芒格主义

(1)”Most people are too fretful, they worry too much.Success means being very patient, but aggressive when it’s time.” 看完这条可不要too aggressive哈。芒格本人曾经就因为用margin给自己带来过大麻烦。我这个朋友也喜欢用margin，非常危险。

1，大部分人都太浮躁、担心得太多。成功需要非常平静耐心，但是机会来临的时候也要足够进取。

(2)”Using [a stock’s] volatility as a measure of risk is nuts. Risk to us is 1) the risk of permanent loss of capital, or 2) the risk of inadequate return. Some great businesses have very volatile returns – for example, See’s [a candy company owned 

想想周围有多少人还在用“股票的波动性”来衡量风险吧。

2，根据股票的波动性来判断风险是很傻的。我们认为只有两种风险：一，血本无归；二，回报不足。有些很好的生意也是波动性很大的，比如See's糖果通常一年有两个季度都是亏钱的。反倒是有些烂透了的公司生意业绩很稳定。

(3)”I think that, every time you saw the word EBITDA [earnings], you should substitute the word “bullshit” earnings.”

3，所谓的“息税折摊前利润”就是狗屎。

 

所以看到在说EBITDA的公司时就要小心了，因为他们在用“狗屎”来说服你。

 

(4)“Warren talks about these discounted cash flows. I’ve never seen him do one.”?”It’s true,” replied Buffett. “If the value of a company doesn’t just scream out at you, it’s too close.” 就是毛估估的意思？

4，巴菲特有时会提到“折现现金流”，但是我从来没见过他算这个。（巴菲特答曰“没错，如果还要算才能得出的价值那就太不足恃了”）

(5)”If you buy something because it’s undervalued, then you have to think about selling it when it approaches your calculation of its intrinsic value. That’s hard. But if you buy a few great companies, then you can sit on your ass. That’s a good thing.” 这条大概要花很多年才能真明白，大概就是未来现金流折现的意思。我觉得自己现在大概有点明白了。

5，如果你买了一个价值低估的股票，你就要等到价格达到你算出来的内在价值时卖掉，这是很难算的。但是如果你买了一个伟大的公司，你就坐那儿呆着就行了。

(6)”We bought a doomed textile mill [Berkshire Hathaway] and a California S&L [Wesco] just before a calamity. Both were bought at a discount to liquidation value.”

这个大概就是人们常说的价值陷阱，如果理解未来现金流折现的概念就容易理解芒格说的是啥了。所以未必市值低过净资产甚至现金的股票就值得投资，除非你能看懂你买的是什么。

6，我们买过一个纺织厂（Berkshire Hathaway）和一个加州的存贷行（Wesco），这俩后来都带来了灾难。但是我们买的时候，价格都比清算价值打折还低。

(7)”For society, the Internet is wonderful, but for capitalists, it will be a net negative. It will increase efficiency, but lots of things increase efficiency without increasing profits. It is way more likely to make American businesses less profitable than more profitable.  This is perfectly obvious, but very little understood.” 我也这么认为：internet 实际上是就业杀手，需要很多年才能消化。但是，如果能看懂这个变化则会非常有收获。

7，互联网对于社会是极为美好的，但是对于资本家来说纯属祸害。互联网能提高效率，但是有很多东西都是提高效率却降低利润的。互联网会让美国的企业少赚钱而不是多赚钱。

(8)”Virtually every investment expert’s public assessment is that he is above average, no matter what is the evidence to the contrary.” 这可是芒格说的哈。

8，市面上对每个投资专家的评价都是高于平均的，不管有多少证据证明其实根本不是那回事儿。

(9)”Investing is where you find a few great companies and then sit on your ass.”

9，同第5条。

(10)”Warren spends 70 hours a week thinking about investing.”

10，巴菲特每个礼拜有70个小时花在思考投资上。

(11)”People calculate too much and think too little.” 投资上看起来确实如此。

11，人们算得太多、想得太少。

(12)”Whenever you think something or some person is ruining your life, it’s you. A victimization mentality is so debilitating.”

12，无论何时，如果你觉得有东西在摧毁你的生活，那个东西就是你自己。老觉得自己是受害者的想法是最削弱自己的利器。

所以老爸不叫李刚也不是借口。

(13)”The tax code gives you an enormous advantage if you can find some things you can just sit with.” 对美国人尤其如此，外国人投美股有点不同

13，税法决定了，还是买个伟大公司傻等它飞起来最划算。

(14)”If you’re going to buy something which compounds for 30 years at 15% per annum and you pay one 35% tax at the very end, the way that works out is that after taxes, you keep 13.3% per annum.  In contrast, if you bought the same investment, but had to pay taxes every year of 35% out of the 15% that you earned, then your return would be 15% minus 35% of 15%—or only 9.75% per year compounded. So the difference there is over 3.5%. And what 3.5% does to the numbers over long holding periods like 30 years is truly eye-opening…” 同上句。

14，如果你买的股票每年复利回报15%，持续30年，而你最后一次性卖掉的时候交35%的税，那你的年回报还有13.3%。反之，对于同一支股票，如果你每年都卖一次交一次税，那你的年回报就只有9.75%。这个3.5%的差距放大到30年是让人大开眼界的。

(15)”The number one idea, is to view a stock as an ownership of the business [and] to judge the staying quality of the business in terms of its competitive advantage. Look for more value in terms of discounted future cash flow than you’re paying for. Move only when you have an advantage. It’s very basic. You have to understand the odds and have the discipline to bet only when the odds are in your favor.” 很稀饭这句。

15，最重要的，是要把股票看作对于企业的一小片所有权，以企业的竞争优势来判断内在的价值。要寻找未来折现的现金利润比你支付的股价高的机会。这是很基础的，你得明白概率，只有当你赢的概率更大的时候才去下赌注。

(16)”Failure to handle psychological denial is a common way for people to go broke. You’ve made an enormous commitment to something.You’ve poured effort and money in. And the more you put in, the more that the whole consistency principle makes you think,” Now it has to work. If I put in just a little more, then it ’all work…. People go broke that way —because they can ’t stop,rethink,and say,’ I can afford to write this one off and live to fight again. I don’t have to pursue this thing as an obsession —in a way that will break me .’ “ 想起沉入成本。还想起老巴说的，如果是个坑就别再往下挖了。看看有多少人在给自己挖坑就明白了。

16，人们破产的常见原因是不能控制心理上的纠结。你花了这么多心血、这么多金钱，花的越多，就越容易这么想：“估计快成了，再多花一点儿，就能成了……” 人们就是这么破产的----因为他们不肯停下来想想：“之前投入的就算没了呗，我承受得起，我还可以重新振作。我不需要为这件事情沉迷不误，这可能会毁了我的。”

(17)”…in terms of business mistakes that I’ve seen over a long lifetime, I would say that trying to minimize taxes too much is one of the great standard causes of really dumb mistakes. I see terrible mistakes from people being overly motivated by tax considerations. Warren and I personally don’t drill oil wells. We pay our taxes. And we’ve done pretty well, so far. Anytime somebody offers you a tax shelter from here on in life, my advice would be don’t buy it.” 让我想起那些为避税而搬离加州的有钱的朋友们，为了省那些未来不属于自己的钱而搬到一个自己未必喜欢的地方好像有点滑稽。当然，搬过去后又喜欢上了那是有智慧的表现啊，至少我还没听说哪位搬家后说新地方不好的。

17，说到我这辈子在生意中见过的错误，过度追求避税是一个常见的让人做傻事儿的原因。我看到有人为了避税干很大的错事。巴菲特和我虽然不是挖石油的，但是我们该交的税都交，我们现在也过得挺好的。要是有人向你兜售避税套餐，别买。

(18)”I believe that we are at or near the apex of a great civilization….In 50-100 years, if we’re a poor third to some countries in Asia, I wouldn’t be surprised. If I had to bet, the part of the world that will do best will be Asia.” 或许50-100年也许稍微短了一点。

18，我认为我们（美国）正处于或者接近我们文明的顶点……如果50或者100年后，我们（美国）只比得上亚洲某国家的的三分之一，我一点儿也不会觉得奇怪。如果要赌，这世界上将来干得最棒的应该是亚洲。

(19)”To some extent, stocks are like Rembrandts. They sell based on what they’ve sold in the past. Bonds are much more rational. No-one thinks a bond’s value will soar to the moon.” “Imagine if every pension fund in America bought Rembrandts. Their value would go up and they would create their own constituency.”

