由于瑞士法郎汇率大幅走高，瑞士出口企业处境艰难、愁云笼罩，但有一个行业却一枝独秀、光彩夺目。
瑞士机床和电子设备在海外的销售额大幅下降，纸产品销售额暴跌，而钟表出口额却大幅增长。
去年11月份，劳力士(Rolex)、欧米茄(Omega)和百达翡丽(Patek Philippe)——只是瑞士众多知名品牌中的三个——的海外销售额同比增长16%，至20.6亿瑞士法郎（合21.7亿美元）。去年头11个月的海外销售额则增长19%，至174亿瑞士法郎。
继2010年反弹逾22%（钟表出口在受到信贷紧缩冲击后已恢复元气）之后，2011年的销售数字有望打破2008年创下的历史最高纪录。
“今年料将成为创纪录的一年，我们对2012年也充满信心，”瑞士钟表工业联合会(FH)主席让•丹尼尔•帕什(Jean-Daniel Pasche)表示。
出口数据只能说明一部分情况。大多数钟表制造公司属于私人所有，它们像私人银行业机构一样对自身的信息守口如瓶。
即使是斯沃琪集团(Swatch Group)和历峰(Richemont)在谈到旗下各品牌（比如前者的宝玑(Breguet)和后者的积家(Jaeger-LeCoultre)）的情况时也惜字如金。斯沃琪和历峰是钟表业的两个巨头，作为上市公司，它们必须有更高的透明度。
只有瑞士海关提供汇总的统计数字。
钟表制造公司的表现之所以与众不同，有三点原因。第一同时也是最明显的是，瑞士几乎占据着垄断地位，特别是在顶级机械表市场上。
在低端市场上，中国、印度和俄罗斯每年生产数百万块手表，但这些手表没有多少能销售到本土市场以外。中高端市场则是瑞士品牌的天下，中端品牌如斯沃琪的天梭(Tissot)，高端品牌如独立品牌爱彼(Audemars Piguet)。就连两个最知名的非瑞士名表品牌——德国的朗格(Lange)和格拉苏蒂(Glashütte Original)——其所有者也是瑞士人。
掌握需求的变化，是瑞士钟表制造公司的第二个制胜法宝。大多数品牌都抓住了蓬勃增长的亚洲需求——主要是来自中国的需求，瑞士表在中国是男士的身份象征。
斯沃琪是最早行动的瑞士钟表制造公司之一，该公司现在也正获益于此。斯沃琪在上海外滩开设了一间令人目眩神迷的品牌陈列室。
调整零售策略是第三个成功因素。传统上，钟表的销售要经过独立分销商，这些分销商随后把表转手给各个零售商。
目前中小品牌仍然依赖于分销商，但各大钟表制造公司都已逐渐掌控了自己品牌的分销，增强了灵活性，提高了利润。
译者/何黎
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001042660
Amid the gloom surrounding Switzerland’s hard-pressed exporters, smarting from the soaring franc, one sector stands out as a glaring exception.
While foreign sales of machine tools and electrical equipment have fallen sharply and paper products plunged, watch exports have soared.
Sales of Rolexes, Omegas and Parek Philippes – just three of Switzerland’s best-known brands – climbed
16 per cent in November year on year to SFr2.06bn ($2.17bn). For the first
11 months of last year, sales were up by 19 per cent at SFr17.4bn.
The figures follow a more than 22 per cent rebound in 2010, when exports recovered from the credit crunch, with 2011 set to exceed
the previous 2008 peak.
“This year is expected to be a record and we are also confident about 2012,” says Jean-Daniel Pasche, president of the Swiss watch industry federation.
Export data tell only a partial story. Most watchmakers are privately owned and guard their information as fiercely as their counterparts in private banking.
Even Swatch Group and Richemont, the two biggest, which have to be more transparent as quoted companies, are sparing when it comes to individual brands, such as the former’s Breguet or the latter’s Jaeger-LeCoultre.
Swiss customs statistics provide the only aggregate data available.
The watchmakers’ story is different for three reasons. First, and most obvious, Switzerland has a virtual monopoly, especially for top-priced mechanical watches.
At lower prices, China, India and Russia produce millions of pieces a year. But few are sold outside the home market. Further up the price band, Swiss brands dominate, whether for “mid-priced” watches, such as Swatch Group’s Tissot, or top names, such as independent Audemars Piguet. Even the two best known non-Swiss prestige brands – Germany’s Lange and Glashütte Original – are Swiss-owned.
Recognition of changing demand has been the second Swiss trump. Most brands have latched on to booming Asian demand – predominantly from China, where Swiss watches are male status symbols.
Swatch Group, which has a glitzy multibrand showroom on Shanghai’s Bund, was one of the early movers, and is now reaping the benefits.
Adjusting retailing has been the third factor. Traditionally, watches are sold via independent distributors, which then forward them to individual retailers.
While distributors remain important for smaller brands, the biggest watchmakers have progressively taken over their own distribution, increasing flexibility and boosting profits.
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