国银行业的主要风险：政府控制太多，而不是太少。所有大银行都是国有银行，因而其商业决策在很大程度上是由政府规定的。
在全球金融危机中，政府利用银行为其刺激支出提供资金支持，导致银行贷款激增，就是一个很有说服力的例子。银行的坏账损失才刚刚开始浮现，有分析师表示，未来多年里，这将为中国银行业蒙上一层阴影。
译者/邢嵬
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001040642
Dorotea, a thirty-something one-woman ceramics entrepreneur based in the remote forests of Peru, knows all about the global financial crisis. She might not be familiar with the intricacies of Lehman Brothers’ demise in 2008, nor with the succeeding slew of regulations intended to fix a broken banking system. But she knows she is lucky. If she were trying today to get the loan of 1,200 sol for a new kiln that she secured a few years ago, she would be disappointed.
Like virtually every bank worldwide, her micro-lender, Mibanco, has had to reduce the risks to which it is exposed, and is no longer granting credit to poverty-stricken businesspeople such as Dorotea. “We’re still lending,” says her local manager. “But we’re looking for lower risks – not so poor, not so micro.”
Three years after the depths of the worst financial crash in eight decades, it is clearer than ever that the crisis many thought ended two years ago is dragging on – and in some ways, particularly in the US and across the eurozone, intensifying. Businesses and politicians say credit is either unavailable or too expensive. Banks complain that profits are being squeezed so hard that investors are deserting them. Regulators, stranded in the middle, are left wondering whether their natural crisis response – to draft tough new rules – is building a stronger system as intended or rather exacerbating the problems of a fragile global economy.
In the first of a week-long series of analysis and comment articles, video interviews and multimedia graphics, the Financial Times here begins an in-depth examination of the future of banking.
With hindsight, it is clear the structure of the sector in the years before 2007 was an accident waiting to happen. Institutions had grown distorted in the pursuit of bumper profits. They held little equity capital to protect themselves – and what they did have was in many cases amplified by as much as 50 times with debt instruments. Vast profits were made from borrowing cheaply, often short-term, and assuming that the risks inherent in products from domestic mortgages to complex derivatives were negligible.
Today, those building blocks of profitability – generating returns on equity of up to 25 or 30 per cent, five times the norm for many blue-chip industrial companies – are gone. Many banks now hold triple the equity they used to, and as much as six times the liquid funding. Typical leverage multiples are down to 20. Risks have been reassessed. And profits have slumped. On the banks’ own preferred measure, ROE, which has historically flattered performance by relating returns only to those thin equity cushions, the best they can aspire to now is half the pre-crisis range.
Citigroup, a big US casualty, has shrunk its assets – loans, mortgages and other credit – dramatically. “The world has changed,” says Alberto Verme, joint chief executive of its European operations. “Banks are going back to basics – getting deposits, lending them on and managing what are increasingly important requirements for customers – cash management, trade finance, foreign exchange.”
Regulators in turn have pushed through a raft of rules on the amount of equity and liquidity institutions should hold. Though most are part of the new standards from the Basel committee, the global regulator, to be phased in by 2019, analysts and investors have applied pressure for early compliance. Their maxim for the past couple of years has been simple: the higher the capital ratio – specifically equity as a proportion of risk-weighted assets – the better.
“It’s quite clear that the banking system today is safer than it was a few years ago,” says Bob Penn, partner at global law firm Allen & Overy. “Is it regulatory action or simply market response to a crisis?”
Either way, the crisis has found a second wind. The direct costs borne by governments three years ago of bailing out broken banks, combined with the indirect costs of the economic slowdown that accompanied the crash in the sector and long-term overborrowing coming home to roost, have shown up in unsustainable sovereign debt burdens from Europe to the US. That is feeding back into the still-fragile banking system, as parts of institutions’ traditionally safe portfolios of government bond investments have slumped in value.
“In this balance-sheet restructuring process, the uncertainties right now are within housing and with governments,” says Richard Brown, chief economist at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, which guarantees US bank deposits and supervises the industry.
Some believe the root problem is that reforms have been insufficient. “The structural changes that have been introduced and planned will not make [the system] safe enough,” says Professor Anat Admati of Stanford University.
By way of example, the latest targets of the markets’ bearishness are French banks that, with the support of their national regulator, have resisted following the drive led by Switzerland, Sweden and the UK to boost capital levels to new heights. At the same time, BNP Paribas, Société Générale and Crédit Agricole all have outsized exposures to Greece.