19，某些程度上，股票就像是伦勃朗的画。它们的价格基于过去成交的价格。债券要理性得多。没有人会认为债券的价格会高到天上去。想象一下如果美国的所有退休基金都去买伦勃朗的油画，它们都会升值并且引来一帮追随者。

那些喜欢炒艺术品当投资的有钱人也许可以看看，当然真的喜欢收藏的例外。

(20)”It’s crazy to assume that what’s happening in Argentina and Japan is inconceivable here.”

20，有人认为阿根廷和日本发生的事情在咱们这里（美国）绝对不会发生，这种想法是很疯狂的。

我也有点这种疯狂的想法。

 

(21)”REITs are way more suitable for individual shareholders than for corporate shareholders. And Warren has enough residue from his old cigar-butt personality that when people became disenchanted with the REITs and the market price went down to maybe a 20% discount from what the companies could be liquidated for, he bought a few shares with his personal money. So it’s nice that Warren has a few private assets with which to pick up cigar butts in memory of old times – if that’s what keeps him amused.”

21，比起机构投资者，房产投资信托（REIT）更适合个人投资者。巴菲特还留着一些烟头性格（意指其早期偏重格雷厄姆式的投资价值低估企业的风格），这让他愿意在人们不喜欢房产投资信托并且市价跌出八折以内的时候，用自己的私房钱买点儿REIT。这种行为能让他回忆起当年捡烟头的快乐，所以他自己有点儿闲钱鼓捣这事儿也挺好的。

(22)”Smart people aren’t exempt from professional disasters from overconfidence. Often, they just run aground in the more difficult voyages they choose, relying on their self-appraisals that they have superior talents and methods.”

22，聪明人也不免遭受过度自信带来的灾难。他们认为自己有更强的能力和更好的方法，所以往往他们就在更艰难的道路上疲于奔命。

(23))”The whole concept of the house advantage is an interesting one in modern money management. The terms of the managers of the private partnerships look a lot like the take of the croupier at Monte Carlo, only greater.”

23，“庄家优势”是个在现代理财学里很有意思的概念。那些机构的基金经理看上去很像是赌场里的总管，只是规模更大。（翻译不知道准不准确，希望达人纠正）

(24)”There are always people who will be better at some thing than you are.You have to learn to be a follower before you become a leader.”

24，三人行必有我师，要成为领导者之前必须先做跟随者。

(25)”We all are learning, modifying, or destroying ideas all the time. Rapid destruction of your ideas when the time is right is one of the most valuable qualities you can acquire. You must force yourself to consider arguments on the other side. If you can’t state arguments against what you believe better than your detractors, you don’t know enough.”

25，我们总是在学习、修正、甚至颠覆各种主意。在恰当时机下快速颠覆你的想法是一项很重要的品质。你要强迫自己去考虑对立的观点。如果你不能比你的对手更好地说服对方，那说明你的理解还不够。

(26)“I remember the $0.05 hamburger and a $0.40-per-hour minimum wage, so I’ve seen a tremendous amount of inflation in my lifetime. Did it ruin the investment climate? I think not.”

26，我以前那个年代，汉堡包5美分一个、最低时薪是40美分，所以我算是见证了巨大的通胀了。但它摧毁了投资环境吗？我不这么认为。

(27)”A lot of success in life and business comes from knowing what you want to avoid: early death, a bad marriage, etc.” 就是坚持不做不对的事情的意思。

27，大部分生活和事业上的成功来自于有意避免了一些东西：早死、错误的婚姻、等等。

(28)”There are two types of mistakes: 1) doing nothing[We saw it, but didn’t act on it]; what Warren calls “sucking my thumb” and 2) buying with an eyedropper things we should be buying a lot of.”

28，有两种错误：一，什么都不做（看到了机会却束之高阁），巴菲特说这个叫做“吮指之错”；二，本来该一堆一堆地买的东西，我们却只买了一眼药水瓶的量。

(29)”Checklist routines avoid a lot of errors. You should have all of this elementary wisdom, and you should go through a mental checklist in order to use it. There is no other procedure that will work as well.” 还是坚持不做不对的事情的意思。

29，经常对照一下清单可以避免错误。你们应该掌握这些基础的智慧。对照清单之前还要过一遍心理清单（意指平常心），这个方法是无可替代的。

(30)”Litigation is notoriously time-consuming, inefficient, costly and unpredictable.”

30，打官司是出了名的费时、费力、低效、以及难料结果。

(31)”Finding a single investment that will return 20% per year for 40 years tends to happen only in dreamland. In the real world, you uncover an opportunity, and then you compare other opportunities with that. And you only invest in the most attractive opportunities. That’s your opportunity cost. That’s what you learn in freshman economics. The game hasn’t changed at all. That’s why Modern Portfolio Theory is so asinine.” 这游戏没变过，在哪里都一样。

31，连续40年每年回报20%的投资只存在于梦想之国。现实世界中，你得寻找机会，然后和其他机会对比，最后只找最吸引人的机会投资进去。这就是你的机会成本，这是你大一经济课上就学到的。游戏并没有发生什么变化，所以所谓的“现代投资组合”理论非常愚蠢。

(32)”The more hard lessons you can learn vicariously rather than through your own hard experience, the better.”

“Well, some of our success we predicted and some of it was fortuitous.”

32，最好是从别人的悲惨经历中学到深刻教训，而不是自己的。我们有些成功是早就预言的，有些是意外获得的。

(33)”The general assumption is that it must be easy to sit behind a desk and people will bring in one good opportunity after another — this was the attitude in venture capital until a few years ago. This was not the case at all for us — we scrounged around for companies to buy. For 20 years, we didn’t buy more than one or two per year. …It’s fair to say that we were rooting around. There were no commissioned salesmen. Anytime you sit there waiting for a deal to come by, you’re in a very dangerous seat.” 这个有点累。

33，一般认为，最好的情形就是你坐在办公室里，然后美好的投资机会一个接一个地被送到你的面前 ---- 直到几年之前，风投界的人们就是这样享受的。但是我们完全不是这样 ---- 我们就跟要饭的似的到处寻找好公司来买。20年来，我们每年最多投资一到两个公司…… 说我们已经挖地三尺了都不夸张。（好机会）是没有专业推销员的。如果你坐在那里等待好机会来临，那你的座儿很危险。

(34)”Our biggest mistakes, were things we didn’t do, companies we didn’t buy.”

34，我们最大的错误是该做的没做、该买的没买。

(35)”You can progress only when you learn the method of learning.”

35，你只有学会怎么学习你才会进步。

(36)”It is remarkable how much long-term advantage people like us have gotten by trying to be consistently not stupid, instead of trying to be very intelligent.” 小聪明和大智慧的差别，也是坚持不做不对的事情的意思。

36，我们长期努力保持不做傻事，所以我们的收获比那些努力做聪明事的人要多得多。

(37)”Berkshire’s past record has been almost ridiculous. If Berkshire had used even half the leverage of, say, Rupert Murdoch, it would be five times its current size.” 经常有很多人用很多margin，然后去和BRK比某年的回报，但没多少人可以把30年的总回报拿来比的，30年以后可能还是如此。

37，BRK的过去业绩简直辉煌得离谱。如果我们也用杠杆，哪怕比默多克用的少一半，也会比现在的规模大五倍。

(38)”It took us months of buying all the Coke stock we could to accumulate $1 billion worth — equal to 7% of the company. It’s very hard to accumulate major positions.”

