2010年3月24日

中国央企考核推新政 2010: A GENUINE GREAT LEAP FORWARD

你也许还不知道,中国国务院国有资产监督管理委员会(SASAC,简称国资委)近期发布了一项“三年业绩考核”政策,这项政策将改变中国商业惯例。这一重大改革给中国带来的影响,可能相当于或超过邓小平在1978年实行的改革。(该政策的全称为《中央企业负责人经营业绩考核暂行办法》——编者注)

新考核办法

国务院国资委管理着127家企业,这些企业的资产总额为3万亿美元,年营业收入为2万亿美元,职工总数为1200万人。它们包括中国石油天然气集团公司(CNPC,为中石油的母公司)、中钢集团(Sinosteel)、中国移动(China Mobile)、国家电网(State Grid)、国航(Air China)以及几乎所有其它国有大型工业和服务业企业。各省市国资委也管理着好几百家大型企业,这些企业拥有数以百亿美元计的资产,职工也有数百万人。

所有这些企业都必须遵守国资委制定的政策方针。由于中国的重大政策都经过集体决策,国资委的政策方针也直接间接地得到胡锦涛主席和中共中央政治局的支持。一切结构性改革都需经过多年研讨,而且改革都是渐进推行的,以逐渐获得主要相关方面的认同。

最新这项政策的指导原则简单明了:从2010年1月1日起,企业的经营利润必须高于资本成本;企业管理者要负责任地管理股东资本。业绩考核、浮动薪酬(奖金)和人事任免将部分地依据一个简化的EVA指标,即经济增加值。其计算公式如下:EVA=税后净营业利润-(投入资本x债务和股权加权平均资本成本率)。在许多高层管理人员看来,这一重大改革并不算大胆,特别是因为初期营业收入等指标在考核中仍占60%的份量,而EVA指标占40%。但是,对这些企业来说,这是向未知世界跨出的一大步。

虽然国资委开始只给企业设定了一个较低的资本成本率(5.5%),但有半数企业的EVA是负值。许多企业凭借人为低成本债务或政府补贴实现增长。大多数企业不支付股息,但都已成为综合性大型企业。有了EVA所带来的透明度,这些做法导致的价值损害一目了然。这在2009年12月31日以前是没有问题的,但从现在起就不可接受了。对于数千名凭借出色行政才能和实现增长而获得晋升的管理者来说,这是一次文化冲击。

对资本的成本负责

国资委这项政策把它所管理的企业推到了绩效管理领域的前沿。许多世界顶尖企业仍不惜代价地执着于市场份额和规模。他们的目标是营业额、EBITDA、EBIT或净利润(每股盈利)。他们无一对资本成本负责。当管理层的薪酬受到营业额、资产或管理人数等因素的驱动时,根据资本成本来决定资本投资就不受重视了。金融机构执着于市场份额,导致西方金融市场不堪“零首付”抵押贷款的压力而崩溃。即使是那些强调致力于投资回报(ROCE, RONA, ROE或ROA)的企业,也不像他们在年报中所说的那样注重价值创造。因此,中国国资委明确规定企业利润必须高于资本成本的做法,把这些企业与大多数主权财富基金区分了开来,尽管他们在使用人为低成本的资本。只有新加坡的淡马锡控股在采用过这样严格的标准。

为什么国资委不更进一步,给企业设定一个更精确、更高的资本成本率?如果这样做,可能显出多数企业都损害了价值,而EVA可能需要很多年才会转为正值。虽然改善EVA比它是否是正值更为重要,但心理效应可能打击企业采取这项制度的积极性。在中国,改革都是逐步推进的,即使在外界看来似乎是闪电般的速度。因此,国资委开始只给企业设定了一个较低的资本成本率,只要求他们对财务会计报表作一些基本调整,这应会鼓励企业加大研发投资,从提供廉价、较低质量的产品和服务,转向提供具有较高价值的产品和服务。

