2010年3月17日

如何叩击中国市场大门 Drive for Chinese inroads spurs unlikely energy partnerships

中海油(Cnooc)与阿根廷的Bridas合作有一个耐人寻味的意外结果——它令这家中国公司成为BP(英国石油)的合作伙伴。

中海油和BP都将持有Pan American Energy的股份——目前BP和Bridas分别持有这家阿根廷合资企业60%和40%的股份。

这是导致西方企业与中国国有石油集团开展合作的最新交易。

荷兰皇家壳牌(Royal Dutch Shell)与中石油(PetroChina)联手竞购澳大利亚Arrow Energy天然气公司;预计法国的道达尔(Total)将与中海油合作开发英国图洛石油公司(Tullow Oil)在乌干达的资产;BP已经与中国石油天然气集团公司(CNPC)建立了合作关系,以共同开发伊拉克庞大的鲁迈拉(Rumaila)油田。

每宗交易的背景都有所不同。例如,在技术上简单但存在政治和安全风险的伊拉克,与中国合作为BP带来了重要优势。IHS Global Insight的塞缪尔•西斯扎克(Samuel Ciszuk)表示,CNPC带来政治影响力(因为它是国有企业),以及“廉价的技术熟练工人和在低利润率项目的投资意愿”。

然而,尽管这些合作的动机各有不同,但背后往往有一个共同的抱负:西方企业希望构建各自与中方的关系,以确保进一步进入中国市场。

BP、壳牌(Shell)和道达尔等大型国际石油集团——更不用提美国的埃克森美孚(ExxonMobil)和雪佛龙(Chevron)——面临着一个根本问题:它们的核心市场正接近成熟。

发达国家支持的智库——国际能源机构(IEA)估计,从现在到2030年,即使没有任何新政策措施鼓励提高能效或采用生物燃料,美国的石油需求平均每年也将下降0.7%。

在欧洲富裕国家,石油需求预计每年下降0.4%;日本则预计每年下降1.8%。

与此同时,国际能源机构的最新石油需求月度数据突显了中国市场的活力。数据显示,1月份中国的表观需求“令人吃惊地”增长28%,这推动美国原油价格在上周五一度升至每桶82美元上方。国际能源机构预计,如果政策不变的话,中国石油消费将每年平均增长3.3%。

面对上述前景,西方企业的选择不多。它们正在打造生产和交付天然气的业务部门,因为发达国家对天然气的需求仍可能增长。

它们可以专注于业务“上游”的勘探和开采部分——这已经是规模最大、最有利可图的部分,并争取成为中国和其它新兴经济体炼油厂和经销商的供应商。然而,逾一百年来,它们的业务模式一直建立在一体化的基础之上:控制整个价值链——从寻找石油,到向消费者交付成品油。

如果这些企业脱离一体化模式,就会使自己更加依赖石油和天然气价格,从而承担盈利波动上升的风险。

鉴于中国本身已经拥有了CNPC/中国石油、中石化(Sinopec)和中海油这三家成功而雄心勃勃的大型石油集团,西方企业的主要问题在于,它们要找出自己有什么恰好是中国需要的。

其中一个可能是技术,比如开发中国“非常规”天然气储藏所需的技术,这些项目需要特殊技术才能具有商业可行性。另一个可能是参与石油和天然气开采。

作为交换,中国企业希望增加自身的石油和天然气储量;这是西方企业仍可提供的资产。如果西方企业要想更多地进入中国,或许只能以让中国企业参与未来开采作为交换。

译者/君悦


http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001031766


CNOOC's tie-up with Bridas of Argentina has an intriguing side-effect – it makes the Chinese group a partner of BP of the UK.

They will both have stakes in Pan American Energy, the Argentinian joint venture owned 60/40 by BP and Bridas.

The deal is the latest to set western companies working alongside China's state-controlled oil groups.

Royal Dutch Shell has teamed up with PetroChina for a joint bid for Arrow Energy, the Australian gas company; Total of France is expected to work with CNOOC to develop Tullow Oil's assets in Uganda; and BP has formed a partnership with China National Petroleum Corp to develop the giant Rumaila oil field in Iraq.

The circumstances of each deal are different. In Iraq, for example, where the projects are technically straightforward but have political and security risks, having a Chinese partner provides important benefits to BP. Samuel Ciszuk of IHS Global Insight says CNPC brings political clout because it is state owned, as well as a “skilled, cheap workforce and a willingness to invest in a low-margin project”.

Yet while these partnerships have a variety of motives, there is often a common ambition behind them – western companies hope to build on their respective relationships to secure greater access to the Chinese market.

The big international oil groups such as BP, Shell, Total, not to mention ExxonMobil and Chevron of the US, face a fundamental problem: their core markets are reaching maturity.

The International Energy Agency, the think-tank backed by developed countries, estimates that even without any new policy measures to raise fuel efficiency or encourage biofuels, US oil demand will fall by an average of 0.7 per cent per year between now and 2030.

In the rich countries of Europe, the expected decline is 0.4 per cent per year; in Japan it is 1.8 per cent per year.

Meanwhile, the latest IEA figures for monthly oil demand are a sharp reminder of the vigour of the Chinese market, showing an “astonishing” 28 per cent increase in apparent demand in January, pushing the US crude price over $82 per barrel for a time last Friday. The IEA expects China's oil consumption to grow by an annual average of 3.3 per cent per year, assuming unchanged policies.

Faced by that outlook, western companies have few options. They are building up their businesses producing and delivering natural gas, for which developed country demand is still likely to grow.

They could concentrate on the “upstream” exploration and production side of their operations, already the largest and most profitable, and increasingly operate as suppliers to refiners and distributors in China and other emerging economies. However, their business model has for more than a century been based on integration: controlling the whole of the value chain from finding the oil to delivering the refined fuel to consumers.

Moving away from that risks exposing them to greater volatility in their earnings by making them even more dependent on the prices of oil and gas.

The big problem for western companies is working out what they have that China needs, given that it already has three successful and ambitious large oil groups of its own, in CNPC/PetroChina, Sinopec and CNOOC.

One possibility is technology, such as the skills to exploit China's reserves of “unconventional” gas, which needs special techniques to be commercially viable. Another is access to oil and gas production.

The Chinese companies, in return, want to build up their oil and gas reserves; assets western companies can still offer. If western companies are to get more access to China, it is likely to be only in return for access to future production for the Chinese.


http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001031766/en

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