38，买可口可乐股票的时候我们花了几个月才攒了10亿美元的股票 --- 是可口可乐总市值的7%。要攒成主要股东是很难的。

(39)”All large aggregations of capital eventually find it hell on earth to grow and thus find a lower rate of return”

39，所有的大资本最终都会发现很难扩大，于是去寻找一些回报率更低的途径。

(40)”If you have only a little capital and are young today, there are fewer opportunities than when I was young. Back then, we had just come out of a depression. Capitalism was a bad word. There had been abuses in the 1920s. A joke going around then was the guy who said, ‘I bought stock for my old age and it worked — in six months, I feel like an old man!’ “It’s tougher for you, but that doesn’t mean you won’t do well — it just may take more time. But what the heck, you may live longer.”

40，如果今天你的资本较少并且年轻，你的机会比我们那时候要少。我们年轻的时候刚走出大萧条，资本主义那时候是一个贬义词，在20年代对资本主义的批判更是肆虐。那时候流行一个笑话：有个人说“我买股票是为老了的时候考虑，没想到六个月就用上了！我现在已经觉得自己是老人了。”你们的环境更加艰难，但并不意味着你们做不好 --- 只是要多花些时间。但是去他娘的，你们还可能活的更长呢。

(41)”Regarding the demographic trend called Baby Boomers, it’s peanuts compared to the trend of economic growth.? Over the last century, [our] GNP is up seven times.? This was not caused by Baby Boomers, but by the general success of capitalism and the march of technology.? Those trends were so favorable that little blips in the birth rate were not that significant.??We can keep social peace as long as GNP rises 3% annually – this can pay for spending by politicians.? If we ever got to stasis [no growth], then with all the promises, you’d get real tensions between the generations.? The Baby Boomers would exacerbate it, but the real cause would be lack of growth.”

41，关于所谓“婴儿潮（美国5、60年代出生）”的人口学现象，其影响相对经济增长的影响来说小很多。过去的一个世纪，美国的GNP（国民生产总值）增长了7倍。这不是婴儿潮导致的，而是由美国资本主义的成功和技术的发展带来的。这两样东西的影响太利好，婴儿潮问题相比之下就是一个小波动。只要美国的GNP每年增长3%，就能保持社会和平 --- 足以覆盖政客们的花销。如果美国的发展停滞了，我敢保证，你们将会见证真切的代沟，不同代的人之间关系会很紧张。婴儿潮是这种紧张的催化剂，但是根本原因还是经济不增长。

(42)”Practically everybody overweighs the stuff that can be numbered, because it yields to the statistical techniques they’re taught in academia, and doesn’t mix in the hard-to-measure stuff that may be more important. That is a mistake I’ve tried all my life to avoid, and I have no regrets for having done that.”

42，实际上，每个人都会把可以量化的东西看得过重，因为他们想“发扬”自己在学校里面学的统计技巧，于是忽略了那些虽然无法量化但是更加重要的东西。我一生都致力于避免这种错误，我觉得我这么干挺不错的。

(43)”You must know the big ideas in the big disciplines, and use them routinely — all of them, not just a few. Most people are trained in one model — economics, for example — and try to solve all problems in one way. You know the old saying: to the man with a hammer, the world looks like a nail. This is a dumb way of handling problems.”

43，你应该对各种学科的各种思维都有所理解，并且经常使用它们 --- 它们的全部，而不是某几个。大部分人都熟练于使用某一个单一的模型，比如经济学模型，去解决所有的问题。应了一句老话：“拿锤子的木匠，看书上的字儿就觉着像钉子。” 这是一种很白痴的做事方法。

(44)”The whole concept of dividing it up into ‘value’ and ‘growth’ strikes me as twaddle. It’s convenient for a bunch of pension fund consultants to get fees prattling about and a way for one advisor to distinguish himself from another. But, to me, all intelligent investing is value investing.”

44，对于我而言，把股票分成“价值股”和“成长股”就是瞎搞。这种分法可以让基金经理们借以夸夸其谈、也可以让分析师们给自己贴个标签，但是在我眼中，所有靠谱的投资都是价值投资。

(45)”In my whole life, I have known no wise people who didn’t read all the time – none, zero. You’d be amazed at how much Warren reads, at how much I read. My children laugh at me. They think I’m a book with a couple of legs sticking out.”

45，我这一辈子认识的所有智者，没有不爱看书的。我和巴菲特看书之多都能吓着你。我的孩子取笑我说我就是一本抻出两条腿的书。

(46)”We read a lot.? I don’t know anyone who’s wise who doesn’t read a lot.? But that’s not enough: You have to have a temperament to grab ideas and do sensible things.? Most people don’t grab the right ideas or don’t know what to do with them.”

46，我们都爱大量阅读，聪明人都这样，但这还不够，你还应该有一种批判接受、合理应用的态度。大部分人看书都没有抓到正确的重点，看完了又不会学以致用。

(47)”We get these questions a lot from the enterprising young. It’s a very intelligent question: You look at some old guy who’s rich and you ask, ‘How can I become like you, except faster?”

47，我们经常从那些上进的孩子们那儿听到这些问题。这是个很“聪明”的问题，你对着一个有钱老头问：“我怎么才能成为你呢？怎么才能迅速地成为你呢？”

(48)”It takes almost no capital to open a new See’s candy store. We’re drowning in capital of our own that has almost no cost. It would be crazy to franchise stores like some capital-starved pancake house. We like owning our own stores as a matter of quality control”

48，我们如果要再开一家See's糖果几乎不用花费任何资本。我们的资本太多了都快淹死我们了，所以几乎是零成本。对于有些极度缺钱的煎饼店，增设特许经营店简直是疯狂的事情。我们喜欢搞直营店以便更好地控制服务品质。

(49)”It’s dangerous to short stocks.”

49，做空行为是很危险的。

(50)”Being short and seeing a promoter take the stock up is very irritating. It’s not worth it to have that much irritation in your life.”

50，坐在空头位置，又看到股价遇到利好大涨，这是一件特别让人气愤的事情。人生苦短，遭受这种气愤太不值当了。

(51)”It would be one of the most irritating experiences in the world to do a lot of work to uncover a fraud and then at have it go from X to 3X and and have the crooks happily partying with your money while you’re meeting margin calls. Why would you want to go within hailing distance of that?”
51，世界上最郁闷的事情之一，就是你费尽力气发现了一个骗局（并且做空这个公司），但是眼睁睁地看着股价继续疯涨三倍，而且这些骗子们拿着你的钱弹冠相庆，而且你还要收到证券行的保证金追加通知。像这种郁闷的事情你哪能去碰呢？

(52)”…the cost of being a publicly traded stock has gone way, way up. It doesn’t make sense for a little company to be public anymore. A lot of little companies are going private to be rid of these burdensome requirements….”?

52，上市的代价已经变得非常高了。一个小公司谋求上市是没有什么道理的。很多小公司正在走私有化的路子以此摆脱上市公司的繁冗负担。
(53)”Well the open-outcry auction is just made to turn the brain into mush: you’ve got social proof, the other guy is bidding, you get reciprocation tendency, you get deprival super-reaction syndrome, the thing is going away… I mean it just absolutely is designed to manipulate people into idiotic behavior.”
53，公开叫价的竞价方式就是设计来让人的脑子变成一锅粥的：由于别人也在叫价，你觉得（你的竞价）得到了社会认同，你会有一种回馈倾向，会陷入一种“被剥夺超级反应综合症”，觉得（必须想方设法阻止）你的“心头好”离你而去……总之我的意思就是这种方式就是设计来操纵人的心理的，让人们去做白痴的事情。

(54)”The problem with closed bid auctions is that they are frequently won by people making a technical mistake, as in the case with Shell paying double for Belridge Oil. You can’t pay double the losing bid in an open outcry auction.”