将来国资委可能会提高资本成本率,并期望企业作更多调整,以反映他们的发展战略,推动业务发展,促进价值导向的长效决策机制。

第一层影响:企业

一些企业会希望带头实施EVA考核制度,比国资委所要求的更加严格地推行这项制度。他们将采用更高的资本成本率,针对每项业务确定一个资本成本率,进行相关改革,以促进价值导向的决策机制。他们将实行动态的浮动薪酬激励制度,以鼓励管理者做出自信而有勇气的抉择。任人唯贤的理念将渗透到商业伦理和企业过程中。优秀的财富创造者将体验到生活方式的改变。

经过运筹的冒险,应取代一致小心回避风险的做法。更具体地说,市场导向、客观和透明的规划及薪酬目标,应取代政治导向、主观和私下商定的目标。减少腐败将创造价值,减少不道德行为。高层管理者应把决策权和责任下放给负责资本运作的操作层管理者。一种注重创新(研发)的投资观念,应取代短期成本文化。

这应具有立竿见影的效果。透明将把价值创造者与价值摧毁者区分开来。管理者将很快尝试改善业绩或收回资本,以低成本的劳动力取代以前人为低成本的资本,并考虑把工厂搬到土地和人力都比较便宜的内地。管理者将尝试创新的解决方案,把亏损业务转化为赢利业务。

在事实证明无法取得上述效果的情况下,重组应登场发挥作用:私人股本、民营企业、其它国企以及外资企业将会吸纳闲置的资产、设备和部门。反过来,中国企业将谋求在海外扩张,而不仅仅是获取原材料。

带头行动的企业应会很快吸引其它企业进行改革,或者促使国资委坚持这套做法。三年后,中国企业在结构或文化上应会面貌一新;他们应当是精简而强壮的,他们的管理者充满干劲,致力于推行最佳实践,注重价值创造。他们将凭借高质量、在研发基础上推出的“中国制造”产品和服务,与西方最优秀企业展开竞争。

第二层影响:中国

国资委的决定,会影响它所管理的企业和地方国资委,而地方国资委也会对它们所管理的企业提出同样要求。国资委所管理的中央企业——尤其是那些拥有受地方国资委监管的附属机构的庞大央企——影响力巨大,金融机构、民营企业、在华外资企业甚至非企业公共部门都可能感受到重要文化转变的影响。

学术研究表明,第一个老板会对一名职员在整个职业生涯中的行为产生很大影响。底层职员会观察高级职员和经理们的行事,以此判断怎样才能得到认可和晋升。小企业观察大企业。家长与学校相互观察,低年级学生观察高年级学生,后者则观察未来潜在雇主。民营行业与公共行业相互观察。因此,国有企业的转变——致力取得成功的观念——将影响整个社会。

四大战略性政策将推动文化转变:

一、获得人为低成本资本支持的国有企业,将把重点转向员工。资本成本不仅是资本的价格,也体现其相对于劳动力的成本。以前,国有企业裁减了数百万职工。现在,他们将再招聘数百万人,并把资本转移到成本较低的西部地区。如果他们贯彻基于EVA的激励措施,将使数百万人能够像主人翁一样思考和做事:给他们发展机会,让他们脱离贫困,培养他们的业绩理念。

二、股权和债务成本提高,将突显出低效率的资本结构:有些企业负债过少,有些则负债过重。总体而言,国有企业可能会减轻负债,使银行得以向民营企业敞开大门,让债务推动这些企业的增长。

三、几乎没有企业向政府支付股息,但他们却能拿到补贴。然而,企业应只投资于能够产生价值的项目,并收回摧毁价值的资本。EVA应带来资本投资的全新创新理念,而较高的资本成本应促使他们支付大笔股息。补贴减少而股息增多,意味着政府将有资金投资于社会福利项目,以减小失业、医疗和退休相关风险。一个更健全的社会保险体系应会促使中国人消费,而不再一味地储蓄。

