上周末，香港新特首在进行就职演说时，使用的语言是普通话。这座以粤语为主的城市的一位当地人表示，这让她感觉自己被疏远了。她说，如果香港人不能选举自己的行政长官，起码可以在就职仪式上使用粤语吧。
在英国人（他们在民主和粤语方面也从未太尽力）把香港移交给中国政府15年后，这座前殖民地城市的中国特色正变得越来越浓。这是在意料之中的。香港的中国化不但体现在梁振英(Leung Chun-ying)作为行政长官首次发言时使用普通话，也表现在他与北京方面和共产党有着密切的关系上——这与打着蝴蝶领结、具有英国高级公务员风范的前任有着相当大的区别。
香港的中国化还发生在更深的层面上。街上讲普通话的声音已明显增多。店主们为了敲开内地人鼓起来的腰包，经常用普通话招呼客人。今年的人口统计显示，有48%的香港人表示自己会说普通话，超过会说英语的人数(46%)。近三分之一香港居民出生在中国内地。另外，人民币在香港也越来越通行了。香港是中国政府致力于推进人民币国际化的中心城市。有些香港人已提出了放弃港元盯住美元的汇率政策、转向与包括人民币在内的一揽子货币挂钩的主张，这在从前是一个禁忌话题。
中国内地人正在抢购香港的房产。去年，香港新建豪华公寓中大约有40%被中国内地人买走。就连昔日身穿细条纹衬衫的外国人在吃着早餐的白煮蛋时阅读的《南华早报》(SCMP)，总编辑现在也换成了内地人，这引起了外界对该报能否保持独立性的苦恼。换言之，种种迹象显示香港更像中国了。得到“一国两制”原则保障的香港与内地之间的界限，正在变得模糊不清。
然而，每一个动作都会引起反应；香港的反应一直颇为激烈。上周末，数以万计的香港人涌上街头抗议，许多人表示他们不喜欢梁振英，认为这个新特首是强加给香港人的。最近几个月来，反对内地的情绪（有些是令人不快的）不断加剧。香港人反对的东西很多，从大量内地产妇占据产科病房，到使用简体汉字（而非香港惯用的繁体字）的公司广告。
在最近一项调查中，45%调查对象称自己为“香港人”，高于回归时34%的比例。只有18%的调查对象称自己首先是“中国人”。这样的定义很容易让人产生误解。大多数香港人都为中国的文化、历史和令人瞩目的经济表现感到自豪。让香港人感到紧张的“中国”是一党制的中国，有些香港人担心，这个中国可能会剥夺香港人享有的自由，并妨碍他们逐步获得普选权。
从北京方面的视角看，香港的中国化肯定是可喜的。但这也是带有危险的。观看梁振英演讲的许多内地人，对一位看来至少在解决民生问题的领导人印象深刻。（早已习惯哗众取宠的政客的香港人，则没有那么被打动。）
随着香港与内地融合程度的提高，香港对内地事务的卷入也在加深。近来，中国湖南省活动人士李旺阳从监狱获释不久后蹊跷死亡，这事在香港激起强烈反应。另一件事是，上周末一些内地农民去香港游行，抗议老家的土地被征收。
香港和内地之间的关系正以复杂的方式发展着。1997年，有些人怀有远大的愿望，即香港的相对自由将对内地产生一些感染。那只是一厢情愿。中国太大了，而且发展迅猛，无暇顾及香港。然而，随着香港变得越来越像中国城市，它所珍视的自由正与政治上苏醒的内地人的抱负融合到一起。
香港是一座中国城市。最终，中国内地将把香港吞了。但在吞咽过程中，香港可能卡在内地的喉里。
戴维•皮林是英国《金融时报》亚洲版主编
译者/何黎
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001045416#s=d
When the new chief executive of Hong Kong made his inaugural speech this weekend, he did so in Mandarin. One native of the Cantonese-speaking city said that made her feel alienated. If Hong Kongers were not allowed to vote for their leader, she said, at least the swearing-in ceremony could be conducted in their own language.
Fifteen years after the British – who were never too big on democracy or Cantonese either – handed Hong Kong back to China, the former colony is becoming increasingly Sinified. That is to be expected. It is reflected not only in the language in which Leung Chun-ying made his first remarks as leader, but also in the fact that he has close ties to Beijing and the Communist party – quite a departure from his predecessor, a bow-tie wearing remnant of the British civil service.
The Sinification of Hong Kong goes deeper. The amount of Mandarin spoken on the streets has risen palpably. Shopkeepers, fishing for the bulging mainland wallet, often greet customers in it. This year’s census shows that 48 per cent of Hong Kongers say they can speak it, overtaking English, at 46 per cent. Nearly a third of residents were born on the mainland. Then there’s the renminbi, ever more commonly accepted, alongside Hong Kong dollars. Hong Kong is the centre of Beijing’s efforts to internationalise its currency. Some in the territory have even floated the idea, once taboo, of breaking the Hong Kong dollar’s peg with the greenback and switching to a basket of currencies including the rmb.
Mainlanders are snapping up property. Last year, some 40 per cent of newly built luxury apartments went to Chinese buyers. Even the South China Morning Post, once a paper to be read over a boiled egg by pinstriped expats, is now edited by a mainlander, provoking not a little anguish about its independence. Everywhere, in other words, there are signs Hong Kong is becoming more Chinese. The line between it and the mainland – safeguarded by the principle of one country, two systems – is blurring.
Yet every action provokes a reaction; Hong Kong’s has been vigorous. It was on display this weekend when tens of thousands of protesters poured on to the streets, many voicing their dislike of Mr Leung, whom they see as being imposed on them. In recent months, anti-mainland sentiment, some of it unpleasant, has been rising. Hong Kongers have objected to everything from Chinese mothers crowding their maternity wards to company advertisements in simplified Chinese rather than the complicated Chinese characters used in Hong Kong.
In a recent survey 45 per cent of respondents identified themselves as “Hong Kongers”, up from 34 per cent at handover. Only 18 per cent put their primary identity as “Chinese”. Such definitions are open to misunderstanding. Most Hong Kongers are proud of China’s culture, history and impressive economic performance. The “China” that makes them nervous is the one run by a party, which some fear could impinge on the freedoms enjoyed by Hong Kongers and limit their progress to universal suffrage.
From Beijing’s perspective, the Sinification of Hong Kong must be gratifying. But it carries dangers. Many mainlanders who watched Mr Leung’s speech were impressed by a leader who at least appeared to be addressing people’s problems. (Hong Kongers, used to grandstanding politicians, were less enamoured.)
As Hong Kong becomes more integrated with China, it has also become more engaged with mainland affairs. Recently, Hong Kongers have vociferously taken up the case of Li Wangyang, an activist who died in Hunan province shortly after being released from prison. In a mirror image, some Chinese farmers went to Hong Kong last weekend to march against land confiscations at home.
The relationship between Hong Kong and the mainland is evolving in complicated ways. In 1997 there were lofty hopes Hong Kong would somehow infect the mainland with its relative freedoms. That was wishful thinking. China was too big and on too much of a roll to take much notice. Yet as Hong Kong becomes more of a Chinese city, the liberties it cherishes are melding with the aspirations of politically stirring mainlanders.
Hong Kong is a Chinese city. Eventually, China will swallow it up. But on the way down, it may just get caught in the mainland’s throat.
The writer is the FT’s Asia Editor
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