54，暗标竞价的问题在于标的物常常被那些犯了技术错误的一方赢得，比如壳牌石油支付给贝利奇石油的价格是（另一方的）两倍。在公开叫价的竞标中，你就不可能比输掉的那一方多付一倍的价钱。
(55)”We’re partial to putting out large amounts of money where we won’t have to make another decision.”

55，我们偏爱把大量的金钱投放到那些不需要我们再做什么其他决策的地方。
(56)”Understanding how to be a good investor makes you a better business manager and vice versa.”

56，能理解投资的真髓也能让你成为一个好的企业管理者，反之亦然。
(57)”What’s fascinating . . .is that you could now have a business that might have been selling for $10 billion where the business itself could probably not have borrowed even $100 million. But the owners of that business, because its public, could borrow many billions of dollars on their little pieces of paper- because they had these market valuations. But as a private business, the company itself couldn’t borrow even 1/20th of what the individuals could borrow.”

57，有件事情很有意思：你可能拥有一家价值100亿美元的公司，而这家公司可能连1亿美元都借不到。但是，由于公司是上市公司，公司的大股东凭着手里的小纸片（股票）做担保却能借到好几十亿美元。但是如果公司不是上市的，它可能连那些大股东能借到的20分之一的钱都借不到。
(58)”I constantly see people rise in life who are not the smartest – sometimes not even the most diligent. But they are learning machines; they go to bed every night a little wiser than when they got up. And, boy, does that habit help, particularly when you have a long run ahead of you.”

58，我经常见到一些并不聪明的人成功，他们甚至也并不十分勤奋。但是他们都是一些热爱学习的“学习机器”；他们每天晚上睡觉的时候都比那天早上起床的时候稍微多了那么一点点智慧。伙计，如果你前面有很长的路要走的话，这可是大有裨益的啊。
(59)”The basic concept of value to a private owner and being motivated when you’re buying and selling securities by reference to intrinsic value instead of price momentum – I don’t think that will ever be outdated.”

59，不管是对于私有企业的企业主还是上市公司的股东，进行买卖时参考的标准应该是企业内在价值而不是过往成交的纪录，这是最基本的价值概念，而且我认为永远也不会过时。
(60)”Warren and I have not made our way in life by making successful macroeconomic predictions and betting on our conclusions.”

60，巴菲特和我不是因为成功预测了宏观经济并且依此下注才获得今天的成功的。
(61)”Well, the questioner came from Singapore which has perhaps the best economic record in the history of any developing economy and therefore he referred to 15% per annum as modest. It’s not modest–it’s arrogant. Only someone from Singapore would call it modest.”

61，提问者来自新加坡，新加坡可能是世界历史上成绩最辉煌的发展中经济，所以这位提问者才会把15%的增长率称作“保守”。但其实这不是“保守”，这是很狂妄的。只有新加坡来的人才敢把15%称作“保守”。
(62)”I don’t spend much time, regretting the past, once I’ve taken my lesson from it. I don’t dwell on it.”

62，我不会花太多时间追悔过去，一旦吸取了教训，我就不会再陷在里面了。
(63)”If you took our top fifteen decisions out, we’d have a pretty average record. It wasn’t hyperactivity, but a hell of a lot of patience. You stuck to your principles and when opportunities came along, you pounce on them with vigor.”

63，如果你从我们的投资决策里剔除掉最好的那15个，我们的表现就显得非常平庸了。（游戏的重点）不是非常多的动作而是非常大的耐心。你要坚守你的原则，当机会出现的时候，就大力出击。
(64)”We just throw some decisions into the ‘too hard’ file and go onto the others.”

我们会把一些决策议题扔进名字叫做“太难了”的档案柜，然后去看其他的议题。
(65)”Forgetting your mistakes is a terrible error if you are trying to improve your cognition.”

65，如果想提高你的认知能力，忘记过去犯过的错误是坚决不行的。
(66)”In the 1930s, there as a stretch here you could borrow more against the real estate than you could sell it for. I think that’s what’s going on in today’s private-equity world”

66，30年代的时候，靠房产抵押得到的贷款可以比房子的售价更多。这大概就是现在私募股权领域的情形。
(67)”Mimicking the herd invites regression to the mean.”

67，模仿一大堆人意味着接近他们的平均水平。
(68)”A lot of opportunities in life tend to last a short while, due to some temporary inefficiency… For each of us, really good investment opportunities aren’t going to come along too often and won’t last too long, so you’ve got to be ready to act and have a prepared mind.”

68，生命中的很多机遇都只会持续一小段时间，它们持续是因为（别人）暂时不便（攫取它）……对于我们每个人，机不可失时不再来，所以你最好随时预备好行动并且有足够的思想准备。
(69)”Everywhere there is a large commission, there is a high probability of a ripoff.”

69，有巨额佣金的地方常常就有骗局。
(70)”Acknowledging what you don’t know is the dawning of wisdom.”

70，承认自己不懂某样东西意味着智慧的曙光即将来临。
(71)”Recognize reality even when you don’t like it – especially when you don’t like it.”

71，即使你不喜欢现实，也要承认现实 --- 其实越是你不喜欢，你越应该承认现实。
(72)”We try more to profit from always remembering the obvious than from grasping the esoteric.”

72，我们努力做到通过牢记常识而不是通过知晓尖端知识赚钱。
(73)?“Over the long term, it’s hard for a stock to earn a much better return that the business which underlies it earns. If the business earns six percent on capital over forty years and you hold it for that forty years, you’re not going to make much different than a six percent return – even if you originally buy it at a huge discount. Conversely, if a business earns eighteen percent on capital over twenty or thirty years, even if you pay an expensive looking price, you’ll end up with one hell of a result.”

73，长期而言，一个公司股票的盈利很难比这个公司的盈利多。如果公司每年赚6%持续40年，你最后的年化回报也就是6%左右，即使你买的时候股票有很大的折扣。但反过来如果公司每年资产收益率达18%并且持续二三十年，即使你买的时候看起来很贵，他还是会给你带来惊喜。
(74)”Just as a man working with his tools should know its limitations, a man working with his cognitive apparatus must know its limitations.”

74，就像工人必须了解自己工具的局限性，用脑子吃饭的人也要知道自己脑子的局限性。
(75)”Many markets get down to two or three big competitors—or five or six. And in some of those markets, nobody makes any money to speak of. But in others, everybody does very well.? Over the years, we’ve tried to figure out why the competition in some markets gets sort of rational from the investor’s point of view so that the shareholders do well, and in other markets, there’s destructive competition that destroys shareholder wealth.? If it’s a pure commodity like airline seats, you can understand why no one makes any money. As we sit here, just think of what airlines have given to the world—safe travel, greater experience, time with your loved ones, you name it. Yet, the net amount of money that’s been made by the shareholders of airlines since Kitty Hawk, is now a negative figure—a substantial negative figure. Competition was so intense that, once it was unleashed by deregulation, it ravaged shareholder wealth in the airline business.? Yet, in other fields—like cereals, for example—almost all the big boys make out. If you’re some kind of a medium grade cereal maker, you might make 15% on your capital. And if you’re really good, you might make 40%. But why are cereals so profitable—despite the fact that it looks to me like they’re competing like crazy with promotions, coupons and everything else? I don’t fully understand it.? Obviously, there’s a brand identity factor in cereals that doesn’t exist in airlines. That must be the main factor that accounts for it.And maybe the cereal makers by and large have learned to be less crazy about fighting for market share—because if you get even one person who’s hell-bent on gaining market share…. For example, if I were Kellogg and I decided that I had to have 60% of the market, I think I could take most of the profit out of cereals. I’d ruin Kellogg in the process. But I think I could do it.”