四、更多企业将通过金融市场融资。有些国有企业拥有公开上市业务,但整体上市的寥寥无几。更多企业将会这样做,让中国人有更多机会持有股权,不管是持有股权和期权的企业员工,还是购买共同基金的普通大众。这将促进业主观念。

从1978年至2010年期间,中国的贫困状况逐渐减轻。国资委释放的这波物质及心理动力,将推动内部失衡状况(资本与劳动力、储蓄与消费、国有企业过度投资现象、债务与股票、补贴与股息、国有与散户持有、避险与冒险、政治商议与任人唯贤)趋向平衡,从而促进中国经济更快增长(达到12%以上)。结果,从2010年起,将有数以百万计的人在经济和文化层面加入中产阶层。

第三层影响:世界

中国大事无一不影响世界。在2008年,当中国需求推动大宗商品价格升至历史高位时,全球消费者叫苦不迭。到2012年,一种注重价值的观念,将使中国企业在与非中国企业(外国企业或在华外资企业)的竞争中,变成比现在更加厉害的对手。然而,消费增加将为那些有能力竞争的外国企来带来机遇;这可能减轻贸易失衡。中国资金可能把目光转向回报率高于美国国债的资产,而消费价格通胀可能促使中国把汇率政策从盯住美元转变为一种更加自由浮动的机制。

许多中国企业将在业绩考核、资本和人员管理以及激励等方面脱颖而出。他们的表现将胜过那些执着于市场份额、EBITDA增长或每股盈利管理的企业。他们将不是通过秘密协定、诡计花招、支持无赖国家或生产廉价劣质产品取胜。中国管理者和董事会成员将是最懂商道与财务的管理者。任人唯贤、投资观念、创新以及注重价值的观念,应会渗透到中国企业与消费者、竞争对手和供应商等的关系中。中国企业负责人将更有自信包容外界,也会得到外界更多的包容与尊重。美国人、欧洲人、亚洲人、南美人和非洲人将更加不害怕中国,更加钦佩中国。

我们正处于转折点上。国资委在2010年1月12日发布了上述政策。中央和地方国有企业的主要负责人面临明确选择:他们可以表面上遵守这项政策,口头敷衍一下资本管理的理念,进行最小程度的改变,从而正中许多怀疑论者的预期;或者,他们可以战胜自满心理,克服缺陷,推广责任制,欢迎注重价值的观念。我幻想的未来景象,有赖于一些企业负责人能够自愿通过树立有力榜样,带动其他人追随,引导中国前进。

注:作者埃里克•斯特恩(Erik Stern)为Stern Stewart & Co.管理咨询公司国际业务总裁,本文仅代表作者本人观点。

译者/杨远


http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001031898


You may not know it. But, the Central SASAC, State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council, the People's Republic of China, just initiated a 3-year Performance Assessment Policy that will transform Chinese business practices. This dramatic change may have an equal or greater impact on China than Deng Xiaoping's 1978 reforms.

THE POLICY

The Central SASAC governs a portfolio of 130 companies with $3 trillion in assets, $3 trillion in sales, and 12 million employees. Companies include CNPC (PetroChina), Sinosteel, China Mobile, State Grid, Air China, and almost all large industrial and service companies with state ownership. Other SASACs represent major states and cities and include hundreds of major organisations with tens of billions of assets and millions more employees.

All follow the guidelines promoted by Central SASAC. As major policy decisions are taken by consensus, SASAC guidelines have explicit or implicit support from Premier Hu and the Politbureau. No tectonic change occurs without years of study and debate, and transformation happens gradually, building buy-in among the key constituents affected.

In this case, the guiding principle is simple and straightforward: from 01.01.2010, enterprises must earn returns above the cost of capital; executives are now expected to be responsible stewards of investor capital. Performance appraisal, variable-pay compensation (bonuses), and promotion/dismissal are based partially on a simplified version of EVA®, economic value added, which equals the net operating profit after tax – (capital employed x cost of capital for debt and equity). The great change will not seem brave to many C-suite executives, especially as sales will initially remain 60% of the goal, with EVA at 40%. But, for these enterprises, it is a great leap forward into the unknown.