Policymakers are struggling to fix the flawed fundamentals of eurozone economies without burning through banks’ capital cushions. But in the mean time, the supply of short-term liquid funding to many institutions across the continent is drying up, in a re-enactment of the jitters that killed off the likes of Northern Rock in the UK and Lehman in the US in 2007-08.
“The fundamental problems in the euro area are only worsening over time,” says Ulf Riese, finance director at Sweden’s Handelsbanken, whose low-risk business model has made it a rare safe haven among European peers. “Liquidity for many banks is getting shorter-term or is reliant on government measures.”
Friday’s deadline for private sector holders of Greek sovereign bonds to sign up to a voluntary deal to extend the term for up to 10 years could trigger another round of bearishness across the eurozone. Bankers predict participation will fall short of the 90 per cent target, which could endanger the next tranche of Greek bail-out money if politicians feel the burden is not being shared fairly. The fragility of the markets has prompted some normally hardline reformers apparently to question the wisdom of an unbending approach. Andrew Haldane, executive director for financial stability at the Bank of England, last month praised the handling of bank regulation in the 1930s by US President Franklin Roosevelt – specifically loosening rules during the Great Depression in a successful bid to boost lending.
Bankers, unsurprisingly, agree. They point out, for example, that lenders’ traditional role of mediating between the capital markets and corporate borrowers may no longer be economically viable, now that so many have been downgraded by credit rating agencies. “Nowadays, a lot of banks have a higher cost of funding than corporates – that makes it very difficult to be a lender to corporates,” says Mr Riese.
When it comes to blue-chip clients, with easy direct access to capital markets themselves, that may be a problem only for their banks. Loans have traditionally been a loss-leader product, giving the lender a relationship with a customer, and a basis on which to cross-sell more profitable business.
But for small and medium-sized enterprises, banks’ shortage of funding poses a real problem, both politically and economically. SME lending, which attracts higher regulatory capital charges, is especially sensitive in Europe, where most employment is by smaller businesses.
Some reformers believe regulators must keep up the pressure – for instance, limiting banks’ ability to pay dividends to shareholders until they have boosted capital levels further through retained profits.
“There will only be long-term prosperity if we underpin the health of our financial system,” says Paul Tucker, deputy governor of the Bank of England. “Had the authorities not pressed the banking system to have more capital, we would probably be in a worse position now.”
The Institute of International Finance, however, which represents the industry globally, estimated this week that complying with new rules will force financial groups to come up with $1,300bn in additional equity. They predict the cumulative effect could push up interest rates on loans by 3.6 percentage points over the next five years and cut global gross domestic product by 3.2 per cent by 2015.
Those who favour a more pragmatic approach to reform have a broader complaint, too – that the process risks creating a whole new set of distortions that could prove just as dangerous as those that preceded the 2008 crash.
Jan Hommen, chief executive of Dutch bank ING, says cracking down on banks will shift risk into “shadow” institutions, from hedge funds to industrial companies branching into lending. “I am nervous that the regulated financial markets – which are basically the oil that greases the economy – are being too tightly regulated,” he says. “Regulators are basically saying: ‘Go there, it’s cheaper.’ But no one’s regulating those new risks.” Rulemakers have promised to study the shadow market but have yet to produce any assessment of the risks.
There are gripes, too, about the side-effects of multiple uncoordinated reforms – at a global level, through the Basel III requirements; in Europe, through the Capital Requirements Directive IV; in the US, through the Dodd-Frank act; in the UK, with next week’s Vickers Commission report; and in the European insurance industry, with the Solvency II rules. “If politicians and regulators are not capable of joining up their thinking, what hope do we have of a sensible outcome?” says Allen & Overy’s Mr Penn.
Taxpayer anger about the 2008 rescues has also limited the options available for dealing with future crises. For example, the Fed cannot direct emergency lending to a single institution.
“I worry that the risk of runs is still very much there,” says Phil Suttle, chief economist at the IIF, referring to the restrictions on the Fed. “If I’m an unsecured shorter-term depositor with the banking system that isn’t clearly insured, I’ve probably got more rather than less worries at this point.”
A still bigger concern is the distorting effect that the clampdown on western banks might have on the few remaining growth markets – most strikingly Asia. “In very macro terms, China clearly has a long way to run in terms of growth. But that doesn’t mean there won’t be bumps along the way,” says a Asia expert at one bank. The continent has steered clear of much of the west’s regulatory reform, so US and European banks are diverting an artificially high volume of investment into the region – from lend- ing to establishing new trading floors – helping to inflate existing bubbles.
But the biggest existential question remains the basic one of lending capacity. And only when the economy’s weak demand for credit finally strengthens, testing the banks’ capacity to lend with their new capital and liquidity constraints, will the world really know whether the future of banking stacks up.
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