“You must have the confidence to override people with more credentials than you whose cognition is impaired by incentive-caused bias or some similar psychological force that is obviously present. But there are also cases where you have to recognize that you have no wisdom to add – and that your best course is to trust some expert.”

75，许多市场最终会形成两到三个大竞争者 ---- 或者五到六个。其中有些市场里压根儿没有人能赚到什么钱。有些市场里每个竞争者都做得不错。多年以来，我们一直在研究，为什么有些市场里竞争比较理性，股东们获得的回报都不错，而有些市场里的竞争则让股东血本无归。我们举航空公司的例子来说吧，咱们现在坐在这里，可以想到航空公司们为世界作出的各种贡献 --- 安全的旅行、更好的体验、能够随时飞向你的爱人，等等。但是，这个行业自从莱特兄弟的时代以来，给股东们回报的利润是负的，而且是一个巨大的负数。这个市场里的竞争是如此激烈，以至于一旦放开监管，航空公司们就开始（大降价）来损害股东们的权益。然而，在另外一些行业里，比如麦片行业，几乎所有的竞争者都混得挺舒服。如果你是一家中型的麦片生产商，你大概能有15%的资产回报率。如果你的本事特别好，甚至能达到40%。但是为什么麦片这么挣钱呢？在我看来他们整天搞各种疯狂的营销、推广、优惠券来激烈竞争，竟然还这么挣钱。我不是很明白。显然，品牌效应的因素是麦片行业有而航空行业没有的。这可能是个主要因素。或者麦片生产商们有共识，认为谁都不可以那么疯狂地竞争 ---- 因为如果有一个二楞子视市场占有率如命根，比如说如果我是家乐氏的老板然后我决定要抢占60%的市场占有率，我想我可以把这个市场的大部分利润都给弄没了。这个过程中我可能会把家乐氏给毁掉。但是我想我还是可以做到（占据市场以及消灭行业利润）。你应该有信心去颠覆那些比你资深的人，条件是他们的认知被动机导致的偏见蒙蔽了、或者被类似的心理因素明显影响了。但是在另外一些情况下，你应该认识到你也许没有什么新意可想 --- 你最好的选择就是相信这些领域中的专家。
(76)”In business we often find that the winning system goes almost ridiculously far in maximizing and or minimizing one or a few variables — like the discount warehouses of Costco.”

76，我们发现那些在生意中优胜的“系统”往往有些变量被近乎荒谬地最大化或者最小化 ---- 比如Costco的打折仓储店。

(77)”There are worse situations than drowning in cash and sitting, sitting, sitting. I remember when I wasn’t awash in cash — and I don’t want to go back.”

77，有些情况比坐拥大量现金无处可投更糟糕。我还记得当年缺钱的情景 --- 我可不想回到那个时候。

(78)”If you always tell people why, they’ll understand it better, they’ll consider it more important, and they’ll be more likely to comply.”

78，如果你（在发出指令和诉求的时候）总是告诉他们你的原因，他们就会更好地理解你的意图，并且觉得你的想法更重要，他们也就更愿意听你的。

(79)”Spend less than you make; always be saving something. Put it into a tax-deferred account. Over time, it will begin to amount to something. This is such a no-brainer.”

79，量入而出、时刻攒钱、把钱放到可以延期交税的账户里。时间长了，你就会攒出一笔财富了。 这完全不需要动什么脑子。

(80)”I try to get rid of people who always confidently answer questions about which they don’t have any real knowledge.”

80，我尽量远离那些不懂装懂的人。

(81)”I believe in the discipline of mastering the best that other people have ever figured out. I don’t believe in just sitting down and trying to dream it all up yourself. Nobody’s that smart…”

81，我觉得先好好掌握别人已经整理好的知识才是靠谱的学习方法。我不认可那种闭门造车自己鼓捣出结果的方法。没人能那么聪明。

(82)”I know someone who lives next door to what you would actually call a fairly modest house that just sold for $17 million. There are some very extreme housing price bubbles going on .”

82，我有个熟人，他们家旁边那个房子看起来很不起眼的，但是竟然卖了1700万美元。房市价格有很极端的泡沫。

(83)”Experience tends to confirm a long-held notion that being prepared, on a few occasions in a lifetime, to act promptly in scale, in doing some simple and logical thing, will often dramatically improve the financial results of that lifetime. A few major opportunities, clearly recognizable as such, will usually come to one who continuously searches and waits, with a curious mind that loves diagnosis involving multiple variables. And then all that is required is a willingness to bet heavily when the odds are extremely favorable, using resources available as a result of prudence and patience in the past.”

83，经验告诉我们，当机会来临的时候，如果你有足够的准备并且适时、果断、有魄力地做一些简单而合理的事情，就能奇迹般地让你致富。偶尔出现的这种机会往往赐予那些时刻准备着、一直搜寻着、并且愿意分析复杂事物的人。当机会出现的时候，你所要做的全部事情就是使用你平时谨慎耐心攒下来的弹药、大手下注在那些胜算极大的赌局上。

(84)”The present era has no comparable referent in the past history of capitalism. We have a higher percentage of the intelligentsia engaged in buying and selling pieces of paper and promoting trading activity than in any past era. A lot of what I see now reminds me of Sodom and Gomorrah. You get activity feeding on itself, envy and imitation. It has happened in the past that there came bad consequences.”

84，现在这个时代是以往的资本主义中没见过的。与以往相比，我们有史上最多的知识分子投身在炒卖股票和投机倒把上。许多我所见到的事情让我联想起索多玛和蛾摩拉（堕落罪恶之城）。自私、妒忌、还有各种山寨货。以前也有过这些事情，它们导致了可怕的后果。

(85)”Our investment style has been given a name – focus investing – which implies ten holdings, not one hundred or four hundred. The idea that it is hard to find good investments, so concentrate in a few, seems to me to be an obvious idea. But 98% of the investment world does not think this way. It’s been good for us.”

85，我们的投资风格被称作焦点投资，意在持有十只股票、而不是一百个或者四百个。好投资不好找，所以应该集中在那些少数几个好的上，这对于我是很显而易见的事情。但是投资界98%的人都不这么想。这对我们倒是挺好的。

(86)”You want to be very careful with intense ideology. It presents a big danger for the only mind you’re ever going to get.”

86，你要当心过于强烈的意识形态观念。如果你脑子里只有一个念头的话那是非常危险的。

(87)”Like Warren, I had a considerable passion to get rich. “Not because I wanted Ferraris– I wanted the independence. I desperately wanted it.”

87，和巴菲特一样，我有很强的致富欲望。不是因为我喜欢法拉利什么的，而是我喜欢独立。我极度渴望独立。

(88)”Anyone with an engineering frame of mind will look at [accounting standards] and want to throw up.”

88，每一个有工程师思维的人看到会计准则都会想吐。

(89)”You can progress only when you learn the method of learning.”

89，你只有学会了如何学习才能进步。

(90)”It’s a good habit to trumpet your failures and be quiet about your successes.”

90，多谈谈你的失败历程、少吹嘘你的成功经历，这样对你好。

(91)”In effect about half our spare cash was stashed in currencies other than the dollar. I consider that a non-event. As it happens it’s been a very profitable non-event.”

91，实际效果上说，我们有一半的闲置现金是以美元以外的货币形式存储的。我觉得这个不是什么大事儿。没想到这件事情成了件很赚钱的小事儿。

(92)”As for what we like least, we don’t want kleptocracies. We need a rule of law. If people are stealing from the companies, we don’t need that.”