Although SASAC has started the companies with a low capital cost (5.5%), half produce negative EVA. Many have grown by consuming artificially low-cost debt or government subsidy. Most do not provide dividends but have become conglomerations of businesses. Transparency highlights the resulting value destruction. This was okay until 31.12.2009. Now, it is unacceptable. For thousands of managers who have ascended by being excellent administrators and delivering growth, this is culture shock.

BENCHMARKING

SASAC's decision places their firms in the forefront of performance management. Many of the world's premier firms remain obsessed with market share and size, at any cost. Their goals are sales, EBITDA, EBIT, or net profit (EPS). None of them are accountable for the cost of capital. Using it for capital investments matters not when management pay packages are driven by sales, assets, or people managed. Financial institutions' fixation on market share caused the collapse of Western financial markets, under the weight of zero-down mortgages. Even firms that underline their commitment to returns (ROCE, RONA, ROE, or ROA) are less value focused than their annual reports suggest. Therefore, SASAC's explicit demand that enterprises earn rates of return above a cost of capital differentiates them from most sovereign wealth funds, even with the artificially low cost of capital.

Why does SASAC not go further and demand that the companies beat a more accurate and higher cost of capital? This would likely show that most portfolio firms have destroyed value, and that positive EVA is possibly many years away. Although improvement in EVA matters more than whether it is positive, the psychological effect could diminish any enthusiasm for adoption. In China, change happens step-by-step, even if to an outsider, it appears to happen at lightning speed. Therefore, SASAC starts the companies with a lower capital cost and asks them to make only a few basic adjustments to their financial accounting statements, which should encourage greater investment in research and development and a move from low-cost, lower quality products and services to higher value offerings. Only Singapore's Temasek Holdings requires such a high standard of performance.

In future, SASAC will likely raise the capital cost and expect companies to make more adjustments that reflect their strategy, support their operations, and advance value-oriented and longer-term decision-making.

FIRST ORDER IMPACT – COMPANIES

Some companies will wish to pilot EVA, taking the framework further than the guidelines demand. They will use a higher cost of capital, defined for each of their businesses, and make adjustments that encourage value-driven decision-making. They will implement dynamic variable-pay incentives that motivate managers to make confident, yet, courageous choices. An ethos of meritocracy will permeate business ethics and corporate processes. The great wealth creators will experience a lifestyle change.

Calculated risk-taking should replace consensus careful risk-aversion. More specifically, market-driven, objective and transparent targets for planning and compensation should supplant politically-driven, subjective and negotiated targets. Cutting corruption will create value, reducing unethical behaviour. Senior executives should drill down decision-rights and accountability to operating managers who handle the capital. An ―investment mindset, with an emphasis on innovation (research and development), should substitute for a short-term ―cost culture.

This should have an immediate effect. Transparency will demarcate the value creators and destroyers. Managers will rapidly attempt to improve or harvest them, replacing previously artificially low-cost capital with low cost labour, and consider moving plants into the hinterland where land and labour are less expensive. Managers will try innovative solutions to make losers into winners.

Where this proves impossible, restructuring should reign: private equity, private sector, other SOEs, and foreign firms will capture unwanted assets, units, and divisions. In turn, Chinese firms will look for expansion abroad, not only seeking raw materials.

The pilots should rapidly entice the others to change or SASAC to insist upon it. In three years, Chinese companies should not be recognizable in structure or culture; they should be lean, strong, and full of highly motivated managers employing best practices and focused on generating value. They will compete with the best of the west, with high quality research-based ―Made in China products and services.

SECOND ORDER IMPACT – CHINA

The decisions of Central SASAC affect their portfolio companies and regional SASACs which demand similar requirements from their firms. Central SASAC firms, especially when magnified by those under regional SASACs, are so influential that financial institutions, private sector firms, foreign firms operating in China, and even the non-corporate public sector are likely to feel the impact of a major cultural shift.