92，我们最不喜欢的东西就是盗贼统治。我们需要法治。如果人们都从公司里盗取东西，我们不要这种公司。

(93)”I agree with Peter Drucker that the culture and legal systems of the United States are especially favorable to shareholder interests, compared to other interests and compared to most other countries. Indeed, there are many other countries where any good going to public shareholders has a very low priority and almost every other constituency stands higher in line.”

我同意德鲁克的观点，他认为美国相对其他国家而言是对公司股东最优惠的国家。事实上，很多国家的上市公司股东权益是很没优先级的，需要让位于各种其他人群的利益。

(94)”Berkshire in its history has made money betting on sure things.”

94，Berkshire的历史就是在确定的事情上打赌的过程。

(95)”I don’t think there’s any business that we’ve bought that would have sold itself to a hedge fund. There’s a class of businesses that doesn’t want to deal with private-equity and hedge funds…thank God”

95，我觉得我们买的公司都不会愿意（把股份）卖给对冲基金。有那么一类公司是不愿意应付私募股权和对冲基金的，谢天谢地有这种公司。

(96)”We’re guessing at our future opportunity cost. Warren is guessing that he’ll have the opportunity to put capital out at high rates of return, so he’s not willing to put it out at less than 10% now. But if we knew interest rates would stay at 1%, we’d change. Our hurdles reflect our estimate of future opportunity costs.”

96，我们在猜测未来的机会成本。巴菲特认为将来有可能遇到很高回报的机会，所以他现在不会为10%回报的机会出手。但是如果我们知道利率一直保持在1%，我们会改变策略的。我们的仓位取决于我们对未来机会成本的预测。

(97)”Our ideas are so simple that people keep asking us for mysteries when all we have are the most elementary ideas.”

97，我们的想法都是很简单的，以至于人们总是希望我们能说点儿神秘的东西出来，但是我们的方法就是这么简单。

(98)”The idea of a margin of safety, a Graham precept, will never be obsolete. The idea of making the market your servant will never be obsolete. The idea of being objective and dispassionate will never be obsolete. So Graham had a lot of wonderful ideas.”

98，格雷厄姆的安全边际理念、不让市场主宰自己的理念、保持平常心的理念永远都不会过时。所以格雷厄姆有很多很好的理念。

(99)”Ben Graham could run his Geiger counter over this detritus from the collapse of the 1930s and find things selling below their working capital per share and so on….? But he was, by and large, operating when the world was in shell shock from the 1930s—which was the worst contraction in the English-speaking world in about 600 years. Wheat in Liverpool, I believe, got down to something like a 600-year low, adjusted for inflation. the classic Ben Graham concept is that gradually the world wised up and those real obvious bargains disappeared. You could run your Geiger counter over the rubble and it wouldn’t click. … Ben Graham followers responded by changing the calibration on their Geiger counters. In effect, they started defining a bargain in a different way. And they kept changing the definition so that they could keep doing what they’d always done. And it still worked pretty well.”

99，格雷厄姆的方法就像是拿着探测器在30年代的废墟里寻找宝贝 --- 股价比每股现金还低的便宜股票。但总的来说，他工作的时代是全世界还陷在二战战后恐惧症的时代，那是英语世界600年来通缩最严重的时代。利物浦的小麦价格跌到了600百年的最低值。经典的格雷厄姆理念认为世界会渐渐苏醒过来，这些便宜会消失的。你拿着那时候的探测器在现在的废墟里恐怕是找不到宝贝的。所以格雷厄姆的追随者们就调整了探测器，他们开始用现代的方法来定义宝贝。他们一直在改进探测器，来做自己擅长的事情 --- 寻宝。直到现在，他们都还做得不错。

(100)”Warren and I don’t feel like we have any great advantage in the high-tech sector. In fact, we feel like we’re at a big disadvantage in trying to understand the nature of technical developments in software, computer chips or what have you. So we tend to avoid that stuff, based on our personal inadequacies. Again, that is a very, very powerful idea. Every person is going to have a circle of competence. And it’s going to be very hard to advance that circle. If I had to make my living as a musician…. I can’t even think of a level low enough to describe where I would be sorted out to if music were the measuring standard of the civilization.? So you have to figure out what your own aptitudes are. If you play games where other people have the aptitudes and you don’t, you’re going to lose. And that’s as close to certain as any prediction that you can make. You have to figure out where you’ve got an edge. And you’ve got to play within your own circle of competence.? If you want to be the best tennis player in the world, you may start out trying and soon find out that it’s hopeless—that other people blow right by you. However, if you want to become the best plumbing contractor in Bemidji, that is probably doable by two-thirds of you. It takes a will. It takes the intelligence. But after a while, you’d gradually know all about the plumbing business in Bemidji and master the art. That is an attainable objective, given enough discipline. And people who could never win a chess tournament or stand in center court in a respectable tennis tournament can rise quite high in life by slowly developing a circle of competence—which results partly from what they were born with and partly from what they slowly develop through work.”

100，巴菲特和我在高科技领域都没有什么优势。我们觉得让我们去了解软件、芯片之类的东西我们讨不着好。所以，基于这些不足，我们尽量避免这些东西。这又是一个很重要的思维。每个人都有自己的能力圈，而且这个能力圈很难增长。如果我要依靠音乐谋生的话 --- 我就完蛋了。所以你应该想想自己的天资在什么地方。如果你在从事别人有天赋而你没有的工作，你肯定是要输的。没有意外。你要知道你的强项在什么地方，要在你的能力圈里面玩儿。如果你想做天下第一网球手，你可能很快发现自己没戏，有人会迅速赢你好几条街。但是如果你想做城关镇的水管承包商，可能三分之二的人都能做到。这需要一个意向和一些智力投入。但是一段时间之后你就会慢慢了解城关镇的水管行业并且渐渐掌握这门艺术了。这是一个可以达到的目标，只要有足够的付出。就是运用一些与生俱来或者后天慢慢养成的能力圈，那些即使从来没有赢过象棋比赛和网球比赛的人们也可以在生活中走向不小的成功。

(101)”Beta and modern portfolio theory and the like – none of it makes any sense to me.”

101，风险系数贝塔和现代投资组合理论都一样 --- 对于我来说完全是瞎搞。

(102)”Today, it seems to be regarded as the duty of CEOs to make the stock go up. This leads to all sorts of foolish behavior. We want to tell it like it is.”

102，今天，保持股价似乎成了总裁们的任务之一，这引发了很多愚蠢的行为。我们这是实事求是。

(103)”Our standard prescription for the know-nothing investor with a long-term time horizon is a no-load index fund. I think that works better than relying on your stock broker. The people who are telling you to do something else are all being paid by commissions or fees. The result is that while index fund investing is becoming more and more popular, by and large it’s not the individual investors that are doing it. It’s the institutions.”

103，对门外汉投资者们，我们的一贯标准建议都是购买免佣金的指数基金。我认为这要比你的股票经纪的建议更好。那些建议你购买其他金融产品的人往往都是借以收取佣金和费用的。其结果就是越来越多的资金投放在指数基金上，而这里大部分都是机构，而不是个人。（意即他们拿了你的钱去买指数基金，还收你手续费和佣金。）

(104)”closet indexing….you’re paying a manager a fortune and he has 85% of his assets invested parallel to the indexes. If you have such a system, you’re being played for a sucker.”

104，"黑箱追指数"投资法（一种大部分钱投资于指数成份股，小部分由基金经理选股的投资组合，一般不公开策略，意在接近指数的表现）……你给经理支付一大笔钱，而他把85%的钱照着指数成分投资。如果你是这么干的，你就被人当傻子玩儿了。

(105)”Black-Scholes is a know-nothing system. If you know nothing about value — only price — then Black-Scholes is a pretty good guess at what a 90-day option might be worth. But the minute you get into longer periods of time, it’s crazy to get into Black-Scholes.”