Academic research demonstrates how significant a first boss is to the actions of an employee for her entire career. Junior employees watch the dealings of their more senior employees and managers to gauge what leads to recognition and promotion. Smaller firms look to larger firms. Parents and schools look to each other, whilst young students gaze at older students who study their future employers. The private and public sector eye each other. Therefore, transformation of the state-owned corporate sector – the mindset of success – will filter through the society.

Four major strategic policies will drive the cultural change.

1. All state institutions that favoured artificially low-priced capital will shift their emphasis to employees. The cost of capital not only prices capital but also its relative cost to labour. Previously, state companies shed millions of employees. Now, they will hire millions, and move capital to the less expensive west. If they drill down EVA-based incentives, they will empower millions to think and act like owners, giving them opportunity, ending their poverty, and opening their minds to merit.

2. Higher priced equity and debt capital will highlight inefficient capital structures: those with too little debt and those with too much. In general, SOEs will likely reduce their debt, allowing banks to open their balance sheets to private sector firms. Debt will give them the fuel to grow.

3. Few enterprises paid dividends to the state; rather they consumed subsidies. Yet, companies should only invest in projects that generate value, and they should harvest capital that destroys value. EVA should initiate innovative new ideas for capital investment, but the higher capital cost should trigger payment of large dividends. Fewer subsidies and greater dividends mean the government will have funds to invest in social programmes, reducing unemployment, health, and retirement risk. A greater safety net should entice the Chinese to consume rather than save.

4. More enterprises will tap financial markets for capital. Several SOEs have publicly traded divisions or units, but the shares of few groups are traded. More will be, granting the Chinese a greater opportunity to own equity, whether they are employees with stock and options or the general public buying mutual funds. This will expand an ownership mindset.

Between 1978 and 2010, poverty diminished in China. The physical and psychological dynamism unleashed by SASAC should bring even faster growth (>12%) to China, as internal imbalances (capital and labour, savings and consumption, over investment among SOEs, debt and equity, subsidies and dividends, state and retail-investor ownership, risk aversion and risk taking, political negotiation and meritocracy) move toward equilibrium. Consequently, from 2010, millions will join the middle class financially and culturally.

THIRD ORDER IMPACT – THE WORLD

Nothing significant happens in China without the world feeling the consequence. In 2008, global consumers squealed when Chinese demand caused commodity prices to rise to record levels. By 2012, a value mindset will make Chinese firms much stronger competition for non-Chinese companies within and outside of China. Yet, greater consumption should open opportunities for those foreign firms that can compete; this may reduce trade imbalances. Chinese RMB will likely seek higher return assets than American government bonds, but consumer price inflation in China may move monetary policy from a dollar peg to a greater free float.

Many Chinese firms will have moved to the forefront in performance appraisal, capital and people management, and motivation. They will outperform those wedded to market share, EBITDA growth, or EPS management. They will not win through backroom deals, intrigue, supporting the distasteful, or through low-price lower-quality products. Chinese managers and board members will be among the most business and financially literate. Meritocracy, an investment mindset, innovation, and value should permeate Chinese corporate relations with consumers, competitors, and suppliers. Chinese executives will have more confidence to include outsiders but will expect more inclusion and greater respect. However, Americans, Europeans, Asians, South Americans, and Africans will fear China less and admire China more.

We are at the ―tipping point. SASAC delivered the policy on 12.01.2010. The Chief Executives of the central and regional SOEs have a clear choice. They can follow the guidelines explicitly and pay ―lip-service to capital stewardship, resulting in minimal change and meeting the many sceptics' expectations. Alternatively, they can defeat complacency, avoid the pitfalls, promote accountability, and welcome a value mindset. My fantastic portrait of the future depends on a few Chief Executives volunteering to pilot China forward by presenting powerful examples for the rest to follow. 


http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001031898/en 

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