105，布莱克-舒尔斯模型（一种衍生品定价模型）是一种白痴模型。如果你对于标的物的价值一无所知而只知道价格，那么这个模型对于90天的期权定价还是有价值的。但当你要放眼于更长的时间的时候，使用这个模型就是疯了。

(106)”Black-Scholes works for short-term options, but if it’s a long-term option and you think you know something [about the underlying asset], it’s insane to use Black-Scholes.”

106，同105.

(107)”It’s hard to predict what will happen with two brands in a market.? Sometimes they will behave in a gentlemanly way, and sometimes they’ll pound each other.? I know of no way to predict whether they’ll compete moderately or to the death.? If you could figure it out, you could make a lot of money.”

107，很难预测市场上两个品牌间的竞争状况。有时候他们会很君子地竞争，有时候他们又会互相猛砍。我无法预测他们是会温和共存还是血战到底。如果你能预测得到，你就能赚很多钱。

(108)”We’ve really made the money out of high quality businesses. In some cases, we bought the whole business. And in some cases, we just bought a big block of stock. But when you analyze what happened, the big money’s been made in the high quality businesses. And most of the other people who’ve made a lot of money have done so in high quality businesses.”

108，我们挣的钱都是从那些优质企业中来的。有些是我们全资收购的、有些是我们部分拥有的。但是当你分析我们的情况时，大钱总是从优质企业里来。其他人也是这样，从优质企业身上赚到钱。

(109)”A lot of share-buying, not bargain-seeking, is designed to prop stock prices up. Thirty to 40 years ago, it was very profitable to look at companies that were aggressively buying their own shares. They were motivated simply to buy below what it was worth.”

109，很多股份回购的行为只是为了刺激股价而不是趁低吸收股权。三四十年前，如果你去寻找那些积极回购股票的公司，可以赚不少钱，因为他们那时候都是因为股价低于价值才回购的，很纯粹很简单。

(110)”There are two kinds of businesses: The first earns 12%, and you can take it out at the end of the year. The second earns 12%, but all the excess cash must be reinvested — there’s never any cash. It reminds me of the guy who looks at all of his equipment and says, “There’s all of my profit.” We hate that kind of business. “

110，有两种生意：第一种每年挣12%，年底可以把钱拿回来；第二种每年挣12%，但是利润必须重新投入运营---永远也看不到现金。这让我想到了一个家伙，他看着手里的一大堆（不能变现的）工具装备，慨然叹曰：“这就是我的全部利润了。” 我们可不喜欢这种生意。

(111)”There are actually businesses, that you will find a few times in a lifetime, where any manager could raise the return enormously just by raising prices—and yet they haven’t done it. So they have huge untapped pricing power that they’re not using. That is the ultimate no-brainer. … Disney found that it could raise those prices a lot and the attendance stayed right up.? So a lot of the great record of Eisner and Wells … came from just raising prices at Disneyland and Disneyworld and through video cassette sales of classic animated movies… At Berkshire Hathaway, Warren and I raised the prices of See’s Candy a little faster than others might have. And, of course, we invested in Coca-Cola—which had some untapped pricing power. And it also had brilliant management. So a Goizueta and Keough could do much more than raise prices. It was perfect.”

111，有些生意你在人生中会见识几次，这些生意里，随便找个人当经理都能大幅提高利润，只需要提高商品价格 --- 但是他们又没有这么做。所以他们有很多未开发的定价权。这些生意是最不需要动脑子的。迪士尼发现他们不管怎么提价，入场率都是那么高。所以艾斯纳和威尔斯（迪士尼CEO）的“杰出表现”很大部分来源于给迪士尼乐园门票提价或者给迪士尼的动画提价。在我们这儿，巴菲特和我给See's糖果提价的速度比别人都更快一些。另外，当然了，我们也投资了可口可乐，可口可乐也是有很多未开发的定价权的。而且可口可乐还有一个很棒的管理层，所以他们的CEO可以做许多提价以外的事情。这很完美。

(112)”At Berkshire Hathaway we do not like to compete against Chinese manufacturers.”

112，我们Berkshire不喜欢和中国生产企业竞争。

(113)”Berkshire is in the business of making easy predictions ?If a deal looks too hard, the partners simply shelve it.”

113，Berkshire的工作是做简单的预测，如果一个交易太难搞懂，我们会把它搁置一边。

(114)”We’re the tortoise that has outrun the hare because it chose the easy predictions.”

114，我们是跑赢兔子的乌龟，因为我们挑那些简单的事情来预测。

(115)”"Warren and I avoid doing anything that someone else at Berkshire can do better. You don’t really have a competency if you don’t know the edge of it.”

115，巴菲特和我尽量不做那些公司内有人比我们做得好的事情。如果你不知道你的能力圈的边缘在哪儿，你等于没有能力圈。

(116)”Understanding both the power of compound return and the difficulty of getting it is the heart and soul of understanding a lot of things.”?

116，理解复利的强大和难于达成，是理解很多事情的精髓。

(117)”Generally speaking, it can’t be good to be running a big current account deficit and a big fiscal deficit and have them both growing. You would be thinking the end there would be a comeuppance.” “[But] it isn’t as though all the other options look wonderful compared to the US. It gives me some feeling that what I regard as fiscal misbehavior on our part could go on some time without paying the price.”

117，总的来说，（美国）同时持续增长的出超和财政赤字肯定不是什么好事儿，你会想到最后应该会有个大报应的。但是比起（投资在）美国，其他的选择也不见得有多好。所以我的感觉是，虽然现在我们的财政不太靠谱，但一段时间内继续如此也暂时不会付出代价。

(118)”We started from such a strong position. It’s not as if the alternatives are all so great. I can understand why people would rather invest in the? U.S. Do you want to be in Europe, where 12-13% of people are unemployed and most 28-year-olds are living at home and being paid by state to do it? Or be in Brazil or Venezuela with the political instability that you fear? It’s not totally irrational that? people still like the U.S., despite its faults. Whatever misbehavior there is could go on quite a long time without a price being paid.”

118，我们（美国）的底子很好。除了美国以外其他的选择也不怎么样。我可以理解为什么人们还是宁愿投资在美国。难道你想投到欧洲吗？那儿的失业率高达12%、13%，大部分28岁的人都住在家里靠政府养着。难道你想投到巴西和委内瑞拉？那儿的政局不稳你整天得担惊受怕。美国有这么多的错误但是人们依然喜爱美国是有道理的。现在不靠谱的（财政策略）还可以继续一段时间而不用付出代价。

(119)”Almost all good businesses engage in ‘pain today, gain tomorrow’ activities.”

119，几乎所有的好生意都是“今日付出，明日回报”类的。

(120)”No CEO examining books today understands what the hell is going on.”

120，今天的总裁没有能通过看报表搞明白发生什么事儿的。（意在讽刺现代财报的不科学）

(121)”Generally speaking, if you’re counting on outside directors to act [forcefully to protect your interests as a shareholder, then you’re crazy].? As a general rule in? America, boards act only if there’s been a severe disgrace. My friend Joe was asked to be on the board of Northwestern Bell and he jokes that ‘it was the last thing they ever asked me.’?I think you get better directors when you get directors who don’t need the money. ?When it’s half your income and all your retirement, you’re not likely to be very independent.? But when you have money and an existing reputation that you don’t want to lose, then you’ll act more independently.”

(122)”If mutual fund directors are independent, then I’m the lead character in the Bolshoi Ballet.”

122，如果共有基金的董事能够做到独立，那我就是莫斯科芭蕾舞团的主跳。

(123)”Of course I’m troubled by huge consumer debt levels – we’ve pushed consumer credit very hard in the US.? Eventually, if it keeps growing, it will stop growing. As Herb Stein said, “If something cannot go on forever, it will stop.”? When it stops, it may be unpleasant.? Other than Herb Stein’s quote, I have no comment.”

123，我当然对现在的巨大消费债务感到担忧。我们美国一直过于致力于推进信用消费了。如果他持续增长，总有一天会停止增长的。就像赫伯・斯坦恩说的“任何不能永远前进的东西都会有停止的一刻。” 当信用消费停止增长的时候，恐怕就不好过了。我完全同意斯坦恩的说法，别无评价。

(124)”?I think it would be a great improvement if there were no D&O insurance . The counter-argument is that no-one with any money would serve on a board. But I think net net you’d be better off.”

124，如果消灭“董事高管责任保险”，我认为是一大进步。但反方的观点认为那样的话有钱人就都不愿意担任董事了。但总的来说我认为消灭它还是好的。

(125)”We don’t care about quarterly earnings (though obviously we care about how the business is doing over time) and are unwilling to manipulate in any way to make some quarter look better.”

125，我们不在意单季度盈利（虽然我们关注一个企业长期表现如何），也很不愿意用任何方法修改报表以便某一季度的结果看上去更好。

(126)”What we don’t like in modern capitalism is the expectations game. It’s not the kissing cousin of evil; it’s the blood brother.”

126，对于现代资本主义，我们不喜欢的部分是拼预测。这玩意儿特别邪恶。

(127)”There are a lot of things we pass on. We have three baskets: in, out, and too tough…We have to have a special insight, or we’ll put it in the ‘too tough’ basket. All of you have to look for a special area of competency and focus on that.”

127，我们略过很多东西的。我们有三个篮子：留着的、要扔的、太难懂的。如果我们没有特别看懂它的前景，我们就把它扔进太难懂的那个篮子。你们要做的就是寻找一个你们特别有竞争力的领域并且专注于此。

(128)”We have a history when things are really horrible of wading in when no one else will.”

128，我们曾经在没有任何人敢涉足的时候进场（买进）过。

(129)”We have monetized houses in this country in a way that’s never occurred before. Ask Joe how he bought a new Cadillac [and he’ll say] from borrowing on his house. We are awash in capital. [Being] awash is leading to very terrible behavior by credit cards and subprime lenders -a very dirty business, luring people into a disadvantageous position. It’s a new way of getting serfs, and it’s a dirty business. We have financial institutions, including those with big names, extending high-cost credit to the least able people. I find a lot of it revolting. Just because it’s a free market doesn’t mean it’s honorable.”

129，我们当今用房子套钱的方法以前从未出现过。你问张三他是怎么买的宝马，他会告诉你是靠抵押房子贷的款。我们现在资本过剩。资本过剩会导致人们疯狂刷信用卡和放债人发放次贷 ---- 发放次贷是一个肮脏的生意。它诱惑人们前往绝地。这是一种获取奴隶的新方法，这是很脏的生意。我们有些金融机构 --- 包括那些大行 ---- 都在向那些弱势群体发放次贷。我觉得这种行为令人厌恶。自由市场是自由的并不意味着它就是光荣的。

(130)”We don’t believe that markets are totally efficient and we don’t believe that widespread diversification will yield a good result.? We believe almost all good investments will involve relatively low diversification. Maybe 2% of people will come into our corner of the tent and the rest of the 98% will believe what they’ve been told.”

130，我们不认为市场是完全有效的，也不相信分散投资会带来更好的结果。我们认为最好的投资都是比较集中的。大概2%的人会跟我们站在同一个立场，其他的都还是相信他们所听到的那些谬论。

(131)”Efficient market theory [is]? a wonderful economic doctrine that had a long vogue in spite of the experience of Berkshire Hathaway. In fact one of the economists who won — he shared a Nobel Prize — and as he looked at Berkshire Hathaway year after year, which people would throw in his face as saying maybe the market isn’t quite as efficient as you think, he said, “Well, it’s a two-sigma event.” And then he said we were a three-sigma event. And then he said we were a four-sigma event. And he finally got up to six sigmas — better to add a sigma than change a theory, just because the evidence comes in differently.And, of course, when this share of a Nobel Prize went into money management himself, he sank like a stone.”

131，市场有效论是一个很好的经济学教条，流行了很长时间，但是跟我们Berkshire Hathaway的经验相悖。事实上依靠此理论获得诺贝尔奖的其中一位经济学家也观察了我们公司好多年，人们当他面质问他，说市场恐怕不那么有效吧，不然怎么解释Berkshire的战绩，他就说我们是一个小概率的例子，有两个标准差。然后他又说我们这个例子有三个标准差。然后又说我们四个标准差。最后终于多到了六个标准差。他宁愿给我们多弄几个标准差也不愿意修改他的理论。当然了，最后当他拿获得的诺贝尔奖金自己去投资的时候，钱就泥牛入海了。

(132)”I know just enough about? thermodynamics to understand that if it takes too much fossil-fuel energy to create ethanol, that’s a very stupid way to solve an energy problem.”

132，我虽然懂的热力学知识不多，但还是足以判断这个事儿：如果你要花费很多石油资源去生产乙醇，那么用乙醇替代石油就是一件很傻的节能方案。

(133)”It is entirely possible that you could use our mental models to find good IPOs to buy. There are countless IPOs every year, and I’m sure that there are a few cinches that you could jump on. But the average person is going to get creamed. So if you’re talented, good luck. IPOs are too small for us, or too high tech, so we won’t understand them. So, if Warren’s looking at them, I don’t know about it.”

我对刚刚IPO的公司也不感兴趣，主要是没足够时间和资料去搞懂。

133，你用我们的思路去找靠谱的IPO来买是完全可能的。每年都有数不清的IPO，我相信肯定有一些是值得整一下的。但是大部分人都是被忽悠的。如果你很有才能，祝你好运。对我们来说，IPO要么太小、要么太高科技所以我们搞不懂。如果巴菲特有在关注它们，我自己是不知道的。

(134)”Well envy/jealousy made, what, two out of the ten commandments? Those of you who have raised siblings you know about envy, or tried to run a law firm or investment bank or even a faculty? I’ve heard Warren say a half a dozen times, “It’s not greed that drives the world, but envy.”

134，你看，妒忌和嫉妒，一个事儿占了十诫里的两个位置。你们养过小孩儿们的、开律所的、管投行的、甚至当系主任的，都知道妒忌是怎么回事儿。我听巴菲特说过好多次：“带领世界前进的不是贪婪、而是妒忌的力量。”

(135)”Suppose, any one of you knew of a wonderful thing right now that you were overwhelmingly confident- and correctly so- would produce about 12% per annum compounded as far as you could see. Now, if you actually had that available, and by going into it you were forfeiting all opportunities to make money faster- there’re a lot of you who wouldn’t like that. But a lot of you would think, “What the hell do I care if somebody else makes money faster?” There’s always going to be somebody who is making money faster, running the mile faster or what have you. So in a human sense, once you get something that works fine in your life, the idea of caring terribly that somebody else is making money faster strikes me as insane.”  这里我看到两点：1.平常心地呆在自己能力圈内; 2. 12%是个可接受的年复合回报率。

135，假设一个场景，你知道有一个铁板钉钉没跑儿的机会可以带来12%的复合年回报。现在，假如这个机会放在你面前，但是要求你从此不再接受别的赚快钱的机会，你们中大部分人是不愿意干的。但你们中很多人也会说：“别人赚钱快为什么我要在意呢？” 这世界总有些人会赚钱比你快、跑得比你快、或者别的什么比你快。但是，从理智的角度来思考，一旦你自己找到了一件运行良好的机制能致富，还非要在意别人赚钱比你快，这在我来看就是疯了。

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